ASEAN Post-Cold War Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific*

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Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a critical role in the promotion of security, not only among its members, but also in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Since its creation in 1967, it has been able to fashion a security community among its six members by using strategies that somewhat validate the neofunctionalist argument about starting multilateral cooperation in non-sensitive areas until it becomes possible, through spill-over, to achieve cooperation in the more sensitive fields of politics and security.[1] ASEAN members also practiced in this regard measures which we now refer to as preventive diplomacy, by managing tension before they erupt into conflict.

In its international diplomacy on the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, clearly the most serious issue in Southeast Asia in the seventies and the eighties, ASEAN was able to earn a credible reputation as one of the most successful regional organizations which have contributed to the promotion of peace in its part of the world.[2] Through various ASEAN instruments

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for creating a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia, ASEAN managed to temporarily set aside intra-ASEAN disagreements and disputes (with the effect of subordinating them for the moment) in order to create a stable external environment for domestic stability and economic development. These instruments and approaches to intra-ASEAN disputes were also necessary in the forging of ASEAN solidarity in dealing with the outside world.

Such subordination came with the recognition that their internecine quarrels were dissipating their energies and other resources which could have been applied to the task of nation and state building as well as economic development. It was also informed by the realization that regional peace and stability can be better secured by a policy of pragmatism which translated into tolerance for divergencies in their foreign policy commitments or approaches to the principal protagonists in the Cold War. While recognizing the temporary character of bilateral and multilateral military alliances of its members, ASEAN nevertheless sough to insulate Southeast Asia from great power rivalry and competition, especially from making it an arena for such competition. This was done through various instruments such as the creation of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

The remarkable thing about ASEAN is that it had managed to achieve regional peace in the absence of a formal charter or constitution, a central authority, a dispute settlement mechanism (although one is conceived, but never organized, under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), or even settling intra-ASEAN disputes themselves. It has become a security community by promoting functional cooperation, skirting sensitive and divisive issues or sweeping them under the rug (such as territorial and

border disputes), and undertaking norms of inter-state behavior that essentially respect each other's sovereignty.

Even occasional transgressions, such as Malaysian air attacks on Philippine seaside towns in Southern Philippines as a form of reprisal for Filipino criminals who robbed a bank in Sabah in September 1985, were quietly dealt with to preserve ASEAN solidarity. Each of the members is aware that they need top stay together if they wish to be heard and to play a credible international role. It is this reality that compounded the seriousness of the diplomatic crisis between the Philippines and Singapore in March 1995 over the conviction and hanging for double murder of a Filipino domestic worker in Singapore. It was the first intra-ASEAN crisis of its kind with great impact on the Association's integrity in its almost 28 years of existence. Not only could it have had serious implications on ASEAN solidarity but also on ASEAN's ability to play a credible international role.[3]

The bipolar structure of global power helped ASEAN members in their bid to achieve economic development through US military presence and its security umbrella in the Asia-Pacific. While non-communists, not all ASEAN members belonged to the network of military alliances under the San Francisco system. In fact, Indonesia was staunchly non-aligned while Malaysia, though a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) was also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Philippines became an observer even while it hosted US military forces in its bases, eventually becoming a full member of NAM in 1993. Recently, Thailand has also sought observer status in NAM.

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The end of the Cold War affected ASEAN as it did other parts of the world. The end of bipolarity destroyed the underpinning structure for regional stability in the Asia Pacific even as its overall effect had been on the whole salutary, with the possible exception of the remnants of the Cold War in a divided Korea and a divided China. A new regional order has not emerged and new forces and dynamics are at work which have not yet settled in a coherent and organized regional security structure. Due to uncertainties in a region in relative peace, but in a state of great change and flux, ASEAN had to have a security strategy reflecting present realities and responsive to new challenges bred by the end of the Cold War. The strategy may be described as continuation and expansion of its earlier security strategy consisting of dialogue with and constructive engagement of all relevant actors in regional security issues. It now includes the expansion of ASEAN membership to other Southeast Asian states to enable it to play a more active and influential role in Asia-Pacific security. The strategy draws on many of the existing mechanisms which have served ASEAN well in the past.

This paper seeks to articulate ASEAN's post-Cold War security strategy and provides a discussion of a host of ASEAN instruments which form part of the strategy. The discussion is in five parts: (1) ASEAN concept of security and instruments for its promotion; (2) the concept of one Southeast Asia or an expanded ASEAN; (3) ASEAN's concentric circles of regional cooperation and engagement; (4) the role of track two diplomacy; and (5) future prospects.

The ASEAN Concept of Security and Instruments for Its Promotion

Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has developed a conception of security different from that shaped by the exigencies of the Cold War in the West and in the East. Recognizing that none of them would have the military capability to effectively secure their borders from powers greater than themselves, ASEAN members crafted a concept of security variously described in terms of national and regional resilience (Indonesia), comprehensive security (Malaysia), and total security (Singapore). Thailand and the Philippines developed

similar conceptions of security at a later time, but went along with the multidimensional and comprehensive concept of security underpinning ASEAN goals from the start.

Part of the misunderstanding about ASEAN lies in this comprehensive notion of security. The "promotion of regional peace and stability"[4] is ASEAN's primary purpose according to ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration, the Association's basic document. But this goal is to be achieved through political, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technical cooperation and not through a military alliance. Through cooperation, a sense of community is developed eliminating the use of force in intra-ASEAN relations.[5] Each member also promotes domestic stability (national resilience) in terms of social cohesion, political stability, and economic development as its contribution to regional stability. Because of ASEAN's studious avoidance of military instruments in the promotion of security, it has been misperceived as primarily seeking some form of economic integration among its members, and have been judged as a failure in this respect.

ASEAN's primary goal to promote security in Southeast Asia is also evident in its 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration to make the subregion a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) as well as proposals for the establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The 1971 Declaration seeks to reduce regional and international tension and to promote "lasting peace in Southeast Asia through prevention of interference by outside powers and the encouragement of greater cooperation among the indigenous states."[6] However, beyond the production of a Programme of Action for ZOPFAN and a draft Treaty on a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, these intentions have not gone very far. Nevertheless, they indicate ASEAN's goal of creating a regional order, through these instruments, characterized by peace and security beyond its members' borders and ultimately including all the 10 states in Southeast Asia.

Similarly, the ASEAN seeks to extend to other states in the region its code of conduct governing interstate relations set forth in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in 1976. The Treaty is open to all Southeast Asian countries, and

like ZOPFAN and SEANWPZ, indicates ASEAN's goal of establishing a regional order in Southeast Asia. In practice, the first state to accede to the TAC was Papua New Guinea which is arguably not part of the usual geographic definition of Southeast Asia, but is strategically important to at least one ASEAN member, Indonesia. Accession to the Treaty is a condition for observer status in ASEAN processes, as well as for eventual membership in the Association. This code of conduct is a set of self-inhibiting rules of behavior, including respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of other states, nonintervention in their domestic affairs, and abstention from using force to settle international disputes. They seek to promote friendship and cooperation and peaceful settlement of conflicts among neighboring states.

The TAC has provided for a mechanism for dispute settlement, but its members have not activated such a mechanism nor have they resorted to the intermediation of ASEAN in the settlement of their disputes with one another. Instead, they have for the most part operated outside the ASEAN framework and used bilateralism in the normalization of their borders, in negotiations about fisheries disputes, and until recently, in joint military exercises.

In the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the primary goal of political stability is also clearly stated. In this regard, its members recognized the need to strengthen national resilience against internal subversion, to settle disputes peacefully, and to undertake political cooperation, political solidarity and common action.[7] Cautious to be misunderstood as a military alliance and careful not to lose their sovereignty as a larger body, the members initially sought to achieve security through bilateral cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis, as noted above. This led some critics to dismiss the role of ASEAN as a group in the achievement of peace among its members. The notion of "bilateral summitry"[8] became the description of ASEAN's approach to intramural problems during this period.

Another important component of ASEAN's approach to security is the establishment of its dialogue mechanism with non-ASEAN states which became operational after the second summit in 1977 in Kuala Lumpur. Convened after the annual

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), it now includes the United States, Japan, the European Union, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. While not dialogue partners, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Laos sit as observers in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) where ASEAN and its dialogue partners meet to discuss issues of mutual interest and concern. The PMC so far had included the so-called 'like-minded,' i.e., non-communist, friends, and while it had been an important mechanism for dealing with economic and political issues, it had not included states which are major regional players, like China and Russia.

The presence of these mechanisms and the use of some of them throughout the years have helped develop a process where discussions of major issues of mutual concern have taken place. They have also served to build confidence among its participants and developed a habit of cooperation among them. Part of ASEAN's post-Cold War security strategy is to extend this circle beyond those already involved in the PMC process, to include all relevant actors in the Asia-Pacific that shape regional security, such as China and Russia and other Southeast Asian states. This is a major rationale for the creation of the ARF.

Because the South China Sea is viewed as the most volatile issue in Southeast Asia after the resolution of the Cambodian problem, ASEAN also tried to provide some norms of behavior for this issue area. In the Manila AMM in July 1992, ASEAN's Foreign Ministers adopted the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea. It called for peaceful settlement of disputes, abstention from the use of force and resort to provocative acts in the area, as well as the adoption of the code of conduct outlined in the TAC. In this regard, the Indonesian-initiated informal workshops on the South China Sea, endorsed by ASEAN, may be viewed as an example of how the Association implements its security strategy of dialogue with and constructive engagement of all relevant actors.

ASEAN believes that isolating a pariah state is not an effective approach in trying to change the behavior of such a state. In fact, isolation is counterproductive because one is not able to influence the pariah state by cutting off all contacts with it. Instead, the pariah state would dig in deeper and be reinforced

in its intransigence. Consequently, ASEAN has maintained a policy of constructive engagement *vis-a-vis* Burma. Many countries in the West have isolated and applied sanctions on Burma to prod it to move toward political and economic reform.

Amid criticism from some quarters, ASEAN has agreed to bring into its processes Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) by allowing it to attend the 1994 Bangkok AMM as guest of the host government, Thailand. By bringing its leaders out of Burma, ASEAN should be able to avert the real possibility of having one major power establish an inordinate amount of influence in that country. It should also be able to accustom Burma's leaders in dealing with other countries in more amicable and friendly terms as their exposure to multilateral interactions should build mutual trust in the long run. The creation of a wider sense of community in Southeast Asia (and eventually in the larger region) is an extension of ASEAN's earlier experience in building a security community among its members.

Starting in the late 1980s, ASEAN states have embarked on programs of military modernization in response to the need to update their outmoded arms inventories as well as to respond to their changed domestic and external security situations. Military force restructuring to enhance naval and air forces is required by a post-communist insurgency situation, the end of the Cold War, and the new responsibilities for wider areas of the oceans created for littoral states by the Convention on the Law of the Sea. New wealth has also provided the ASEAN militaries with the resources to finance arms modernization.

In response to the spate of arms modernization within ASEAN and in neighbors such as China, the Association has considered the adoption of a host of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) especially relating to defense policies, military procurements, military exercises, and other defense-related activities among ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries in various fora such as the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), PMC, and the ARF. These CSBMs seek to create greater military transparency, avoid the likelihood of misunderstandings, reduce misperceptions, and clarify intentions among neighboring states in the region.

In addition, ASEAN is considering the establishment of a Regional Training Center for Peacekeeping as another contribution to UN peacekeeping operations and a Regional Conventional Arms Register.

ASEAN has also embarked on the extension of political and security discussions among its members' officials. Deviating from its usual practice of having political and defense officials meet separately, it has convened a special SOM bringing together officials from both the foreign and defense ministries of its members on a regular basis. Joint military exercises have also involved armed forces from more than two countries, and maritime patrols over straits used for international navigation have involved three countries -- Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore -- in the case of the once pirate-infested Straits of Malacca. All of these measures seek to promote an improved regional security environment in the 1990s and beyond.

One Southeast Asia: An Expanded ASEAN

It is apparent that part of ASEAN's regional security strategy is to expand membership to the rest of Southeast Asia. Isolating itself from the four other Southeast Asian countries is viewed by ASEAN as counterproductive, despite many obvious differences between the non-communist ASEAN states on the one hand, and Vietnam and Laos on the other, between ASEAN states and the newly-reconstituted Kingdom of Cambodia, and between ASEAN and the military regime in Burma. The ASEAN's reconciliation with Vietnam[9] following the Cambodian Peace Accord signalled the drawing of the Indochinese states into ASEAN processes by stages. Rapid economic development in ASEAN member-states and the economic opportunities offered by a market liberalizing and outward looking diplomacy by Vietnam, the realization that Vietnam's continued isolation from ASEAN could undermine ASEAN's long-term security interests, and the potential strategic importance of a united Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era are factors that may have expedited the decision to expand ASEAN.

The expansion of ASEAN, however, is faced with a number of problems. These concerns include the impact of expansion on

ASEAN cohesiveness, the timing of expansion, the ability of new members to meet ASEAN commitments such as the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), attendance at its numerous meetings (about 230 annually), and contribution to the ASEAN Fund. As observed by a leading ASEAN security analyst, these are not insurmountable.[10]

With respect to the effect of expansion on ASEAN cohesiveness and its timing, 'like-mindedness' may no longer be that important in an age of declining salience of ideology and with communist countries in Southeast Asia similarly undertaking the path of reform as their non-communist ASEAN counterparts. Nonetheless, Burma's future membership presents a truly problematic case, particularly in the light of a repressive regime therein that would most likely take more time to change. Having been isolated from the rest of the region for decades and faced with many historical realities that pose obstacles to social change, Burma's path to reform is likely to be long and arduous.

The problem of meeting all of ASEAN's commitments and participation in its many activities by new members is also manageable. These can be dealt with by applying the ASEAN formula of decision-making which leaves members to determine whether, how, and when they would be prepared to go along with the rest in a particular endeavor. Membership obligations can also be undertaken on a step-by-step basis, as new members feel ready to comply with these new responsibilities.[11]

A number of more problematic obstacles to ASEAN's expansion than those presented above need to be considered. These obstacles are fundamental in that they relate to ASEAN's primary character as a mechanism for conflict-management and to its ability to take a common position with respect to external actors.

Until the present diplomatic row between the Philippines and Singapore noted above, ASEAN had been able to restrain conflict between its members and prevent its escalation. While its six members have a number of bilateral disputes over territory, fisheries, and other issues, these have been subordinated to the primary goal of preserving regional peace and ASEAN solidarity. However, potential conflict over Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia could be more difficult to resolve due to "highly

charged emotion rooted in ethnic and historical animosity"[12] between them.

Secondly, the ASEAN's ability to deal effectively with external actors is closely hinged upon its members' image as responsible and respectable international actors. While this may no longer be a problem for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Burma remains a pariah state despite recent relaxation of sanctions by a number of countries in the West. Its membership in ASEAN would thus pose greater difficulties for the Association than that of the three Indochinese states.

Finally, there is the question of domestic stability,[13] particularly for Cambodia and Burma. Because ASEAN views regional security in terms of national and regional resilience, the achievement and preservation of domestic stability is a requisite condition for ASEAN to succeed in its goal of creating a regional order in Southeast Asia. Consequently, aspiring members need to achieve national resilience as well.

Be that as it may, ASEAN's goal of a regional order remains an important imperative for its expansion in due course. It is through one Southeast Asia that ASEAN can truly claim to be representative of this subregion. In relating to the outside world, ASEAN would achieve greater leverage in this capacity.[14]

ASEAN's Concentric Circles of Regional Cooperation and Engagement

ASEAN's strategy in relating to the world has been expressed in terms of concentric circles.[15] In the economic realm, these concentric circles include AFTA, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The forging of AFTA was driven by the increasing interdependence and rapid integration of ASEAN economies in the regional and global economy as well as the realization that the member-states needed to get together and deal with the international economy on a collective rather than on an individual basis.[16]

AFTA's goal is to enhance ASEAN's attractiveness as a destination for investments and a market for goods and services. According to an expert, it serves as a 'training ground' for its

members to become more fully integrated into the world economy.[17]

Other initiatives in promoting economic security and cooperation include the creation of growth areas such as the Singapore-Johore-Riau (SIJORI) growth triangle and the East ASEAN Economic Area (EAEA) -- the latest in the pipeline linking southern Philippines with parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. The success of these growth areas, however, lies in the presence of genuine complementarities among the territories involved, the leading role of the private sector, and the facilitative role of ASEAN governments in the enterprise.

With respect to APEC, ASEAN was initially lukewarm to its formation and suspicious of its negative consequences for the Association. Fearing that APEC might dilute ASEAN's cohesion and viability, the members approached APEC very cautiously at first. As a hedge against negative consequences of the emerging North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) on its members and the perceived negative impact of APEC, Malaysia proposed the creation of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) with Japan as its major partner. The EAEG did not obtain support from the intended members and faced the objection by those outside its scope. Thus, the proposal was repackaged within ASEAN into the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) -- a mechanism that would be subsumed within APEC processes. Apart from Malaysia, all the ASEAN states have become supportive of APEC in varying degrees. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Mahathir came to the Bogor meeting of APEC heads of state as a demonstration of support for the host and of ASEAN solidarity.

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As extra-regional cooperation schemes, EAEC and APEC serve

as "an insurance policy for ASEAN...against the uncertain development in the world economy."[18] They are part of the new regionalism that is emerging in the Asia-Pacific in the economic, political, and security fields. ASEAN is very much a part of this new regionalism and views it as a positive development in its security strategy for the region.

The ASEAN has played a more important role in this new regionalism in the political and security field. While there were earlier initiatives for the convening of a regional mechanism for the discussion of security issues reflecting the experience of Europe in the Council for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), they did not take off. Australia, Canada, and Japan made these calls at various stages, but such regional mechanism became a reality only after ASEAN formally agreed at the Singapore Summit in 1993 for the convening of such a forum. The ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) was a material contributor to the elaboration of the idea broached informally to a number of governments in the region as early as June 1991.[19]

The new regionalism is an open one in the sense that it aims at inclusiveness -- the involvement and engagement of all relevant actors into the process. It is inclusiveness which led to the adoption of a new mechanism in ASEAN to deal with the post-Cold War security environment in the region. The ARF is a response to the difficulty of enlarging the ASEAN PMC process beyond its like-minded dialogue partners, and to the compelling need to draw all relevant actors in the political and security field to a region-wide dialogue regardless of their ideological or political state of mind. Hence, a new regional dialogue mechanism that includes China and Russia, and before too long, even North Korea, needed to be formed.

The spirit of inclusiveness of this new regionalism is reflected in APEC as well. Prior to Taiwan's recent diplomatic initiatives to get a seat in the United Nations and its financial institutions apart from that presently occupied by China, ASEAN agreed for both Taiwan and Hong Kong to become members of APEC in their capacity as economic units. This enabled the three entities to be represented in the APEC process.

Such a development is a positive one in that it acknowledges the important economic status of both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

It also provides a degree of fulfillment for international recognition of its merits as a viable entity on the part of Taiwan, and an important venue where both Taiwan and China could meet in a multilateral setting. It is necessary that the world community empowers Taiwan to play an international role commensurate to its contribution to global economic development and peace. Failure to achieve such recognition would only create further frustration on the part of its leadership and people and drive it to undertake other foreign policy initiatives which could undermine regional peace should China react negatively to them.[20]

It is unfortunate that cross-straits relations were marred by Taiwan's diplomatic initiatives to the extent that its participation even in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with political and security issues remains in doubt due to China's unwillingness to cooperate in this matter. To date, the issue of membership for China and Taiwan in the newly-formed Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has not yet been definitively settled by its Steering Committee. While the principle of inclusiveness inheres in CSCAP, it is also necessary to have key countries represented by Member Committees in this regional security NGO if it were to achieve its goal of making policy inputs to ARF decision-making. At the same time, it seems unfair for actors not yet part of CSCAP to hold the group hostage to the state of cross-straits relations. After all, CSCAP is an unofficial and non-governmental effort and can in fact serve the national interests of countries involved in its activities in ways that official agencies and mechanisms cannot. It is hoped that pragmatism will prevail and enable regional cooperation on the second diplomatic track to prosper in advance of the official parallel track. Here, ASEAN can play a useful and facilitative role by remaining attuned to various sensitivities of its partners.

From the above, ASEAN's interaction with the outside world can then be seen in terms of concentric circles of regional cooperation and engagement, whether in the economic or political and security fields. Dialogue with and constructive engagement of all relevant actors are features of its security strategy.

Track Two Diplomacy in ASEAN

Over the past decade, track two diplomacy in ASEAN and in the larger Asia-Pacific region has developed into a complementary, facilitative, and supportive arm of the official diplomatic track in the promotion of regional security.[21] Based on the principles of informality, multisectoral representation, non-attribution to encourage openness in discussions, and inclusiveness, track two diplomacy has created a region-wide network of relationships that has contributed to the process of tension reduction and confidence building among regional actors. One of the leading ASEAN-wide networks is the ASEAN-ISIS, a ten-year old security policy NGO registered with the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN-ISIS has provided policy inputs to ASEAN decision-making through regional and international conferences, policy memorandums to ASEAN, and policy discussions with ASEAN Senior Officials on a regular basis since 1993.

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Through these means, ASEAN-ISIS assists in the continuing analysis and rethinking of ASEAN's security strategy and also helps promote the strategy through its own network of similarly-oriented institutions in other countries in the region.[22] It maintains ongoing dialogues with partners in North America, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and the European Union, and is about to embark on similar activities with counterparts in Taiwan. It has attracted the interest of countries as far away from the Asia-Pacific as Brazil.

It has submitted to date several memoranda for ASEAN consideration including *A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit*, 4 June 1991; *The Environment and Human Rights in International Relations: An*

Agenda for ASEAN's Policy Approaches and Responses, July 1992; *Enhancing ASEAN Security Cooperation*, 5 June 1993; *Beyond UNTAC: ASEAN's Role in Cambodia*, October 1993; *Confidence Building Measures in Southeast Asia*, December 1993; and *A Special Memorandum on Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN*, February 1994.

Another memorandum on the South China Sea is being prepared. In addition, it has produced numerous briefing papers on various economic, political, and security issues for the consideration of ASEAN Senior Officials. Its paper on regional CSBMs was submitted by ASEAN to the ARF during its first meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 as ASEAN's own submission.

The parallel diplomatic track has also played a useful role in opening up new areas of intra- and extra-ASEAN cooperation over the past decade. At a time when official relations between ASEAN and its Southeast Asian neighbors were extremely difficult, particularly during Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, track two diplomats encouraged and sustained contacts with their counterparts in these countries. Cambodia has been a central concern of ASEAN-ISIS as reflected in the special discussions and inclusion of the issue in its multifarious activities throughout its ten-year lifetime. But the recognition of the role of track two diplomacy in ASEAN's repertoire of security-related measures came only after extensive networking with ASEAN officials and the establishment of a credible track record among the institutes themselves.

ASEAN's security NGOs were also among the founding institutes of the CSCAP. The largest and most regionally well-known conference on security is the ASEAN-based Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Asia-Pacific. Starting as the Pacific Workshop on Regional Affairs in Seoul and Manila, the Roundtable came to be based in ISIS Malaysia, and since 1993 became an ASEAN-ISIS responsibility. The Roundtable has succeeded in creating a region-wide network of security analysts, scholars, officials in their private capacity, and other opinion leaders which have contributed to regional confidence building and tension reduction. Many participants outside of ASEAN's regional partners, especially in Northeast and Southeast Asia became increasingly visible and audible,

making for a truly region-wide exchange of ideas and perspectives on security issues facing the region.

In tandem with the Roundtable is the annual forum on One Southeast Asia held in Kuala Lumpur over the past six years. It brings together multisectoral representatives from the ten Southeast Asian countries. A networking mechanism, a confidence building activity, as well as an attempt to acculturize the rest of Southeast Asia about how ASEAN works, the Southeast Asia Forum has succeeded in breaking some of the barriers that kept ASEAN and non-ASEAN opinion leaders apart in the past. Unfortunately, due perhaps to internal problems, there were no Burmese representatives to the Forum in December 1994. But the Vietnamese counterparts, attending the Forum for the first time as members of ASEAN-ISIS, actively participated, as did those from Laos and Cambodia. Institutional and individual linkages among Southeast Asians concerned with economic, political, security and related issues have been facilitated by Forum activities. Learnings from the Forum are bound to find their way to security policy-makers.

It was also through the efforts of track two diplomats that a group of opinion leaders met in Manila in May 1994 and forged *A Statement of Vision for Southeast Asia Beyond the Year 2000.* It essentially pushed further an earlier Thai initiative of a 'SEA-10,' an idea which did not obtain ASEAN official blessing because it was conceived to be formed outside of ASEAN. However, the Manila Statement seeks to establish one pluralistic Southeast Asian community within or outside (but preferably within) ASEAN. This community is seen as playing a constructive and greater role in regional affairs, and will undertake flagship projects of relevance to the subregion, projects which would intensify the forging of a single Southeast Asian community interacting with, but not subordinated to the great powers as in the colonial past.

ASEAN has formally recognized the value of second track diplomacy. During the AMM in July 1994, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers

> noted with satisfaction that ASEAN cooperation was also being fostered on a parallel track, through the contribution, for example, of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies

(ASEAN-ISIS), the Workshop Series on ASEAN-UN Cooperation in Peace and Preventive Diplomacy, co-chaired by Thailand and Singapore, and the informal meeting in Manila (30-31 May 1994) of academics and other citizens from ASEAN and the four other Southeast Asian countries resulting in their statement "Southeast Asia Beyond the Year 2000: A Statement of Vision".[23]

Thus, track two diplomacy has become a component past of ASEAN's security instruments.

Future Prospects

ASEAN's post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia-Pacific has continued to rely essentially on the approaches and instruments it has used in building a security community among its members. Good neighborliness and respect for the political independence and territorial of others, as well as other norms of self-inhibition in relating to other states, peaceful settlement of disputes, quiet diplomacy, among others, are likely to continue guiding ASEAN security strategy in the future.

Domestic political stability and economic development are likely to remain as cornerstones of national resilience and domestic stability. It is not surprising that ASEAN countries continue to view their primary security challenges as internal in origin, a view they have consistently held even during the Cold War. This will continue to inform their security policy well into the foreseeable future. This is likely because rapid economic development is altering ASEAN sócieties, often in ways not anticipated by their founding fathers. The rise of a sizeable middle class was a force for social and political change elsewhere in Asia and should serve as lessons from which appropriate strategies for managing its impact on ASEAN societies might be devised. Generational change is also likely to alter the face of these societies, including that of their political leadership. These have implications for regime security and that of the nation.

Change is also taking place in other countries in the region. Rapid modernization in China is altering the way its leadership is responding to regional and international issues, and to relevant actors in these issues. Witness the ongoing South China Sea disputes and China's foreign policy behavior towards other

claimants, particularly the Philippines at present. With the contemporary high level of China's economic leverage, it has reaped major foreign policy successes. These are likely to increase the level of self-confidence among its leadership and make them less sensitive to international influence. In this regard, ASEAN's security strategy of engaging China and bringing it into the regional dialogue process on both diplomatic tracks is a necessary one from the ASEAN's vantage point.

But ASEAN can only be effective if it remains united. The instruments which worked to create a secure and stable Southeast Asia need to be sustained. In fact, ASEAN must continue to hone and improve upon these instruments as it has done with regard to the Special SOM, the ARF, and the TAC. Perhaps it is also time to consider tackling the intra-ASEAN bulls by the horns -- to try to use the ASEAN framework in the management of conflict and tension between its members, or even to provide diplomatic support to its members whose security interests are faced by grave challenges from extra-ASEAN sources.

China's building of four military installations on the Kalayaan Islands could be a litmus test for ASEAN's capacity to act in concert on an issue that affects not only one of its members, but all of them and their neighbors as well. For the Philippines, it is a litmus test as to whether its US allies are credible to at least share intelligence information for early warning purposes. ASEAN as a group could invoke the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea calling for peaceful settlement of disputes, desistance from taking provocative acts on the disputed areas, and applying the code of conduct for interstate behavior outlined in the TAC. If they fail to stand together, they could be in danger of falling one by one.

To maintain ASEAN solidarity and put it on more substantial and lasting basis, it is necessary and timely to sort out many of the issues on which they differ. Human rights and democracy in international relations is an extremely important and contemporary issue with divisive potentials. This issue will continue to hound ASEAN states, more because of the dynamic forces unleashed in their societies by their phenomenal economic achievements, and less by external actors. ASEAN faces this bilateral crisis between the Philippines and Singapore because

of varying interpretations of human rights and differences in their legal and judicial systems, apart from the larger issue of uneven development in the subregion which created the phenomenon of labor migration. This issue needs sorting out because of its implications for regional security, for ASEAN's viability as a security community, and for its credibility as a major regional actor in the political and security field through the ARF.

ASEAN's expansion is part of its post-Cold War security strategy. Its full realization is a matter of time because the desire to expand the ASEAN order into the rest of Southeast Asia is shared by ASEAN members as it is desired by their future partners.[24] Vietnam will lead the way. Laos is already an observer, while Cambodia is next in line to accession to the TAC. Burma, as noted above, will take a much longer time to become fully involved in ASEAN processes.

It is highly likely that the interface and close collaboration between the two diplomatic tracks working to promote regional security will continue into the future and will form part of ASEAN's security strategy for the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN's acceptance of and reliance, in many instances, on the work and policy recommendations of its track two diplomats are likely to increase rather than decrease as ASEAN expands its membership and activities to the point where its official diplomats and foreign policy makers face greater pressures on their limited time.

The increasing complexity of the nexus between security and its many component elements: political change and regime security, environmental preservation and sustainable development, economic development and global interdependence, the rise of a more politically demanding middle class, international migration, religion and ethnicity, international terrorism, drugs and AIDS, to name a few, would require expertise beyond the capacity of most ASEAN governments to provide. They will, of necessity, look to their counterparts in the unofficial track to assist in obtaining a better understanding of these forces, and advancing the security interests of ASEAN in their own processes and activities.

Despite ASEAN's present problems, it is likely that the Association will be able to manage them for the simple reason that ASEAN serves important, if particular, purposes for each of them. Moreover, the concept of concentric circles of regional cooperation and engagement applies to them all.

While ASEAN is too small an operational area for its members, it is still their primary operational arena, one which is geographically determined and strategically driven. The present predicament in intra-ASEAN relations can be a difficult but important testing ground for the integrity of ASEAN's security strategy in the Asia-Pacific and should be handled more as an opportunity to demonstrate ASEAN's viability rather than a challenge to or an erosion of its credibility and survival.

Notes

*A paper presented in the conference "Asia-Pacific Collective Security in the Post-Cold War Era," hosted by the Institute for National Policy Research and the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, Taipeh, Taiwan, 10-14 April 1995.

[1]On functionalism and neofunctionalism, see Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

[2]Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46 No. 2, Winter 1993, reprinted by the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.

[3]The case underscored both the problems related to international migration and the varying legal, judicial and human rights systems within ASEAN. For some of the problems in intra-ASEAN relations differences in human rights perspectives are likely to engender, see Carolina G. Hernandez, "ASEAN Perspectives on Human Rights and Democracy in International Relations: Problems and Prospects," Working Paper 1995-1, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Canada.

[4]*The ASEAN Declaration*, 8 August 1967.

[5]Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," p. 11.

[6]Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12 No. 4, March 1991, p. 270.

[7]Okabe Tatsumi, "Primary Characteristics of ASEAN and Its International Significance," in Tatsumi Okabe, ed., *Twenty Years of ASEAN: Its Survival and Development* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1988), p. 5.

[8]See Estrella D. Solidum, *Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN* (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1982).

[9]For a comprehensive analysis of past ASEAN-Vietnam relations, see Sukhumband Paribatra, "The Challenge of Co-existence: ASEAN's Relations with Vietnam in the 1990s," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9 No. 2, September 1987, pp. 140-156.

[10]For an excellent analysis of the issue of expanding ASEAN, see Kusuma Snitwongse, "An Expanding ASEAN: The Political Dimension," a paper presented at the ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium celebrating its 10th Anniversary on *New Directions for ASEAN*, Singapore, 12-14 September 1994, in particular pp. 11-18 on the problems of expansion.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 16.

[13]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[14]Ibid., p. 19.

[15]The term was first used by Hadi Soesatro in a presentation he made on economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific a few years ago.

[16]Hadi Soesatro, "ASEAN and the New Pacific Economic Community (APEC, EAEC, NAFTA)," a paper presented at the ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium celebrating its 10th Anniversary on *New Directions for ASEAN*, Singapore, 12-14 September 1994, p. 8.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., p. 9.

[19]See ASEAN-ISIS, *A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit*, Memorandum Number 1, 4 June 1991; and Carolina G. Hernandez, *Track Two Diplomacy and Other Papers* (Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 1995) on the evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum among policy recommendations of ASEAN-ISIS to ASEAN.

[20]An argument to this effect has been made by the author in "Towards a Credible International Role for Taiwan," a paper presented to the Conference on the Republic of China and the World Community, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, 30-31 October 1993.

[21]On these various efforts, see Paul M. Evans, ed., Studying Asia-Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, York University, 1994), especially the editor's "The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis," pp. 297-316.

[22]For a brief introduction to ASEAN-ISIS, see Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Role of the ASEAN-ISIS," ASEAN-ISIS Monitor, Issue No. 6, April 1993, pp. 1-3.

[23]Joint Communique of the Twenty-Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, 22-23 July 1994, paragraph 5, p. 2.

[24]See the presentations of Vietnam's Nguyen Trung Thank, Laos' H.E. Phong Savath Boupha, and Cambodia's H.E. Dr. Chem Widhya and H.E. Lu Lay Sreng about their countries' expectations and views about membership in ASEAN during the sixth Southeast Asia Forum hosted by ASEAN-ISIS in Kuala Lumpur, 10-13 December 1994.