# Peace Processes and Internal Armed Conflicts

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One of the significant changes in the nature of war is the increased prevalence of internal armed conflicts. Recent peace agreements and political changes appear to have brought an end to some of these conflicts in Central America and Southern Africa. These peace processes can be analyzed in terms of three phases: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacemaking is the act of bringing hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means such as mediation, negotiation and the like. Deemed as an invention of the United Nations, peacekeeping involves the cessation of hostilities and subsequently, the creation of a demilitarized corridor on each side of the truce line. The last phase, peacebuilding, seeks to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace so as to avoid recurrence of conflict. A crucial internal factor concerning conditions for initiating peace processes is a genuine commitment of conflicting groups, as in El Salvador, both to engage in negotiation and to address underlying causes of conflict. A sustainable peace process includes a wide variety of actions contributing to the said phases, ranging from confidence-building measures to economic and political reforms. To ensure its success, it must guarantee that the conflict is demilitarized, must address social and economic issues that generate conflict within the society and must initiate political changes supporting democratization and human rights. Peacemaking must be coupled with peacebuilding activities as the former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Rather, the latter can reinforce already existing peacemaking efforts, triggering a virtuous cycle of peace.

The nature of war has changed in recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War. One of the more prominent characteristics of recent wars is the significant increase in the ratio of civilian to military casualties. Wars also tend to be longer and more pervasive but, perhaps, of less intensity. The number of armed conflicts with less than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year has increased noticeably since 1990.[1]

Moreover, non-state actors, including guerrilla, paramilitary and criminal groups, became more prominent, particularly in countries where state structures have collapsed, such as Somalia. In fact, as Mary Kaldor points out, it becomes "increasingly ... difficult to distinguish state and non-state actors" in many "new wars," precisely because these wars "arise from the erosion of state structures."[2]

Another significant change in the nature of war is the increased prevalence of internal, as distinct from international, armed conflicts. That is, armed conflict is a characteristic of contending groups within a

country, rather than occurring as transboundary wars or disputes between countries. Any analysis of peace processes must acknowledge the importance of war as a feature of social, economic or political relations within and between countries. Such an analysis, however, need not ignore the role of external factors in both triggering and sustaining internal conflicts.

Recent peace agreements and political changes appear to have brought an end to some of these internal conflicts, for instance, in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique and South Africa. An examination of the three phases or components of peace processes, conventionally described as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, helps reveal the conditions required both to initiate such processes and to sustain the peace they achieve.

## Three Phases or Components of Peace Processes

Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can each be referred to as parts of an ongoing and dynamic peace process. Furthermore, they can be described as phases of a peace process, in the above sequence. Each phase leads or contributes to subsequent phases, culminating in activities associated with peacebuilding.

I have used the term phases rather than stages to refer to them, in order to avoid analyzing peace processes in a manner either too abstract or too mechanistic. They are not meant to be exclusive since activities such as mediation might occur during any one of them, although it is perhaps more central to peacemaking activities. Nor are they meant to be deterministic, in the sense that one phase somehow necessarily leads into the next, although subsequent phases tend to build upon previous phases in a peace process. The three phases are useful only as descriptive categories aiding our understanding of actual peace processes in areas such as Central America and Southern Africa.

Moreover, there is no strict agreement as to the use of the three terms. Different commentators sometimes use the same term to refer to different aspects or components of peace processes. Michael Tucker recently referred to 17 different definitions of peacekeeping alone, again emphasizing the importance of examining case studies rather than focusing on strict definitions when analyzing peace processes. For the

sake of clarity and consistency, however, I will refer to these terms as they appear in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, through which they have recently entered wider usage.

Boutros-Ghali referred to the first phase, peacemaking, as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through ... peaceful means."[3] This can include mediation, negotiation and various forms of conflict resolution or conflict transformation.

According to Chadwick F. Alger, the second phase, peacekeeping, "essentially involves a ceasefire, followed by [the] creation of a demilitarized corridor on each side of a truce line."[4] Boutros-Ghali claims that peacekeeping "can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations,"[5] eventhough it is not mentioned in the UN Charter. It is the activity conventionally associated with UN intervention in armed conflicts, initially international but now also internal, with UN peacekeeping forces patrolling a demilitarized zone and keeping the warring factions apart. This is sometimes referred to as "classic peacekeeping," involving the impartial imposition of the armed forces of uninvolved countries between warring or conflicting groups. In addition, civilian and military involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in the form of "human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists" and even police officers has become increasingly important.[6]

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping has required the consent of all groups involved in the conflict so that peacemaking or the search for some sort of peace agreement or settlement must at least have been initiated. As Boutros-Ghali writes:

> [P]eacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained .... Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means.[7]

The general function of peacekeeping activities is to preserve or protect whatever peace agreements or political settlements conflicting groups have been able to achieve, perhaps with the help of outside agents or mediators.

Conventional peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts need to be distinguished from more recent and controversial attempts at so-called "peace enforcement" under UN auspices eventhough Mary Kaldor refers to this as "robust peacekeeping" or "second-generation peacekeeping."[8] In Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, for example, UN forces were deployed without the permission of groups or even states that are involved because there was no clear authority for granting such permission and without first obtaining a ceasefire.[9]

Also, such interventions included the use of arms by U.N. forces beyond self-defense, a traditional role on peacekeeping operations. U.N. interventions had previously occurred under the auspices of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which is restricted to peaceful means, as opposed to Chapter VII, which is not subject to this limitation.

Kaldor argues that terms like consent may have to be redefined in the context of "new wars" and "robust peacekeeping." The consent of the victims, rather than the warring parties, is more important when it comes to "delivering humanitarian aid, protecting safe havens, or capturing war criminals" as a justification for outside military intervention.[10] Even so, such intervention occurs in the absence of a peace agreement and through the use of non-defensive military force, and should not be confused with peacekeeping or peacemaking activities. As an Irish army officer involved in the training of UN peacekeeping troops recently remarked, "if we lose the ability to distinguish between war and peace, we are in big trouble." Alger also remains skeptical about the utility of "peace enforcement" as a peace tool, precisely "because of the tendency of the use of even limited violence to result in escalation."[11]

Boutros-Ghali connects the final phase, peacebuilding, to conflict prevention, thus bringing the whole process full circle in a sense. He defines peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." Furthermore, successful peacemaking and peacekeeping "strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."[12] Similarly, Raimo Vayrynen refers to peacebuilding activities, concerned with "preventing the reemergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the society" as "post-conflict prevention."[13]

Where preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention seek to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions, "post-conflict peacebuilding" aims to prevent the recurrence of such a breakdown. Peacemaking and peacekeeping, nonetheless, deal with a conflict once such a breakdown has occurred.[14] The four instruments have been described as major components of both international and internal conflict management.

The distinction between "negative peace" and "positive peace" can assist our understanding of the relationship between the different phases or components of peace processes. Negative peace is essentially the absence of violence while positive peace involves the creation of conditions which preclude it. In Galtung's terms, this involves the elimination of structural violence (or injustice). As Alger writes:

> Put in the simplest terms, Negative Peace is achieved by stopping violence. Positive Peace is achieved by building societies and interstate relationships that do not generate conditions likely to precipitate violence or other causes of human suffering and deprivation.[15]

Peacemaking and peacekeeping can be described as examples of negative peace, aimed at stopping immediate armed conflict, while peacebuilding, particularly through its conflict prevention aspects, is a form of positive peace.

As such, peacebuilding involves action aimed at building new social, political and economic institutions and structures, at fostering reconciliation, and at removing the underlying causes of armed conflict. According to Boutros-Ghali, this can include "disarming the previously warring parties" but also "monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation." Such measures are needed to consolidate gains made during the peacemaking and peacekeeping phases of the process.[16]

Finally, each phase can be said to have a different core value crucial to its success. In the case of peacemaking, this is dialogue because open and truthful communication is needed to reach a peace agreement acceptable to all sides. Peacekeeping requires trust that the other groups will maintain their side of the peace agreement, and peacebuilding involves a commitment to reconciliation on the part of conflicting groups.

■  The point is simply that peacemaking with its associated core value of dialogue or communication must have begun in order for peacebuilding with its associated core value of reconciliation to take root and flourish.

This is not to deny that the value of reconciliation should be promoted at each phase since the values in each phase will be transmitted on to the next. But it would be an error to focus exclusively on reconciliation in the absence of a genuine peace agreement based, for example, on open and honest dialogue.

This reminds us that the three phases are best viewed as having a cyclical rather than a strictly linear relation. In this way, peacebuilding initiatives can contribute to higher phases of peacemaking, or the successful evolution and integration of different peace agreements (as in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador), as well as peacemaking creating the conditions in which peacebuilding can occur. The point is simply that peacemaking with its associated core value of dialogue or communication must have begun in order for peacebuilding with its associated core value of reconciliation to take root and flourish.

## Conditions for Initiating Peace Processes

Both internal and external factors are among the conditions encouraging groups involved in open armed conflict to resort to peace processes aimed at ending those conflicts. Each factor also involves both political and moral considerations, concerning imbalances of power and attitudes towards opponents.

A crucial internal factor concerning conditions for initiating peace processes is a genuine commitment on the part of conflicting groups both to engage in negotiations (peacemaking) and to address underlying causes of the conflict (peacebuilding). As Yvon Grenier and Jean Deaudelin write, with regard to El Salvador, "minimal agreement to end the war, in the domestic political class, is the first indispensable ingredient of peacemaking."[17] Albie Sachs, ANC activist and member of the new Constitutional Court of South Africa, made a similar point when he spoke in Dublin recently about key factors leading to a political settlement in South Africa. One of his conditions was an open acknowledgment by combatants that a political, rather than a military, solution was necessary.

Political considerations encouraging such a commitment involve achieving a sufficient balance of power between conflicting groups to the extent that all groups realize they cannot win an outright victory and accept the need to negotiate. Moral considerations involve recognizing one's opponents as legitimate partners in the peace process even if one does not accept the legitimacy of all or most of their political claims or ambitions. As Albie Sachs pointed out, "you do not negotiate with your friends, you negotiate with your enemies." In other words, negotiating by definition involves a willingness to talk to your enemies. This may also require attitudes of trust, reconciliation, and even forgiveness (and contrition) towards one's opponents.

Moral considerations also involve accepting a win-win solution rather than a zero-sum approach to the conflict. Sachs described this in terms of a proper understanding of consensus as enough agreement to allow a political settlement to be reached even if no group achieves all they seek. As Terry Lynn Karl writes about El Salvador: "In what might be considered the hallmark of a successful negotiation, both sides believe they have won."[18]

John Paul Lederach summarizes these political and moral considerations as justice and mercy[19] which we can also refer to as concerns about power and forgiveness. Without these internal factors, no amount of external involvement or pressure will succeed in bringing an end to a conflict, short of annihilation of one or more of the conflicting groups. As Albie Sachs said, internal settlements cannot be determined by outside intervention. A conflict will stop only when those involved want it to stop although external factors may encourage them to reach that point.

A rough balance of power between groups involved in armed conflict encourages all groups to negotiate because no group is able to achieve an outright military victory or at least is unable or unwilling to pay the price of doing so. This may have to be achieved by empowering weaker groups in the conflict situation. Such empowerment is required because, otherwise, they will not be in a position to negotiate effectively and stronger groups will not be interested in negotiating at all. The use of coercive power is sometimes required to bring stronger groups, often those with a vested interest in the status quo, into a peace process.[20]

As Lederach points out, this "assumes a value orientation in favor of less powerful groups attaining a voice if peaceful relations and restructuring (i.e. peacebuilding) are desired outcomes."[21] It also assumes that they will stop short of utilizing acquired power to actually vanquish or defeat their hitherto more powerful opponents, as this would also diminish any need to negotiate.

Such empowerment of weaker groups can initially exacerbate or expose otherwise hidden social, political or structural conflicts to the point of open or heightened confrontation. Yet, increasing the intensity of conflict in this way may be necessary if it is eventually to be resolved or transformed. As Lederach writes:

> If successful, the confrontation will increase the awareness of interdependence and balance of power. Negotiation now becomes possible, and the role of mediation emerges. In essence, negotiation means that the various people or groups involved recognize they cannot simply impose their will or eliminate the other side, but rather must work with each other to achieve their goals. Successful negotiations and mediation lead to a restructuring of the relationship and deal with fundamental substantive and procedural relations.[22]

Balancing the power of conflicting groups, eventhough this temporarily intensifies a conflict, creates the political conditions under which genuine negotiations can occur and peace processes can be initiated, which later on culminate in peacebuilding or the restructuring of political, social and economic relationships.

While the mechanisms leading to empowerment and confrontation may involve violence, they need not do so. Civil resistance, involving the mobilization of civil society or people's organizations against a repressive regime, is a prime example of a nonviolent method of empowering the poor and oppressed. The advantage of civil resistance as a mechanism of empowerment is that it supports processes such as democratization, through strengthening civil society, as well as setting a precedent for the nonviolent resolution of political and social conflict. As Uyangoda says (with reference to Sri Lanka): "the best guarantee for the success of democratic transition — with demilitarization of political conflicts, demilitarization of the state, rebuilding of democratic institutions and

practices, etc. — is the struggle for autonomous and democratic civil society politics."[23]

If the values of each phase of a peace process (including an initial "empowerment" phase) are transmitted on to the next, *nonviolent* political action is important, if our ultimate concern is with building new relationships in a just and peaceful society or peacebuilding. Armed intervention, on the other hand, depends on coercion and violence and leaves a legacy of fear and instability.

External, as distinct from internal, factors tend to augment political and moral considerations, such as power imbalances or attitudes towards opponents which are already internal to the conflict situation itself. In the case of power imbalances, for example, changing levels of external support for conflicting groups can play a vital role in encouraging them to either heighten armed conflict or to enter into genuine peace processes. The impact of superpower involvement in Central America and Southern Africa both during and after the Cold War illustrates this.

External forces can contribute to initiating peace processes in situations of internal conflict through affecting the existing balance of power between conflicting groups. They can do this by providing or withdrawing resources or support to particular groups. As Grenier and Daudelin comment, with reference to El Salvador, "resourceful external players can greatly facilitate peacebuilding and democratic transition by providing the extra resources (economic and political) needed to make trades possible" in the context of peace negotiations.[24]

On the other hand, James K. Boyce insists that: "The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was not the prime mover of the Salvadoran conflict." Instead, we need to look at the internal conditions for this.[25]

This centrality of internal factors leads Johan Galtung to reiterate that sustainable peace processes culminating in peacebuilding and conflict prevention need to be "endogamous, being rooted inside

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the [conflict] formation."[26] A focus on external factors alone, however important, will not be sufficient to achieve a sustainable peace in any conflict situation.

## The Example of El Salvador

Conditions in El Salvador leading up to the Chapultepec Accord of January 1992 provide good examples of factors that encourage a nascent peace process. Karl suggests that compromise in El Salvador "was made possible by a combination of several factors: a military stalemate; increased flexibility on both sides brought about by momentous events in El Salvador and the world; and the presence of a respected neutral arbiter in the United Nations."[27]

The military stalemate was a decisive internal factor, connected to the balance of power between the FMLN guerrillas and government forces. Boyce agrees that:

> The peace accords brokered by the United Nations and signed at Chapultepec, Mexico in January 1992 were born of a military stalemate. The 12-year civil war, which claimed some 75,000 lives, had brought neither the government nor the guerrillas of the ... FMLN ... the prospect of a decisive victory.[28]

According to Karl, the FMLN had "demonstrated that it was too strong to be defeated by the Salvadoran military alone or excluded from the consolidation of a new order." The armed conflict and Salvadoran state repression had resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, the displacement of one-quarter of El Salvador's population and a ruined economy, without bringing either side any closer to victory.[29]

As early as 1987, "national opinion polls showed that an overwhelming 83.3 per cent of the population supported an end to the war through a negotiated settlement." The FMLN's military offensive in November 1989 drove home the point that outright military victory was possible for neither side, and that "a prolonged and inconclusive struggle was less desirable than a political settlement."[30] Boyce also agrees that the FMLN offensive "dispelled illusions that either side could win the war."[31]

External factors supporting this shift to political negotiations instead of armed conflict include changes in U.S. foreign policy due to the ending of the Cold War and reaction to the Salvadoran army's murder of six Jesuit priests subsequent to the November 1989 FMLN offensive. Unequivocal U.S. support for the Salvadoran military was no longer available, contributing to the realization by government forces that an outright victory over the FMLN was not attainable. According to Boyce:

> By the end of 1990, the United States had cut military aid to El Salvador and imposed conditions whereby military aid would be eliminated altogether if the government failed to negotiate in good faith, and restored to previous levels if the FMLN did not do the same.

U.S. foreign policy now favored a negotiated settlement rather than a military-based strategy.[32]

The military stalemate, reinforced by changes in U.S. foreign policy, encouraged the Salvadoran government to abandon their attempt to defeat or eliminate the FMLN and to enter into genuine peace negotiations. Similarly, the military stalemate combined with global political changes resulting from the end of the Cold War encouraged the FMLN "to distance themselves from their faith in socialist revolutions and seek a political settlement instead."[33] According to Grenier and Deaudelin, "the burial of the revolutionary project was clearly the requisite for successful peace negotiation."[34] The effectiveness of the FMLN as a political party, on the other hand, is revealed by its success in the recent (March 1997) Salvadoran legislative and municipal elections.

The balance of power revealed by the military stalemate demonstrated to both government and rebel forces in El Salvador the need for genuine peace negotiations to bring an end to armed conflict. External factors, such as changes in U. S. foreign policy, the end of the Cold War, and the availability of the U.N. as an impartial mediator, simply reinforced this basic point.

## Components of Sustainable Peace Processes

Sustainable peace processes, once initiated, include a wide variety of activities contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in some way. These range from so-called "confidence-building measures"

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(CBMs), such as the cessation of armed guerrilla campaigns or the repeal of repressive emergency legislation, to complex programs of economic and political reform, such as the Reconstruction and Development Program in South Africa. Furthermore, these activities can occur during any or all of the three phases of a peace process although they may be more appropriate or important during one phase in particular. CBMs may be particularly important during the peacemaking phase, for example, although they can also contribute to both peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Two aspects or components of a peace process are especially critical to its success, however understood as a sustainable peace incorporating both peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It must ensure that the conflict is demilitarized through dealing with such issues as the role of the military and police and the "decommissioning" of weapons. Furthermore, a sustainable peace process must not only end open armed conflict, it must also address the underlying causes of a conflict. This concern with underlying causes needs to be expressed at every phase of a peace process, beginning with the initial peace negotiations and culminating with necessary social, political and economic changes. Boyce writes, for example, that the "Salvadoran Peace Accords, signed in Chapultepec, Mexico in January 1992, aimed not only to end the civil war but also to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict."[35]

Social and economic issues that must be addressed by a sustainable peace process include problems of poverty, unemployment and land distribution that generate conflict within a society. These raise fundamental questions concerning the connections between peace and development.

Boyce has examined the links between "economic growth, income distribution, and the consolidation of peace" in post-conflict El Salvador.[36] His conclusion is that:

In such a context distributional equity cannot be relegated to a lower priority than economic growth. Rather, it must be a policy objective of the first order.[37]

Problems of poverty and income inequality must be addressed directly as social and economic causes of the civil war in El Salvador in order to prevent such a conflict from recurring.

Grenier and Deaudelin argue that, ironically, the civil war has made it easier to rectify a related social and economic cause of the conflict in El Salvador — the inequitable land distribution. The war has facilitated the transfer of land to ex-combatants as part of the peace process.

Interestingly, it appears that land has become, as a direct result of the conflict, a less attractive and politically strategic resource that it used to be in this oligarchical state . . . . The war proved to be an opportunity for the oligarchy to convert its activities into less traditional, and arguably more lucrative, business pursuits.[38]

In addition to addressing such social and economic causes of conflict, a sustainable peace process may also need to initiate political changes supporting democratization and human rights. As Boyce writes, "medium and long-term adjustment toward peace requires ... equity, that is, balance in the distribution of income and wealth ... and democratization to achieve balance in the distribution of power."[39] The institutional components of democracy conventionally include "fair and pluralist elections, the rule of law, political freedoms, and civilian control over the military."[40] As Karl points out, "regular elections alone will not guarantee democracy ... regularly scheduled elections cannot channel conflicts in a democratic manner unless they are coupled with effective civilian control over the military and enforcement of the rule of law."[41]

Similar with institutional changes, Grenier and Deaudelin point out that the "consolidation of democratic values is essential, especially in the political class.[42] The same can be said for support for human rights which requires both "rebuilding respect for basic human rights and establishing mechanisms for their promotion and monitoring."[43] In recent peace agreements, this has involved attempts to end impunity for human rights abuses and the establishment of "truth commissions" to investigate abuses perpetrated during armed conflicts or civil wars.

Connected to democratization as a goal of peace processes is the issue of non-elite or civil society involvement in each phase of a peace process, from peacemaking to peacebuilding. As Imtiaz Ahmed writes about the communal conflict in Sri Lanka:

> In any state, problems of sociopolitical and economic significance can be resolved at two different levels, which incidentally opens up space for varied and different ways to resolve a particular problem. The first level is *political society* of the state, which includes government, military, rules and regulations etc., while the second level is *civil society*, which includes political parties, different sociocultural organizations, education, the media (newspaper, television, radio), etc .... If Sri Lanka's communal conflict is to be resolved, the key prerequisite is total participation of both political and civil societies.[44]

If democracy is one important goal of sustainable peace processes, then the peace processes themselves must be as open and participatory as possible. Also, the inclusion of as many sectors of society as possible augments the resources available for conflict resolution.

Likewise, it increases the likelihood that the acceptability of peace agreements and peace processes will be shared as widely as possible within a society, rather than being restricted to political, military and economic elites. As Grenier and Deaudelin note, "political pacts are fragile when elites cut themselves off from their rank and file." They argue that elite domination is a weakness of the peace accords in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.[45] This view is supported by explanations of continuing political violence in Nicaragua as suggested by indigenous NGOs. According to Helen Yuill:

> The 1990 national peace accords were negotiated at the top between political leaders but for many of the ex-combatants their conflicts were just beginning. Having played no active part in the negotiation process, ex-soldiers saw themselves as objects of other people's decisions.

Among others, this, in turn, has resulted in continuing localized armed conflict in the mountains of northern Nicaragua.[46]

The demilitarization of conflict is also a crucial component of a sustainable peace process. Such demilitarization "includes demobilization,

disarmament, demining, [and] reintegration of the military into civil society and the economy."[47] In the case of El Salvador, reforms aimed at demilitarization "limited the scope and power of the armed forces, restricted their mission to the defense of El Salvador's borders rather than the maintenance of public order ... and created a national police force under civilian rather than military control."[48] The Chapultepec agreement "slashed the size of the army, purged the most notorious human rights violators, disbanded the old security forces, and disarmed the FMLN and allowed it to become a legal political party."[49]

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Experience seems to show that demilitarization and related issues can only be addressed once peacemaking in the form of genuine, inclusive and open peace talks has already been initiated. Albie Sachs argued, for example, that successful political negotiations are a necessary precondition for the decommissioning of weapons because they make arms increasingly irrelevant.

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## Conclusion

Recent peace processes, in Central America and Southern Africa for example, can be analyzed in terms of three phases, conventionally described as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Both preceding and subsequent phases of successful peace processes have also been identified, describable perhaps as "balance of power" and conflict prevention. "Balance of power" refers to endogenous political factors encouraging conflicting groups to engage in peace negotiations, or peacemaking because they realize that some sort of political settlement is preferable to a prolonged and otherwise irresolvable conflict. Conflict prevention is a central goal of peacebuilding, which aims at removing, transcending or transforming sources of armed conflict within a society through social, political and structural changes.

However we analyze these component phases of successful and sustainable peace processes, their relationship is perhaps best understood as cyclical rather than linear or deterministic. In other words, there is no guarantee that peacemaking, once embarked on, will culminate in sustainable peacebuilding activities even though it might create the necessary context in which such activities can occur. At the same time, successful efforts at peacebuilding can reinforce already existing peacemaking initiatives, producing a virtuous cycle of peace to replace a vicious cycle of war and violence. ◉

## Notes

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2  Kaldor, 1996, p. 506.
3  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, New York, 1992, p. 11.
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5  Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 28.
6  Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 30.
7  Boutros-Ghali, 1992, pp. 12, 20.
8  Kaldor, 1996, p. 510.
9  Alger, 1996, p. 28.
10  Kaldor, 1996, pp. 510-511.
11  Alger, 1996, p. 28.
12  Boutros-Ghali, 1992, pp. 11-12.

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14  Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 33.

15  Alger, 1996, p. 27.

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19  John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse NY, 1995, p. 20.

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21  Lederach, 1995, p. 14.

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