

Globalization, the Political Theory of the State and Civil Society, and the Politics of Identity in the Context of Environmental Governance*

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The onslaught of globalization, like a bad storm, has caused serious implications not only to the practices of governance, but also on the body of theories that seek to explain the process of governance. The establishment of the discourse of the “global village” has eroded the power and autonomy of nation-states even as economies are increasingly becoming globalized. However, it is also evident that the power of civil societies within the boundaries of nation-states, and in the transnational arena has strengthened considerably. Also present is the awakening of cultural activism and women-based movements as a way of asserting the articulation of identities along ethnic or racial and gender lines. This interplay between globalization and governance requires an inquiry into the specific moments in which the political theories of the state and civil societies are either engaged or demolished; the manner by which politics of identity find their way to intervene and colonize the spaces which are left open by the unraveling of the colonial and patriarchal binds of the modern nation-state; and the manner by which globalization reasserts its agenda and recolonizes the spaces that are opened by identity-based politics. The final task is to locate these in the nexus of environmental resources governance.

Revisiting the Political Theory of the State and Civil Society

The state, as an institution of power, is traditionally viewed in the context of governance. While structural-functionalist political theory has defined the state as composed primarily of four elements, namely territory, citizenry, sovereignty, and government, it is still the later which emerges as the bottom-line in most of the theorizing on the state. Typologies of states are mainly based on the manner by which mechanisms of governance are executed. Common good theories of the state as well as those premised on the social contract defined the *telos* for the existence of the state as a protector of the common good or as a mechanism that protects individual rights. This has led to the emergence of the liberal theory of the state based on constitutional fetters and whose *raison d'être* is to pursue the greatest good for the greatest number. Smithian doctrine has added a layer of restraint on the liberal state by

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valorizing a non-interventionist mode vis-à-vis the economy, something which Keynesianism has debunked and Neo-classicism has reaffirmed. The succeeding theory of liberal-pluralism has defined the state as a neutral governing mechanism that synthesizes and levels-off the conflicting interests of groups in society (Carnoy, 1984). Any deviation from the liberal-pluralist model is considered far from ideal and has warranted a negative imprint of being labeled as elitist or authoritarian, wherein the state apparatus are in the hands of a ruling elite class. Theories of power have emerged out of these constructions, with Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1957) offering models for the pluralist strand, and C. Wright Mills (1956), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), and Parenti (1978) providing models for the elitist strand.

The positioning of the state in the context of Marxist analysis, in both its structuralist-materialist as well as in its symbolic-idealist models, has added excitement to the theorization about the state and about power. The latter is expressed by the Gramscian construct wherein hegemony is defined in the context of the ability of the state to mobilize ideology to gain acceptance and consent from the governed. What is creative about Gramsci's theory is his construction of the state and of civil society as analytical political categories that are relevant to the definition of hegemony and resistance. A simple analysis of Gramscian theory reveals that the coercive apparatus of the state are tempered by the ideological apparatus residing in civil society to establish and maintain hegemony by gaining consent from the oppressed classes (Gramsci, 1971). Later, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have redefined hegemony as the translation of former oppositional and conflicting categories into mere differences in strategies. For them, new hegemonic formations emerged after the second world war as an outcome of the fundamental changes in modes of production manifested in the state-culture nexus. This resulted in the commodification, bureaucratization and massification of social life.

The structuralist Marxists have preoccupied themselves with the celebrated debate on the nature and extent of state autonomy from the ruling class, as illustrated by the Miliband-Poulantzas debate (Miliband, 1969 and Poulantzas, 1969). This preoccupation was logically anchored on the vulgar Marxist argument that the state is but an executive committee of the ruling class. This issue of state autonomy was confronted by a critique of pluralism and led to the development of corporatist theories of the state in all its variants. Corporatism became

the defense mechanism of the state in asserting its economic power in a situation where pluralism failed to restrain the contradictions of competitive capital accumulation. Schmitter (1974) argues that corporatism originated in the decay of pluralism in Europe while Wolfe (1977) saw corporatism as a response to the crises of late capitalism. The corporatist state takes over the economy and mediates the relationship between the interest of capital and labor. The state is no longer merely autonomous from capital; it is now directing capital. It has moved away from a position of supporting capital accumulation to directing that process (Ham and Hill, 1984).

The greatest contribution of Marxist theory, for all its worth, to the political theory of the state is the articulation of an economic logic within the discourse of state theorizing. The capitalist state was defined in the context of a particular mode of production. In this context, the economic structure of society was positioned as an analytical category from where the political and ideological superstructures can be defined. The stage was set for defining the relationships between modes of production and modes of governance. The typologies of states that emerged out of this structuralist discourse were clearly based on the logic of economic production and their concomitant development theories. These included the ECLA theories (Prebisch, 1950), the dependency school (Furtado, 1963 and Frank, 1967), world systems theory (Frank, 1978 and Wallerstein, 1979), and the modes of production school (Brenner, 1977; Laclau, 1971 and Rey, 1975). Thus, neo-colonial, dependent, underdeveloped states collectively became a major focus for political economic theorizing. With this, the field of political economy received a leftist shot in the arm, enabling it to go beyond the Smithian mold that has long encapsulated it.

The discourses on state-civil society by the idealist Marxists and on base-superstructure by the materialist Marxists found their confluence in the theorizing by Habermas (1972, 1976 and 1984). He effectively positioned the legitimacy of the state as the analytical point of entry in attacking the complex relationship between the economic, political and ideological substrates. Habermas positions the state as implicated in an interplay between a system that colonizes a life-world. The system is operating in the medium of money (economic) and power (political), wherein rational scientific knowledge and control mechanisms such as legal mandates are used to consolidate power by colonizing the life-

world. The latter is a constellation of symbolic practices immanent in ideological worldviews manifested in culture, consciousness, and cosmology, all of which are templates for the definition of identities, whether of individual or of communities (Habermas, 1984). The state became a structural imposition whose legitimacy is defined in its ability to effectively contain any resistance to such colonization. In its full colonizing splendor, the state is a material, economistic, capital-accumulating, legal-rational, class-based, patriarchal and colonial construction.

This positioning of the state has diversified the alternative positions for resistance. Feminist theories have challenged the patriarchal mold of the state, while cultural critique has revealed a powerful deconstruction of the alienating and colonizing state practices. While Marx has hoped for the withering away of the state brought upon by the internal contradictions and later demise of capitalism, Michel Foucault (1977 and 1980) effectively decentered the state by articulating a centerless concept of power, wherein the state becomes merely a mechanism which emerges out of the complex web of power in society. However, no one from among the political theorists of the state, not even Immanuel Wallerstein who theorized about a world economic system, was able to anticipate the emergence of a powerful force, a force so effective in diminishing the power of the state. What Marxists failed to vanish through revolutions, or Foucault failed to deconstruct out of the discourses of modernity, is now being slowly withered away by the dark force of globalization that has set upon the political firmament.

Globalization as a World Reality

Globalization has negotiated a complex path across modern history. Its entry into the modern times is but a logical outcome of the earlier processes of mercantilism, colonialism, imperialism and global capitalism which successively sought to unify the divergent economies of what has been discursively constructed as geopolitical dualisms — the developed first and the underdeveloped third, the industrial west and the exotic orient. Later, the disarticulated and disemboweled former bastions of socialism were inserted into the dual categories, forcing a renaming of subject positions into a north-south divide that has displaced a capitalist-socialist cold war opposition. In the new international division of labor, capitalism is globalized with socialism emerging only in isolated enclaves.

These last frontiers of socialism are now beginning to unravel not only in terms of compromising the purity of their economic dogma, as in the case of China willing to have 50 years of capitalist Hong Kong, but also in terms of their political hegemony, as in the case of the domino-principle collapse of the socialist Balkan republics and the diminished capacity of communist movements and states to threaten national and global security. The globalization paradigm has emerged with the retreat of ideology-driven tensions in the realm of economic discourses and with the proclamation of victory by global capitalism and its attendant politics.

The success by which globalization was able to cut a deep swath across the geopolitical terrain is evident in the manner by which it effectively reordered the political and economic map of the world. The most powerful accomplishment of globalization is the success by which it was able to consolidate a global political economic system that governs commodity and information flows. The developments in technology, particularly those in transportation and telecommunications, have led to the establishment of global networks that are able to shape and influence political and economic decisions of individual nation-states. The pathways that eroded the imaginary boundaries of states are the same pathways that created a need to consolidate and interact with others to build what has been celebrated as the “global village.” The addiction to new technologies has created a consciousness that craved for identification with and acceptance of a globally constructed collective. Identities were assaulted through colonization projects that are articulated no longer through armies and missionaries, nor through development and extension workers, but through powerful images of CNN beamed to almost all parts of the world, or to hamburgers that has the same taste wherever you go.

The mode of production that has evolved out of this global spell is a rebirth of mercantilism without the trading ships, of imperialism without its monarchies. The world economic order has globalized capitalism to a form that surpassed Ander Gunder Frank’s and Immanuel Wallerstein’s nightmares. The productionist view of globalized modes of production manifesting an international division of labor has accommodated the entry of circulationist views involving global finance and capital markets. The global fundamental class processes of economies extracting surplus from other economies through direct exploitation of resources gave way to the articulation of subsumed class processes involving global rent-seekers composed of finance capitalists peddling investments and global

merchants peddling their hardware and software, from power plants to guns to computers to virtual pets, affecting transfer payments brought upon by unequal terms of trade. This paved the way for the reappearance of corporate giants, now effectively divorced from any statist anchor, which slowly but surely colonized the spaces opened by this new economic domain.

The circulationist character of the world economic system is evident in the unique situation wherein trade and investment expanded rapidly relative to GDP growth. As O'Connor (1996) argued, the real reasons for the growth of the ratio between trade and investment and GDP are but manifestations of the communications revolution and changes in the structure of national economies. These structural changes included the reduction of tariff rates and the liberalization of trade and investment rules, things which globalization has brought to bear, particularly with the establishment of GATT-WTO. The expansion of trade and investments have also attended the abandonment of Keynesian and welfare state policies and the adoption of "post-Fordist," monetarist economic policies in the North, and the rejection of nationalist development strategies in favor of export-oriented development in most countries in the South.

International financial markets and the power of finance capital have grown tremendously. In the face of declining production, credit money bolstered a frenzy of speculative behavior, further driving financial markets to rise faster compared to world trade. The information superhighway utilizing high technology communication systems made the global financial boom possible, as evident in the internationalization of more financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. O'Connor (1996) believes that the expansion of trade and investment vis-à-vis GDP is an indicator of the extent by which national economies are increasingly becoming specialized even as they are more integrated into each other in a global system. Financial market growth indicates the growing power of finance capital to direct not only the patterns of foreign trade and investment but also domestic investment, production and prices. The financial crisis that rocked most of East and Southeast Asia recently indicates the relative fragility of national economies that are emerging out of this new economic arrangement. The crisis showed that economies that are highly dependent on trade and investment for their growth, and have increasingly relied on finance capital rather than on

capital produced out of actual production, are vulnerable to predatory speculative attacks on capital and financial markets.

As economies become increasingly globalized, the new medium of money required a restructuring of the medium of power. Changes in the modes of production demanded changes in the modes of governance. As globalization raced across the face of economic systems, effectively undercutting autonomous fiscal, trade and development policies of individual nation states, the power of governments to provide political fetters and assert economic sovereignty has substantially weakened. The state is under attack. Its citizenry's cultural uniqueness is threatened by a homogenizing global consciousness; its territory's integrity is assaulted by a liberalized flow of economic goods and environmental "bads" such as global climate changes, acid rain, and haze from burning forests; its sovereignty is compromised; and its government's ability to govern independently is diminished. Indeed, the state is an endangered species in the face of globalization.

The Theoretical Ramifications of a Globalized World: Revising the Political Theory of the State and Civil Society

The globalization of the economy has turned loose an array of institutional interventions that hoped to deepen and widen the extent of the global village. Global economic imperatives have shaped the development of global governance arrangements that sought to facilitate the flow of commodities and images across porous national boundaries. The GATT-WTO, APEC, NAFTA and the soon to be launched AFTA, are deployed to assist the consolidation of regional and global economic and political communities. The United Nations and all its instrumentalities, despite earlier criticisms of being inconsequential or, worst, unnecessary have shown renewed vigor not only in harnessing multilateral support for active intervention into particular nation-states to ensure security and human welfare, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Iraq, but also in the conduct of global conferences that tackled transboundary issues such as population, gender, environment, and sustainable development. It is obvious that modes of governance are being reinvented as they are globalized.

In this context, the nation-state took a beating. The statist fixation of the earlier world-systems theories espoused by the new left, as well as

their vulgar Marxist predecessors who posited theories of imperialism, were theorized out of contention by the unfolding of a new global mode of governance. Globalization has engendered the weakening of the state as a leading edge in pushing for the global agenda and has relegated it to a role of merely assisting the process. The world economic and political markets are now led by a corporate community that ironically debunks the traditional corporatist theory of a state acting as the lead capital accumulator. Corporations with no national loyalties, acting as direct producers of goods, images, and symbols or as rent-seekers peddling merchandises and finance capital, have taken over the rein of global economic governance as its high priests, while states as well as global and regional groups such as the UN and ASEAN are now just performing as political altar boys. The inversion of the state corporatist logic is completed with the subservience of the state to global capital, making one conclude that the owl of Minerva has indeed returned to its nest at dusk, albeit a global capitalist dusk. The Marxist conception of a state in the service of capital was rearticulated as a globalist construct which transformed the state as a servant of global capital, or in raw Marxist language, as just an executive committee of the global capitalist class. However, it was not only the corporatist theory of the state that was debunked by globalization. The fact that the state has withered away not because of socialism but due to global capitalism is a powerful negation of the Marxist dogma, a fundamental slap in the face of a theory that has inspired so much political struggle to wish the capitalist state away out of existence.

It is obvious that one of the few survivors of this theoretical bloodletting is the structuralist concept of the state, where it is still empirically verifiable to argue that states and its global articulations (UN, APEC, ASEAN) are actually now instruments of global capital, even as they can also have certain degrees of autonomy. However, the more powerful survivors, at least with respect to their ability to provide explanations to the current predicament, are the hegemony framework of Gramsci (1971) as extended by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Mouffe (1988), and the legitimation framework of Habermas, with the latter requiring reconceptualization and translation in the context of globalization. As David Held (1982) argued, Habermas' framework is limited to the nation-state. In this sense, I argue that the theory of Habermas requires modification if only to be applicable to the world economic system

wherein national economies interact and might produce new types of economic and political crises.

Key to the revision and global contextualization of the Habermasian framework is the fact that the erosion of the nation-state led to the globalization of system mechanisms. Capitalism was “kicked upstairs” in the global arena, bringing with it the impetus to articulate supportive global governance arrangements. The media of money and power, that is, of economy and politics, or what Habermas considers as constitutive of the “system” is now a global terrain that colonizes a lifeworld that is increasingly, and interestingly, also globalized. The homogenizing effects of information technology have disarticulated cosmologies and communities from their local anchors and have also created a space for a global civil society. While corporations and state apparatus are communing in their new-found modes of economic and political intercourse, civil society actors such as NGOs, cause-oriented groups, and alternative financing institutions are also globalizing their interactions. There is, to borrow Gramsci’s words, a globalization of the war of movements affecting a hegemonic crisis for the global capitalist system. It is interesting that human rights, indigenous people’s rights, feminist, gay, environmental, and sustainable development activists are taking advantage of the same venues of globalization such as global conferences and the cyberspace. These global modes of activism indicate a reaction to the global colonization of the life-world that assault the integrity of habitats, cosmologies, and identities of marginalized peoples and communities.

Gramscian analysis can be very useful, particularly in the relationship between modes of governance and modes of ideological legitimation. The on-going strengthening of civil society mechanisms at a global level is undoubtedly indicative of a deeply rooted awakening of civil society mobilization at the nation-state level. Globalization may have weakened the state, but such weakening has opened the statist cage that before has restrained civil societies from flourishing. The grip of the state, manifested either through hegemony-building or through the actual use of physical and structural violence, has loosened. While globalization has intensified the assault on the life-world of women, indigenous peoples, the poor, and the marginalized, it has also brought to their doorsteps courtesy of CNN images of equality, participation and the possibility of resistance, and has opened up channels by which they can build alliances with those of similar plight from other places. Globalization has indeed

reared a janus face. While the system's colonization of the lifeworld is globalized, so is resistance, and so is the Habermasian legitimation crisis and the Gramscian hegemonic crisis.

Cultural and Sexual Politics: Identity Politics as Forms of Resistance to Globalization

For Habermas, the crisis of capitalism, one that was defined by classical Marxism only in the context of internal contradictions based on materialist exploitation, is deeply rooted in a cultural substrate (1976). The colonization of the life-world by the system reaches crisis potential when the imperatives of money and power operating through capitalist economic systems and state bureaucracies intrude into the norms, practices and institutions of everyday life, thereby eroding culture, social relations and personality development. The globalization of economies and bureaucracies has only heightened the legitimation crisis by transporting the assault on the life-world from local to global dimensions. The globalization crisis has unleashed disarticulated communities whose resources and cultural identities are assaulted by the dark forces of globalization. Environmental and cultural erosion takes place, lending a powerful cause for local resistance. Carl Boggs (1994) dramatizes this phenomenon by elucidating the manifestations of social contradictions between "the interests of the transnationals and the prevailing quality of life; between the system of production and the imperatives of nature; between the political capacity of local governments to act and the popular demands being placed upon them" (p.99). He further argues that as the tensions and contradictions intensify, foundations are being built for a potential convergence of interests among social movements. In the North, he posits that a post-materialist logic will engender the emergence of new social movements, while in the South, the marginalized economic classes will still remain as the bulwark of resistance and social mobilization. However, he points out that the common thread that weaves across these multiple local struggles is the fact that they are reactions to the prevalence of environmental decay.

Boggs' (1994) analysis, when juxtaposed with Habermas' (1976) revelation of a legitimation crisis and modified to take on a global context, provides a succinct framework from where the emergence of resistance can be located. The emergent juxtaposition will also challenge Boggs' argument about Southern movements being limited only to economic-

determined struggles. At the outset, I argue that as the colonization of the life-world is globalized with the globalization of the system operating on the media of money and power, the South will also nurture a post-materialist ideology that will provide logic for new social movements. Furthermore, the emergence of new social movements in the North could only but influence the development of similar movements in the South. Thus, while colonization of the life-world has created disarticulations among local communities differently in the North and in the South, the assault on cultural and personal identities has created a kind of collective rage that provides counterpoints against globalization in both areas. The weakening of the nation-state and the reduction of the autonomy of state bureaucracies to independently chart their policies and strategies have loosened the grip of the state on its own ideological apparatuses and have exposed a deep hegemonic crisis for the state. Development agenda and policies, as the bearer of the developmentalist ideology, are now defined as a top-down imposition from the multilateral, bilateral, and corporate merchants of development capital, with the South bearing the burden more than the North. The global culture is now effectively served through the information superhighway and the increasing globalization of consumerism. With its weakening ideological function, what is revealed is the state's dependence on coercive power, particularly in the South, to keep afloat. In a globalized context, the coercive apparatuses are recruited as praetorian guards protecting the health and stability of the state to carry out its functions of furthering the global agenda.

This development, using Gramscian theory, has bred a crisis of hegemony for the nation-state. This hegemonic crisis is based on the unraveling of its ability to socially construct its citizen's collective consciousness that is dependent on the effective deployment of ideological processes. The capacity of the state to direct the production of political and economic subjects was greatly diminished, thereby creating a space for radical alternatives in defining critical and new subject positionalities. The emergence of new social movements is characterized by a decentering of class as the sole explanatory variable for resistance. These movements exist at the communicative level of action, with their focus set on issues of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization (Cohen, 1983; Habermas, 1981). As Melucci (1980) has pointed out, new social movements are engaged in struggles towards the articulation of identities. Two of the more powerful arenas for the identity articulation of resistor-subjects are in the domain of cultural and sexual politics.

Cultural and sexual identities were assaulted by the onslaught of a capitalist state. Culture and sexuality bore the brunt of disarticulating development and state-building activities — indigenous peoples were displaced, women's voices were made invisible, sexuality was banished as a non-development issue except to regulate it in order to limit population. However, unlike class, which likewise was assaulted, the marginalization of cultural and sexual politics was more pronounced. Class struggle became the daily fare of resistance against modes of production and governance — either in terms of theorization, or actual acts of rebellion, and as such was given ample attention in radical theory and praxis. Cultural and sexual resistance emerged only recently, and as such, were accommodated only as an agenda for movements that still considered class the bottom-line. This adding-on phenomenon was particularly pronounced in the South, where oppression was perceived more in the context of class, and not in the context of sexuality and culture. In most of the South, and among the Left, gender advocates devoid of class-based politics were seen as reactionary forces, or worst, as elitist Western-styled radicals who sought to dissipate the momentum of class struggle. On the other hand, cultural repression of ethnic communities was interpreted as mere manifestations of a capitalist system that exploits them for their resources, and consequently, destroys and commoditizes their cultures into mere merchandise for the tourist economy.

However, the class reductionism of social movements unraveled not only with the demise of socialism and communism as a potential threat to capitalism, but also with the celebration of a new global order that declared the supremacy of capitalism as an economic arrangement. Class identities were torn asunder by the increasing mechanization of work and the entrenchment of a techno-cultural society that redefined the work process (Kellner, 1989). The emergence of sexual and cultural politics as the new domains of resistance, and the weakening of class-based struggle is empirically supported by events. Racial- and ethnic-based struggles dominate the terrain of political mobilization in various parts of the world such as the Middle East, Bosnia, Rwanda, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India, to name a few. Ethnic nationalism has intensified and there is a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism not only in the Philippines but in Malaysia and Indonesia. Sexual-based struggles, seen in the strengthening of feminist politics and the birth of gay and lesbian

political movements, have appeared not only in the North but even in the South.

It is interesting to note that ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism are slowly now being appropriated as ideologies for economic resistance. In Malaysia, Islamic nationalist sentiments permeate the manner by which common citizens cope with their economic problems. In Indonesia, the state is losing the capacity to legitimize itself through ideological mechanisms and while economic-based dissent propels much of the street outrage, there are evidences that the logic of Islamic nationalism, and not socialism, is creeping into the discourse of popular movements. At the height of the Thai financial crisis, there was a rediscovery of Buddhism in the face of widespread incidence of psycho-social stress and a sudden increase in acts of suicide. In India, a country ridden with class-based inequities, the popular language of resistance is no longer socialism but Hindu nationalism, as shown by the popular support given to the Hindu nationalist parties which carry a platform manifesting a powerful critique against the alienating modes of global capitalism. It seems that the worst enemy of capitalism is no longer socialism but ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism.

Identity politics is also seen in the popularity of Joseph Estrada among the Filipino masses. Political analysts call this as a class vote, but in the absence of a strong class-based ideology, I interpret this more as an identity-based vote, an expression of a mass culture of a people identifying themselves with a popular political icon. Thus, the elitist criticisms that were hurled against him, particularly those which refer to his being unschooled and economics-illiterate, stoke further the sense of alienation which the voters feel from the culture of the elite establishments that have long governed them and which they perceive were responsible for their miseries. A criticism of Estrada's personality is almost parallel to an elitist slur against the "*kultura ng masa*," a derision of a symbol with which the masses, most of whom also lack advanced schooling and are economically illiterate, can identify.

It is indeed real to conclude that globalization and the new world order have unleashed forces that heightened and enhanced the politics of identity, even as class struggles are beginning to unravel. The fundamental crisis of capitalism that was class-driven was replaced by a legitimation crisis that situated the life-world as its battle-ground and has elevated

identity struggles as the core of resistance. Using the legitimation framework of Habermas (1976), I argue that class repression, unlike sexual and cultural repression, is based not on an assault on the life-world. Class conflict is a contradiction residing in the material system emanating in the media of money and power, as manifested in material relations of production, or in the context of structuralism, as moments in the structures of society. The assaults on cultural and sexual identities, on the other hand, are undoubtedly attacks on the symbolic and ideological domains of existence that are falling under the realm of the life-world. With the globalization of the system, the local anchors for class struggle are weakened together with the weakening of the nation-states. As the state's projects emanating from the media of money and power are displaced into the global modes of production and governance, the momentum and the logic of local and site-specific class struggles are dissipated.

On the other hand, the state, now weakened, still has to contend with its on-going project of colonizing the life-world through a continuous assault on cultural and sexual identities by Western colonial and patriarchal practices. However, as earlier pointed out, the capacity of the nation-state to independently summon ideology to define a hegemonic project was reduced, and there is evidence that states have shown to be increasingly relying on coercive legal-rational mechanisms to assist its colonization of the life-world. If at all, development ideologies are now articulated globally and are transmitted to state mechanisms through the power of development financing. Development strategies are no longer defined in parliaments and in cabinet meetings, but in regional and global conferences and workshops, and in financing negotiations.

The inability of the nation-state to maintain its ideological role left a wide opening for identity-based struggles to occupy, and for civil society mechanisms to flourish. The unraveling of the nation-state loosened its grip on the ideological apparatus that, if strong, could have effectively contained nascent identity-based movements. The surrender of the state of its autonomy to global mechanisms left spaces for civil society to take over. It is therefore clear that the Habermasian legitimation crisis and the Gramscian hegemonic crisis took new forms. The legitimacy of the state is now challenged by a politicized civil society, with identity-based movements at the forefront. Feminism and retribalization ideologies have inspired women, indigenous peoples, homosexuals, and all other sectors

whose identities were marginalized to become actively political. Globalization, in uprooting the statist anchor of the system's colonization project, has enabled the life-world to fight back at the local level. The homogenization and erosion of cultural and sexual identities brought upon by a global leviathan warranted the emergence of assertive cultural and sexual wars of movements at the grassroots.

The Environment as an Arena for the Articulation of Modes of Governance: Resistance to or Legitimation of Globalization?

The comment made by Boggs (1994) about the environment as a common element that traverses all types of social mobilization in response to a new global order requires a closer look, and this should be done in the context of the global legitimation and hegemonic crisis. The environment, in its dominant construction, is viewed as an array of resources that serve as raw materials for production. In this view, the environment was deployed as a material substrate that existed in the domain of the system, as inputs to economic activities and as objects of governance mechanisms. The environment became defined as a resource to be exploited and administered. It is fairly obvious that this dominant construction of the environment failed to appreciate its symbolic function. Forests, the land, and the bodies of water were not seen in the context of a life-world, as symbols of culture and as nurturers of identities. Thus, the extractive and utilitarian discourse of resource use became in itself a cohort of the system's colonization of the life-world. Economic and political imperatives coming from an omnivorous, fossil-fuel dependent, and parasitic worldview caused the deployment of development practices. Mostly globally directed, such practices left a deep wound on the planet seen in denuded forests, over-fished oceans and coral reefs, poisoned rivers, degraded lands, and threatened biodiversity. However, these material manifestations of a destroyed environment have its symbolic translations to which only the victimized communities can relate. In their own terms, environmental destruction has destroyed their cultures, violated their sacred mountains, ravaged their homelands, and assaulted their identities. Thus, modes of production and governance which led to environmental abuse are but activities of a system which colonized the life world, where money and power caused the dysfunctional erosion of culture, social relations, and identities and led to the loss of meaning and to alienation of whole societies and nations.

The life-world that was attacked by the colonial projects of a system operating in the media of money and power has engendered the emergence of counter-hegemonic social movements that hope to recapture their communities and their identities. Indigenous movements challenged the colonization projects by laying claim to their lands and their rights to chart their own histories. Women's movements challenged the system by laying claim over their bodies and their rights to weave their own "herstories." These identity-based struggles provide an interesting domain for environmental activism, as seen in the emergence of deep ecology, cultural ecology, and eco-feminism as ideological anchors for resistance. Gradually, the symbolic, cultural, and ontological are taking root in local environmental resistance, in addition to the class-based reductions of the socialist ecologists, and in opposition to the modernist-antiseptic logic of the bourgeois environmentalists who are fixated with clean and green environments and are dedicated to ban garbage without challenging the system that produces them in the first place. Civil society has provided avenues for the explosion of these alternative forms of organizing and problem-solving, from the urban areas of Manila to the rural areas in Bukidnon, or as Robin Broad (1993) depicted, as seen in ordinary people moving to ensure a better future for their children.

However, even as these modes of alternative organizing offer an avenue to resist the colonizing projects of globalization, there are indications that global modes of governance appropriate and coopt life-world elements to affect an adaptive discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argued in extending Gramsci's theory of hegemony, there is evidence that opposing movements and strategies are now effectively appropriated as just different yet equivalent strategies. The logic of the adaptation can be understood by appropriating the theory of articulation forwarded by the Marxist anthropologists in the realm of mode of production and translating it in the domain of modes of governance. In its original version, the theory of articulation refers to the concrete manifestation of coexistence of different modes of production which rather than being parallel, constitutes a hierarchy characterized by the domination of one mode of production over another. In a global economy, the articulation between capitalism with pre-capitalist modes of production produces a complex array of relationships by which capitalism is able to assert its power over other modes, either as "protective" as in the case of Rey's analysis of the relationship between capitalism and feudalism (1975), or predatory.

The translation of the theory of articulation to the domain of modes of governance will gain meaning in the context of the coexistence of bureaucratic systems, as the dominant mode of governance, with alternative and non-bureaucratic ways of organizing which valorize life-world processes associated with community and identity. Historically, the emergence of bureaucracies has preconditioned a predatory relationship between system organizations and life-world processes, with the former assaulting the logic of traditional organizations by imposing alienating, hierarchical, rigid, and impersonal standards. Hummel (1987) and Ferguson (1984) provided powerful critiques of bureaucracies from cultural and sexual perspectives, respectively, and both posit that the articulation of bureaucracies with other forms of organizing has displaced the culture of personal interactions and of interconnectedness that are natural among social groups. With the emergence of globalization, and drawing inspiration from the appropriated critique from the human relations school, the articulation between bureaucratic systems and life-world processes has taken a new form. From becoming predatory vis-à-vis the life-world, bureaucracies are in themselves transforming to accommodate alternative concepts such as work-groups, corporate communities, decentralization, and participatory development. However, this is not to say that the modes of organizing drawing their logic from life-world processes are now dominant in the hierarchy. It is safe to argue that there is an appropriation of concepts by the bureaucracy, or as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) said, a translation of opposing discourses into just different strategies to improve the system's ability to penetrate the life-world.

This adaptation to globalization is propelled by a desire to get away from the fundamental contradictions of a global capitalist system. These contradictions are particularly pronounced in the realm of the environment, considering the fact that the globalization process has heightened the environmental crisis. The economic imperatives of a globalized system demanded an intensification of productive activities. Such intensification exacted high costs on the environment, and has developed into a situation which O'Connor (1990) labeled as the second contradiction of capitalism. This contradiction emerges when the desire to intensify the accumulation of capital leads to the depletion of the natural environment that consequently compromises the capacity of the resource to generate future capital. The second contradiction is an effect of the tendency of capitalist production activity to consume the conditions of production,

particularly nature. It should be remembered that the first contradiction of capitalism, as defined by classical Marxism, occurs when the desire to intensify capital accumulation leads to class-based exploitation that consequently compromises the capacity of capital to reproduce since heightened class consciousness will lead to the collapse of capitalism. Thus, the first contradiction of capitalism is a result of capital's social and political power over labor (O'Connor, 1991).

The two contradictions, if left unchecked, offer challenges to the hegemony of global capitalist systems. It is in this context that articulation of modes of governance provides a way out of the crisis, with global imperatives directing the appropriation of life-world processes to reshape system bureaucracies both globally and nationally. Polanyi (1957), writing at a time when the discourse of globalization was not yet in fashion, foresaw the need to contain the action of the market with respect to the factors of production through institutional mechanisms to address the social upheaval and cultural disruption which are produced by the disarticulating effects of capitalism. At present, globalization appears to have settled the first contradiction through the deployment of administrative mechanisms designed to coopt labor and of development initiatives which appropriate participatory approaches to establish consent and gain legitimacy from those who might resist development interventions. The global capitalist system takes into account the reality that the insertion of pre-capitalist systems, such as communities existing in subsistence peasant modes of production, will create material disarticulations. Class-based struggles can be dealt with by appropriating community development models as mechanisms to contain rebellion. The provision of income generating projects and other life-support systems through a participatory process to displaced peasants is in the same mold as the provision of bonuses to workers who have been pep-talked through value reorientation seminars hammering the ideology of corporate communities and cementing a collective consciousness.

The second contradiction is now effectively addressed with the entry of sustainable development as a global discourse, and of community-based resource management as a strategy for development intervention. These discourses of governance are effective in reforming the manner by which environmental resources are engaged by society. The environmental crisis that threatens the foundation of capitalist accumulation requires a transformation of the manner by which capital is generated from the

environment. Social justice, equity and sustainability are now mainstreamed in the discourse, and capital accumulation is now regulated by environmental safeguards, and are even “born again” with the accommodation in the corporate discourse of ecological measures such as green taxes for pollution, green subsidies for recycling of wastes, and eco-labeling.

Recent strategies by which statist modes of governance articulate with organically constituted modes emerge in the context of managing conflict in situations wherein multiple stake-holders clash over the use of resources. One of these is the strategy of “adaptive management.” As a concept originated by Hollings (1978), adaptive management referred to the dynamic learning processes used by managers to adapt to uncertainties. Recently however, adaptive management is slowly becoming a technique for deflecting conflict and depoliticizing the management process. This is evident in the focus of adaptive management on “increasing new learning instead of increasing power, interest and control” (Gunderson et al, 1995). This has heightened the capacity of adaptive management to lend legitimacy to colonization projects by deploying life-world elements of cooperation, process learning, consultation, and participation of stakeholders in managing conflict and in facilitating the entry of development interventions. In a positive manner, adaptive management may be effective in recruiting life-world processes to infect the manner by which bureaucratic institutions operate, thereby reversing the colonization process. This is the case when communities are able to influence bureaucratic structures and processes in determining the direction of development. However, there is also the risk that the structural-functionalist logic of adaptive management might influence practices that coopt resistance and silence nascent political struggles which are necessary to affect structural transformations needed to liberate the community from elitist, colonial and patriarchal systems. The agenda of managing conflict and making stakeholders “learn” from each other might have the danger of turning a blind eye to existing systems of inequality, if only to deploy an effective resource management strategy.

Conclusion

It is indeed clear in the abovementioned maneuvers of maintaining hegemony that life-world elements which appeal to community solidarity and collective consciousness may be recruited to lend legitimacy to colonizing projects. Modes of governance are deployed no longer as purely system strategies, but have begun to articulate with the life-world to generate consent. Thus, even as there is ongoing globalization of governance mechanisms seen in the imperatives borne by development financing, there is also a pronounced articulation with local and community-based governance strategies. The state, in the service of its global development financier is only willing to deploy its soft coercive mechanisms through the issuance of state policies, and a big portion of civil society is coopted to provide the ideological mantle and the venue for the articulation of bureaucratic modes of governance with community-based and sustainable resource management, with participatory work arrangements being deployed no longer as opposing but as alternative modes subsumed under the larger global mode. Thus, a legitimation crisis is averted and the life-world, which if left unchecked might destroy the system, is re-colonized. ❁

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