
In this tome, Vincent Kelly Pollard examines foreign policymaking in the context of “intermestic politics,” a term that combines aspects of the domestic, intergovernmental and transnational aspects of politics that, in turn, configure or result in policymaking. Pollard asks the question: “Why then have presidents and prime ministers of some democratically elected governments in Asia better achieved their foreign policy objectives than others?” In attempting to answer the question, he focuses on the idea of the executive’s ability to “share power,” and introduces an analytical tool that he refers to as the Social Process Model.

In the Social Process Model, the overlapping of three major factors—precedent, executive initiative, and stretched organizational pluralism—determine the success or failure of executive foreign policy goals. To Pollard, precedent “refers to structural influences and includes national institutions, campaign promises, treaties and other international agreements, policy legacies, gender, standard operating procedures, value diffusion, global markets and similar forces.” Executive initiative is understood as “agency and includes the chief executive’s public and private statements, other agenda setting actions, and other effective and self-defeating policy legacies. Stretched organizational pluralism “refers to the extent to which the foreign policymaking power is shared, willingly or unwillingly, with other individuals and institutions. Actors falling under the category of stretched organizational pluralism run the whole gamut of non-government organizations, including ones with local, national and international scope of action, citizens’ movements, international media, agencies of other governments, military organizations and so on. Pollard illustrates the usefulness of the Social Process Model as a perspective in understanding foreign policymaking in following cases: 1) President Ferdinand E. Marcos’s skillful resurrection of the Foreign Policy Council, established by his predecessor, to gather support from Philippine political personalities of divergent if not conflicting ideologies and interests for his pursuit of greater Philippine involvement in regional cooperation, a move which eventually saw the birth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); 2) President Corazon C. Aquino’s failed attempt at extending
the military bases agreement with the United States, a result complicated, among others, by the anti-bases Convenor’s Group Statement which she signed in 1984, by her predominant “open options,” and by her inability to communicate effectively the “full range of her military relations preferences for a single public audience,” or more specifically, to the Philippine public; and, 3) the politics of foreign aid centering on increasing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s influence in directing Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the developments that led to the declaration of the Cabinet ODA Charter that combined universal and particularistic criteria of a) protection of the environment, b) democratization of political systems, c) spread of market economies, and d) demilitarization.

As a book on methods, theories, perspectives and approaches to politics, Pollard’s work undoubtedly inspires. It is not very often that one encounters a well laid out method or approach to the study of foreign policy that is decidedly multivariate in character and that veers away from the usual unidimensional and linear historical narrative. It also helps that the book is well illustrated with figures and tables that summarize and explain data in a most simple and direct manner. Indeed, the book is a must read for graduate students and aspiring policy analysts who want to understand alternative ways in making data and models meet and how to glean observations from such methodological matchmaking. However, substantively, in terms of content, the book slightly disappoints. Readers will notice that the discussions on the Philippine cases are obviously “thick” compared to that of the Japanese cases, which are obviously “thin.” More discriminating readers will however have to suffer through several glaring errors found in the book. For instance, Sabah is mistakenly located in “Eastern (peninsular) Malaysia” (page 158). Claudio Teehankee appears twice in the list of members of the Foreign Policy Council convened in 1967 (page 30). And President Corazon C. Aquino is referred to as “Aquinas” (pages 78 and 97). Notwithstanding the “asymmetry” in its discussion of cases and errors in editing, the work is still very much an engaging one.—MATTHEW SANTAMARIA, PROFESSOR, ASIAN CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN

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