Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis

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During the past half-century, China's foreign relations strategies evolved in an uneven way. Undeniably, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made significant impact on the evolution of China's foreign relations strategy and established their own models in their respective eras in effect dividing the history of Chinese foreign policy into two. In the shadow of the Cold War, Chinese foreign relations shifted between the United States and the Soviet Union as the future superpower struggled to safeguard national security, guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity and enhance its international status under Mao. In the last two decades Chinese foreign relations strategies were less geared towards survival and security as Deng presided over the pursuit of the Four Modernizations and the establishment of a new international political and economic order in a framework of peace and non-alliance. As its impact on the shaping of world affairs grows, China's foreign relations strategies will continue to evolve in the next century when it becomes truly capable of an "overthrow of the planetary balance".

The 20th century has witnessed China's rise from a weak, economically backward country to an important actor in the international system. From the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1949, Mao Zedong attempted to break the bipolar system and make China an independent and important strategic power. The "reform and opening to the outside world" policy program, also known as China's "second revolution,"[1] initiated by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978, laid the foundation for China's spectacular economic growth and enabled it to become an effective actor in the international system.

In view of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a rising China[2] has become more significant yet more vulnerable, as the US emerged as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era. Talks about the so-called "China Threat" in fact reflect a recognition of China as an emerging great power.[3] As Samuel S. Kim has pointed out, the important question is: Will China be a responsible great power?[4]

According to Adlai Stevenson, we can see our future clearly only when we know the path that leads to the present.[5] We shall better understand how China will behave as a great power in the future in the

world arena by looking back and examining systematically what China had done in the past; and the best approach although not an easy one, is to reexamine the evolution of China's foreign relations strategies since 1949. Like any other country, China had to define its foreign relations strategy in order to guide its diplomacy to maximize its national interests. In fact, as the biggest developing and socialist country in the post-Cold War era with an ancient civilization, "China has established an independent and comprehensive international strategic system with its own characteristics and mechanisms."[6]

As the founder of the PRC and the general designer of the reform and open door policies respectively, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were very important figures in the history of modern China. In Chinese foreign policy, the "authoritative conceptualization" of the world situation by the top Chinese leaders has played a very important role in defining China's strategies.[7] Many historians of the PRC consider that its history may be conveniently divided into two periods: the era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) and the era of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997).[8]

During the past half century, China's foreign relations strategies evolved in an uneven way. Undeniably, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made a significant impact on the evolution of China's foreign relations strategy, and established their own models in their respective eras. This article aims to explore the principal determinants and patterns which shaped the formation and evolution of Chinese foreign relations strategies under Mao and Deng systematically and comparatively, including their goals, their theoretical foundations, their implementation, their characteristics, and their influences on China and the world.

Strategy and Foreign Relations Strategy

Strategy

It is widely accepted in the Western countries and in China that the term "strategy" initially derived from the term "tactics."[9] Its usage has been broadened in the 20th century in international relations studies with the globalization of the international system; it has become a popular term in daily life too. The different interpretations, for instance, those of Carl von Clausewitz in his *On War* and Sunzi in his *Sunzi Bingfa* (Art of War) reflect the differences in strategic cultural backgrounds.

The *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* defines strategy as follows: "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war." [10] This is similar to Edward Luttwak's view as expressed in his book entitled *Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace*.[11]

The Chinese dictionary *Ci Hai* regards strategy as "the plan and guidance of the overall situation in war." It further defines strategy in comparison with the term tactics as follows: "the long-term and general policy the nations or the parties prescribe for themselves in a fixed historical period."[12]

As demonstrated above, the Western and Chinese interpretations of strategy have a lot in common. They tend to share the following factors in the construction of a strategy: 1) the subject: nations (or states, parties); 2) the ends; goals, purposes or objectives; and 3) the means: policies. Some differences, however, seem to exist among their interpretations. The Chinese definition focus more on the overall and long-term aspects of strategy, while Western definitions emphasize the use of armed or the threat of force.[13] These differences are also reflected in the definitions of foreign relations strategy.

Foreign relations strategy

In terms of general planning or guidance of foreign policy, international strategy and foreign relations strategy are often treated interchangeably in the study of foreign relations. Elmer Plishke defines foreign relations strategy in a normative manner as follows:

> Foreign relations strategy is a plan *of action* to promote a *nation's interest* and *ideals* in the pursuit of its *purposes*, basic *goals* and concrete policy *objectives*, by means of substantive and procedural *foreign policy* for the implementation of which the nation commits it political, economic, diplomatic, military, psychological, and moral resources.[14] (Emphasis added)

Lian Shoude, a Chinese scholar in international politics, offered a similar definition with Chinese characteristics:

> Foreign relations strategy, also called international strategy or global strategy, means the *plan or guidance* which *the state* uses to pursue its *national interests*. It includes the *perceptions* of the times and the evolving patterns of the basic contradictions, which provides the *context for the international community*, the judgment on the evolving patterns of *the international structure* and the making of its *foreign relations principles and policies*. The state uses it to map out the essential characteristics and trends of world politics, economy, military, culture etc., as well as its own international environment and position in the international structure with *long-term and overall importance*.[15] (Emphasis added)

Thus from these definitions of foreign relations strategy, we can outline the basic factors in the construction of a state's foreign relations strategy: 1) ends (goals, purposes); 2) means for the implementation of the strategies; and 3) perceptions of national interests, and those perceptions of the themes of the times and the international environment.

Foreign relations strategy is a process in which the long term and overall plan of action is designed by the states (or the decision-makers on behalf of the states) through their own perceptions of the internal and external environment, in order to guide their foreign relations and realize maximum national interest.

According to K.J. Holsti, the principal conditions or variables in determining foreign relations strategies include the structure of the international system, the nature of the state's domestic attitudes and socioeconomic needs, the degree to which policy-makers perceive a persistent external threat to the state's own values and interests, and its geographic location, topographical characteristics, and endowment in natural resources.[16]

Besides assessing the significance of these factors, the policy-maker must answer to a series of pertinent questions relating to the state's means and ends. For example, what national interests are at stake, and are they vital to the survival and prosperity of the state? What are the state's general goals and concrete policy objectives? Which states can realistically contravene these objectives, and which states may support them? In terms of resources, is the state capable of implementing the strategies under consideration, and is the state devoted to the fulfillment

of its commitments? How can the state succeed in achieving its aims at a minimum cost? And equally important, is the sequence in which the questions are raised. Deciding on the nations interests and objectives is critical and must come first, before any attempt is made to formulate policies and decide on what should be done. [17] As Deng Xiaoping believed, the Chinese should first see where the threat comes from.[18]

Chinese Foreign Relations Strategies in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949-1976)

In the era of Mao Zedong, the foci of Chinese foreign relations strategy shifted between the Soviet Union and the United States: the *yibiandao* (leaning to one side) strategy in the 1950s, the *liangge quantou daren* (fighting with two fists strategy in the 1960s, and the *yitiaoxian* (one united front) strategy in 1970s.

The yibiandao (leaning to one side) strategy

From the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the end of the 1950s, the basic characteristics of Chinese foreign policy was that China struggled against a US-led imperialist camp through the Sino-Soviet alliance established in the 1950s. This has been widely known as the *yibiandao* strategy, which was adopted on the eve of the founding of the PRC. On June 30, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the *yibiandao* in his article, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship." Mao stated:

> The forty years’ experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years’ experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean on one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road.[19]

The "leaning to one side" strategy was considered as the only option for the Chinese leadership under the specific internal and international environment at that time,[20] although in theory there might have been other choices.[21] The *yibiandao* strategy had been formally adopted by the

Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949 and embodied in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in February 1950. The "leaning to one side" strategy laid out the basic structure of Chinese foreign relations strategy in the 1950s: cooperating with the Soviet Union to struggle against the US, thus positioning China as a key member of the socialist bloc against the imperialist camp in the bipolar Cold War era.

The "leaning to one side" strategy did not mean that China would lose its independence and become a satellite state of the Soviet Union. As Qian Qichen said:

> Of course, *yibiandao* (leaning on one side) was constructed on the basis of independence, equality and mutual benefit, not fell (sic) into the Soviet Union's arms.[22]

As a matter of fact, the "leaning to one side" was just a strategy for survival, which was to guarantee China's security, sovereignty and independence as it was in no position to deter the US alone. Earlier, on June 15, 1949, Mao declared at the Preparatory Committee of the New Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that, "China must be independent, China must be liberated. China's affairs must be decided and ran by the Chinese people themselves; and no further interference, not even the slightest, will be tolerated from any imperialist country."[23] On December 8, 1956, Mao emphasized again in a meeting with provincial secretaries, "our leaning to one side means that we are on the side of the Soviet Union, this 'leaning to one side' is a relationship of equality."[24] In many ways, the "leaning to one side" strategy was a security-oriented strategy with a fixed enemy. However, the attrition in alliance cooperation and the strong desire for independence of the PRC finally eroded the basis of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The liangge quantou daren (fighting with two fists) strategy

In the 1960s, China adopted an anti-imperialist (US) and anti-revisionist (Soviet Union) international united front strategy which was known domestically as the *liangge daren* strategy,[25] or the *liangtiao xian* (two united fronts) strategy,[26] or the *shijie geming* (world revolution) strategy.[27]

The Sino-Soviet split, as well as the Sino-American confrontation, led to the adoption of this strategy by the Chinese leadership. By the end of the 1950s, Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet leader, was perceived to be ready to cooperate with the US to control the world and impose many unreasonable demands on China's sovereignty.[28] When Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders opposed the Soviet stand, Moscow then took a number of steps to threaten China politically, economically and militarily, including the withdrawal of all Soviet specialists from China, abrogation of hundreds of agreements and contracts, and the engineering of border disputes involving the encouragement of national minorities living along the Sino-Soviet border to flee the Soviet Union. As a result, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union sharply deteriorated, and confrontation and strong mutual suspicions replaced the alliance relationship.

On the other hand, the Sino-American confrontation had not shown any signs of relaxation. Although the US welcomed the Sino-Soviet split, Washington continued to isolate China. The latter became the main target of the US strategy of "containment"[29] pursued since the end of World War II. In the eyes of the US government, China was an immature, underdeveloped socialist state, similar to the Soviet Union in the Stalinist era. As such, it was adventurous and aggressive.[30] It would even be more dangerous if it became a nuclear power.[31] Hence the Kennedy administration did not regard the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to improve relations with China. Instead it considered that the Soviet Union had already become a mature socialist state sharing converging interests with the US.

Under such circumstances, China adjusted its position in the new international strategic environment. The "leaning to one side" strategy had lost its foundation, and China chose to uphold the two conspicuous flanks — anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism, as declared by Mao Zedong in early 1961.[32] This was in line with the radical domestic political programme pursued by Mao at the time.

The "fighting with two fists" strategy declared by Mao was a passive response to the new international strategic power configuration. To a considerable extent, it was a product of "leftist-deviationists" thinking of Mao and other Chinese leaders. The "fighting with two fists" strategy pushed China to confront the two superpowers at the same time. Such

an unfavorable strategic position made China's nightmare come true, i.e., the US and the Soviet Union cooperated to contain China.

The yitiaoxian (one united front) strategy

In view of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, especially the armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, the Chinese leadership realized that China's biggest threat came from the north. China's very survival was at stake, and China had to change its "fighting with the two fists" strategy to escape from this strategically disadvantageous position.

In preparation for the increasing military threats from the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong called for "preparation for war, for famine and for the people," while looking for allies to deter the Soviet Union. The best choice obviously was the US, the only country that could stand up to the Soviet militarily. Hence China had to improve its relations with the US. As the US also faced considerable pressure from the Soviet Union's expansionist designs and wanted to withdraw from the Vietnam War, President Nixon in fact made the initiative to approach China, which objectively offered China an opportunity to exploit the contradiction between the two superpowers. "We must win over one of the two superpower (hegemons), never fight with two fists," declared Mao, "we can take advantage of the contradiction between the two superpowers, and that is our policy."[33]

Based on the common interest of deterring the Soviet Union, China and US normalized their relations in February 1972. In his meeting with Henry Kissinger a year later, February 17, 1973, Mao Zedong explained his *yitiaoxian* strategy: "I talked with a foreign friend and indicated that I want to draw a line, i.e., the latitude lining up the US, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Europe."[34] The essence of this strategy was to unite all the forces that could be united, including the US to fight against the Soviet Union. Despite the death of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976, the *yitiaoxian* strategy continued until 1982-1983. While meeting the chief editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* on November 15, 1980, Deng Xiaoping still held the position that efforts had to be made to contain Soviet expansion, as long as the Soviet hegemonic strategy did not change. Deng did not anticipate improvements in Sino-

Soviet relations then; and he hoped that Sino-US relations would continue to develop, as this was the demand of China's global strategy.[35]

In sum, China greatly benefited from the *yitiaoxian* strategy. Not only had China realized its security benefits, but the Sino-US rapprochement also promoted China's relations with many other countries, especially Western countries.[36] As a result, China emerged from its isolation to the world community and laid a solid foundation for the next phase of "reform and opening to the outside world" could not have been so smooth and the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the so-called "Chinese Miracle" might have encountered many more obstacles.[37] The *yitiaoxian* strategy facilitated China to become part of the international system, and this was an important legacy of Mao's final years.

Chinese Foreign Relations Strategies in the Era of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997)

Chinese foreign relations strategies under Deng covered both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, during which China had a broad agenda including economic construction and opening to the outside world, national reunification, securing global and regional security, and the establishment of a new political and economic order. Despite dramatic events, such as major changes in Eastern Europe, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the bipolar system and the termination of the Cold War, Chinese foreign relations strategies maintained considerable community. They may be divided into three phases.

Duli zhizhu de heping waijiao (independent and peaceful) (1982-1989)

Independence has always been the basic characteristic of the Chinese revolution and PRC's foreign policy; it was described as the "fundamental characteristic" of new China's foreign policy.[38] The 12th National Congress of the CPC is considered a turning point in Chinese foreign policy, in which Chinese leadership clearly established its guidelines for its foreign relations strategy, i.e., a foreign policy of independence and peace. Deng Xiaoping declared, in his opening address to the Congress on Sept. 1, 1982:

> China's affairs should be run in the light of China's specific conditions and by the Chinese people themselves. Independence and self-reliance

> have always been and will always be our basic stand. While we Chinese people value our friendship and cooperation with other countries and other people, we value even more our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country can expect China to be its vassal nor can it expect China to accept anything harmful to China's interests.[39]

Taoguang yanghui (adopting a low profile) strategy (1989-1995)

Deng Xiaoping articulated a series of principles in handling China's difficult international environment in the wake of the Tiananmen incident. In 1989-1991, China suffered from economic sanctions imposed by the West, and had to deal with the implications of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as well as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. In this talk with leading members of the CPC-Central Committee on September 4, 1989, Deng stated:

> In short, my views about international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act calmly. Don't be impatient; it is no good to be impatient. We should be calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something – something for China.[40]

On December 4, 1990, Deng enunciated a further set of principles China should uphold in dealing with the international situation:

> There are many unpredictable factors affecting the international situation, and the contradictions are becoming increasingly evident. The current situation is more complex and chaotic than in the past, when the two hegemonist powers were contending for world domination. No one knows how to clear up the mess. Some developing countries would like China to become leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that – this is one of our basic state policies. We can't afford to do it and besides, we aren't strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative. China will always side with the Third World countries, but we shall never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader. Nevertheless, we cannot simply do nothing in international affairs. We have to make our contribution. In what respect? I think we should help promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order. We

> do not fear anyone, but we should not give offense to anyone either. We should act in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and never deviate from them.[41]

Deng's strategy might be summarized as follows:

- *lengjing guancha* – observe and analyze (developments) calmly;
- *wenzhu zhenjiao* – secure (our own) position;
- *chenzhuo yingfu* – deal (with changes) patiently and confidently;
- *taoguang yanghui* – conceal (our) capabilities and avoid the limelight;
- *shangyu shouzhuo* – be good at keeping a low profile;
- *juebu dangtou* – never become a leader;
- *yousuo zuowei* – strive to make achievements.[42]

The objectives of Deng Xiaoping's *taoguang yanghui* strategy was to make sure that China would continue to seize every opportunity to develop the economy. According to Deng's design, if China could reach the goal of quadrupling its GNP by the end of the century, then "in another 30 to 50 years our country will rank among the first in the world in overall strength. That will really demonstrate the superiority of socialism." [43] By definition, the *taoguang yanghui* strategy should be carried out in a non-confrontational manner and cooperation with all countries should be encouraged.

The shijie duoihua (world multipolarization) strategy since 1966[44]

Since the mid 1990s, especially after the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996, China has accelerated the pace of promoting the establishment of a new international political and economic order through establishing strategic partnerships with the major powers of the world.

During Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in April 1996, China and Russia declared that they had established a "strategic cooperative partnership" based on equality and mutual trust. One year later during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow, Jiang and Yeltsin signed the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration on the Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New World Order.

In May 1997, China and France also established a "comprehensive cooperative partnership" to promote the process of global multi-polarization. During Jiang Zemin's state visit to the US in September 1997, the two leaders stated that both countries were determined to build toward a constructive strategic partnership. Bill Clinton's return visit to China in June and July in 1998 demonstrated that his administration has recognized China as a rising and responsible power, and would pursue a policy of engagement to encourage China to accept the existing international norms defined by the Western world.

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While promoting the development of multipolarization, China plans to manage its relations with the major powers in the context of strategic partnerships. According to Chinese leaders, strategic partnerships imply that major powers should avoid becoming opponents, and instead should strive to cooperate. At the minimum, they should accept the *san bu* (three no's), i.e. *bu jiemeng, bu duikang, bu zhendui disangfang* (non-alliance, non confrontation, against no third party).[45] By weaving this net, China has been achieving a favorable position in the fierce competition and adjustment among the great powers in the context of the pursuit of primacy in the 21st century.

Table 1: China's Foreign Relations Strategies Under Mao and Deng (1949-1997): A Systematic and Comparative Study

	Mao Zedong's Era (1949-1976)	Deng Xiaoping's Era (1978-197)
Main Strategic Decisions	1) The "Leaning on One Side" Strategy 2) The "Fighting with Two Fists" Strategy 3) The "One United Front" Strategy	1) The Independent and Peaceful Diplomatic Strategy 2) The "Taoguang Yanghui" 3)The World Multipolarization Strategy
Goals (Priorities)	1) Security 2) Sovereignty and National Independence 3) International Status and Prestige	1) Peaceful Environment for the Four Modernizations 2) The New International Political and Economic Order
Theoretical Foundations	"War and Revolution"	"Peace and Development"
The Strategic Means	The United Front	1) Balance of Power 2) Opening to the Outside World
Patterns of Strategic Behavior	1) Alliance 2) Pseudo-strategic Alliance	1) Non-Alliance and Independence 2) Strategic Partnership
Influence on China	Emphasis on Political and Military Dimensions as a Strategic Power	Emphasis on the Economic, Political and Military Dimensions of a Major Power
Influence on the World	Strategic Balance of Power in the Cold War Era	Push for Mulit-polarity in the Post-Cold War Era and Offer a Chinese Model of Managing Major Powers Relations
Characteristics	1) Strategy with a Fixed Enemy 2) Security-oriented Strategies 3) World Revolution with Heavy Ideological Overtones 4) Idealistic with Pragmatic Characteristics	1) Strategy Without a Fixed Enemy 2) Modernization-oriented Strategy 3) Realistic and Pragmatic

A Comparative Analysis of Chinese Foreign Relations Strategies Under Mao and Deng

From the accounts above, we now have a clear map to trace the course of the evolution of Chinese foreign relations strategies since 1949. We now attempt to compare the objectives, the theoretical foundations, the strategic means, the influences on China and the world, and characteristics of Chinese foreign relations strategies under Mao and Deng. (See Table 1)

Goals

The goals of Chinese foreign relations strategies under Mao may be ranked as follows: 1) to safeguard national security; 2) to guarantee China's hard-won state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 3) to enhance China's international status. In this sense, the foreign relations strategies under Mao were basically for survival and were security oriented strategies.[46] In Deng Xiaoping's era, the priorities of Chinese foreign relations were different: 1) to maintain a peaceful international environment for the pursuit of the Four Modernizations;[47] and 2) to promote the establishment of the new international political and economic order. In the opening address at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in 1982, Deng declared:

> To step up socialist modernization, to strive for China's unification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, and to oppose hegemonism and work to safeguard world peace – these are the three major tasks of our people in the 1980s. Economic construction is at the core of these tasks; it is the basis for the solution of our external and internal problems.[48]

In a meeting with foreign guests on April 4, 1990, Deng emphasized again that "without the Four Modernization, China will not get the international status that it should have."[49] In this sense, the foreign relations strategies under Deng can be described as modernization-oriented strategies. As Paul Kennedy described in his book, China under Deng is "a country straining to develop its power (in all sense of that word) by every pragmatic means, balancing the desire to encourage enterprise and initiative and change with an *etatiste* determination to direct events so that the national goals are achieved as swiftly and smoothly as possible."[50]

Theoretical foundations

The main themes of the foreign relations strategies under Mao were war and revolution, while peace and development were those of Deng's era. His early experience and almost 30 years of struggle for victory of communism in China made Mao hold an orthodox Leninist worldview: war causes revolution and revolution prevents war. Mao considered China a revolutionary country, which should support revolutions in other countries.[51] Mao's ideal were fully reflected in an editorial of the People's Daily in early 1965, which openly presented the slogan of "world revolution" as a guide for Chinese foreign policy.[52] These themes had a significant impact on Mao Zedong's perceptions of the world, e.g., those of a world war. Mao always believed that world war is inevitable and China must be prepared for it as soon as possible – for the great world war, and even for a nuclear war. In October 1970. Mao observed that: the danger of the new world war still exists," though "the main trend of the world today is revolution."[53]

In contrast to Mao's worldview and observations on the question of war and peace, Deng Xiaoping concluded that world war could be delayed and even avoided. In a speech on China's international status and foreign policy on June 4, 1985, Deng considered that:

> China had made two important changes in our assessment of the international situation and in our foreign policy. The first change is our understanding of the question of war and peace. We used to believe that war was inevitable and imminent. Many of our policy decisions were based on this belief, including the decision to disperse production projects in three lines, locating some of them in the mountains and concealing others in caves…In short, after analyzing the general trends in the world and the environment around us, we have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent.[54]

In a talk with a delegation from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in March 1985, Deng Xiaoping noted that "peace and development are the two outstanding issues in the world today."[55] Soon afterwards, they were to be "the main themes of the contemporary world" in the political report to the 13th National Congress of the CPC in 1987;[56] and the "themes of the times" in the report to the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992.[57]

The strategic means

The foreign relations strategies under Mao were mainly implemented in the context of an international united front. The united front was one of the three "magic" weapons in the Chinese communist revolution developed by Mao Zedong; it meant uniting all the forces that could be united to fight against the main enemy. On the contrary, Deng Xiaoping adopted another line, namely, independence and non-alliance. China under Deng attempted to remain independent of the two superpowers and assume an important role in maintaining the global balance of power. Although China still declared its opposition to hegemonism, it did not specify any fixed country, neither the US nor the Soviet Union. China under Deng avoided making enemies and identifying the principal contradiction internationally, thus giving China much more room for maneuver and facilitating its maintenance of a favorable environment for its economic construction.

Patterns of strategic behavior

The patterns of strategic behavior refer to the characteristics in its dealing with the major powers. The foreign relations strategies under Mao and Deng also revealed different patterns of strategic behavior.[58] Generally speaking, the foreign relations strategies in the era of Mao reflected a pattern of alliance relationship; for example, the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. Even the international united front strategies in the 1960s and 1970s can also be categorized into the alliance paradigm, although the latter was regarded as pseudo-strategic cooperation.[59] The practice of Chinese foreign relations strategies under Deng in the 1980s and the 1990s emphasized non-alliance and independence, allowing China to play a key balancing role.

Influences on China and the world

The above foreign relations strategies naturally had significant impacts on China and the world. Mao's foreign relations strategies emphasized the political and military dimensions, and China's strategic decisions managed to influence the global power transfiguration, despite China's backwardness. The "ping pong" diplomacy in the early 1970s was a good example which not only altered the world balance of power but also promoted the pace of the world toward multipolarization.[60]

On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping's modernization-oriented foreign relations strategies were aimed at developing China into a genuine power, especially in the post-Cold War era. The emphasis was on economic and technological power, the major components of "comprehensive national strength." China also behaved as a satisfied and mature major power, accepting the existing international organizational framework and their norms. Obviously China was no longer isolated diplomatically and strategically.[61] Its future potential is well illustrated by the observation of French President Jacques Chirac that China had changed the world balance of power and it would cause the "overthrow of the planetary balance."[62] China also offered its model of managing its relations with other major powers through its independent and peaceful foreign relations strategy in the 1980s and especially the concept of strategic partnership in the 1990s. The core of the Chinese model has been non-alliance, non-confrontation and against no third party which calls for cooperation and mutual benefit on the basis of equality. This model is expected to surpass the zero-sum game between the superpowers in the Cold War era and lead toward a non-zero sum game among the great powers in the forthcoming century.

Conclusion

Through the above comparative analysis of Chinese foreign relations strategies under Mao and Deng, it is hoped that certain basic patterns in Chinese foreign relations strategy since 1949 may be identified.

In the first place, Chinese foreign relations strategies have been influenced and determined by the structure and process of the international system. The Cold War system restrained China's shifting between two poles, the US and the Soviet Union. As Andrew Nathan Robert Ross said, "Only when the military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the US eased could China also relax, taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the end of the Cold War to deal on favorable terms with both former enemies at once."[63] China's foreign relations strategy now has to focus on the US, the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era.[64] The future strengthening of China hopefully will enhance its freedom of action and reduce the restraints imposed on it by the international structure.

Secondly, the structure and process of China's internal system certainly had important impacts on the making and evolution of its foreign

relations strategies. China has experienced three phases of development: survival, development and reemergence in the era of Mao, in the era of Deng, and the post-Deng era. In the era of Mao, the unfavorable international environment was an obstacle to China's development, and Mao's radical development strategy was in line with a more ideological and dogmatic foreign relations strategy.[65] Since China's economic reform and opening to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping's modernization-oriented foreign relations strategies served his emphasis on economic construction. The third-generation of Chinese leadership and their successors in the 21st century hopefully will preside over an economically developed China, which is able to assume the role of an effective actor in the international community. With the departure of Deng Xiaoping, the making of Chinese foreign relations strategies has become more

Table 2. The Subjective-Objective Linkage Perspective in Understanding Chinese Foreign Relations under Mao and Deng (1949-1997)

	Mao Zedong's Era (1949-1976)	Deng Xiaoping's Era (1978-1997)
The Objective Determinants (Variables) Leading to the Definition of China's Foreign Relations Strategy	The International System 1) The Structure of the International System 2) The Process of the International System	The International System 1) The Structure of the International System 2) The Process of the International System
	The Domestic System 1) The Structure of the Domestic System 2) The Process of the Domestic System	The Domestic System 1) The Structure of the Domestic System 2) The Process of the Domestic System
The Subjective Determinants (Variables) Leading to the Definition of China's Foreign Relations Strategy	Decision-Makers' (Mao) 1) Level of Perception 2) Belief System 3) Rationality 4) History and Traditional Culture 5) Personality and Life Experience	Decision-Makers' (Deng) 1) Level of Perception 2) Belief System 3) Rationality 4) History and Traditional Culture 5) Personality and Life Experience

institutionalized and the bureaucracies concerned play an increasingly important role. Authoritarian leaders have been giving way to professionals.

Thirdly, the making and revolution of China's foreign relations strategies has been characterized as a subjective-objective linkage process in which the degree of the Chinese leadership's (especially Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) perceptions of the objective world had exercised a great influence on the track of Chinese foreign relations strategies. The subjective-objective linkage perspectives in understanding Chinese foreign relations strategies requires further inquiries (see Table 2).

Fourthly, China's ancient civilization and its humiliation at the hands of the foreign imperialist powers over the past century and a half have contributed a great deal to its unique strategic culture. Despite the differences between the foreign relations under Mao and Deng, one significant common theme shared by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and even Jiang Zemin has been the everlasting pursuit of the enhancement of China's international status and dignity in the international society. In Deng Xiaoping's words, "we must learn a little about Chinese history, which has been the spiritual dynamic of China's development."[66]

Finally, the making and evolution of Chinese foreign relations strategies has been a learning and adaptive process, in which China has gone through a transformation from an isolated revolutionary state to an active participant enjoying its rightful place in the international system. This transformation has shown its great impact, e.g., China's responsible behavior in the recent Asian financial crisis and the Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, and will continue to have its impact on China's diplomacy in the next century. ❁

Endnotes

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7 Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, *Zhongguo yu Dongya* (China and the East Asia), Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1990, p.i; Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, declared at the 15th Party Congress in September 1997 that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory constitute a unified scientific system imbued with the same spirit. Adhering to Deng Xiaoping Theory means genuinely upholding the banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." Quoted in Frank Ching, "Pragmatism Rules in China," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 160, October 9, 1997, p.50.

8 Between the eras of Mao and Deng, there was a two-year transitional period (1976-1978) under the leadership of Hua Guofeng, Mao's handpicked successor. This short period, however, had little influence on the continuity of China's foreign relations strategy. Some observers argue that the era of Jiang Zemin should begin with the 4th plenary meeting of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC in September 1994, when Jiang apeared to have emerged from Deng Xiaoping's shadow. See Gao Xin, *Jiang Zemin de Muliao* (Jiang Zemin's Counselors), Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1997, pp.141-144.

9 Carl von Clausewitz standard definitions of strategy and tactics are: "tactics teaches the use of forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagement for the object of war," see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (1833, 3 vols.) ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, Book 2, Chapter 1, p. 128.

10 *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1993, p. 2256.

11 Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 2-5. In his book, Luttwak also presented his own term "paradoxical logic" and divided strategy into three types: strategy as the doctrine of this or that state or military institution, strategy as actual practice, and strategy as theory, science and analysis.

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15 Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, p.57.

16 K.J. Holsti, *International Politics*, 7th ed., Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 250-288.

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22 Qian Qichen, "Xuexi Mao Zedong Waijiao Sixiang Zuohao Xinshiqi Waijiao Gongzuo" (Study Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Thought and Perform the Diplomatic Work Well in the New Era), in Pei Jianzhang (ed.) *Mao Zedong Waijiao Shixiang Yanjiu* (Study of the Diplomatic Thought of Mao Zedong), Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe (World Affairs Press), 1994, p.4.

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