

Patrimonial Barriers to Political and Economic Development

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An apparent reality among many post-colonial states of the third world is that some states attained democratization and economic development more successfully than others. Corollarily, the more successful nations or developmental states do not share the patrimonial nature other states possess. In the attempt to explain this phenomenon, one hypothesis purports that there is an inverse correlation between a nation's level of patrimonialism and a nation's degree of economic development and democratization. Patrimonialism thus represents a barrier to both economic growth and democracy. In the economic sphere, while developmental states adopt strategic industrial policies toward industrialization and put a high premium on efficiency and productivity, patrimonial states cater to particularistic interests rather than national development. In the political realm, the same antithetical rule holds for democratic states, as political power is based upon the rule of law and political parties act as mobilizing interest groups. In patrimonial states, the ruler is above the law and the parties function to cater to patronage politics; thus, the state becomes detrimental to democratic consolidation. Through a constructed system of rankings for the degree of patrimonialism of some twenty-five states, the paper shows how patrimonialism poses a potential barrier to stable democratic polities and the promotion of economic growth.

Introduction

Since attaining their independence, the post-colonial states of the Third World have faced a number of political and socio-economic challenges. However, the two major challenges facing them have been, and continue to be, the consolidation of democratic systems, and the promotion of economic development. Some Third World states have been more successful than others at dealing with these challenges, experiencing "miraculous" rates of growth, and extended periods of stable democratic rule. In an attempt to explain the disparate experiences of the post-colonial states, this paper will argue that the patrimonial nature of many

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Third World states represents a major barrier to their political and socio-economic development.

According to Weber, a patrimonial state is one where:

Practically everything depends explicitly upon personal considerations: upon the attitude toward the concrete applicant and his concrete request and upon purely personal connections, favors, promises, and privileges.¹

The following represent some of the essential features of patrimonial states: the exchange of resources from political officials to their associates; policies tend to be particularistic, rather than universalistic in nature; the rule of law is secondary to the "rule of man"; and political officials tend to blur the boundaries between the public and private realms.²

Today, many of the post-colonial states of the Third World remain patrimonial.³ In actuality, these states should really be referred to as neo-patrimonial, because they exhibit patrimonial features, while possessing bureaucracies. Weber had predicted that patrimonialism would disappear in the advent of rational-legal bureaucracies.⁴ However, this has not been the case.

In order to examine the impact of patrimonialism on political and economic development, the author has constructed a system for ranking nations for their degree of patrimonialism. This ranking system will facilitate the testing of the following two hypotheses: HYPOTHESIS ONE: Patrimonialism represents a barrier to economic growth. Therefore, there should be an inverse correlation between a nation's level of patrimonialism and its degree of development. HYPOTHESIS TWO: Patrimonialism represents a barrier to democracy. As a result, there should be an inverse relationship between a nation's level of patrimonialism, and its degree of democratization.

In the following two sections, the logic behind these hypotheses will be laid out. After which, these hypotheses will be tested by ranking twenty-five Third World nations with regard to their levels of patrimonialism, development, and democracy. This section will test the hypothesis that there should be an inverse correlation between levels of patrimonialism and degrees of democratization and development. In so doing, it will

facilitate our understanding of the barriers Third World nations face in their struggles to promote economic growth and stable democratic rule.

Patrimonialism and Economic Development

In order to explain the tremendous growth of the East Asian NICs, many social scientists have referred to these nations as developmental states.⁵ This section will argue that patrimonial states could not foster capitalist development the way the developmental states of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore did.

Capitalism requires the depersonalization of economic and political activity, so that economic decision-making can be based upon rational, profit-seeking criteria. Such a depersonalization of the political and economic realms represents the antithesis of the patrimonial state. For Weber:

The patrimonial state lacks the political and procedural predictability, indispensable for capitalist development which is provided by the rational rules of modern bureaucratic administration. Instead, we find unpredictability and inconsistency on the part of the court and local officials, and variously benevolence and disfavor on the part of the ruler and his servants.⁶

This unpredictability and inconsistency prevents the patrimonial state from adopting a coherent set of economic policies. The developmental states used strategic industrial policies in order to foster industrialization. Industries were targeted based upon the developmental goals of the state. Unlike their counterparts in developmental states, patrimonial officials tend to be more interested in promoting their own interests, or those of their associates, rather than national development. Thus, patrimonial states tend to promote those industries which enjoy close ties to the political officials. Connections, rather than considerations of efficiency or productivity, determine which industries are promoted. As the former Prime Minister of Thailand, Anand Panyarach,

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puts it: "It has been said that Thai industry rests not on 'know-how' but on 'know-who'."⁷

Particularistic interests prevail in patrimonial states. According to Christopher Clapham: "This can lead to allocations often very different from those which would be produced by 'universal' criteria of efficiency and need: the road goes to the 'wrong' place; the 'wrong' person gets the job."⁸ Rather than rationally allocating resources in order to further the "general interest", capital is allocated according to the interests of the officials and their cronies.

In contrast, the developmental states channeled resources to the industries which they had targeted in their strategic industrial policies. This has not been the case in patrimonial states for two reasons. First, as was discussed previously, resources are allocated based upon particularistic considerations. The allocation of capital tends to be motivated more by the desire to gain popular support, rather than by the issues of efficiency or productivity. Second, patrimonial officials treat their national treasuries as their private "piggy banks", to be plundered at will. As a result, they have little money left over for promoting industrialization. In the patrimonial state, the developmental program is forced to make-do with whatever is left after the officials and their associates have raided the nation's treasury.

- Due to this plundering, patrimonial states are unable to assume another role played by their developmental counterparts: creators of an environment conducive to private entrepreneurship. Patrimonialism promotes rentier, rather than productive activities. This is the case not only for the officials and their associates, but for the prospective entrepreneurs as well.
- Patrimonialism discourages productive activity in a number of ways. First, in patrimonial systems, the route to wealth lies through the state, not production. According to Sayre Schatz:
- Due to its emphasis upon personal connections and considerations, a patrimonial state would be hard pressed to play the role of a developmental state. The focus upon connections, as opposed to considerations of efficiency and productivity, prevents the patrimonial state from developing a coherent development strategy.

For the most vigorous, capable, resourceful, well-connected, and "lucky" entrepreneurs (including politicians, civil servants, and army officers) productive economic activity, namely, the creation of real income and wealth, has faded in appeal. Access to, and manipulation of, the government spending process has become the golden gateway to the future.⁹

As the elites become increasingly dependent upon the state, their willingness to engage in risk-taking enterprises declines accordingly. In the words of one Nigerian observer: "One of the most challenging problems is that we prefer to consume without producing. That is why we contest political power so fiercely. Political power gives us abundant coercive resources to appropriate and consume."¹⁰

In lieu of production, the elites in patrimonial systems focus their attention on real estate, and other speculative activities.¹¹ They tend to be risk-averse when it comes to going into manufacturing or other productive activities. In recent years, the Filipino oligarchs have fueled a boom in the real estate markets of Manila, Cebu, and other large Philippine cities. Luxury hotels, condominiums, and "mega-malls" have risen up in these cities. In the Philippines, property, not production, is the major source of economic wealth.

The elites in patrimonial systems tend to use their connections to the political officials in order to acquire vast property holdings. Once involved with real estate, they rarely venture into the risky world of manufacturing. In other words,

[They] do not operate in the true capitalist spirit and are not primarily businessmen. They are not involved in the good management of their enterprises, nor do they reinvest their profits locally. Instead, they pillage what they have taken, amassing vast wealth from their mismanaged but extensive holdings and spending it on themselves. These parasitic practices suck wealth out of the economy rather than [expand] it.¹²

Patrimonialism not only discourages productive activities among the "favored" elites, but also among the non-favored, potential entrepreneurs. This is because these individuals come to feel as if the only way to make

money is through connections, which they lack. According to an Indonesian economist:

The presence of vested interests discourages entrepreneurs from taking the risks they ought to be taking. They convince many Indonesian businessmen that the only way to get ahead is to cultivate friendships with government officials.¹³

Due to its emphasis upon personal connections and considerations, a patrimonial state would be hard-pressed to play the role of a developmental state. The focus upon connections, as opposed to considerations of efficiency and productivity, prevents the patrimonial state from developing a coherent development strategy. Furthermore, it discourages entrepreneurship by promoting rentier activities. In the words of Thomas Callaghy: "When the rational imperatives of bureaucratic statist development came into conflict with the patrimonial core of the administrative state and its consolidating political class, the former gave way to the latter."¹⁴ Although Callaghy was describing Zaire, his words are appropriate for other patrimonial states, where developmental goals have come up against the patrimonial system, and lost.

Patrimonialism and Democracy

In recent years, authoritarian regimes around the globe have been collapsing. This section will argue that this "wave" of democratization will lose its force when it crashes against the rocks of the patrimonial state. This is the case for several reasons. First, if democracy represents majority rule, then patrimonialism stands for "favored" rule. Political decisions are not based upon the will of the majority, but rather upon the interests of the political elites and their associates. As former President Senghor of Senegal puts it:

When I say 'politics',...it is not a question of the art of governing the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations. It is a question of politician politics: the struggles of clans -- not even (ideological) tendencies -- to place well one's self, one's relatives, and one's clients in the *cursus honorum*, that is, the race for preferments.¹⁵

In the race for preferments, those with connections to the politicians end up in the "winner's circle". Unlike in a democracy, political power is not impersonal, based upon the rule of law, but rather is built upon

personal considerations. Administrative decisions are made upon a case-to-case basis, with personal connections and considerations determining the outcome.

Not only are patrimonial systems not based upon the rule of law, but patrimonial officials are above the law as well. The rulers of patrimonial states are simultaneously the source of the law and beyond its jurisdiction.¹⁶ According to the current Attorney General of Mexico, Antonio Lozano Gracia: "Operating above the law was not only at the highest levels. It was a way of life here, and that is what we are changing."¹⁷ If democracy represents the rule of law, then patrimonialism could be seen as the "rule of man". Patrimonialism bypasses such democratic institutions as the judiciary, the legislature, political parties, etc. All of these institutions lack autonomy in patrimonial states, and instead, are either the creations, or at the very least, the personal vehicles of the patrimonial leaders. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg's discussions on personal rule in Africa captures the essence of the patrimonial state:

[It] is a dynamic world of political will and action that is ordered less by institutions than by personal authorities and power; a world of stratagem and countermeasures, of action and reaction, but without the assured mediation and regulation of effective political institutions.¹⁸

Checks and balances are inoperative in the patrimonial state. As was discussed previously, the patrimonial ruler is above the law, so the judiciary is unable to serve as a "check" on his power. Similarly, parliament lacks the autonomy necessary for it to play an independent role. Rather than serving as the arena for the articulation of societal demands, it serves as the locus for the divvying up of the pork barrel.

Similarly, the political parties are unable to serve as the arena for the mobilization of societal interests. The parties are not based upon ideologies or issues, but rather, upon their ability to distribute patronage. Political parties represent little more than the private electoral vehicles of the politicians. Furthermore, opposition parties tend to be extremely weak, since they lack access to the state's patronage resources.

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In determining whether or not democracy has been consolidated, the literature on transitions from authoritarian rule has focused upon these political institutions. Successful democratization is seen as involving the holding of free elections, the writing of constitutions, and the inaugurating of new parliaments.¹⁹ For Adam Przeworski, the "institutionalization of uncertainty" is the primary indicator of democratic consolidation. When "uncertainty" has been "institutionalized", all of the political actors are willing to accept the popular will as revealed in the political market of free elections and the parliament.²⁰

In contrast, in the patrimonial state, the popular will is sacrificed to the interests of the elites and their associates. In such a system, there is little uncertainty. In fact, the only uncertainty is over the fates of the "non-favored" and "less-favored" societal members. Therefore, patrimonialism could be seen as creating an environment which is not only inhospitable to capitalist development, but democratic consolidation as well.

Testing of the Hypotheses

In order to test the hypotheses, twenty-five Third World nations were ranked with regard to their degree of patrimonialism.²¹ To do so, a ranking system was designed, which drew upon the following characteristics of patrimonialism:

a. **Policy Orientation:** To what degree are the government's policies oriented towards particularistic concerns/considerations? (1 = low, 5 = high)

b. **Basis of Rule:** To what degree is political rule based upon personalities? (1 = low, 5 = high)

c. **Personal Connections:** To what degree are political decisions based upon personal connections and considerations? (1 = low, 5 = high)

d. **Separation of the Public and Private Spheres:** To what degree do the public and private spheres tend to overlap? (1 = low, 5 = high)

To answer these questions, the author drew upon newspapers (*New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, as well as some foreign newspapers); magazines (*The Economist*, *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Africa Reports*, etc.); journals (*Comparative Politics*, *World Politics*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Current History*, etc.); and books by area specialists. While the articles used were from 1992 to the present, a few older texts and articles were used as well in order to gain a historical perspective on the case studies.

Drawing upon these disparate sources, the author was able to rank each country from one to five for each of the four patrimonial characteristics. By totalling up the scores and dividing by four, the author derived a ranking of patrimonialism for each nation, ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). For the results of that ranking, see Table 1.

Each of the countries was ranked for their degrees of democratization and development as well. For the former, Freedom House's *Freedom in the World: 1994-1995* was used. For the latter, the author drew upon the World Bank's *World Tables 1995* as well as its *World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment*. With regard to their level of democratization, the countries were ranked from 1 (low) to 3 (high). One corresponded to the Freedom House's ranking of "Not Free", 2 represented those deemed "Partly Free", and 3 was for those which were "Free". For the results, see Table 2.

Table 3 reveals the results of ranking the nations with regard to their level of economic growth. The countries were ranked based upon their 1994 rates of growth in GNP. Where 1994 data was unavailable, the 1993 statistics were used. In addition, the countries were also ranked based upon their average rates of growth in GNP from 1980 to 1992. In both cases, the following system was used:

Table 1
Rankings for Degree of Patrimonialism

	Score	Rank
<i>Low</i>		
Chile	4	1
Singapore	5	1.25
<i>Low to Moderate</i>		
Botswana	9	2.25
<i>Moderate</i>		
Ghana	12	3.00
Taiwan	13	3.25
Argentina	15	3.75
Cote D' Ivoire	15	3.75
India	15	3.75
South Korea	15	3.75
<i>Moderate to High</i>		
Malaysia	17	4.25
Peru	17	4.25
Mexico	18	4.5
Pakistan	18	4.5
Tanzania	18	4.5
Thailand	18	4.5
Venezuela	18	4.5
Paraguay	19	4.75
<i>High</i>		
Brazil	20	5.0
Gabon	20	5.0
Indonesia	20	5.0
Kenya	20	5.0
Nigeria	20	5.0
Philippines	20	5.0
Zaire	20	5.0
Zimbabwe	20	5.0

Table 2
Ranking for Democratization,
1994-1995

1 (Not Free)	2 (Not Free)	3 (Free)
Cote D'Ivoire	Brazil	Argentina
Indonesia	Gabon	Botswana
Kenya	Ghana	Chile
Nigeria	India	South Korea
Tanzania	Malaysia	
Zaire	Mexico	
	Pakistan	
	Paraguay	
	Peru	
	Philippines	
	Singapore	
	Taiwan	
	Thailand	
	Venezuela	
	Zimbabwe	

Source: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: 1994-1995* (New York: Freedom House, 1995)

Growth rates of 0-2.49%	2
Growth rates of 2.5-4.99%	3
Growth rates of 5-7.49%	4
Growth rates of 7.5-	5

On Table 4, the results of the three rankings were combined. The countries are listed as on Table 1, by their degrees of patrimonialism, from low (1) to high (5).

■ (I) In the patrimonial state, the popular will is sacrificed to the interests of the elites and their associates. In such a system, there is little uncertainty. In fact, the only uncertainty is over the fates of the "non-favored" and "less-favored" societal members. Therefore, patrimonialism could be seen as creating an environment which is not only inhospitable to capitalist development, but democratic consolidation as well.

The results generally support the hypothesis that patrimonialism represents a barrier to democratization. Table 4 shows the average democratization ranking for each category. The highest ranking (i.e. most democratic) corresponded with the least patrimonial states, while the most patrimonial states had the lowest scores when it came to democratization. Furthermore, those averages decline accordingly as you move from the least to the most patrimonial states.

None of the nations who received a 4 or higher for their patrimonialism ranking were considered democratic. Two moderately patrimonial states, South Korea and Argentina, were ranked as democracies, but none of the countries in either the "Moderate to High" categories were so ranked. Finally, the lowest democratization rankings were clearly among the most patrimonial states. While some might be inclined to view Brazil and the Philippines as fairly democratic, the same could not be said for the other highly patrimonial states in the global system. Therefore, the results tend to support the hypothesis that there should be an inverse correlation between a nation's level of patrimonialism and its degree of democratization.

The impact of patrimonialism on development was less clear-cut. On the one hand, the averages for GNP growth in 1994 and 1980 to 1992 do generally drop as one moves from the least to the most patrimonial states. On the average, the least patrimonial states had the highest growth rates. Albeit with a few exceptions, practically all of the countries who experienced either negative growth, or growth rates of only 0-2.49 percent, ranked four or higher on the scale of patrimonialism.

However, one must avoid the temptation to make too strong a claim concerning the impact of patrimonialism on development based upon these findings. While collectively, the most patrimonial states experienced the lowest growth rates, individually some of them experienced very

Table 3**Rankings by GNP growth rate, 1994**

1 (Negative)	2 (0-2.49%)	3 (2.5-4.99%)	4 (5.0-7.49%)	5 (7.5%)
Venezuela	Cote D' Ivoire	Botswana	Argentina	Malaysia
Zaire	Gabon	Ghana	Brazil	Singapore
	Kenya	India	Chile	Thailand
	Mexico	Nigeria	Indonesia	
	Philippines	Pakistan	Peru	
	Zimbabwe	Paraguay	South Korea	
		Tanzania	Taiwan	

Rankings by average annual growth rate in GNP, 1980-92

1 (Negative)	2 (0-2.49%)	3 (2.5-4.99%)	4 (5.0-7.49%)	5 (7.5%)
Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Botswana	South Korea
Cote D'Ivoire	Kenya	India	Singapore	Taiwan
Gabon	Tanzania	Indonesia	Thailand	
Ghana		Malaysia		
Mexico		Pakistan		
Nigeria				
Paraguay				
Peru				
Philippines				
Venezuela				
Zaire				
Zimbabwe				

Source: World Bank, *World Tables 1995* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995); and World Bank, *World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Table 4
Rankings for Degree of Patrimonialism,
Democratization, and Development

	<i>Patrimonialism</i>	<i>Democratization</i>	<i>GNP Growth</i> 1994	<i>Ave. GNP Growth</i> 1980-1992
<i>Low</i>				
Chile	1	3	4	3
Singapore	1.25	2	5	4
Average	-	2.5	4.5	3.5
<i>Low to Moderate</i>				
Botswana	2.25	3	3	4
<i>Moderate</i>				
Ghana	3.00	2	3	1
Taiwan	3.25	2	4	5
Argentina	3.75	3	4	1
Cote D'Ivoire	3.75	1	2	1
India	3.75	2	3	3
South Korea	3.75	3	4	5
Average	-	2.167	3.33	2.667
<i>Moderate to High</i>				
Malaysia	4.25	2	5	3
Peru	4.25	2	4	1
Mexico	4.5	2	2	1
Pakistan	4.5	2	3	3
Tanzania	4.5	1	3	2
Thailand	4.5	2	5	4
Venezuela	4.5	2	1	1
Paraguay	4.75	2	3	1
Average	-	1.875	3.25	2
<i>High</i>				
Brazil	5.0	2	4	2
Gabon	5.0	2	2	1
Indonesia	5.0	1	4	3
Kenya	5.0	1	2	2
Nigeria	5.0	1	3	1
Philippines	5.0	2	2	1
Zaire	5.0	1	1	1
Zimbabwe	5.0	2	2	1
Average	-	1.5	2.5	1.5

impressive rates of growth. For example, Indonesia and Thailand enjoyed rapid economic growth, despite their "High" and "Moderate to High" patrimonial rankings, respectively.

Additionally, unlike the democratization rankings which were fairly consistent, the development rankings fluctuate considerably within the categories. For example, in 1994, the highly patrimonial states experienced everything from negative growth to growth rates of 6.5 percent (Indonesia.) Therefore, while the results indicate that patrimonialism is often a barrier to development, it is not necessarily always a barrier.

Towards a Conclusion

This paper represents the beginning of a larger project on the impact of patrimonialism on political and socio-economic development. While it has shown a fairly strong inverse relationship between a nation's level of patrimonialism and its degree of democratization, the relationship between patrimonialism and development was less straight-forward. Although the latter results were weaker, both studies point to the need for further research in this area. This is especially true in light of the continued survival of patrimonial systems in a number of Third World states.

Future research will focus upon the experiences with democratization and development of several case studies. Through an in-depth examination

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of the case studies, a clearer picture will be provided of the relationship between patrimonialism and political as well as socio-economic development. In other words, it will contribute to a great understanding of how patrimonialism affects these processes. One potential avenue of research would be an analysis of the experiences of the Philippines (highly patrimonial), Taiwan (moderately patrimonial), and Chile (low level of patrimonialism).

An alternative approach would attempt to explain why some patrimonial states have enjoyed higher levels of

development and democratization than others. For example, a comparison of the Philippine and Indonesian experiences would provide further insight into the relationship between patrimonialism and democratization and development.

This paper has shown that the continued survival of patrimonialism represents a potential barrier to the establishment of stable democratic polities, and the promotion of economic growth. Despite Weber's prediction, patrimonial systems have not been supplanted by bureaucratic regimes. Thus, there is a need for further research to provide a deeper understanding of the prospects for political and socio-economic development in the patrimonial states of the Third World. ☉

Notes

- 1 Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Vol. 3, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968): 1041.
- 2 For example, see: S.N. Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Patrimonialism*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences, 1973); and Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaïre in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984): 45-46.
- 3 For example, see: Callaghy; Eisenstadt; Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, Vol. xxi, (July 1979); Karen L. Remmer, "Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1987," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (January 1989); and Robin Theobald, "Patrimonialism," *World Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (July 1982.)
- 4 Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985): 48.
- 5 See the compilation of essays in Frederic Deyo, *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.)
- 6 Weber, 1095; quoted in Thomas M. Callaghy, "The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa," in Zaki Ergas, ed. *The African State in Transition*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987): 102.
- 7 Patcharee Siroros and Kenneth J. Haller, "Thai 'Style' Contractual Relationships: Two Case Studies," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (December 1994): 317.
- 8 Clapham, 59.
- 9 Sayre P. Schatz, "Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (1984): 55.
- 10 *New York Times*, October 12, 1995.
- 11 See Callaghy, (1984): 53; as well as his "The State and the Development Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, and Comparative Perspectives," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989): 72; and John Iliffe, *The Emergence of African Capitalism*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983): 69.

- 12 Janet Macgaffey, *Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaïre*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 63.
- 13 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1992: 40.
- 14 Callaghy, (1987): 103.
- 15 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982): 77; originally quoted in Edward J. Schumacher, *Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 5.
- 16 Callaghy, 1987, 97.
- 17 *New York Times*, December 17, 1995.
- 18 Jackson and Rosberg, 12.
- 19 For example, see Juan Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Summer 1990): 157.
- 20 Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 14.
- 21 The countries selected were from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. None of the countries selected had experienced communist rule, or were currently at war, although some did face indigenous insurrections.