Charles Gutzlaff (1803-1851) and the First Opium War*

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"But how is it possible to do much with but one interpreter? All that one man can do, more than any other, perhaps, could do, Gutzlaff does."[1]

I.

Language barrier has long been a major obstacle faced by the Westerners when they come to China for trading and various other purposes. For the British, as early as January 1617, King James I had wanted to send a letter to the Chinese Emperor. But he could not find anyone to translate it into Chinese, as he believed that any Chinese commissioned to do so would be punished by death.[2] The first trading voyage to China, led by Captain John Weddell (1583-1642) in 1673, ended in hostilities, due largely to the duplicity of the Chinese interpreter, who purposefully mistranslated the order from the Chinese authorities to leave into a permission to trade in order to gain profits from it.[3] Then when the British decided to send an official embassy to China in 1782, they had to search the entire European continent for translators/interpreters, ultimately finding two Chinese who in fact did not know English and could only translate Latin. The lack of competent translators/interpreters was regarded as a major cause of failure of the embassy even at that time.[4] It goes without saying that effective communication constituted a great headache for the Supercargoes in the daily operation of the East India Company in Canton (Guangzhou) throughout the 18th century and in the first half of the 19th century. There are many complaints logged in the official records of the company against the Chinese linguists (*tongshi*) for failing to translate their documents accurately to the authorities.[5] When it came to major hostilities like the Opium War, the demand for

translators/interpreters was more acute than ever. Although efforts had been made in the Company to teach Chinese to their officers[6] and a number of translators had actually been trained up, it was suggested during the War that at least five times the number of the interpreters available then were needed for the British to handle a war of this magnitude.[7] In the fields, there were frequent desperate cries for interpreters.[8]

The present paper studies the activities of a major translator/ interpreter in the British camp, Karl Friederich Gützlaff, anglicized as Charles Gutzlaff (1803-1851) during the First Opium War. It attempts to analyze the different roles he played and the contributions he made. It aims at providing a better understanding of this historical event of long-term consequence, as much as the social and cultural position of translators/interpreters during this early stage of encounters between Imperial China and Great Britain.

II.

Charles Gutzlaff was well-qualified, probably better than anyone else, to be the leading translator of the British camp during the First Opium War. Before his arrival in China in 1831, he had spent a few years in South-east Asia, first in Java and then in Siam (Thailand), where he learned Fujianese, a dialect not only commonly used among the Chinese in South-east Asia and the Fujian Province in the south-east, but also all along the coast of China where Fujianese merchants were actively conducting trade at that time. Greatly talented in language learning, Gutzlaff also mastered the Guanhua, mandarin, the official common Chinese language, very well, and learned a few other Chinese dialects. For this, he was described as "a rare bird" in Canton.[9] One special feature noted by his contemporaries was that in his conversations with the Chinese, Gutzlaff frequently made references to the Chinese classics, especially when he was engaged in arguments. For instance, to convince the people that Westerners had no ill-feeling towards the Chinese, he would quote Confucius's saying "All within the Four Seas are brothers"; when he was rudely treated by the Mandarins, he would readily remind them of what was said

in the *Lunyu* (Analect), "Isn't it great happiness when a friend from afar visit you?" And the most often quoted case was his reference to Su Dongpo's (1037-1101) differentiation between the barbarians and the Chinese to protest against the Chinese use of the term *E* (*Yi*, barbarians) in reference to the Westerners.[10] As observed by Hugh Hamilton Lindsay (1802-1881), Secretary of the East India Company who was confirmed by Robert Morrison to be quite fluent in both written and spoken Chinese,[11] and who had hired Gutzlaff as interpreter for a voyage along the coast of China in 1832, "the power which this gives any person over the minds of the Chinese, who are peculiarly susceptible to reasonable argument, is extraordinary."[12] This has not been reported on other translators/interpreters and Chinese experts of his time. In less than two years after his arrival in China, he could speak very good Chinese, to a point that on many occasions, he was taken as an ethnic Chinese in disguise by people who had spoken with him, including the Chinese officials, the Mandarins, who supposedly had experience in handling the foreigners.[13] Even Emperor Daoguang (1782-1850, r. 1820-1850) was misinformed during the War that Gutzlaff was a *hanjian* (Chinese traitor) assisting the foreign devils and demanded his arrest.[14] There was also a saying that Gutzlaff "was of Chinese origin, born at the illicit intercourse between a Chinese in Guangdong and a foreign woman."[15] Another version was that he was born and grew up in Macao.[16] Even for those who knew that Gutzlaff was a "stranger", they would still conclude that he was "a true Chinese".[17] This could be attributed, apart from his high proficiency in the Chinese language, to his deliberate identification with the Chinese race and culture. In 1831, he claimed that he had been naturalized as a Chinese for a long time:

> Long before leaving Siam I became a naturalized subject of the Celestial Empire, by adoption into the clan or family of Kwo [Guo], from the Tung-an district in Fuhkeen [Fujian]. I took, also, the name Shih-lee [Shilie], - wore, occasionally, the Chinese dress, - and was recognized (by those among whom I lived) as a member of the great nation.[18]

In many places, he talked about how he was kindly treated by "people of my [his] clan".[19] Further, according to some contemporary

descriptions, even from Westerners, Gutzlaff actually looked like a Chinese. William Hunter (1812-1891), who felt a kind of "fellow-feeling" with Gutzlaff because both had studied at Malacca, stated clearly that Gutzlaff "resembled a Chinese very much, while *they* declared him to be a 'son of Han in disguise'!"[20] But the most definite assertion comes from Dr. Edward Hodges Cree, naval surgeon on board a troop-ship *Rattlesnake* during the war:

> He [Gutzlaff] looks much like a Chinaman, although he is a Prussian missionary. He has been in China many years and has travelled where no other European could venture, he knows the language and the people so intimately. When he ventures into the country and with a false tail and dressed as a Chinaman, he could not be detected.[21]

Another strong point of Gutzlaff's that could not be found in other translators/interpreters at that time was his ability to mingle with the general people. As a missionary, he had made special efforts in getting close to and acquainted with people of all walks of life so as to be able to preach to the largest population possible. In his own recollection of his life in Siam, he mentioned how he had made friends with the poorest people and handled with ease the "wicked", including gamblers, opium smokers, and smugglers. The experience he gained put him in an advantageous position as an interpreter. Again, quoting Lindsay's report on the 1832 voyage, "having lived so long among the lower class of the Fokien people", Gutzlaff had "obtained a knowledge of their peculiarities, both of thought and language, which no study of books can convey".[22] We shall shortly see how Gutzlaff was able to use this "expertise" to establish good relations with and obtain important military information from the masses during the Opium War.

But the real extraordinary credentials of Gutzlaff that made him famous among the Westerners and sought after as interpreter in Macao and Guangzhou even shortly after his arrival in China was his visit to the Chinese coastal cities at a time when it was strictly forbidden for foreigners to do so. After staying in Siam for about three years, Gutzlaff decided to go to China and in a Chinese trading boat, he set off from Bangkok in June 1831. Unlike all

Westerners who would go to and stay in Canton, the only port opened to foreign trade, he sailed along the coast and visited many ports and cities, including Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai. He went as far north as the Liaodong Peninsular and even visited Korea. He spent three weeks in Tianjian, hoping to find a chance to visit the capital, a two-day journey away. Upon returning to Macao, he was immediately greeted by Robert Morrison, whom he had met in London to trigger off his idea of preaching in the Orient.[23] Apparently, Morrison was impressed by his achievements, as he soon recommended him to act as an interpreter for the East India Company for a voyage to explore trading possibilities in places other than Canton. After this second voyage of over six months, from 26 February to 5 September 1832, Gutzlaff was even more popular when he returned to the Western community in Macao. The opium trader James Innes was reported to have said that he would be willing to pay Gutzlaff $1,000 for a three-day service as interpreter.[24] Before long, Gutzlaff found himself on board opium ships as interpreter for more voyages to the coastal cities of China.

Among the dozen or so voyages he made to the Chinese coast during these few years, the second one, on board *the Amherst*, deserves greater attention here in our discussion of Gutzlaff and the Opium War. Mainland Chinese scholars have accused that the voyage was a spying activity of the British to secure military information in preparation for a war with China. To them, Gutzlaff was a conspirator working with the British in their imperialist aggression against China[25]. As evidence, they quote from Gutzlaff's own journal of the voyage, which reports briefly their inspection of some military establishments such as forts and barracks.[26]

Unfortunately, this kind of discourse is politically biased. At that time, the British government had not the slightest intention to wage a war against China.[27] They had not even sent their first Superintendent of Trade to China; and China trade was still working under the monopoly of the East India Company. It was Charles Majoribanks (1794-1833), President of the Select Committee of the Supercargoes of the Company in Canton, who, seeing that its monopoly was going to end soon, wanted to explore new options in the north. He gave clear instructions to "ascertain how far the Northern Ports of

China might be gradually opened to British Commerce; which of them was most eligible; and to what extent the disposition of the natives and the local governments would be favourable to it".[28] Thus, it was without doubt a commercial venture. Gutzlaff had the same understanding of its nature. He mentioned right at the beginning of the journal of the second voyage that the expedition was "to facilitate mercantile enterprise, and to acquire information respecting those ports where commerce might be established".[29] It is true that both Lindsay and Gutzlaff recorded a dismantled fort here and there, some half-wrecked war junks lying idly, some rusty guns and lethargic soldiers, etc. If this can be regarded as military information at all, it was far too general and sketchy to be of any use for military actions. Some articles published openly in the *Chinese Repository* gave more detailed and concrete reports on the military establishments of China;[30] and as we shall see, when hostilities eventually broke out, there were other means for the British to collect information. But of course, the experience of travelling to this part of China was an invaluable asset for Gutzlaff, and even for Rees, Captain of *the Amherst*, when war actually broke out. Elliot once mentioned that because Rees had travelled to this region, he was the best navigator and also he knew the sea routes to the various ports along the coast very well.[31] Nevertheless, it should be prudent to point out that Majoribanks at that point was stepping down as President of the Select Committee and he gave the instruction of the voyage without the approval of Court of Directors of the Company in London. As reported by John F. Davis (1795-1890), who was appointed President of the Company shortly after the expedition, it "was, upon the whole, condemned by the court",[32] and over a year later, when Majoribanks wrote to the Board of Control to comment on Sino-British relations, he still expressed regrets that the voyage in 1832 was disapproved.[33] But this is in fact not important at all, because before long, the monopoly of East India Company was terminated. The British government took over the administration of trade by appointing the first Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China, Lord William John Napier (1786-1834) in 1834. From then on, the East India Company gradually disappeared from the China scene, and they played no part at all in the Opium War more than half a decade after.

Unfortunately, the appointment of an official Superintendent did not improve the situation but compounded the problems. The so-called "Napier Fizzle" ended in disaster, if not tragedy.[34] There was serious disruption and even suspension of trade, and in less than a year, Napier died an unhappy soul in Macao, after being forced to withdraw from Guangzhou. In his communication with the Chinese, he was at first able to secure the service of the best English/Chinese translator available at that time, Robert Morrison, who helped to translate his notice to the Viceroy of Guangdong announcing his arrival. But the stressful and tiring back-and-forth negotiations between Napier and the Chinese was too demanding for the ageing and ailing Morrison. Within a few days, he died at an age of fifty-one. Napier immediately appointed his "outstanding offspring",[35] John Robert Morrison (1814-1843), to succeed him as the Chinese Secretary and Interpreter. Thus, famous and well qualified as he was, Gutzlaff was not involved in the "Napier Fizzle." However, he was once mentioned by Lord Napier when the latter accounted for the appointment of John Robert Morrison:

> I have appointed his [Robert Morrison's] son, who is an adept in the Mandarin tongue … Gutslaff [Gutzlaff] is absent on the coast, converting and healing, while Jardine is trading.[36]

John Morrison was probably not Napier's first choice, rather Gutzlaff was. Had he not been engaging himself with the opium dealings and making one trip after another, he might have been appointed as Chinese Secretary and Interpreter at that time.

However, as there had constantly been a shortage of hands for translating and interpreting services, the British were eager to enlist Gutzlaff to their camp. The successor of Lord Napier, John Davis, himself a Chinese expert, was fast to recruit Gutzlaff officially to the service of the British government. According to the obituary that appeared in the *Chinese Repository* in 1851, Gutzlaff was appointed Joint Chinese Secretary in February 1835, with an annual salary of £800.[37] But this piece of information was faulty, as Gutzlaff was actually appointed in December 1834.[38] Gutzlaff allegedly has said that his accepting the appointment was "a matter of necessity",[39] meaning that it was for the money that he took up the job.

In January 1835, we saw Gutzlaff perform his first duty as the deputy Chinese Secretary of the British Superintendent of Trade. He negotiated with the Chinese authorities to secure the release of twelve British sailors of the *Argyle* who were detained by some local residents off the coast of Macao in demand of a ransom. He was responsible for translating the memorandum signed by the three Superintendents appealing to the Chinese authorities to intervene. He also accompanied Charles Elliot to present the memorandum to the Governor of Guangdong. But they were assaulted by the Chinese soldiers, until the appearance of the Mandarins;[40] and the Englishmen were released after a few days.

But this was the only major incident handled by Gutzlaff as a British officer before the Opium War broke out. For three to four years, Davis and his successor Sir George Best Robinson (1797-1855) adopted "The Quiescent Policy",[41] keeping interactions with the Chinese authorities to a minimum. Gutzlaff spent most of the time, apart from those spent on his evangelistic work, on collecting information about China for the Superintendents of Trade to report to Britain. He was so free at that time that he could join the American trader Charles King to a voyage to Japan in 1837.[42] Then in 1838, he published the highly controversial *China Opened*.[43] His critics queried not only the central argument – if China was actually opened, but also the sources of the contents of book. Apart from criticizing that the work was "hastily written and carelessly revised", evincing "a great lack of research and judgment", the Editors of the *Chinese Repository* openly accused Gutzlaff of "unblushing plagiarisms", that he had adopted extensively from articles published in the *Chinese Repository* and others' works without proper acknowledgment. The editors were very direct in saying that "for not only in this chapter [Chapter Four], but in various other parts of the book, paragraphs occur as original which are surprisingly like some we have seen in other works, both in sense and sound". [44] Another article in the *Chinese Repository* pointed out that most of the contents of the book came from the *Blue Book*, which was reported by the Superintendents of Trade to the Parliament.[45] Interestingly, more than a decade later, in Gutzlaff's obituary, the editors of the same journal "repackaged" the plagiarism issue by stating that the book consisted of a series of papers Gutzlaff

wrote "at the order of Sir George Robinson on various topics relating to China for the information of the British Government".[46] In any case, the remark from Arthur Waley (1899-1966) that "none of his books ever give any sort of references, and it is often impossible to tell whether he is using some relatively good source, repeating gossip or merely inventing" should be seen as the most lenient.[47] Little wonder that the editors of the *Chinese Repository* concluded that "we dismiss *China Opened*".[48]

III.

By the end of 1838, Emperor Daoguang, after rounds of consultation with his ministers, eventually decided to put a complete ban on opium. On 31 December 1838, he appointed Lin Zexu (1785-1850) as Imperial Commissioner to Guangzhou to wipe out the "foreign mud". The confiscation of over 20,000 chests of opium and the order for all foreign traders to sign a bond not to carry opium to China, the violation of which would mean death penalty, were too much for the British. Hostilities broke out upon the arrival of British expedition forces from England and India. The infamous Opium War ended in 1842 with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. From the very beginning of the war, Charles Gutzlaff played various active roles. In this section, we will see what exactly he has done during the war.

Firstly, before the war, Gutzlaff had once advised the British government to employ force to break open the door of China. In an essay secretly commissioned by the Foreign Office on the relations between Britain and China in 1835, Gutzlaff proposed to seize one of the Chusan islands and use it as a base to blockade China's coastal trade. As this would pose a threat to "the economic vitality of six or eight maritime cities", the Chinese would be forced to negotiate a more agreeable trading relationship.[49] A historian relates this to the belligerent attitude of the editors of the *Chinese Repository*, of which Gutzlaff was a regular contributor. "By presenting China as a weak and wicked empire, the editors believed that they [the British and American general public] made the decision to wage war more likely."[50] However, we have seen that the relations between Gutzlaff and the editors of the *Chinese Repository* were not cordial.[51] It is

doubtful if they would work together on this. Further, Gutzlaff has not published any articles openly in the *Chinese Repository* in advocacy of a British war against China. Thus we would rather say he influenced not the editors of the *Chinese Repository* but Hamilton Lindsay, who had, as we have seen, made the voyage to the Chinese coast with Gutzlaff several years before. A year later, Lindsay wrote an open letter to Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, presenting exactly this same idea of using a small force to blockade the Chinese coast.[52]

Interestingly, a French priest reported in a letter written on 20 April 1939, that "by the spring of 1839 Commissioner Lin was reported determined to have his [Gutzlaff's] head".[53] This is hard to believe, because Lin Zexu had only arrived at Canton on 10 March and after interrogating Hong merchants, linguists, and compradors, he gave his first order to surrender the opium on 18 March. The edicts were translated by John Robert Morrison and Robert Thom; the latter was also responsible for reading aloud Lin's edict to the foreign merchants.[54] Gutzlaff was not much involved. More significantly, we cannot find any record of such an order from Lin in either Chinese or English sources. Lin mentioned some names, the ringleaders of the illicit opium trade, such as Dent, Jardine, and Matheson in his memorials to the Emperor and the correspondence with the Hong merchants. He even commanded Dent to go into the city to be questioned.[55] But he had not the slightest intention to take their lives; and subsequent development saw that Lin only wanted to deport them and forbid them from coming back to China again.[56] It does not sound logical that he would want the head of an interpreter at that time. In fact, Lin Zexu first mentioned the name of Gutzlaff in a memorial to the Emperor as late as 16 August 1840, after war had already broken out and the British had occupied Dinghai, putting Gutzlaff as the local magistrate. In the memorial, Lin was unclear about the identity of Gutzlaff. He just reported that he heard of someone called Gutzlaff in Dinghai, but he added that this had to be confirmed.[57] Thus, it was extremely unlikely that Lin wanted to have the head of Gutzlaff in approximately a month after his arrival in Canton.[58]

Gutzlaff was, however, directly involved in the first fighting of the Opium War, the so-called Battle of Kowloon.[59] In August 1839, the British, who had left Canton after surrendering the opium and taken refuge in Macao, had to evacuate because of a homicide case of a Chinese Lin Weixi that involved over 30 seamen from two British ships. Captain Elliot (1807-1875), Chief Superintendent of Trade since June 1836, brought the English community of almost 7,000 to live on vessels anchored off the waters of Hong Kong. Running out of food and other provisions, Elliot, accompanied by Gutzlaff, went in person to procure supplies on 4 September. After prolonged delays from the junior Chinese officers on the ground that they needed to seek instructions from their senior, and failing to buy from the villagers, Elliot lost control and ordered open fire on the Chinese war-junks. Though fire exchanges were relatively brief, the skirmish was the first open hostilities since the arrival of Commissioner Lin. Apparently, Elliot regretted the use of force to procure provisions. In his report to Lord Palmerston, he admitted that it was injudicious to use a man-of-war for the destruction of three small junks.[60] Most importantly, he did not want his action to be interpreted as a declaration of war. Thus on the following day he sent a notice in Chinese to the Chinese camp, described by one study of Elliot as "a soothing proclamation",[61] explaining that he desired to have peace with the Chinese.[62] This Chinese letter was prepared by Gutzlaff, who also wrote an account of the incident, published together with the report of Elliot in the *Chinese Repository* about a year later.[63]

When war actually broke out, Gutzlaff was even more engaged and busier. As there were only a few people who were qualified to translate/interpret,[64] the British had to make the best arrangement on how to deploy them. According to one source, they could only afford to assign one interpreter to one station in the North.[65] Expectedly, British interpreters/translators during the Opium War had to handle everything that involved the Chinese language. Among them, the most important one would be the official exchanges, in particular, the negotiations between the two camps. On the British side, the Chief Superintendent of Trade, a position first held by Elliot and subsequently by Henry Pottinger, was

responsible for negotiating with the Chinese and signing all official documents to the Chinese. Interpreting for such negotiations and translating these documents were mainly the work of Robert John Morrison, the Chinese Secretary and Interpreter for the Superintendent of Trade. As "joint interpreter," Gutzlaff was generally not responsible for translating the official exchanges, but occasionally he represented the British and wrote letters to the Chinese directly in Chinese.[66] Yet in most cases, he was more of a "field interpreter". He first interpreted for General Bremer (James John Gordon Bremer, 1786-1850) and Colonel George Burrell,[67] and then later spent most of the time serving Major-General Sir Hugh Gough (1779-1869), who arrived at the scene on 2 March 1841.

While Gutzlaff was not much involved in the translation of official dispatches between the two countries, he nevertheless translated quite a number of official documents from China, for the purpose of gathering military intelligence. For a long time, Westerners in China had been able to secure information on China through the *Peking Gazette* (*Jingbao*), a kind of publication published with the permission of the Beijing provincial government to disseminate information about the daily events in the capital. As Morrison reported, there were two forms of the gazette, one mainly for the highest officers and the other for the junior officers, sold to the public at a high price. As they were originally designed entirely for the officers of the government, they often contained important information from the Central government, including edicts from the emperor and petitions from senior ministers. In this way, "the whole world" would be "made acquainted in some degree with the avowed feelings, wishes, and desires of the great emperor and his advisors".[68] For the British, Robert Morrison first mentioned the *Peking Gazette* in his diary on 25 July 1813,[69] and then in about two years' time, East India Company published *Translations from the Original Chinese, with Notes*, which was wholly translated from the *Peking Gazette*.[70] Since then, translations from *Peking Gazette* appeared regularly in the *Chinese Repository*, *Canton Register*, and *Canton Press*. During the War, much valuable information was obtained from *Peking Gazette*, including deployment and

movement of armies. One example is a lengthy article published in *The Chinese Repository* entitled "Summary of Information Collected from Official Documents Regarding the Views and Proceedings of the Emperor and the Officers of His Government, Since the Evacuation of Ningpo." This contained sensitive and confidential intelligence of Chinese military actions and troop deployment.[71] While most of the *Peking Gazette* was translated by John Morrison, we also have concrete evidence that Gutzlaff had also been involved in translating the *Peking Gazette*. A field officer recorded in his recollection that in a breakfast, he heard the translation by Gutzlaff of a letter to the Emperor from Yijing: "This gentleman promises to send the emperor the heads of Pottinger, Gough, and Parker, and professes his intention of eating their bodies while still alive, and afterwards sleeping in their skins."[72] It was also reported that on one occasion, Gutzlaff showed people "a curious collection of translations of Chinese State papers" on the opium problem in China.[73]

Apart from translating this kind of official Chinese documents to secure intelligence, Charles Gutzlaff had other more daring means to get information, one that John Morrison would not have done well: he simply went out bribing informants.[74] We have earlier pointed out that Gutzlaff could mix well with people from all walks of life, and in particular, the lower class. Dated back to 1832, during his second voyage along the China coast, he had already been able to acquire information from people he had never met before. Over a dozen letters written to Lindsay and Gutzlaff from different people are now available, and they provided information of all sorts, including places that they could go to sell their goods, notices from the local authorities on their visits, etc. A certain *juren* (provincial graduate) even wrote them three letters, suggesting to supply a maritime chart of an inner river in Fujian, in addition to a piece of information that cannons would be placed on a hilltop to blast off their ship.[75] Of course, these letters often asked for money; and we are not sure if Lindsay and Gutzlaff had actually given out any. But many of the letters also gratefully mentioned receiving religious tracts as well as medical treatments from Gutzlaff.[76] Without doubt, Gutzlaff was very experienced in getting assistance from the general people for securing information.

With this special ability, Gutzlaff made important contributions in securing military intelligence for the British. Arthur Waley, in his famous work *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*, repeatedly called him "director of intelligence" and information officer.[77] These were by no means official titles or appointments, but they denoted unmistakably the role played by Gutzlaff in intelligence gathering. John F. Davis, who was once Superintendent of Trade and took an active leadership role in the war, put down in his recollection that "Dr. Gutzlaff obtained from time to time pretty accurate information of the designs of the enemy. Many native Chinese proved very useful in this respect."[78] In official Chinese records, there were a number of statements made by the informants who had been in the service of Gutzlaff.[79] In fact, it was reported that quite a large number of people worked for Gutzlaff and every day, they went to his office to make reports. They were from diversified backgrounds and most were low characters in financial difficulties. Some would get from Gutzlaff a dollar or two for every piece of information,[80] while some were paid on a daily or even monthly basis. They provided useful military information such as troop deployment, plans of military movements, and names of the rich people out of whom money could be squeezed.[81] They also acted as guides to rob off pawnshops and other shops, and to arrest people who were against the British. Some of them, the literate ones, might help with writing proclamations for Gutzlaff for posting in the town.[82] He even organized them into a police force, known among the Chinese as the "Red Hair Village Guards" (*Hongmao xiangyong*).[83]

One important question to ask is: how effective was this intelligence network that Gutzlaff built up with his Chinese spies? We have just seen how Davis confirmed that Gutzlaff was able to get pretty accurate information from time to time. However, these Chinese informants were really shaky characters and they were not always reliable. After all, they worked only for money and they were under serious risk for being arrested as *hanjian*. There were in fact confessions from informants that they had made up stories so as to get rewards from Gutzlaff. Would they really be loyal and honest to the British?

We may probably go into some details on one particular case which shows that there were flaws in Gutzlaff's intelligence system, the counter-attack by the Chinese on 10 March 1842 at Ningbo, which was captured by the British in October 1841. According to one English account, towards the end of February, Gutzlaff received intelligence from his local informants that the Chinese were gathering forces in preparation of the counter-attack. But he was not sure when the attack would take place, and for the time being, he was satisfied that there was no imminent danger. Then on 8 March, he was warned by the informants that the attack would start on the following day, "but as the cry of the 'wolf' had been more than once raised, the warning was disregarded."[84] It was only when Gutzlaff saw that many inhabitants were quitting the city that he became anxious. The author of the accounts gave great credits to Gutzlaff:

> [T]he great experience of the reverend gentleman, and his intimate acquaintance with their peculiar habits and notions, enabled him to penetrate the mystery, and obtain information sufficient to strength and confirm his suspicions of the coming storm.[85]

A lieutenant stationed in the city of Ningbo then also reported that by March, they heard "every day rumours of armies collecting, and orders being given for our utter extermination." But "very little credit was given to these reports", because they did not believe that the Chinese would be able to launch a counter-attack. However, he unambiguously stated that "on the evening of the 10th of March, Mr. Gutzlaff positively asserted, that we should be attacked, that same night." Yet, when the Chinese actually attacked after midnight, the British were somewhat caught unprepared, because "even after this assurance, none of the guards were reinforced, nor were any preparations made to receive the enemy".[86] One account gave the following explanation:

> It is said, however, that he [Gutzlaff] did not express himself to the military authorities in a manner sufficiently marked to lead them to suppose that he himself attached credence to the report.[87]

Obviously, the fundamental issue was: even Gutzlaff did not have great faith in the informants, and that is why the intelligence from them was taken as "cry of the wolf", not "attached credence". Yet, if we look at the Chinese source, the entire plan of the campaign had been leaked out, down to such details as the day and hour of the attack. In fact, it was a kind of open secret, because notices had actually been posted to warn the inhabitants of the coming attacks, urging them to leave.[88]

Despite this, Gutzlaff was an able advisor for the British expedition forces. It has been reported that he played a central role in the expedition that took Zhoushan in July 1840, a port that he had visited many times during his early voyages.[89] The attack on Shanghai was launched at his advice,[90] he also took the lead when they captured and occupied Zhenjiang.[91] But the crucial move of the British was to head for Nanking (Nanjing) after they had captured Hangzhou. This ultimately brought the pleading for peace from the Chinese, and the negotiation and signing of the Treaty of Nanking. For this strategic move, we saw in a report from a British Lieutenant that it was John Morrison who obtained through "some of his employees" "a native plan", which enabled the British to draw up an assault plan.[92] Liang Tingnan (1796-1861), in his famous book *Yifen wenji* (*Accounts on the Barbarians*), even went one step further to assert that the British originally planned to move north to attack Tianjin after they had taken Hangzhou. It was on the advice of John Morrison that they decided to target Nanjing instead, because Morrison saw Nanjing's strategic position of mastering control over all inland water routes.[93] But what they were unaware was before this, Gutzlaff had written a position paper to General Hugh Gough, recommending that the British bypass Hangzhou and other cities but take Nanjing. This would cut China into two halves and block shipping on the Grand Canal, bringing a standstill to the transport of rice and salt to the Capital.[94] As one study on Gutzlaff suggests, it is not possible to determine the influence of this position paper on General Gough. "But Gough did read the paper and comment favourably on it. The strategy they followed coincided closely with that recommended by Gutzlaff."[95]

However, following the advice of Gutzlaff and other translators/interpreters did not always get the most desirable results. One piece of ill advice from them cost the lives of over 450 men. In July 1840, the British occupied Dinghai and Zhoushan with very little resistance. At the advice of the interpreters, who urged not to coerce the local civilians, the plenipotentiaries allowed the inhabitants to leave the city with all their belongings, and at the same time ordered the British soldiers to stay in tents set up in the paddy fields.[96] This had serious consequence—the British soldiers had to shoulder all the tough and fatiguing work, with no fresh provisions, leaving them too weak to fight diarrhoea and malaria under the intense heat of a south China summer. By the end of the year, 448 were dead out of the 3,000 men garrison.[97] This was labelled as the "Chusan tragedy" by one historian, who did not hesitate to point an accusing figure at Gutzlaff for giving such "unfortunate advice" to the plenipotentiaries.[98]

But nevertheless, with the overwhelming military superiority, it was easy for the British to conquer city after city. However it would be a totally different thing to govern these places, which were inhabited by a huge number of people who spoke a different language. To help rule the Chinese, Gutzlaff was appointed as magistrate in various cities occupied by the British: Dinghai (July 1840-Feb 1841), Ningbo (Oct 1841-May 1842), Zhenjiang (1842). By all means, his proficiency in Chinese was a major factor that made him a capable magistrate. But it has to be pointed out that other translators like John Morrison did not act as magistrates. A field officer made the following observation:

> The want of interpreters is very much felt. The scattered state of the force limits one to each station of the north, and gives them great authority; and they are men quite unused to command. For aught we can tell, many of their proceedings may be highly impolitic as regards the speedy success of the expedition.[99]

Obviously, Gutzlaff was not among the "impolitic", because the same officer commended that "he is very clever, and a pleasant companion", "truly an example that knowledge is power".[100]

From what we can see, Gutzlaff was someone who could make commands. In fact, he was described by one historian as "the undisputed king of the place", when he was magistrate at Ningbo.[101] He was even in charge of a police force. Upon getting some information about a group of robbers, he ordered their arrest with very detailed instructions.[102] Also in Ningbo, where the Chinese resorted to kidnapping British soldiers, Gutzlaff advised a stern and merciless method: hang half a dozen of them, burn their village, and "this example would give a check to kidnapping".[103] At his advice, Pottinger actually hanged two men on a tree in a village where they were seized for attempting to kidnap a British soldier; and with this, "there established a considerable check upon their operations".[104]

Interestingly, according to some records, Gutzlaff seemed to have done a decent job as local magistrates, even from the Chinese side. One thing he did, apparently quite well, was to pacify and calm the local people. According to one study, people of Chusan welcomed the return of the British, after a six-month Chinese reoccupation.[105] Davis reported that "they (inhabitants of Chusan) received our soldiers as old acquaintances, and opened their shops under their protection".[106] Likewise, William A. P. Martin (1827-1916) had personal experience in meeting the people of Ningbo in the 1850s, whom he found were very friendly and welcoming to the Westerners, because they said they had "experienced kind treatment at the hands of the British during the war". They were astonished at the arrival of the "Red barbarians", that they were "protected instead of pillaged". They even mentioned Gutzlaff to him frequently:

> They were never tired of telling how Dr. Gutzlaff, formerly a missionary at Hong Kong, had been installed in the yamen of the prefect, and how careful he was to see justice done, so that if a soldier bagged a fowl it had to be brought back or paid for.[107]

There is no exaggeration, as we see a poem, or a song, written by a local poet of Ningbo saying something similar. To quote a few lines:

> Up to his high dias
> Daddy Kuo comes.
> If you are in trouble
> He'll get things straight,
> If you have been wronged
> He'll come to the rescue,
> If you have got into difficulties
> He'll arrange things for you.
> …
> Big troubles about a bull,
> Small trouble about a chicken –
> He'll settle the case with a pen
> That seems to have wings!
> And sooner will the Southern Hills move
> Than this decision be altered.[108]

Other lines such as "Yet never has the business of the court been handled so swiftly as by Daddy Kuo", "The man who made the complaint, / Goes home delighted, trusses a pair of fowls / And sacrifices them to Heaven",[109] all portray a just and able magistrate.

However, under English pens, the picture was drastically different. The most severe criticism comes from Robert Thom, a fellow translator/interpreter who was stationed at Dinghai together with Gutzlaff:

> I have often thought – could one of the Hong merchants have seen Gutzlaff seated on the Chehëen's [the magistrate's] chair and waited upon by his blackguard Nankingmen, … they would certainly have muttered something about *hu-chia hu-wei*, the Fox borrowing the dignity of the Tiger – or as we might quote from scripture – "my house – ye have made it a den of thieves." Civil government I look upon *in the meantime* as a perfect farce – until our authority is firmly established we ought to have military law – and military law *only*.[110]

Even the field officer we have quoted earlier, who had a deep respect for Gutzlaff himself, could not help criticizing Gutzlaff's team of

policemen, that they were “a sad set of rogues”. When they were sent to search for robbers, they instantly “commenced plundering”. “Whether these men were really soldiers or not, neither Mr. Gutzlaff nor myself could ever find out,” he lamented.[111] This finds some echo in a relatively objective account from one Chinese source at that time: Gutzlaff himself would not kill or hurt others indiscriminately, he was “a villain with a moral sense” (*dao yi you dao*); but he was not able to exercise good control over his soldiers and subordinates, who plundered, raped, and committed all sorts of crimes. For this, he was unforgivable.[112] And of course, there were many other reports that Gutzlaff was actually behind all the plunders and crimes.[113]

In fact, in the eyes of the Qing leaders, all the translators/interpreters of the British camp were unforgivable. Shortly after the war had begun, a price of $30,000 was put up for the head of John Robert Morrison, which was the same as that for Charles Elliot, George Elliot, and General Gordon Bremer (1786-1850). The price would go up to $50,000 if anyone of them was captured alive.[114] Although Gutzlaff's name was not specifically mentioned, he was in danger because killing or capturing a British would also be rewarded handsomely. It was reported that there was at least one attempt on Gutzlaff's life in April 1842 when he was magistrate of Ningbo. The gunpowder in a machine was lighted when Gutzlaff passed by. But there was a signal failure and Gutzlaff was not hurt, but the drummer who followed him was slightly burnt.[115] This was reported to Emperor Daoguang, but greatly distorted. Yijing, the general, delightedly reported on 13 May that from the statement of a traitor, *hanjian*, Gutzlaff was hacked to death in Ningbo on 23 April.[116] But before long, the Emperor was utterly disappointed to hear from another report that Gutzlaff was leading a troop to attack Zhapu of the Zhejiang Province.[117]

As the war was drawing to a close and a peace negotiation was about to start, the busiest people were undoubtedly the translators/interpreters from the British camp. This is because even at the very last stage, the Chinese simply did not send in any interpreter. The person who was involved heavily in the negotiation was Zhang Xi, a retainer of the Imperial Commissioner Yilibu (I-li-pu,

1772-1843). Though he was regarded "the pre-eminent barbarian expert",[118] he did not know any English. Further, because he was not a government official, Pottinger refused to discuss with him. Instead, he assigned John Morrison to handle Zhang Xi.[119] From various accounts of the negotiation process, we can confirm that John Morrison was the one who played the leading role. He dominated the conversations and discussion. He was the one who worked out the Chinese version of the Treaty of Nanking, not to say that he represented the British government to seal the Treaty with the official seal of Henry Pottinger.[120] Clearly Gutzlaff was not heavily involved in the process, as he was referred to by Zhang Xi as the joint interpreter. In most cases, he was doing some kind of social interpreting. According to the memoirs of the contemporary people, Gutzlaff helped with interpretation actively during some friendly visits as well as the final signature ceremony, when a few Chinese officials were present.[121] Clearly, for occasions of this kind, Gutzalff would perform excellently. It was reported that at one of the meetings between Yilibu, Qi Ying, and the British plenipotentiaries, because of the brilliant interpretation provided by Gutzlaff, "the Commissioners and surrounding Mandarins seemed greatly interested".[122]

IV.

At the beginning of the paper, we have remarked that Gutzlaff was best qualified as the leading interpreter/translator of the British at that time. But for most of the time of his service to the British, he was deputy to John Morrison, who was in fact much younger and relatively less experienced. It was not until the latter's premature death in Hong Kong at the age of twenty-nine in 1843 that Gutzlaff was promoted as Chinese Secretary and Interpreter in the newly established Hong Kong colonial government. However, even though he had occupied a very senior position, he did not enjoy much popularity. A study of Gutzlaff maintains that he "was always an outsider, never a part of Hong Kong colonial society".[123] One reason for this was of course his nationality, that he was not British but of German origin. However, the greatest problem seems to have lain in his personality and the ways he handled people and issues. We have seen that he was unpopular among the Protestant missionaries

in China, for his involvement in the opium trade, his unorthodox preaching methods, as well as exaggerating claims for achievements. We have also seen how even a fellow interpreter Robert Thom made a sarcastic criticism on his magistracy in Ningbo. But nevertheless, despite all the negative comments, people who had taken part in the Opium War generally acknowledged his service and contributions as an interpreter/translator. At a time when the British were in desperate need for translators/interpreters in their military actions in China, Charles Gutzlaff, a Prussian priest whose wish to come to the East was to open China to Christianity, performed his service to the British diligently and faithfully. For this, and of course his evangelistic activities, he, together with many of those who had participated in acquiring and building the British Hong Kong colony, has gone down in history, with a street in the Central district of the Hong Kong Island named after him: Gutzlaff Street.

Notes

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[1] Anonymous, *The Last Year in China, to the Peace of Nanking: As Sketched in Letters to his Friends by a Field Officer Actively Employed in that Country, With a few Concluding Remarks on Out Past and Future Policy in China* (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1843), 144.

[2] H. B. Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), vol. 1, p. 10.

[3] The most detailed records of the Voyage can be found in Sir Richard Carnac Temple, ed., *The Travels of Peter Mundy, in Europe and Asia, 1608-1667* (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1967), Vol. III, Travels in England, India, China, Etc., 1634-1638; Part I, Travels in England, Western India, Achin, Macao, and the Canton River, 1634-1637. For an analysis of the role played by the interpreter Paulo Norette, cf., Wang Hongzhi [Lawrence Wang-chi Wong], "Tongshi yu jianmin: Mingmo zhongying humen shijianzhong de yizhi" [An Evil Subject and a Linguist: Translators in the First English Trading Voyage to China During the Late Ming], *Bianyi luncong* [Compilation and Translation Review] vol. 5 no. 1 (March 2012), 41-66.

[4] Earl H. Pritchard, "Letters from Missionaries at Peking Relating to the Macartney Embassy," *T'oung Pao*, XXXIV (1934), p. 35. For an analysis of the role played by the

translators in the Macartney Mission, cf., Wang Hongzhi, "Majiaerni shihua de fanyi wenti" [Translation in the Macartney Embassy to China], *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica] vol. 63 (March 2009), 97-145.

[5] Morse, *The Chronicles*, vol. 3, 7.

[6] Cf., Susan Reed Stifler, "The Language Students of the East India Company's Canton Factory," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* vol. 69 (1938), 46-82.

[7] S. Wells Williams, "*A Chinese Chrestomathy in the Canton Dialect*. By E. C. Bridgman," Part I, *The Chinese Repository* vol. 11 no. 4 (April 1842), 223.

[8] "Hostilities in China: Communication for the Emperor's Ministers; the Queen's Plenipotentiaries; British Forces; the White Flag; and the Occupation of Chusan," *China Repository* vol. 9 no. 4 (August 1840), p. 231. For a study of the lack of interpreters before and during the Opium War, cf. Guan Shipei [Uganda Sze-pui Kwan], "Zhengqiu yizhe zhengqiu yizhe: Yanpian zhanzheng yizhe buzu yu yingguo hanxue de qiyuan" ["The Want of Interpreters! The Want of Interpreters!"—in the Opium War and the Institutionalization of Chinese Studies in the Early 19th Century England], *Guoji hanxue* (International Sinology) no. 25 (December 2014).

[9] Jack Beeching, *The Chinese Opium Wars* (London: Hutchison & Co., 1975), 61.

[10] Xu Dishan, ed., *Dazhongji* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931), 53-54. On the question of *yi* and its translation, see Lawrence Wang-chi Wong, "Barbarians or Not Barbarians: Translating *Yi* in the Context of Sino-British Relations in the 18th and 19th Century," in Lawrence Wang-chi Wong, ed., *Towards a History of Translating: In Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Research Centre for Translation* (Hong Kong: Research Centre for Translation, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013), vol. 3, 293-388.

[11] Cf., Su Jing, *Malixun yu zhongwen yinshua chuban* [Robert Morrison and Chinese Printing and Publishing] (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng shuju, 2000), 117.

[12] H. H. Lindsay and Charles Gutzlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China, in the Ship Lord Amherst* (London: B. Fellowes, 1834), 31.

[13] *Ibid*., pp. 10, 21 & 49. This is different from other cases, for example, that of Bremer, where people had not actually met him, but just rumoured that he was Chinese by birth, kidnapped and adopted by the British when he was very small. Qi Sihe, et al., eds, *Yapian zhanzheng* [The Opium War] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1954), vol. 3, 372.

[14] The First Historical Archives of China, ed.,*Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao* [Collection of Historical Material on the Opium War] (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1992), vol. 5, 222.

[15] This is quoted from the introduction to a poem written by a Ningbo poet Xu Shidong on Gutzlaff's magistracy in Ningbo in 1841. Xu Shidong, "Lin gaotai" [At the Terrace], collected in Ah Ying, ed., *Yapian zhangzhen wenxueji* [Opium War Literature] (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1957), 24. The poem was translated into English by Arthur Waley. Cf.

Arthur Waley, *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), 230-231.

[16] *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol. 4, 134.

[17] Charles Gutzlaff, *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832, & 1833* (London: Frederick Westley & A. H. Davis, 1834), 131.

[18] Ibid., 71

[19] Ibid., 131.

[20] William Hunter, *The "Fan Kwae" at Canton Before the Treaty Days, 1825-1844* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1882), 70. But from the portrait of Gutzlaff available today, it seems quite unlikely this misconception should have been formulated. We have the following description of Gutzlaff's outlook from "an eye-witness":

As to his personal appearance, "an eye-witness", quoted by Lane Poole, speaks of the deep impression made upon him by "the short squat figure, the clothes that for shape might have been cut in a village of his native Pomerania ages ago; the broad-brimmed straw hat; the great face beneath it, with that sinister eye!" In short, a cross between parson and pirate, charlatan and genius, philanthropist and crook.

Waley, *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*, 233. See also Lane-Poole Stanley, *Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, K. C. B., G. C. M. G., Sometimes Her Majesty's Minister to China and Japan (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1894), 55.

[21] Michael Levien, ed., *Naval Surgeon: The Voyages of Dr. Edward H. Cree, Royal Navy, as Related in His Private Journals, 1837-1856* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), 61.

[22] Lindsay and Gutzlaff, *Report of Proceedings*, 31.

[23] Gutzlaff, *Journal of Three Voyages*, 22-152.

[24] Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-42* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 139-140, n 4.

[25] Gu Zhangsheng, *Cong Malixun dao Situ Leideng: Laihua xinjiao chuanjiaoshi pingzhuan* [From Robert Morrison to John Leighton Stuart: Critical Biographies of Protestant Missionaries in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985), 59; Gu Zhangsheng, *Chuangjiaoshi yu jindai zhongguo* [Missionaries and Early Modern China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1995), 30. It should be noted that Gu Zhangsheng probably was the only mainland Chinese scholars who had written extensively on Gutzlaff in the 1980s.

[26] Ibid., 31.

[27] For discussion of the British policy towards China during this period, see Glena Melancon, *Britain's China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003)

[28] "Advertisement," Lindsay and Gutzlaff, *Report of Proceedings*, n.p.

[29] Gutzlaff, *Journal of Three Voyages*, 153.

[30] For example, see A. S. Keating, "Military Skills and Power of the Chinese; Actual State of the Soldicry, Forts and Arms; Descriptions of the Forts on the River of Canton; Army and Navy of China; Modes of Warfare; Offensive and Defensive Arms, etc., etc.," *Chinese Repository* vol. 5 no. 4 (August 1836), 165-178.

[31] Captain Elliot to Viscount Palmerston, Macao, 24 June, 1840; in Ian Nish, ed., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1994), Part I, Series E, Vol. 16, 80.

[32] John Francis Davis, *The Chinese: General Description of China and Its Inhabitants* (London: Charles Knight & Co., 1840), 51.

[33] Charles Majoribanks, "Letter to the Right Hon. Charles Grant, President of the Board of Control, on the Present State of the British Intercourse with China (London: J. Hatchard & Son, 1833), 23.

[34] William Hunter, *The "Fan Kwae" at Canton Before the Treaty Days, 1825-1844*, 131. For information of the topic, see H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910-18), vol. 1, 118-144; Priscilla Napier, *Barbarian Eye: Lord Napier in China, 1834, the Prelude to Hong Kong* (London & Washington: Brassey's, 1995).

[35] Lindsay Ride and May Ride, *An East Indian Company Cemetery: Protestant Burials in Macao*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 236.

[36] Quoted from Priscilla Napier, *Barbarian Eye*, 134.

[37] The Death of Rev. Charles Gutzlaff," *Chinese Repository* vol. 20 no. 7 (July 1851), 512.

[38] Jessie G. Lutz, *Opening China: Karl F. A. Gützlaff and Sino-western Relations, 1827-1852* (Grand Rapids, Michigan & Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 90-91.

[39] Gutzlaff to Rev. Reed, Macao, 20 January 1835, quoted from Lutz, *Opening China*, 91.

[40] James B. Eames, *The English in China, Being an Account of the Intercourse and Relations between England and China from the Year 1600 to the Year 1843* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1909; London: Curzon Press, 1974 reprint), 220; Susanna Hoe and Derek Roebuck, *The Taking of Hong Kong: Charles and Clara Elliot in China Waters* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), 95.

[41] Cf., H. B. Morse, "The Quiescent Policy," *The International Relations*, vol. 1, 145-170.

[42] C. W. King and G. T. Lay, *The Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom, Exhibited in Notes of Voyages made in 1837, from Canton, in the Ship Morrison and Brig Himmaleh, under the Direction of the Owners* (New York: E. French, 1839), 2 vols.

[43] Charles Gutzlaff, *China Opened, or, a Display of the Topography, History, Customs, Manner, Arts, Manufactures, Commerce, Literature, Religion, Jurisprudence, etc. of the Chinese Empire* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1838).

[44] *The Chinese Repository* vol. 8 no. 2 (June 1839), 84-97.

[45] "War with China; Order in Council; Speeches of Leading Members in Parliament; Contents of the Blue Book," *The Chinese Repository* vol. 9 no. 6 (October 1840), 418.

[46] The Death of Rev. Charles Gutzlaff," 512.

[47] Waley, *The Opium War through Chinese Eyes*, 234. Lord Jocelyn, military secretary to the Expedition, provided another explanation for the mistakes in Gutzlaff's work. "Dates and exact statements of finance, &c., are difficult to be correctly obtained in any country, but more particularly in these far Eastern lands; and it is not probable that a jealous race like the Chinese would permit a stranger to become so intimately acquainted with their internal policy. Thus the errors of the reverend gentleman seem to have arisen not from any international mis-statement, but from a guileless disposition, giving too easy a credence to the natives of the country be has opened." Lord Jocelyn, *Six Months with the Chinese Expedition – Leaves from a Soldier's Note-book* (London: John Murray, 1841), 43.

[48] *The Chinese Repository* vol. 8 No. 2, p. 98. For an analysis of the tense relationship between Gutzlaff and other Protestant missionaries in China at that time, with a section specially devoted to *China Opened*, see Su Jing [Su Ching], "Guoshili he qita chuanjiaoshi de jinzhang guanxi" [The Tense Relationship Between Charles Gutzlaff and the other Missionaries], in *Shangdi de renma: shiqiu shiji zaihua chuanjiaoshi de zuowei* [Under God's Command: Papers on Early Protestant Missionaries in China] (Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 2006), 33-71.

[49] K. Gutzlaff, "Present State of Our Relations with China," separate inclosure, Robinson to Palmerston, 26 March 1835, F.O. 17/9/131.

[50] Ibid. See also M. Rubinstein, "The Wars they Wanted: American Missionaries' Use of *The Chinese Repository* Before the Opium War," *American Neptune* xlviii (Fall 1988), 271-282.

[51] E. C. Bridgman, editor of the *Chinese Repository*, wrote a long letter to the Prudential Committee if the American Board to give an account and assessment of the missionaries situation in China after the Napier Fizzle. One of the issues that Bridgman dealt with at length was "the problem of Karl Gutzlaff." Cf., Murray A. Rubinstein, *The Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise in China, 1807-1840* (London: Scarecrow Press, 1996), 320-321.

[52] H. Hamilton Lindsay, *Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston on British Relations with China* (London: Saunders & Otley, 1836).

[53] Pierre-Louis Legrégoies to the Directors of the Missions Estangères, April 20, 1839, v. 323, Missions Entrangères letter books, Rue du Bac, Paris; quoted from Peter W. Fay, "The Protestant Mission and the Opium War," *Pacific Historical Review* vol. 40 no. 2 (May 1971), 153, n. 31.

[54] Peter W. Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by which They Forced her Gates Ajar* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 145.

[55] For an account of this incident, that Lin Zexu demanded Dent to meet him and the foreign community together rejected the demand, see *The Chinese Repository* vol. 7 no. 12 (April 1839), 621-625; Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 148-155.

[56] *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol. 1, 529.

[57] Ibid., vol. 2, 281.

[58] The Gutzlaff expert, Jessie Lutz, seems to accept this idea. In her book on Gutzlaff, she states "Perhaps overestimating Gützlaff's influence on British policy, Commissioner Lin was said to have been determined to have Gützlaff's head," with a footnote citing Fay (She wrongly puts it as S. Fay) and adding "Lin had been governor of Jiangsu when Gützlaff made one of his exploratory journeys up the Yangxi River." Lutz, *Opening China*, 100. However, it must be pointed out that during this second voyage, Gutzlaff was using a different name Jiali in disguise. From the Chinese side, no one ever mentioned the identity of Jiali as Gutzlaff. On the other hand, Peter Fay himself did not include this piece of information in his own book *The Opium War, 1840-1842*.

[59] Beeching, *The Chinese Opium Wars*, 92.

[60] "Under the Same Date Captain Elliot at Hongkong Wrote the following Letter to Viscount Palmerston," *Chinese Repository* vol. 11 no. 9 (September 1842), 467-468. In a letter written to James Matheson, Elliot wrote, "Perhaps I ought not to have fired at all but every man's patience has limits and mine has been sorely tried. I am afraid I have disappointed the men's ardent spirits here." Charles Elliot in China to James Matheson in Canton, 5 September 1839, in Alain Le Pichon, ed., *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong 1827-1843* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 377.

[61] Hoe and Roebuck, *The Taking of Hong Kong*, 95.

[62] Sasaki Masaya, *Ahen sensō zen Chū-Ei kōshō bunsho* [Correspondences between China and Britain Before the Opium War] (Tokyo: Gannando Shoten, 1967), 225.

[63] "Minute of Conversations held by Mr. Gutzlaff with some of the Chinese Officers at the Anchorage of Kaulung," *Chinese Repository* vol. 11 no. 9, 466-467.

[64] In the Opium War, the interpreters/translators of the British were, apart from Gutzlaff, Robert John Morrison, Robert Thom (1807-1846), George Tradescant Lay (1799-1845) and Samuel Turner Fearon (1819-1853). For a study of the interpreters/translators of the British camp, cf., Wang Hongzhi, "Diyici yanpian zhanzheng de yizhe: Xiapian: yingfang de yizhe" [Translators/Interpreters in the First Opium War: Part II, Translators/Interpreters of the British Camp], in Wang Hongzhi, ed., *Fanyishi yanjiu 2012* [*Studies in Translation History*] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2012), 1-58.

[65] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 103.

[66] For example, when he was magistrate in Ningbo, Gutzlaff wrote in Chinese to Yijing, who had sent an official Chen Zhigang over to negotiate for an armistice. *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao* vol.5, 34.

[67] Beeching, *The Chinese Opium Wars*, 115.

[68] Robert Morrison, "Peking Gazette," *The Chinese Repository* vol. 1 no. 12 (April 1833), 506-507.

[69] Elizabeth A. Morrison, *Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison, DD* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1839), vol. 1, 368.

[70] *Translations From the Original Chinese, with Notes* (Canton: Select Committee of East India Company, 1815).

[71] John Robert Morrison, "Summary of Information Collected from Official Documents Regarding the Views and Proceedings of the Emperor and the Officers of His Government, Since the Evacuation of Ningpo," *The Chinese Repository* vol. 11 no. 9 (September 1842), 470-479.

[72] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 104-105.

[73] Levien, ed., *Naval Surgeon*, 67.

[74] John Morrison allegedly had also secured information from the local people. Cf. John Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War: An Account of All the Operations of the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty of Nanking* (London: Saunders & Otley, 1844), 428.

[75] "Sanshan juren tongzhishu" [Notice from a Provincial Graduate], in Xu Dishan, ed., *Dazhongji*, 17-19.

[76] Ibid., 19-31.

[77] Waley, *The Opium War*, 168, 223 and 229.

[78] John Francis Davis, *China, During the War and Since the Peace* (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1852), vol. 1, 227.

[79] The several memorials collected in Qi Sihe, et.al. eds., *Yapian zhanzheng*, vol. 4 contain information on the agents and informants in service of Gutzlaff, including the statements made by these spies after they were arrested. *Yapian zhanzheng*, vol. 4, pp. 272-277. Most of these have been translated by Waley in "Gutzlaff and his Traitors. Mamo," *The Opium War*, 222-244.

[80] Waley *The Opium War*, 236.

[81] Ibid., 236-237.

[82] Ibid., 237-238.

[83] *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol. 5, 131-132.

[84] Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 228.

[85] Ibid., 229.

[86] Alexander Murray, *Doings in China: Being the Personal Narrative of an Officer Engaged in the late Chinese Expedition, from the Recapture of Chusan in 1841, to the Peace of Nankin in 1842* (London: Richard Bentley, 1843), 98-99.

[87] Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 229.

[88] Bei Qingqiao, "Duoduo yin" [Songs of Oh Dear! Oh Dear!], *Yapian zhanzheng* vol. 3, 188. The tricky issue here is: Bei reported that the proclamations were posted by the British, while according to Ouchterlony, the British were not aware of the date of counter attack. But one thing is certain: the inhabitants were warned of the coming hostilities and they closed their shops and quitted the city. The only possible explanation is that it was the Chinese spies who posted the proclamations on behalf of the British. After all, these proclamations were written in Chinese.

[89] G. B. Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1958), 107.

[90] Granville G. Loch, *The Closing Events of the Campaign in China: The Operations in the Yang-Tze-Kiang; and Treaty of Nanking* (London: John Murray, 1843), 41-42.

[91] Ibid., 108.

[92] Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 428. According to Ouchterlony, John Morrison even included a "Chinese sketch of the city." Ibid., 433.

[93] Liang Tingnan, *Yifen wenji* [Accounts on the Barbarians] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), 81-82.

[94] Gutzlaff, "Remarks upon the Occupation of Nanking," Gough Papers, National Army Museum, quoted from Lutz, *Opening China*, 107.

[95] Ibid., 107. However, another scholar was more affirmative on this: "More significantly, Gutzlaff had a major impact on Gough's military planning, particularly the advance via Hangchow to the walls of Nanking. In a lengthy paper early in 1842 he proposed in lucid, carefully supported argument the campaign which ended the war. Gough was delighted and wrote at the end, 'Excellent Old Gutzlaff.'" John Nicolson, "The Reverend Charles Gutzlaff, The Opium War and General Gough," *Missiology: An International Review* vol. 13 no. 3 (July 1985), 360.

[96] According to Ouchterlony, it was "out of respect to the religious feelings of the Chinese, Colonel Burrell did not permit any of the pubic buildings or Joss-houses in the city of Tinghae to be occupied as barracks by our troops." Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 53.

[97] Ibid., 54.

[98] Edgar Holt, *The Opium Wars in China* (London: Putnam, 1964), 109.

[99] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 103.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Fay, *The Opium War*, 319.

[102] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 107-108.

[103] Ibid., 144-147.

[104] Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 226-227.

[105] Christopher Munn, "The Chusan Episode: Britain's Occupation of a Chinese Island, 1840-46," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* vol. 25 no. 1 (January 1997), 82-112.

[106] Davis, *China, During the War*, vol. 1, 193.

[107] W. A. P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay; or, China, South and North. With Personal Reminiscences* (New York & Chicago: F. H. Revell Co., 1896), 66-67. But it should be pointed out that the people of Ningbo seemed to be friendly to the British from the very beginning. Ouchterlony reported that when the British took possession of Ningbo, the local inhabitants "manifested every friendly disposition towards our troops, supplying them with provisions in abundance, and even accepting employment from them in various capacities, as servants and camp followers." Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War*, 209. John Davis also recorded that Gutzlaff "declared that in no part of China had he met with such quiet and orderly people as at Ningpo and in its neighbourhood." Davis, *China, During the War*, 208.

[108] Xu Shidong, "Lin gaotai," translation quoted from Waley, *The Opium War*, 230.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Jardine Matheson Archives, Chusan I, quoted from Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, 210.

[111] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 112-113.

[112] "Zhachuan lanlüe" [A Brief Report on the Disasters at Zhachuan], in *Yapian Zhanzheng*, vol. 3, 268.

[113] Ibid., vol. 4, 406.

[114] "Rewards for British Ships and British Subjects, offered by Eleang, Lieutenant Governor of Canton, in a Proclamation, Dated February 27th 1841, "The Chinese Repository vol. 10 no. 3 (March 1841), 174-175.

[115] Anonymous, *The Last Year*, 107-108.

[116] *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol. 5, 253.

[117] Ibid., 371.

[118] John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 99.

[119] Masaya Sasaki, Compiled, *Ahen sensō kenkyū, shiryō hen* [Materials for Research on the Opium War] (Tokyo: Kindai chugoku kenkyu sokan ahen, 1964), 198-199.

[120] *The Chinese Repository* vol. 11 no. 10 (October 1842), 575.

[121] Anonymous, *The Last Year in China*, 182.

[122] Loch, *The Closing Events*, 174.

[123] Lutz, *Opening China*, 114.