

## Indonesian and Dutch Reactions to the Philippine Struggle for Independence\*

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In 1898, when American forces wrested the Philippines from Spanish rule, the Filipinos' struggle for independence drew mild reaction from a Southeast Asian neighbor of similar colonial circumstances. At that time, Indonesia, with its limited literacy and nonexistent political landscape, could not fully appreciate the repercussions of the Philippine independence movement. Only decades later did a small part of the Indonesian nationalist movement draw inspiration from its neighbor. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the political developments in the Philippines was followed closely even before the arrival of Admiral Dewey. Aware of the possible impact of the growing clamor for Philippine independence on Indonesian political parties with nationalist aspirations, the Dutch's greatest fear, however, was American abandonment of a newly-independent Philippines, which would leave the door wide open for Japanese conquest of the region. The Dutch proved to be prophetic in this regard, losing its colony in 1942.

### 1898

News about political events in the Philippines reached Java via indirect channels. In its issue of May 17, 1898, the Dutch newspaper *Java Bode*, published in Batavia, informed its readers that, according to a cable from Hong Kong received the day before, the American cruiser *MacCulloch* arrived there with the news that Admiral Dewey was still waiting for more troops before he could act. The paper added that Williams, the American consul, had landed in Cavite the week before. He was welcomed enthusiastically by the “rebels” who were shouting “*Viva Americanos!*”

Later this enthusiasm of the Filipinos would turn into — to use an understatement — bitter disappointment. But the Dutch in the East Indies were relieved when the Americans decided to stay in the Philippines. They were afraid that if the Filipinos would get their independence, the area would fall to the Japanese whose territory by that time had extended to Taiwan. This fear of the “yellow peril” was already expressed in the *Java Bode* of December 19, 1896 when the armed struggle against Spain was still going on. The article quoted F. Blumentritt's claim<sup>1</sup> that the Filipinos'

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fight for independence was a direct consequence of the Japanese victory in the war against China. It said that although for a long period feelings of discontentment had prevailed in the archipelago partly due to the embitterment of native secular priests towards the Spanish European friars, and partly because of the involvement of “liberals” who were aiming at representation in the Spanish parliament, the idea to be separated from the mother country had taken sharper forms only after the Sino-Japanese war.

The article went on to say that Filipinos were then looking at the Japanese as their “elder brothers” who might come to help them to be free. This idea of being “elder brothers” was said to have been fostered by Spanish ethnologists who reiterated that the Japanese were of the same Malay stock as the peoples of Southeast Asia including native Filipinos, an idea which was “readily accepted by the inhabitants of the Philippines, because the Tagalogs who formed a principal part of the population had intermarried with Chinese and were thus in appearance similar to the Japanese.”<sup>2</sup> It was then anticipated that Japan would play the same role as the United States with regard to the South American states such as Cuba, and would make the Philippines a kind of Japanese protectorate. As we shall see below, fear of Japan would be a recurring theme in Dutch attitudes toward American policy of decolonization in the Philippines.

Newspapers in Java like the *Java Bode* received their news by cable from Hong Kong, since there was no direct connection with Manila. Most papers in the “Outer Provinces,” however, had to rely on secondary newsprint. Readers of the *Tjahaja Sijang* — a paper published by Dutch (Protestant) missionaries in Minahasa (North Sulawesi) — for instance, were informed by contributions sent in by other readers, usually translated from papers received from Holland. Thus information about the Philippine Revolution traveled to North Sulawesi — lying just south of Mindanao — all around the globe via New York and Amsterdam. In a small item the *Tjahaja Syang*, announced in its issue of August 7, 1899, that Aguinaldo had surrendered. It was just a simple statement, without any comment. But the Minahasan contributor (A.C. Tumbel from Kendis, Tondano) of this information betrayed his sentiments by his choice of words as he said that the Filipinos had “enslaved themselves” (*memperhambakan diri*) to the Americans. (See Appendix I) Perhaps the Dutch (missionary) editors had no sufficient command of the Malay language, or they must have

agreed with the text so that it could appear in print. Minahasan readers, therefore, must have had a different appreciation from Dutch authorities about the fate that befell their northern neighbors.

During the war between Spain and the United States a strict neutrality was maintained by the Dutch government. To protect this neutral position a warship was sent to the Caribbean where the Netherlands had a few islands in the West Indies. In the Eastern Archipelago, too, a farcical small ship was sent to the north of Sulawesi (Celebes) which provoked some sarcastic comments in the *Java Bode*:

As the situation in East Asia is now growing tense and the first signs of undeniable truth are revealing itself, namely that the fate of Europe will not be decided there but in Asia, now or later; as the war between America and Spain had now its first threatening consequences for the Philippine Islands which are lying not far from the borders of our archipelago, we shall now — being a colonial power we certainly must have great interest in this struggle — have to be on the lookout. It is fortunate that we have always maintained a strong fleet in the seas of the Indies, because it is most needed there..., now we are sending a squadron (*smaldeel*), oh, no, a little ship if we could spare it yet, to the vicinity of the Sangir and Talaud islands, to inspire respect on the part of the Americans or Spaniards or both, and to keep them at a distance. The heart of our nation, seafaring people since olden times, is beating with bravado and pride to hear such joyful news. There may have been colonial millions [of guilders] thrown overboard or into the water, but one thing has been taken care of through all the years, that is for a strong marine power in the Indies which is prepared to face all kind of eventualities, and that gives us a very comforting feeling.<sup>3</sup>

During the early phase of the Revolution the Dutch government, too, had to rely on the printed press to keep abreast with political developments in the Philippines. The consul, P.K.A. Meerkamp van Embden, was in Europe when the Americans occupied Manila. But he was later sending regular reports to Batavia. The consul, however, was a businessman and was more interested in trade than in politics. Only when explicitly instructed did he send reports on the local political situation, such as the “Overview on the Political Situation in the Philippine Islands during the first four months of 1900.”<sup>4</sup> Information of the resistance encountered by American troops in the provinces abound, but it is obvious that the

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Dutch consul was hoping for an American victory. The consul also did not agree with American measures to free captured Philippine leaders after the latter have pledged an oath of allegiance to the US government. He thought that usually they would be the victim of revenge and anger of their former fellow insurgents, and they would either be forced to renounce their pledge or be killed by them. "It would be much better," he

wrote, "if the American government would banish captured Filipinos of some importance temporarily to an island of this Archipelago. With good treatment such imprisonment would hardly be felt and the Administration would be certain that they will not get any trouble from them while they would be safe from the vengeance of the Indios."

The French consul in Manila, too, in his reports to the Governor General in Hanoi, showed a clear disposition towards the occupying forces. If in April 1898 during the Spanish-American war, the consul was writing that "*ce n'est pas sans une certaine apprehension que chacun envisage l'avenir*" (it was not without a certain apprehension that everyone looks into the future), in June 1900 his successor was hoping that the situation would soon return to normal despite "*l'absence de securite des campagnes, qui sont parcourus sans cesse par des bandes d'insurges plus ou moins nombreuses*"<sup>5</sup> (the absence of safety in the province which is continuously infested with insurgent bands more or less numerous). He also reported that prices of food and daily necessities had soared during the last couple of years (See Appendix II) and warned young Frenchmen who wanted to try their luck in the Philippines to demand wages sufficient to sustain this high cost of living. Since the American government had prohibited the fabrication of local alcohol (owing to many deaths among the American troops who consumed it), the consul wondered whether French spirits could not be imported to meet local demand. He also added that abaca cultivation in Indochina could profit from the decline in production in the Philippine islands owing to the unsafe situation there.

After this short side trip to the French documents — just to show the different kinds of interest among the French and the Dutch consuls — let us now return to the Dutch agent's report<sup>6</sup> which said that the

American occupation government had occupied the harbors of Cotabato and Zamboanga and other minor ports in Mindanao as well as Jolo and Siasi which were now opened for trade. The strength of the “rebellion” has been broken, he wrote, and it is now turning into a guerrilla war. He therefore suggested to the Governor General in Bogor “without, however, giving any kind of advice in this regard” (*zonder evenwel eenigerlei raad in dit opzicht te geven*), to withdraw the warship on the north coast of Sulawesi. The Navy Command, accordingly, gave orders to the small man-of-war to leave the area.<sup>7</sup>

Another interesting aspect during this period was the visit of General Leonard Wood to the Netherlands Indies in July 1903.<sup>8</sup> After having served successfully as the military governor of Cuba since 1900, he was now appointed commander over the American forces in the Philippines, in particular over territories still under military rule. Before taking up his post, however, he wanted to learn more about colonial administrative practice, especially about the British and Dutch organization of native troops. Hence he traveled via Europe, Egypt, British India, and Java before arriving in the Philippines. With recommendations from Baron Gevers, the Dutch representative in Washington who had good relations with President Roosevelt, the colonial authorities in Java gave him VIP-treatment during his stay in the island. Because of his limited time schedule, he could not, much to his regret, visit Aceh where the war was still going on and where he had hoped to get some ideas about the situation he was going to face in Moroland. But he had ample opportunity to discuss with military authorities in Batavia the problems in Aceh, and he had made a tour of West Java where the military hospital in Cimahi drew much of his attention.<sup>9</sup>

Except for the small news item in *Tjahaja Sijang* as was mentioned above, we have no other recorded contemporary comment from the Indonesian side about the ongoing struggle in the Philippines. There is also not much information about Dutch apprehensions of similar developments in the Indies against the colonial government. A retired colonel of the KNIL (Royal Dutch Indies Army), J.F. Breyer, gave a lecture in The Netherlands in October 1899 on “Some considerations about colonial possession, also in connection with the war between Spain and the United States of America” (*Eenige beschouwingen over het koloniaal bezit, ook naar aanleiding van den strijd tusschen Spanje en de Vereenigde Staten van Noord-Amerika*).<sup>10</sup> He was not concerned that a

similar revolt would take place in the Indies. Spain was to be blamed for the events in the Philippines because of her own “colonial incapability.” He advocated a Dutch policy of promoting the welfare of the indigenous people and allowing foreign enterprises freely into the Indies: a true reflection of the general spirit of the time when the so-called Ethical Policy — the Dutch version of the White Man’s Burden and the *mission civilisatrice* — was not only moved by humanitarian considerations but also motivated by the prospect of economic gains!

## 1928

For the Indonesian people, the year 1928 is a most important milestone indeed, as on October 28, 1928, youth organizations — many of them grouped according to ethnic or geographic origins — held a general congress and pledged to recognize only one country and one nation called *Indonesia*, and speaking one national language. The event is now commemorated annually as the Youth Oath Day and is considered as the day when the Indonesian nation was born. Of course, the idea of unification had been growing for more than a decade ever since political parties were allowed to emerge by the colonial government. It also received tremendous impetus from the activities of Indonesian youth who were then studying in Holland. Perhaps owing to internal preoccupations related to attempts at national unification, there were no references during this period about Indonesian reactions on the political situation in the Philippines. At least we were not able to find written records.

There is no doubt, however, that the political elite must have known what was going on among their northern neighbors. News about the Jones Act of 1916 which created a Philippine legislature, about Governor General Harrison and his policy of “philippinization,” etc., all appeared in Dutch periodicals such as the *Indische Gids* and *Koloniale Studien*. The articles, however, were all against President Wilson’s colonial policy.

When Harrison visited Batavia in 1916 on his tour of Southeast Asia, his Dutch counterpart, Governor-General Count van Limburg Stirum, might have discussed the political changes taking place in Manila. To be sure, the report did not mention what was discussed, but when in 1918 it was decided that a People’s Council (*Volksraad*) would be set up in the Netherlands Indies, Van Limburg Stinim wanted to give the Council more extended power. The Minister for Colonial Affairs, Idenburg, however,

remarked that the Council was already much more advanced than those in British India and French Indochina, to which Van Limburg replied that the people here [in Indonesia] were not looking any more to the British and French models; instead they were comparing it with the Philippine legislative body which was far ahead indeed. Tjokroaminoto, *Volksraad* member and leader of the Sarekat Islam, wanted an elected parliament with legislative competence and a government responsible to the Council. But such far-reaching proposals were refused point blank.

Only a few people in Holland could appreciate in a positive way what was taking place in the Philippines. They were outside government circles such as C. van Vollenhoven, professor of *adat* law at Leyden University. His stay in the United States in a special mission attached to the Netherlands embassy in Washington allowed him to follow at close range the debate about Philippine independence. In several articles (1919-21) he informed the Dutch public about American commitments to decolonization. Van Vollenhoven was full of praise about the Jones Act and recommended that the Dutch adopt the institution of Resident-commissioners for Indonesians. He advocated a policy of *ontvoogding* (de-tutelage) and referred to Harrison's philippinization programme. He proposed to give autonomy to Indonesia within a short period, and pointed out that the Philippine experience should be of great benefit.<sup>11</sup>

Another positive reaction came from G.J. Nieuwenhuis who visited the Philippines in 1916 and 1921. He admired the educational system introduced by the Americans, and suggested that national education should be aimed at "Education Towards Autonomy" — which was the title of his report published in 1923. Education in the Philippines, he wrote, was more oriented towards "human development" (*menselijke ontplooiing*) whereas the Dutch in Indonesia were pursuing an educational system which was aimed at "intellectual cultivation" (*intellectuele vorming*). Nieuwenhuis proposed that the Dutch adopt the Philippine system and educate a class of autochthonous leaders. But he was against teaching English to

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very young children as they must be taught first in their own mother tongue.<sup>12</sup>

Two years after General Wood took over the governorship from Harrison, he paid a friendly visit to the Netherlands Indies in December 1923. It appeared just to be a courtesy call, but at a counter-visit of Governor General Fock in April 1924, Wood intimated two important things he wanted the Dutch to take into consideration. In the first place he wanted the Dutch to know what the consequences would be if the United States were to grant the Filipinos independence. Fock agreed that such moves would have a tremendous impact on the nationalist movement in Indonesia. Moreover, he was of the opinion that an independent Philippines could not possibly stand on their own so that sooner or later, they would fall into Japanese influence which certainly would change the political balance in the western part of the Pacific. Both governors were concerned about the possibility of a change of policy in favor of Philippine independence as there was a strong current growing in the U.S. Congress that supported Philippine demands. Wood would therefore appreciate it if the Dutch government, should the occasion arise, were to impart to American political leaders about Dutch concerns regarding steps that would give Filipinos independence "prematurely." Although Fock, according to his report to The Hague, took a rather reserved attitude during the conversation as the matter was lying outside his competence, he strongly supported the idea of conveying Dutch apprehensions in this case. He was apparently shocked that the situation which from the outside looked so firm and safe because of Wood's strong hand, was rather shaky and could change in an unexpected direction.<sup>13</sup>

In the Netherlands Fock's report was received with real concern. Of course, the Dutch could not change or protest against American policy in the Philippines. But Foreign Minister H.A. van Karnebeek expressed his views to the U.S. diplomatic representative in The Hague: "We have in Holland great dread that your country may bestow autonomy upon the Philippines. I think it would be a dreadful misfortune if the United States were to disappear as an Asiatic power. I am convinced that the Filipinos are utterly incapable of self-government. If left to themselves they would fall into hopeless disorder and would undoubtedly become a prey to Japan. It would be for us the beginning of the end, as undoubtedly we should be the next victim of the Japanese policy of imperialistic conquest."<sup>14</sup>



The second point raised by Wood was that a future war against Japan would be inevitable. It would then be a war between white people together against the yellow race over the problem of whether the control of the riches of Asia would remain in Western hands or be taken over in their own hands. In this context he proposed to hold annual meetings of colonial governors to discuss such problems of common interest. That is why he did not want, when asked by Fock, to include the Japanese governor of Taiwan in these talks. Fock countered that such *froisseering* (offense) against Japan would be very conspicuous, but Wood could not agree, whereupon the Dutch governor took a more reserved attitude. Fock also reported that Wood “was rather very militarily inclined,” an impression which was strengthened by the fact that all his advisers were military officers.<sup>15</sup>

Although an exchange of bilateral friendly visits among colonial governors in Southeast Asia took place during the interbellum period (with the exclusion of the Japanese governor in Taiwan), annual conferences as envisaged by the American governor-general never came off the ground.

The year 1928 was also a turning point for the Philippines when Henry L. Stimson arrived in Manila to assume his post as governor-general replacing Leonard Wood who died on August 7, 1927. It was the beginning of the end of “the critical decade,” and the Great Debate of 1929-1933 “towards compromise”<sup>16</sup> could begin which eventually led to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill in 1934, promising full independence after a 10-year period of Commonwealth government.

In Batavia, Fock was succeeded by A.C.D. de Graeff, former Netherlands ambassador in Washington. In Indonesian historiography he is usually described as progressive. He increased the power of the *Volksraad* and provided for a joint Indonesian and Chinese majority in the Council which drew the comment of Stimson (at the time still governor-general) that “De Graeff has been introducing our methods.” But De Graeff, too, was of the opinion that the Americans were acting too hastily and on too wide a scale to give the Philippine Legislature so much power.

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More exhaustive research has to be carried out to dig out Indonesian reactions from the newspapers and documents. During this period the Indonesian press was actively disseminating news about developments in the Philippines. In Holland, Lambertus N. ("Nick") Palar, Indonesian associate of the *Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen* (Dutch Alliance of Trade Unions), gave a review of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in the weekly *De Strijd* (The Struggle). In his analysis he also mentioned American motives that made acceptance of the bill possible: the actions of economic pressure groups and resistance against Philippine migration in the United States. He argued that the Americans wanted to remain good friends with Filipinos, which would be advantageous to the United States if a war on supremacy in the Pacific would break out.<sup>17</sup>

It goes without saying that the acceptance of the Act by the U.S. House of Representatives was received enthusiastically in Indonesian nationalist circles. In a meeting of the Jakarta branch of Partindo, Amir Sjarifuddin and Mohammad Yamin gave glowing speeches, and the board decided to send a cable of congratulations to Manuel Quezon.

## 1938

In Indonesian historiography, the year 1938 is not as significant a year such as, for example, 1928 and 1945. In the present context, however, it should have our special attention as it was in November of that year when the Dutch government rejected the Soetardjo Petition. Soetardjo and the co-signers of the petition in the People's Council (Ratu Langi, Kasimo, Datoe Toemenggoeng, Ko Kwat Tiong and Alatas) submitted on July 15, 1936, pleaded for a conference between representatives of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies to discuss "on an equal footing a plan that would give the Netherlands Indies a state of independence through gradual reforms within a period of ten years, within the context of Article 1 of the [Dutch] Constitution."

Although not explicitly stated, the time span of 10 years would suggest that the petitioners had the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill in mind. Indeed during the debate the Philippines was frequently mentioned. Some opponents of the petition remarked that events in neighboring Philippines had stimulated in Indonesia the wish to become independent. But, they argued, the Philippines is not a good point for comparison. There the forced conversion of the indigenous people to Christianity

under Spanish rule resulted in a more Western-oriented development of the people, and broad layers of the population were more educated and had grown into a more homogeneous unity than the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago. Moreover, some voiced warnings that great difficulties were expected for the Philippines in connection with their independence.<sup>18</sup>

The signers replied in a memorandum (received August 15, 1936), wondering what kind of difficulties were expected in connection with Philippine independence, although they believed that such problems should be safely left to the Philippine leaders themselves who had, according to the opinion of competent American statesmen, revealed an unequalled degree of statemanship" (*dat men die vraagstukken gerust aan de Philipijnsche leiders kan overlaten, waarvan velen volgens het oordeel van competente Amerikaansche staatslieden een ongeevenaarde staatsmanskunst hebben geopenbaard*).

They agreed that the independence movement in Indonesia was also being influenced by events in the Philippines. Surely one could not expect a Chinese wall to be erected to keep off the influx of ideas from abroad. Ideas happen to be toll-free, even though expressions of them are sometimes obstructed (*Gedachten zijn nu eenmaal tolvrij, al legt men ook de uitingen ervan aan banden*).

But if some members thought to be free to ascribe the progress of the Philippines to Christianity, then the signers — although reluctantly — could refer to Japan which was not a Christian country, yet had experienced in a time span of 10 years a development in the Western sense that could not be demonstrated anywhere else. For the rest the signers considered it unnecessary to make comparisons with other countries. One had to judge what was possible and needed in Indonesia.<sup>19</sup>

The Dutch refusal of the Soetardjo petition was in sharp contrast with American policy in the Philippines where, since 1935, Manuel L. Quezon had become President of the Commonwealth. It is also very significant that the Netherlands did not even send good wishes to the new state. After the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Dutch attitude plainly ignored the Philippines. There was no official information about the Commonwealth.

This “cold-shoulder” treatment was already evident on Quezon’s visit to Indonesia in 1934 on his way to Paris. The Dutch could not refuse as the request had come from the American government. But when the American consul in Batavia arranged an audience with the governor-general, the latter received “mister” Quezon without enthusiasm. In 1939, the President of the Commonwealth wanted to embark on a grand tour of Southeast Asia which would include the Netherlands Indies, but there was some pressure from the Dutch on the State Department to make him abandon his plan.

On the other hand, Indonesian nationalist circles welcomed the political changes in the Philippines with great interest, and Quezon’s visit was awaited with great expectations. He was, however, very prudent during this visit and limited his public talks to compliments and generalities only. But personal contacts were established. And when the Commonwealth was officially established, the occasion gave rise to a grand meeting of eleven political organizations at the initiative of M.H. Thamrin, leader of the *Nationale Fractie* in the People’s Council. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, *Volksraad* member, was sent to Manila by the PPPI (*Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Students) to convey the good wishes of the conference. Many Indonesian newspapers published articles about “the great step towards independence of the Philippines,” and Thamrin himself made an obvious comparison in the *Volksraad* that after barely 40 years of American rule in the Philippines, they soon will have full independence, whereas Indonesians after three hundred years of Dutch colonization were still unfree.<sup>20</sup>

Thus developments in the Philippines had given hope to the *ko*-group (*i.e.*, those who chose to cooperate with the government) of the nationalist movement that the cherished dream of Indonesian independence, too, could be achieved through legislative channels. However, the rejection of the Soetardjo Petition in the People’s Council after more than two years of stalling, was a turning point. Thamrin who had voted for the petition, would then look for other alternatives which made him suspect (of secretly working with the Japanese) and resulted in his arrest in January 1941. He died soon afterwards and his death was commemorated in the Philippine Assembly by Maximo Kalaw who remembered him, as many of his colleagues did, as “the Indonesian Quezon.”<sup>21</sup>

Events in the Philippines remained prominently exposed in the Indonesian nationalist press. For example, the Dutch-language *Nationale Commentaren* published by Dr. G.S.S.J. Ratu Langj, one of the co-signers of the Petition, informed its readers in almost every issue about happenings in the Commonwealth, and many covers were devoted to Philippine matters. (See Appendix III)

### Conclusion

It was only during its later phase that repercussions of the Philippine struggle for independence were felt in the Netherlands Indies as a small part of the Indonesian nationalist movement drew inspiration from political developments in Manila. During the earlier years, modern political organizations were nonexistent in Indonesia; moreover, literacy in Western languages was limited to a very small elite who were mostly fluent in Dutch only. But as soon as information seeped through from the Philippines, our nationalist leaders made use of the experiences of their colleagues in the north. Of course they admired the skill and adroitness of Philippine political leaders to negotiate and achieve most of their objectives, but they also appreciated American large-mindedness and loyalty to democratic principles, whereas back home they were only encountering a Dutch stone wall. Two other groups of the nationalist movement have not been reviewed in this paper: the non-cooperative group and the communists. Members of the first group were mostly in jail or in political exile, while the latter worked underground and had a network of their own. Further studies could throw more light to complete our historical picture.

Dutch circles closely followed political developments in the Philippines from the very beginning. Naturally they were concerned about the impact on Indonesian political parties, but they felt themselves capable and strong enough to deal with nationalist aspirations. Their greatest fear, however, was the possibility of American abandonment of their colony which would allow Japan to enter the scene. Of course they could do nothing to influence US moves with regard to the Philippines. The only measure left for them was to build up a good defense force in the Archipelago, but it was too late. Their apprehensions of this Japanese threat proved to be right, because the invasion and subsequent Dutch capitulation in March 1942 marked the end of centuries of Dutch rule.

Thus Indonesians became independent in fewer than ten years since the Soetardjo Petition was submitted. ❁

### Endnotes

- 1 F. Blumentritt, "Der Aufstand auf den Philippinen," *Globus* No. 14, September 1896.
- 2 J. G. Doorman, "De Philippijnen," *Java Bode*, December 19, 1896 (from *Vragen des Tijds*, The Hague, October 8, 1896).
- 3 *Java Bode* of May 16, 1898, English translation by ABL from the original Dutch: *Nu het in Oost-Azie gaat spannen en het eerste teeken zich openbaart van de onloochenbare waarheid dat het lot van Europa niet daar maar in Azie zal worden beslist, thans of later; nu de oorlog tusschen Amerika en Spanje de eerste dreigende uitwerking gehad heeft voor de Philippijnsche eilanden, die niet zoo heel ver aflaggen van de grenzen van onzen archipel, nu zullen wij, die als koloniale mogendheid zeker groot belang, hebben bij den strijd, toch ook een oog in het zeil gaan houden. Gelukkig dat wij altijd in de Indischewateren eene krachtice vloot hebben, omdat die daar't meest noodig is .... ; thans zenden wij een smaldeel, o neen, een klein scheepje, als we het nog missen kunnen, naar de buurt van de Sangi-en Talauer-eilanden, om daarmede Amerikanen of Spanjaarden of beiden respect in the boezemen en op een afstand te houden. Het hart onzer natie, een zeevarend volk van ouds, klopt van fierheid en trots op zulk een heuglijk bericht. Mogen er al vele koloniale millioenen over den balk of in het water zijn geworpen, voor eene zaak is echter door alle tijden heen goed gezorgd, dat is voor eene flinke zeemacht in Indie, op alle eventualiteiten voorbereid; en dat stemt erg geruststellend...*
- 4 *Arsip Nasional R.I.* Kommissoriaal, June 22, 1900, No. 13764. Consulate of the Netherlands in Manila, May 15, 1900, No. 62. "Overzicht van den politieke toestand in de Philippijnsche Eilanden gedurende de eerste maanden van 1900."
- 5 *Archives de France*, Aix-en-Provence. Gouverneurs-Generaux 54.398. The French consul at Manila to the Governor-General of Indochina in Hanoi, Manila, April 15, 1898, No. 175, and the French consul at Manila to the Governor-General in Saigon, Manila, June 15, 1900, No. 122.
- 6 P.K.A. Meerkamp van Enibden to the Governor General, Manila, December 31, 1899, No. 136 Geheim.
- 7 *Arsip Nasional*, Geheime Missive Gouvernements Secretaris, No. 109, Geheim. Ag. 7716/00 Afd. E, Buitenzor, April 12, 1900.
- 8 *Arsip Nasional*, Besluit No. 13, Tjipanas, July 5, 1903.
- 9 N.A. Bootsma, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
- 10 *Vereeniging ter beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap 1899-1900*: 8-50, quoted in Bootsma, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
- 11 *Mr. C. Van Vollenhoven's verspreide geschriften*. Haarlem-The Hague, 1935, vol. III. Bootsma, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
- 12 Bootsma, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 52.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 52.
- 16 Samuel K. Tan, *The Critical Decade 1921-1930*, Chapter 5. CSSP Publications, Manila, 1993.
- 17 Palar, L.N. "Philippijnsch invloed op de Indonesische vrijheidsbeweging," *De Strijd*, 1933, 4:84.

- 18 *Indonesie Zefstandig - Petitie Soetardjo, door de Onderteekenaars der Petitie* [Soetardjo, Ratu Langi, Kasimo, Datoe' Toemenggoeng, Ko Kwat Tiong, Alatas], Batavia, 1937, p. 26. (Afdelingsverslag, August 1, 1936).
- 19 "Wanneer echter enkele leden de vrijheid meenen te mogen nemen den meerderen vooruitgang der Philippijnen te mogen toeschrijven aan het Christendom, dan mogen onderteekenaars, zij het met schroom wijzen op Japan, dat geen Christenland is, en nochtans binnen een tijdvak van zestig jaar een ontwikkeling in Westerschen zin heeft doorgemaakt, zooals nergens is aan te wijzen. Overigens achten onderteekenaars het niet noodig vergelijkingen te maken met andere landen, men heeft te beoordeelen, wat hier noodig en mogelijk is" (*Ibid.* p. 34).
- 20 Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires. The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946*. New Haven-London, 1965, pp. 169-170. Bootsma, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.
- 21 Bootsma, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

Appendix I. Tjukajo Sjong, August 7, 1899, page 4, showing the news item about President Aguinaldo's surrender.

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Dengan ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Lelutera ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

**BUPA-BUPA CEMARA DALAM SURAT CERAMAH „PEWAKTA BUKU“ JANG YER-RIET DARI NOTA AMSTERDAM.**

Meneri ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Maka ... dan ...  
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Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

Di ... dan ...  
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... di dik ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

... di dik ... dan ...

**Akan hal Collect, mengumpulkan derma.**

Maka ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

... di dik ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...

... di dik ... dan ...  
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... di dik ... dan ...  
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... di dik ... dan ...  
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... di dik ... dan ...  
... di dik ... dan ...



Appendix II: From Archives de France, OC, 34.318, Manila, June 15, 1900, No. 122. Fragment of Dutch colonial report showing the differences in food prices in 1897 and 1900.

à Washington, et que le gouvernement a aussi une augmentation de 50% sur les traitements et soldes du personnel de cette colonie, qui ne seraient payés en dollars ou

Voici d'ailleurs une comparaison à prix d'un certain nombre d'articles de consommation entre les années 1897 & 1900, qui est donnée par un journal de Manille et qui est assez exacte, ainsi que celle d'autres dépenses forcées :

### Consommables.

Prix en Piastres  
En 1897    En 1900

1 livre de viande de bœuf sans os	0.25	1.00
1 boîte de pain d'oreilles à 8 livres	1.50	3.50
1 sacou de riz de 1 <sup>re</sup> qualité	2.50	5.75
1 livre de viande de porc	0.20	0.50
1 livre de viande de mouton	0.20	0.75
1 livre de pommes de terre	0.05	0.10
1 livre d'ignames	0.05	0.10
1 livre de quinquina (pas sèche)	0.15	0.40
1 pouce	0.15	0.50
1 pouce	0.50	1.25
1/2 de litre d'huile d'olive	1.00	2.00
1 bouteille de vinaigre	0.20	0.40
1 œuf de poule	0.05	0.05
1 œuf de cane	0.05	0.05
1 petit pain	0.05	0.05
1 chopin de lait de bufflonne	0.05	0.10
1 livre de café moulu	1.50	0.50
1 goute de cacao en amandes	1.50	3.00
1 1/2 ————— moulu	2.00	4.00

