In writing about transnationalism and labor, Guevarra uses language and style that is more familiar to academic and intellectual discourses rather than to the general reader. What is particularly notable is the richness of the accounts and narratives of nurses in the United States, particularly in Arizona and Texas. Given the book’s focus on nurses and domestic workers, one becomes curious about similarly probing and teasing out the experiences and narratives of Filipino domestic workers and wondering if it is the case that the domestic worker’s life just cannot be viewed from the same lens of “living the [American] dream”. Still, the stories of personal understandings and definitions of empowerment based on achievements and “purchasing power” of the nurses in America are striking and insightful. She presented a well-written account of the lives of nurses abroad showing how communities are knitted, the expectations and norms shared among nurses—both Filipinos and non-Filipinos, and the story of nurses who refused to conform to these expectations.—DINA MARIE B. DELIAS, PhD Student, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore.

REFERENCE


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[Note: The following review was read on the occasion of the book launching entitled “Development Economics in the Twentieth Century,” 24 July 2006 at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman. The event was sponsored by the Third World Studies Center, Action for Economic Reforms (AER), and the South-South Exchange Programme for Research in the History of Development.]

The recent period in the growth of economics has witnessed a surprising revival of interest in the problems of development. Many of the profession’s “big names”—Stiglitz, Sachs, Barro, Krugman, Helpman, and North, to mention only a few—have lent their names to the rediscovery of a field whose independent existence was denied not too long ago in many teaching departments. With this recently gained
respectability, the current professional mainstream seems almost to be saying, “We are all development economists now.”

On the other hand, there are an admirable few like Prof. Jomo Kwame Sundaram—and I suspect many practising economists in developing countries—for whom no such rediscovery has been necessary because they never deserted the field to begin with. This “faithful remnant” can claim partial vindication in the fact that a greater number among the profession are now willing to work in the vineyards they never left. The vital work nonetheless remains of reintroducing the grand themes of development and of reframing the current state of the development debate for the benefit of a new generation of economists who have been reared largely oblivious to the earlier literature and to the thinkers that preceded them.

The volume being reviewed here, as Jomo explains in his introduction, is part of a series that seeks to fulfill that task. In particular, however, he and his collaborators in the series are anxious to forestall the rise of a new Whiggism in this rediscovered appreciation for development themes: “While appearing to concede much of this more historically oriented theoretical ground, the recent ‘new’ development economics continues the intellectual offensive against a development economics tradition that constitutes an alternative to the Washington Consensus” (viii).

Both justice and scholarship are served when students are given the chance to study the history of thought. On justice, it is only appropriate that the new generation should know on whose shoulders they stand. On scholarship as well, to the extent that (1) students are protected from exercising that unnecessary originality that an ignorance of Dogmengeschichte often entails; (2) it serves to prevent what Schumpeter called “a sense of lacking direction and meaning from spreading among students”; and (3) the new generation might actually obtain new or neglected insights from the thoughts of earlier writers. Unlike the natural science, economics is not, after all, a discipline where we can completely trust our mentors to sum up all that is valuable in what was written before. In fact, nothing better can demonstrate this fact than the virtual eclipse and sudden reappearance of development economics that we are witnessing.

The message the editor suggests to guide the current trend in development economics is the following:
[T]he way forward . . . must involve rejection of its imperialist and “nineteenth-century English liberal economic” origins. Instead it must build on the many heterodox economic legacies that have contributed valuable insights which development economics has built upon . . . Hence rather than encourage development economics to be “domesticated and “rehabilitated” by the orthodox mainstream, the economics of development needs to be recognised as offering a superior mode of economic analysis (xiii).

Though they cannot be found in a single locus, one might venture to interpolate in the most general terms the common underlying heuristics (both positive and negative) that guides this “heterodox” research-program and which the articles of the volume seek to substantiate:

1. Posit that the problem of development economics cannot be reduced simply to a technical question of the optimal allocation of resources, whether this is sought to be accomplished by bureaucrats or markets;

2. Posit that development entails a thoroughgoing transformation from some pre-existing initial (typically noncapitalist) social formation; hence, development economics must comprehend the reasons for the stability and persistence of such noncapitalist formations, as well as the human and social consequences of their disappearance or supersession. Within a Marxist tradition, moreover, (missing subject) do not exclude the possibility that development may include the supplanting of capitalism itself;

3. Assert that the differing levels and rates of development between economies—which cannot be explained without including the relations between rich capitalist economies and poor developing (non- or semicapitalist) economies—as an integral part of one’s analytical framework;

4. Assert the principle that no adequate understanding of development in any country can be gained unless one’s analytical framework ab initio simultaneously includes the historically-given character of the State and of the social forces influencing it; and
5. Assert the primacy of concrete historical evidence over broad theoretical generalisations. In line with this, deconstruct a writer’s theoretical arguments in the light of prevailing historical and biographical circumstances to reveal latent biases and advocacies.

Examples of the deconstruction implied by the last heuristic are Goodacre’s and U. Patnaik’s respective papers on Petty and Ricardo. In his article, Goodacre is concerned to demonstrate that the views of Petty—whom he seeks to build up as a pioneer of development economics—were conditioned by his social position as a key player in the brutal colonization of Ireland by the English. Patnaik, on the other hand, tries to show up Ricardo’s comparative-advantage theorem as a disingenuous rationalization of the enforced trade specialization between England and its overseas colonies and client states that were largely disadvantageous to the latter.

Other articles in the volume, such as those on List, Marx, Lenin, Kalecki, Kaldor, and the latter-day development economists Prebisch, Lewis, and Singer are to be understood as appreciative summaries and expositions of the ideas of economists whose work more or less adhered to most of the positive heuristics enumerated above. Somewhere in between these two types are the pieces on Keynes and Kaldor. (The piece on Marshall is admittedly difficult to classify, since its conformity with any of the points above is tenuous, at best.) Keynes himself, of course, did not devote too much time to worrying about underdevelopment or about the pernicious effects of rich-country capitalism on underdeveloped countries. As has been said before, if Marx expected to destroy capitalism, Keynes’s aim in life was to save it. His solution—stimulating effective demand through fiscal and monetary policy—had little to gain from or contribute to theorizing about underdeveloped countries (indeed, Keynes mostly assumed a closed economy, which violates the third heuristic). On the other hand, Keynes’s work did further open the issue of the state’s explicit and indispensable role in the economy—as against the liberal notion that the economy is largely self-regulating.

The bulk of the volume’s articles are expository pieces that are bound to be helpful in introducing scholars to the ideas of some lesser-known great economists, or at least to the lesser-known ideas of well-known great economists. While most of them survey the ground that has been largely ploughed earlier by biographers, specialist scholars, and editors of the collected works of significant economists, it is
nonetheless eminently useful to find these critical reviews conveniently collected in a single volume. Nonspecialist scholars and students who are first venturing into the history of thought or development economics will find the collection useful and will definitely find in it an invitation to delve more deeply into specialist biographies and definitive editions of these authors’ works. In addition, novel perspectives are contributed by some articles, notably Goodacre’s article on William Petty; Patnaik on Lenin’s views on the peasantry (which notes the little known fact that Lenin probably originated the device that later came to be known as the Lorenz curve); and Polanyi Levitt’s privileged insight into the development and motivation behind the ideas of her father Karl Polanyi.

Inevitably, of course, one will find some things to quibble about, of which I shall cite only three arbitrary instances that struck me. One of this is Goodacre’s deconstructive piece on Petty, which is factually rich, but seems to suffer from a confusion of aims. On the one hand, it seems at first to bolster Petty’s claim to precedence over Smith as the true founder of the “sub-discipline” of development economics. No sooner is this done, however, than this “pioneer” is promptly demolished, first, by a discussion of Petty’s inferiority to Smith in terms of their relative contributions to concepts, such as the division of labour, economic growth, or inter-sectoral relations and second, through a recounting of some of Petty’s sordid biographical details, particularly his use of his position as surveyor to obtain undue advantage in accumulating land. Goodacre’s point is essentially that development economics is “red in the tooth.” But it is difficult to be excited about this contradictory plea for a guilty conscience for two reasons: first, since the author did not adequately show to what extent Petty’s ideas ultimately came to be absorbed in the mainstream of development economics, and what (presumably undesirable) theoretical and practical consequences their adoption has had. Indeed, the profession’s contemporary neglect and ignorance of Petty is proof of the lack of such influence. But second, one must ultimately wonder to what extent an author’s social origins and deeds are a truly relevant critique of his ideas, which must ultimately stand or fall on their own theoretical or practical merits.

Another minor complaint is occasioned by U. Patnaik’s article on David Ricardo, which sets itself the aim of refuting the theoretical proposition of comparative advantage by pointing to its irrelevance in an actual development context. Essentially, the author denies the
validity of comparative advantage when one or both of the two trading
countries are completely specialized in one commodity, without a
possibility of producing both.

Ricardo’s argument is applicable only to countries with a similar production
structure, where the assumption of the model holds—that both countries
can produce both goods. (32)

The article’s motivation is obvious enough—that the theory of
comparative advantage falsifies the actual historical choices confronted
by developing countries in their trade with advanced capitalist countries
(third and fifth heuristics). But the attempt at refutation from a purely
theoretical principle from this viewpoint is somewhat gratuitous and
unfortunately invalid. In the specific case being cited—where the
developing country could produce both goods but only one was
producible in the developed country—the correct answer in fact (as any
trade textbook would say) is not that comparative advantage was
nonexistent, but rather that a mutually beneficial post-trade price
ratios could exist somewhere between zero and the autarky price-ratio
of the country producing both goods, with incomplete specialisation
in the ambi-productive country. To arrive at this result, of course, one
would need to incorporate information on the demand side: Ricardo’s
comparative advantage theory, as is well-known, remained incomplete
until J.S. Mill suggested the proper conditions for the existence of a
trading equilibrium.

The principal discomfort presented by the volume to this reviewer,
however, is the spottiness in the selection of “great names” to be
covered. The selectivity may be explained partly by the higher agenda
implied by the heterodox social-research programme. For it is an
explicit aim of this volume not to bolster the genealogy of the
“mainstream orthodox” re-interpretation of development economics,
but rather to assert that a heterodox tradition has always underlain its
history (it is in this sense that aspects of Marshall’s work, e.g., are
reinterpreted).

Such considerations would explain the egregious omission of
Adam Smith himself, who then implicitly becomes classified as part of
the orthodox mainstream. Nonetheless, one will wonder whether this
implicit surrender is well-advised. It would after all have been an
effective antidote to the lack of appreciation of the themes of development
to re-emphasise the point—already made many decades ago by Hla
Myint—that the Wealth of Nations is itself a piece of development
literature rather than a treatise on the virtues of static allocation. In short, Smith himself—indeed more than Keynes—practised many of the heterodox heuristics (as I have interpolated them) and; therefore, in a sense might be *reclaimed* for that tradition through an appropriate reinterpretation.

On this topic, one might as well wonder why Joseph Schumpeter has not been represented; after all, apart from Marx, arguably, he more than any other economist, wrote most explicitly and extensively on the dynamic forces underlying the development of capitalism (the entrepreneur versus bureaucratization and centralization) and drew out their implications for a possible socialist future. Schumpeter could neither, even remotely, be called part of the theoretically orthodox mainstream: he denied the importance of allocative efficiency as capitalism’s principal contribution to historical progress; he recognized the trend to monopoly and concentration under competition and countenanced them—even as he pointed to their long-run dangers; and his view of capitalism’s future extended well beyond its economics and included both its cultural and political implications. He was, in almost every respect, an adherent of the heterodox heuristic. And yet, notwithstanding their observance of heterodox heuristics, Smith and Schumpeter were essentially (though perhaps unwillingly) political conservatives and ultimately have espoused policies akin to what may now be called “neoliberal.”

This leads to the larger question whether the effort to advance the cause of heterodoxy has not led paradoxically to *too small* a circle being drawn, one that includes only those thinkers whose views ultimately support and coincide with those of the political Left in today’s debates. Is heterodoxy, in other words, to be defined by methodology and heuristic or by the conclusions and policies one ultimately comes to advocate? Pedagogically, it is clear that fundamental heterodoxy must be defined based on methodology and scientific research-programmes—policy-conclusions should only be secondary. To present past ideas as being no more than tentative approximations or anticipations of one’s own conclusions is the kind of Whiggism of which today’s orthodoxy stands accused, and is precisely what heterodox economics should be concerned to avoid.—EMMANUEL S. DE DIOS, DEAN, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-DILIMAN.
NOTE

1. Indeed, Marx regarded Petty rather than A. Smith as the true founder of political economy as a whole.

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Land reform is an issue that has recurred throughout human history: one that has often shown the power to make or unmake nation-states and one that has repeatedly sparked uprisings of various types—including national revolutions.

By and large, the concept of land reform refers to the transfer of ownership from a small number of people with extensive land estates to those who till the land, whether individually or collectively. Land reform may take place with or without compensation for or consent of the “original” owners. In cases where the “original” owners are compensated, the amount of compensation varies from token sums to the full market value of the land.

There had been land reform schemes as early as during the ancient times—the Lex Sempronia Agraria proposed by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, and passed by the Roman Senate in 133 BC, was one such scheme—but land reform became an issue of particular significance in the modern period, and particularly in the last century. The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917, as well as the revolution in China that Mao Zedong led to victory in 1949, resulted in major land reforms. The Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara implemented a land reform program after toppling the US-sponsored dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Land reform was also a component of anti-imperialist struggles in Africa (notably in Namibia and Zimbabwe), the Arab countries, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

A few governments, like those of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, have recognized the importance of land reform as a prerequisite for development and industrialization.

In most other parts of the world, however, land reform remains a dream for peasants to work toward—nay, a goal to struggle for. A number of governments have introduced limited “land reform” programs to defuse peasant discontent and prevent the onslaught of revolutionary