Canada’s Aid Policy and Assistance to Rural Development and Land Policies to the Philippines since the 1980s

DOMINIQUE CAOUETTE, JULIEN VALLÉE, AND LINDSAY LONG

ABSTRACT. Concerns over food security and agriculture are back on the agenda for many donor agencies. Canada followed the trend by declaring that food security is one of its three priority areas (CIDA 2009). While these are encouraging and welcome initiatives, one cannot avoid wondering how much Canada has learned from its past experiences, and also how much such focus is rooted in an understanding of the structural impediments and obstacles to rural development. This paper takes a long-term perspective on Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) commitment to land and rural development policies, examining the specific case of the Philippines. In doing so, the paper suggests that Canada’s commitment to land policies and agrarian reform appears driven by specific political conjunctures and moments, rather than a long-term commitment on how to address issues of rural poverty and unequal access to land and resources. So far, on land policies and rural development, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has talked the pro-poor talk but has failed to walk the redistribution walk.

KEYWORDS. aid policy · Canada · Philippines · land policies · rural development

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, concerns over food security and agriculture have been back on the agenda for many donor agencies. Canada followed the trend recently by declaring that food security is one of its three priority areas (CIDA 2009). In doing so, it aspires to strengthen an earlier objective declared in 2003 to increase its overall commitment to sustainable rural development (CIDA 2003). While these are encouraging and welcome initiatives, one cannot avoid wondering how much Canada has learned from its past experiences, and also how much such focus is rooted in an understanding of the structural impediments and obstacles to rural development.
This paper takes a long-view perspective on Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) commitment to land and rural development policies, examining the specific case of the Philippines. Going back to the mid-1980s, when Canada substantially enhanced its aid to the Philippines in the wake of the People Power revolt that led to the end of the Marcos dictatorship, the paper highlights how Canada explored a variety of delivery channels, mechanisms, and projects through the years.

In doing so, the paper suggests that Canada’s commitment to land policies and agrarian reform appears driven by specific political conjunctures and moments, rather than a long-term perspective on how to address issues of rural poverty and unequal access to land and resources. As such, Canada’s role and activities in promoting rural development are not alien to many of the issues put forward by advocates of food security or even of food sovereignty (Caouette 2010). However, programs of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) remained rooted in a liberal conception of food security—meaning, one that minimizes rural differentiation and structural change and instead favors greater market integration, modern industrial agriculture, and biotechnologies. Moreover, CIDA believes that the right to food and nutrition rests in large part upon food security at the household level, which requires that individuals be able to engage in activities, such as agricultural production, that will improve their access to food (CIDA 1997). For example, and with particular relevance to questions of land reform as explored in this paper, CIDA recognizes that access to housing is dependent upon improved land tenure security to meet the basic human need of shelter.

Stated in these program priorities, CIDA’s emphasis on “land access” and “administration” have a definitely conservative outlook, as in Putzel’s (1992) typology between conservative and progressive land reform policies. Putzel characterizes conservative land policies by their overarching goal of preserving existing property rights, whereas a progressive policy strives to redistribute property rights in a more equalitarian fashion. As noted by Borras (1998), “land access” does not change the fundamental power relations between peasants and landowners, and so cripples further redistribution efforts, while market-oriented reforms typically pushed by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions do not adequately address the issue of poverty and income inequality among farmers.
Prior to investigating the particularities of Canadian development programs in the Philippines, it is useful to lay out the historical goals and motivations of CIDA more generally.

**Canadian Official Development Assistance**

ODA gained prominence on the international scene following World War II and the reconstruction efforts in Europe under the Marshall Plan (Padilla 2006). Soon after its establishment, CIDA was moved under the authority of the External Affairs Ministry in 1968. As a result, the direction of ODA shifted to reflect and focus on the interest of the most powerful economic sectors in Canada. Unsurprisingly, there was a push toward rural development projects, particularly the establishment of agribusiness in developing countries. To strengthen these initiatives, CIDA emphasized industrial cooperation, including support for an international specialization of labor and production, furnishing of technology and transfer of information to multinational corporations. For Morrison (1998), given the direction of aid toward advanced Canadian sectors, such as civil engineering, there were some clear business-specific interests driving CIDA’s programs and policies. Taking a different position, Pratt (1994) suggests that that the determinants of ODA policy are historically most closely related to bureaucratic self-interest, not to changes in partisan politics or public opinion, or even to general worldwide zeitgeist. Nevertheless, what most authors surveyed seem to reject is a “naive” position, whereby the better part of aid policy is explained by what is deemed “best” for the receiving country (Morrison 1998; Pratt 1994; Rudner 1996). Another point of agreement rests on the impact of the management structure of the Canadian government. Since the ministries of foreign (external) affairs, defense, finance, industry, trade and commerce have historically functioned rather autonomously, this fragmentized structure helps explain the oftentimes contradictory nature of aid objectives and policies.

The official development assistance from Canada, with a total fund of USD 4.73 billion in 2008 (Government of Canada 2009), is broadly organized into three branches. First, there is the CIDA, which accounts for roughly two-thirds of Canadian ODA. Second is the Department of Finance, which accounts for 14 percent of ODA, through contributions to international organizations such as the World Bank, but also programs of “Official Bilateral Debt Relief,” the
latter accounted for 5.1 percent of total ODA for the fiscal year 2006-2007 (Government of Canada 2009). The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade comes third, with about 4-5 percent of ODA, through the Canada Fund program handled autonomously by Canadian embassies on behalf of CIDA.

**ODA and Food Security**

In the early 1970s, the policy directions of CIDA experienced a shift in that there was more serious consideration of agricultural development, following the global food crisis of 1973 (Morrison 1998). In the middle of that decade, CIDA announced through a policy document, entitled *Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980*, that Canada would “focus its assistance to a greater extent on the most crucial aspects or problems of development” (Carty 1981, 130), which included food production and rural development. Building on this, there was a pledge by the agency to allocate at least 33 percent of its total bilateral aid budget to agricultural and rural development schemes in the period from 1977 to 1982 (ibid.).

During the following decade, CIDA’s priorities in rural areas and development shifted to specific components of agriculture and food production: food self-sufficiency, transportation, storage, small farming marketing, and women’s empowerment in poor and/or rural areas (Côté and Caouette 2012, 163). From 1989 to 2003, a host of land policy initiatives were supported by CIDA, albeit with a regional focus on the Americas. “Technical cooperation” was emphasized, with aid being channelled to aerial photography, radarsat technology, and land mapping (Caouette 2007). For many critics, CIDA started to lose its edge during the 1990s. The problem was twofold: a lack of sustained and coherent political leadership, and a crisis of funding. As a matter of fact, the Canadian ODA to GDP ratio shrunk by more than half, going from over 0.5 percent in the 1980s to 0.24 percent in 2002 (Greenhill 2005). Up to the late 1990s, Canadian aid had been characterized as “dispersed and tied” and determined by political and commercial interests in terms of aid allocation, thus resulting in mostly bilateral programming with a very broad geographic scope (Morrison 1998). For another author, this pattern of dispersion can be explained in a more historical way, relating to Canada’s role and self-image as a major donor and an important actor at the international level since World War II (Rudner 1996).
The year 2003 was a turning point, with a renewed global interest in food security. On the specific issue of land policies, there were even signs that CIDA might develop an agency-wide land policy, but instead
what came out was Promoting Sustainable Land Development through Agriculture, a document released in 2003 (CIDA 2003). At the time of its launching, CIDA declared that it wanted to substantially reinvest in agricultural programs, from CAD 85 million in 2001-2002 to CAD 500 million in 2007-2008, a number that has likely not been reached, perhaps due to cuts made by the Conservative government in CIDA’s “non-Afghan” spending.

In light of the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), CIDA tried to redefine its land policy objectives, purportedly to place them in a broader perspective and to better understand the linkages between land policies and other areas of development, such as environmental sustainability and gender equality, the two main “intersectional” themes for CIDA since the early 2000s (Côté and Caouette 2012, 167). CIDA also recognized that the role of women in agriculture is not generally appreciated or supported for its full value, and women all too often suffer from discriminatory economic policies and practices. As for environmental sustainability, CIDA emphasized a fast improvement in agrotechnologies instead of a quantitative increase in land usage in order to limit deforestation and to protect biodiversity (CIDA 2003). At the same time, the Canadian ODA establishment was torn between those who advocated that food security could be achieved through sustainable, ecological agricultural practices, and those who proposed a nutrition-based approach with a certain tendency toward medical or technical “fixes” to food security and poverty—namely, increasing distribution of nutritional additives, micronutrient enhancement, vitamin supplements, and enriched seeds (Caouette 2007). The full program priorities of CIDA in land policies can be seen in table 1.

**LAND POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES**

Following the demise of the Marcos dictatorship, groups and associations of peasants formed in 1987 a broad coalition named Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform, or CPAR (Bello 2004). For Putzel (1992), the formation of CPAR was probably the most positive development during the Aquino years. CPAR’s consolidation was one of the rare “working” coalitions among progressive forces, and it constituted a platform on which could be articulated demands about land reform. While CPAR was, as any other vast coalition, plagued with ideological differences or power-sharing tensions, it succeeded nevertheless in
mounting a media campaign, as well as lobbying congress members to push for a policy promoting land redistribution. An agrarian reform program was finally adopted by the Aquino administration, called the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which is still active today with a few changes—notably the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER) law of December 2008. CARP included not only land redistribution but also the provision of support services. It is comprehensive in the sense that all agricultural lands can potentially be declared “CARPable.”

Back in 1988, when CARP became law, it was rejected by most peasant organizations because it seemed to betray the more progressive vision that the CPAR coalition had previously articulated (Franco and Borras 2005). In Putzel’s (1992) terms, CARP showed its conservative nature through its numerous exemptions, phasing, delays, and later concessions to market-based approaches. Nevertheless, CARP had surprising success, with a completion rate of 80 percent. Its initial objective to redistribute 10.3 million hectares was cut down to 8.1 million hectares, due to lack of funding and some outright hostility by the Congress—namely, political leaders voting to exempt their own landholdings (Bello 2004). However, the success of CARP is probably overstated, since DAR counts as a land transfer the distribution of a certificate of land ownership award (CLOA) instead of taking into account the actual land takeovers.

Land conversion is another problem facing peasants seeking to benefit from CARP. Court decisions often let landlords convert “CARPable” land into “technoparks,” golf courses, and so on. Moreover, following the introduction of more market-friendly mechanisms, some “crafty” landlords have found ways to remain in virtual control of their lands; in this, beneficiaries are allowed to legally own the land, though only on paper, in a process called “land reversal” (Bello 2004).

As time passed, CARP moved from the “easier” land transfers to a much more contentious distribution program. Landowners did not hesitate to use all the legal channels available in order to delay the process as much as they could, waging a quasi-war of attrition against peasants. Often, landowners used extralegal means, such as violence and threats, to intimidate farmers and try to derail the transfer process. On the other hand, peasant groups also used extralegal means, such a public demonstrations and land occupation.

To resolve the clashes between those social forces in the farmers’ favor—that is, a fast land transfer—Borras (1998) and Putzel (1992) agree
that a strong peasant mobilization is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Following Fox, Borras (1998) argues that an effective strategy is to build alliances between people’s organizations (POs), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) specialized in land reform, and government officials, in order to “sandwich” the landowners. Borras calls it the *bibingka* strategy. Thus, the united political action of a plurality of social actors can overcome a disadvantageous structural or institutional context.

After the slow but steady successes of the “bibingka years,” a new national coalition of autonomous peasant organizations (UNORKA) was launched in 2000, to resume the land redistribution process in an ever-more contentious setting (Franco and Borras 2005). According to the authors, violence, repression, and violations of basic human rights came back with a vengeance, reminding many of the bad old days of the Marcos regime (Franco and Borras 2005). In recent years, land transfer efforts have suffered from gridlock of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. It remains to be seen whether CARPER will succeed in launching a new wave of land distribution. However, it is important to note that the social context is very tense, especially in peripheral areas such as Mindanao, where many local people, NGO workers, and journalists have recently been victimized by severe violence.³

**CIDA Programs**

With regard to the Philippines, the climate for incoming development aid from Western nations changed with the removal of Marcos and the election of Corazon Aquino in 1986. The Canadian policy changed as well, designating the Philippines as a major recipient of long-term assistance in September 1986 (CIDA 1986). Before that, CIDA had limited involvement in the country. The first bilateral project that Canada had in the Philippines was in 1974, when USD 3.9 million became available over a five-year period as part of the Cagayan Valley Cooperative Development Program for the purposes of agricultural training and facilities construction (CIDA 1987). While Canada only had one active project in the Philippines in 1985, in October 1986, then-external relations minister Monique Landry announced a planned USD 100 million program (ibid.).

After 1986, Canada’s ODA in the Philippines became significant. According to CIDA, the immediate objective of Canada at the time was “[to] support the new government’s reform efforts and the
restoration of democracy” (The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service 2010). This objective slowly morphed into a two-pronged strategy: on the one hand, the goal was to improve governance at all levels, and, on the other hand, the aim was to support the development of the private sector. Between 1986 and 2009, Canada contributed about CAD 675 million in development cooperation programming in the Philippines (including core funding for multilateral institutions) (CIDA 2005). However, in recent years, CIDA’s commitments to the Philippines have been much more limited. In 2007/2008, Canadian overall ODA in the Philippines amounted to CAD 19.5 million (about USD 18.7 million at the current exchange rate), which made CIDA the eighth largest ODA contributor for the Philippines. Approximately 60 percent of total ODA went to projects located in Mindanao. The biggest projects relate to the development of civil society organizations, support of local governance, and peace-building efforts. Nonetheless, Canada is a modest contributor, accounting for less than 1 percent of ODA.

Recently in February 2009, CIDA announced that in order to increase aid efficiency, it would concentrate 80 percent of its bilateral resources on twenty “countries of focus.” After the drastic budgetary cuts of the 1990s, the switch to a smaller geographical focus was justified by the need to “improve aid effectiveness through greater selectivity in the choice of recipients, disburse more aid to fewer countries and in fewer sectors, and attain greater coherence with other Canadian government policies” (Brown 2007, 213). The Philippines is not currently part of this select group.

CIDA’s programs to the Philippines can be organized into two broad distinct historical periods according to the policy frameworks that have guided CIDA’s interventions throughout the years. The first period encompasses the Interim Strategy for Canadian Cooperation with the Philippines (1986-1989) and the Country Program Review (1989-1995). The second period includes the Country Development Policy Framework (1995-2005) and the new Interim Strategy for the Philippines (2005-today).


In this section, we review some of the leading projects that had a land component, highlighting the overall context of their implementation, their goals and structure before offering a short critical examination.
Negros Rehabilitation and Development Foundation

Negros Occidental is an island province of the Philippines with an economy historically based heavily upon the sugar industry, extending back to the traditional sugar haciendas established by Spanish colonial powers. Indeed, prior to 1986, 90 percent of the island’s population was dependent upon the sugar trade (Laurie 1988). Negros was once known throughout the Philippines as “Sugarlandia,” and was considered one of the healthiest regions and sectors of the country’s economy. However, when CIDA was becoming more engaged with the Philippines in 1986, the international sugar market had entered a slump. In response, Canada sent an emissary, then-member of Parliament James Edwards, to inquire into the conditions of Negros Occidental and seek out potential projects to be undertaken by CIDA (Laurie 1988; Wurfel 1989). What emerged from this was the establishment of the Negros Rehabilitation and Development Fund (NRDF).

A critical feature underlying the development of NRDF was the recognition within the Philippines that the sugarcane sector of the economy had been in dire need of an overhaul, particularly with regard to agrarian land reform. In principle, NRDF accepted what was known as the “60-30-10” plan of land sharing, in which major landowners would cede 40 percent of their landholdings to the state. Following this, 10 percent of that land would be distributed to sugar workers, and the remaining 30 percent would be opened to agribusiness investment (ibid.). In this way, the rural poor would be given the opportunity to enhance their well-being and become self-sufficient. Moreover, despite the profitability of the industry in the past, sugarcane production was not going to be sufficient to support the growing population, even if prices recovered. In total, NRDF received over CAD 11 million from September 1986 to March 1990, accounting for roughly 12 percent of CIDA’s total ODA to the Philippines in that period. Ostensibly, this funding was meant to aid displaced workers and the poor who suffered from the collapse of the sugar industry.

To illustrate the goals, methods, and effectiveness (or lack thereof) of NRDF, it is useful to look more pointedly at a specific project that was funded through NRDF. The Salvapul Bamur Economic District Management System (EDMS) drew CAD 9 million in funding from CIDA and began in 1988 (BIND 1989). Broadly speaking, this project aimed to implement a fifteen-year plan, at the end of which no families would be living below the poverty line in the municipalities of Salvador
By establishing a wide range of livelihood projects in the area, the hope was that local residents, and particularly those underprivileged members of society, would be given an opportunity to earn higher incomes and become self-reliant, productive members of the community. Then-governor Daniel Lacson touted the program as putting the Salvapul Bamur region on the track to becoming a “mini-Taiwan,” thus setting up expectations of an economic transformation and high levels of growth (BIND 1989).

Specifically, local production under this scheme was to be linked to private enterprise and both government and nongovernment institutions, enabling small-scale producers to achieve, through combining their total production together, commercial economies of scale (CIDA 1989). At the household level, livelihoods were to remain diversified, and households would be able to integrate into several agribusiness schemes at once.

The motivation behind Salvapul Bamur and other NRDF projects was the idea that households are best able to articulate what is necessary to maximize production and efficiency, and it was therefore necessary to provide households with the incentives to produce, which had been lacking in Negros following the collapse of the sugar industry (CIDA 1989). An added bonus was the potential for these efforts to quell insurgent, armed leftist movements that had emerged in response to drastic economic disparities between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in Filipino society (ibid.). However, the effectiveness of the projects aimed at enhancing livelihood opportunities for the poor was limited, given an incomplete commitment to land reform and the incapacity to break down preexisting social hierarchies that privileged the wealthy few.7

Philippine Development Assistance Program

The Philippine Development Assistance Program (PDAP) likewise emerged in the initial period of Canadian development interventions in the Philippines in the mid-1980s. The first phase of the project lasted from 1986 to 1989, with an allocated CAD 4.88 million, accounting for 5 percent of CIDA’s contributions to development assistance in the Philippines for that period (PDAP 2010). The program was extended with a second phase lasting until 1995, with an additional CAD 15 million from CIDA, and also into a third phase that ended in 2004 (PDAP 2010).
The overarching aim of PDAP was to build partnerships between Canadian and Filipino NGOs, therefore acting as a cofinancing mechanism to support projects directed at improving the well-being of the most disadvantaged sectors of the Philippine society (Silliman and Noble 1998). Within this mandate, PDAP identified target participant groups as being the rural poor, including tenant farmers, landless rural workers and subtenants, small fishermen, and cultural minorities; the urban poor, such as blue collar workers, informal settlers and slum dwellers; and the so-called special sectors, by which is meant women from low-income families, out-of-school youth, homeless street children, the disabled, and the elderly (PDAP 2010).

The second phase of PDAP further refined the focus of the program to stress support for agricultural development projects, of particular import in discussions of land reform, while the third phase moved onto support of rural small enterprises and private sector development (PDAP 2010). Underlying all of these initiatives was the support of private development organizations, which were recognized for their creativity, innovation, and dedication in development work, but likewise noted to suffer from lack of funding, and technical, organizational, and management expertise.

In moving to understand the impacts of PDAP on rural development and land reform, it is critical to recognize the means by which funding was allocated to various NGO groups and projects. In the official literature produced by CIDA and PDAP, it is explained that NGOs must submit a proposal to a member of the Philippine PDAP committee. The PDAP committee members are drawn from local development actors who are active in Philippine NGO networks. If endorsed by the committee, the NGO that is applying for funding then works directly with the committee to submit a proposal to the decision-making Canadian committee. Importantly, it is stipulated that members of the Philippine Committee are not eligible to apply for funding directly connected to their organization. In figure 1, a graphical representation of the proposal forwarding mechanism of PDAP is displayed, with arrows representing the movement of the NGO proposal through different stages.

This bureaucratic structure relied on approvals from the Philippine Committee, which was composed of local elites, power brokers, and centrist foundations (Wurfel 1989). This fact is important to keep in mind as we move on to analyze the effectiveness of these early CIDA development interventions next.
Figure 1. PDAP proposal forwarding mechanism

In the early years of Canada’s involvement in the Philippines, CIDA failed to push for true and lasting reforms, despite its discourse and intentions to aid the rural poor. Instead of favoring progressive methods over conservative ones, which would have meant encouraging redistributing landownership in a more equalitarian fashion, such program as the NRDF failed to break down preexisting social hierarchy. As a result, its effectiveness was limited, even though the project was supposed to improve livelihood opportunities for the poorer peasants. By being unable to contribute to lasting reforms involving structural changes in landownership in favor of poorer peasants, the project’s goals could not be reached. The existing hierarchical class structure proved to be much more resilient than first anticipated and the state too weak to implement reforms. PDAP is another example where the hierarchical scheme of funding made it difficult to reach the poorest of the poor. In this context, PDAP can also be cited as one of CIDA’s more conservative program.

This situation can be best explained not so much by a clear design from CIDA officials but rather because CIDA projects were captured and nested within existing provincial government structures, which served to maintain the status quo and the interests of the landholding elite. Moreover, CIDA targeted politically conservative organizations to receive funding, and in so doing passed over those more left-leaning groups, including the Negros Federations of Sugar Workers (NFSW), the peasant movement Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, and other church-supported peasant organizations. In fact, these organizations came into conflict with both the government and military in advocating for meaningful reform. Speaking on the situation in Negros, the Broad Initiatives for Negros Development (BIND), a local NGO noted: “substantial gains in socio-economic work have been achieved by the people of Negros through their struggles . . . The mass-based POs and NGOs, often described as militant, are an integral part of the stark reality of this province” (BIND 1989, 8). CIDA’s development initiatives in the 1980s ignored these essential groups, and thus bypassed largely the interests of those disenfranchised in the prevailing hierarchical system of the Philippines. Even worse, the situation in the Philippines evolved to the detriment of many progressive groups, as landowners secured funding that bolstered their economic status even more, as well as worked with military and paramilitary groups to quell
uprising and movements toward lasting agrarian reform and development. In the specific case of the NRDF, true and lasting progressive reforms would have been better, to achieve the goal of improving the livelihood opportunities of the farmers. Had there been a push for reforms in the way the land was distributed, the goal of providing all households with incentives to produce might have been attained (CIDA 1989). However, by choosing to allow local elites and power brokers (the Philippine Committee) an important role in approving funding for local NGOs and projects, the CIDA chose to go through traditional social hierarchy—that is, the local elites—ignoring the risks of client-patron relationships in attribution of funds. Access to CIDA’s NRDF funds needed to be approved by a six-person committee responsible for reviewing project applications. The Committee included Governor Lacson and members of prominent Negros planters’ families, including Eduardo Locsin of the Chito Foundation, Leonardo Gallardo of the Negros Economic Development Foundation, Cecile Magsaysay of the First Farmers Human Development Foundation, and Eduardo Ledesma of the Sugar Industry Foundation. All in all, important landowners—some more politically conservative, some more liberal—constituted the committee (Wurfel 1989). According to a study conducted by a national coalition of progressive Filipino NGOs, most of the funding (i.e., USD 1.7 million, was allocated to planters organizations, most of whom were linked via family connections to committee members. The second largest chunk, about USD 625,000, was reserved to state agencies, directing most of CIDA’s funding for projects toward the pockets of landowners and power brokers (Laurie 1988). In maintaining the importance of such relationships, CIDA failed to bypass power holders in the community, therefore forgoing its equalitarian aims.

The strength of CIDA’s programs in maintaining the status quo was equally present within PDAP’s first phase. In fact, PDAP’s organizational structure relied heavily on large landowners, who constituted a managing body that accepted or rejected funding request of local NGOs. Without the approval of these landlords, NGOs were not able to send their requests to the Canadian Council, which ultimately held the authority to grant funding. Coupled with the reluctance of CIDA to collaborate with so-called leftist NGOs that might be considered destabilizing to the government, it emerged that “most of the Filipino NGOs involved in the program tend[ed] to reflect a middle-class base and a ‘centrist’ political orientation, leaving many
peoples’ organizations, or NGOs with a mass base among the poor, feeling either excluded or unable to participate” (Evans 1987, 3).

Likewise, the NRDF did not challenge the existing polarized socioeconomic and political structure of Negros. Rather, this program emerged from the provincial government, which did not acknowledge the need for a major and sustained land reform as a fundamental issue in economic rehabilitation of the island (Evans 1987). In fact, it reversed gains made by peoples’ organizations that went some way in improving the livelihoods of the agricultural workers on the island. Landowners that were successful in acquiring CIDA funding through NRDF could do so because the committee that allocated funding was made up of local elites, as with PDAP (Evans 1987). However, the disparity between landowners and agricultural workers was greater in Negros than in many regions of the Philippines. Given the stronghold of current and former landowners over the funding purse of NRDF, many of the organizations that worked on behalf of small farmers and the rural poor refused to be involved with NRDF. Indeed, “having struggled for decades under the yoke of the planters, they consider[ed] the suggestion that they now ‘submit’ project proposals for approval by a group of planters to be unacceptable and politically insensitive” (ibid., 5).

Representing well the difficulty of CIDA’s efforts at providing access and opportunities to the rural disadvantaged is the structure of the Salvapul Bamur project, which fell under the umbrella of NRDF. As pointed at by BIND (1989), there were three main failings within the Salvapul Bamur EDMS. First, there was no consultation with local people, POs, and NGOs. Second, no major reform occurred as a result of the program, because it followed the “60-30-10” plan of the government—meaning, a large majority of the land remained in the hands of the elite. Third, the mayors of the economic districts, those individuals that were in charge of determining important factors such as the livelihood activities of the farmers in their districts, were elite landlords. Thus, large-scale agrarian reform was against their interests. In fact, some of the same individuals were active in supporting paramilitary groups that fought against the leftist movements of the rural poor. While couched in the language of progressive development in the interests of the most disadvantaged members of the community, the scheme was put in place to preserve the status quo.

To be more specific, in its conceptualization, the EDMS project in Negros was entirely based on hierarchical structure. The strengthening
of this hierarchical structure can be illustrated with the case of the community organizers, responsible for the link between villagers and other villages. In the La Carlotta district, it has been noted that their salaries were contributed by planter-landowners, as they managed the funding received from CIDA. This created a situation in which the community organizers, responsible for representing the population were also working as agents of the patron-centred hacienda system. As mentioned in BIND (1989), the communities have the smallest part of the resources compared to government funds and private-sector investments, making their socioeconomic interests third behind those of the two other players. The danger of CIDA funds being used in favor of the status quo and the landholding elites was apparent in a livelihood systems structure such as this one. Still concerning the EDMS project, “except for the mayor of Bago City, all the other mayors in the economic district are big landlords who are resisting comprehensive land reform, are responsible for the revival of warlordism in the same area, and are well-known sponsors and coddlers or paramilitary/vigilante groups that have consistently oppressed the poor residents of the concerned communities” (BIND 1989). These mayors are the professional managers of this project. In addition, the organizations responsible for implementing the EDMS project (CIDA funded) in 1988, which formed the Salvapul Bamur District Management Corporation, were the Foundation for Community-based Organization and Management Technology (FCOMT); the Visayas Cooperative Training Center (VICTO); the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual, Cultural Advancement (OISCA); the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC); and the Diocese of Bacolod. Most were liberal, technocratic, and politically conservative organizations, except for the Diocese of Bacolod, which was more socially progressive and rooted in local parishes (BIND 1989).

At the same time, the 85,000-member NFSW, which had been undertaking a small-scale land transfer program with the peasants, with assistance only from small NGOs, did not receive CIDA funding on the basis that the union was perceived to be too leftist. At the same time, during those years, the NFSW was often the target of conservative and planter-supported armed groups. Also, the Philippine Business for Social Progress, another recipient of CIDA aid, was known to accuse workers who refuse to take part in their projects of being members of the New People’s Army, a left-wing guerrilla movement (Laurie 1988).
coalition that monitored social justice issues in the Philippines at the time, CIDA knew of the network of POs and unions that have existed in Negros for over a century. In fact, a conference held in Tagaytay in June 1988 was the site of many recommendations by various POs and NGOs. They endorsed the idea that programs and projects should be implemented while promoting comprehensive agrarian reform, advancing human rights, and supporting authentic development initiatives. Even though two employees of CIDA attended the conference, proving its relevance, their recommendations were largely ignored.

Despite its legitimate impulse of modernizing and reforming Negros economy, the EDMS project ended up pushing for conservative reforms, changing how the poor communities could be managed as contract growers and farm employees of big businesses, not how they could best control their production/marketing resources themselves. Considering the prevailing patron-client system in existence at the time, it is certain that not all of disenfranchised rural populations in the Philippines disagreed with power holders. Nevertheless, CIDA’s pro-democratic rhetoric and programs could have reflected the interests and demands expressed by grassroots, mass-based left-wing NGOs and POs. Many of these organizations were interested in modifying the traditional patron-client relationship in favor of individual/communal empowerment. Planned livelihoods for clusters of people might be useful to those elites and their clients; however, these were not reaching the majority of poor rural residents in Negros Occidental in general and within the Salvapul Bamur areas in particular.


In this second time frame, the general orientation of CIDA’s policies in the Philippines moved from the consolidation of democratic institutions to the development of the private sector and “good governance.” As previously stated, the majority (more or less 60 percent) of Canadian ODA is now concentrated in Mindanao, to support the peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government of the Philippines (GOP). In fact, a burst of new or revised programs started in 2005, coincidently with the new Interim Strategy for the Philippines. However, as we shall see in this
Table 2: CIDA programs, 1995-2008*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Investments (in CAD)</th>
<th>Official Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting Rural Industries and Market Participation (PRIME)</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>4.95M</td>
<td>Support the development of small and medium enterprises, with the goal of lowering poverty in the rural sector, promoting participation in the economy of marginalized groups, and food security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance Support Program in Muslim Mindanao (LGSPA)</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>17.75M</td>
<td>Assist the government of the Philippines and the autonomous regional government in their efforts to achieve poverty reduction and sustainable peace and development in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao through excellence in local governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Advisory Project in the Philippines Phase II (BAP)</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>5M</td>
<td>To promote sustained and equitable economic growth by supporting private sector development in the Visayas and Mindanao.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree Link* (Southeast regional program)</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>3M</td>
<td>Help countries in the region protect their environment, and increase the ability of the Asia Pacific Association of Forest Research Organization (APAFRI) member-institutions to contribute to the renewal of Asian forests through the conservation and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) Philippines</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Currently 370,000 per year</td>
<td>Support small projects proposed and implemented by local organizations in the Philippines in order to reduce poverty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken from the programs’ logical frameworks obtained from CIDA.

We do not have the necessary data to analyse the impact of this program in the Philippines, but we suspect it is rather small, the brunt of it being concentrated in Malaysia and Indonesia following the 1997 forest fires. See the following APAFRI newsletter for some more details: www.apafri.org/newsletter/doc/dec02.pdf.

section, efforts toward land reform or the valorization of more equitable land tenure, even in Mindanao, received very little attention. Table 2 gives a brief outlook of the main CIDA programs relevant, directly or indirectly, to land policies in the Philippines since 1995.
Business Advisory Project in the Philippines Phase II

Private sector development now appears to be CIDA’s main strategy to reduce poverty. Since grants to NGOs were cut in 1997, an increasing segment of CIDA funds were channelled to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). One such program has been the Business Advisory Project (BAP) that aims not only to increase the operating effectiveness of SMEs of all sectors (including agribusiness), but also to establish a local, volunteer-based business advisory service in the Visayas and Mindanao. The available funds are split fifty-fifty according to those two overarching purposes.

Overall, the impact of BAP was limited in the rural sector. According to its 2006-2007 Annual Work Plan (AWP), only 1 percent of all the Corporate Volunteers for Enterprise Development (CVEDs) employed specialized in agribusiness (CIDA 2006). CVEDs were crucial for this program, in that they are central to facilitating information dissemination and helping with the business plans and communication strategies of the SMEs. Despite the relative lack of concrete expertise in agribusiness from CVEDs, many enterprises of the rural sector obtained help and training from experts in other fields (finance, marketing, etc.). Five enterprises gained a total of twenty-five new clients in business advisory, with the United Hinatuan-Lingig-Bislig Fishpond Operators Multipurpose Cooperative (UNIHFOMCO) and Tagabuli Fishcage Operators taking most of them. TESDA Bohol also had forty-nine of its staff trained in sustainable agriculture. The achievements of the marketing efforts of BAP were less than stellar: when the Ubi Convergence Group received a tiny PHP 15,000 loan from the Japanese government, it was put at the top of the list in the agribusiness section (CIDA 2006, 13), and although UNIHFOMCO got a PHP 2 million help from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for the construction of a new laboratory, this only reflected improved lobbying and networking with government officials.

There was not much in BAP that dealt with land policies as it did not offer any innovative or even reformist ideas about how rural development could be done in a different way in order to improve the conditions of life of the majority of farmers or producers. The single value consistently stressed in the BAP work plan is efficiency. But the very orthodoxy of this program did underscore the rather conservative worldview of contemporary Canadian ODA when stripped of its environmental and gender-mainstreaming components. Success is
officially defined by a reduction in poverty rates, but it is rarely evaluated as such. On the contrary, success in these programs is often measured in the annual reports by the amount of gainful lobbying and clever commercial or marketing strategies, good networking with the local or national authorities, and sustainability at the unit level, without really looking at the macroeconomic value of these projects.

Promoting Rural Industries and Market Enhancement

Promoting Rural Industries and Market Enhancement (PRIME) was a CIDA-funded program implemented through PDAP, which had four main objectives until the program’s end in 2010. With an annual budget of almost CAD 1 million, the objectives pursued were as follows: (1) microenterprise development in poor rural communities, the goal of which is not so much to build commercial capabilities but to strive for greater food security and income creation for both women and men; (2) enhancing participation in the market to scale up microenterprises and their connection with buyers; (3) program and policy analysis to support rural enterprises; and (4) sustainability and the need to strengthen PDAP capabilities.

On the policy level, PRIME has been much more active than the BAP, but has stopped short of formulating or facilitating deep reforms. It worked in a corporatist mode, engaging industry and government officials at local and national levels, with a market-oriented focus. Activities included a donor’s forum leading to an expansion of areas devoted to sugarcane production, and an orientation meeting on executive order (EO), which was essentially large “multistakeholder” consultation processes conducted at all levels.

Nonetheless, PRIME had some activities that had an innovative input on agricultural policy. On the issue of biotechnology, there was the formulation of the “Philippine Agriculture Road Map,” a strengthening of the organic certification system, standards formulation for organic muscovado sugar, elaboration of fair trade standards, and finally a consumer awareness campaign (CIDA 2007b). Provisions were also made to coordinate and operationalize the Organic Rice Industry Plans. One problem that has been noted in the 2007/2008 AWP was that 5 percent of the budget allocated to gender themes was misspent by the local government units (LGUs), which necessitated increased engagement with LGUs and target beneficiaries.
In general, PRIME looked very down-to-earth and focused, with a small number of client producer associations (thirteen) and products to market (only two: organic muscovado and organic rice). The policy and advocacy side of their work took 4.7 percent of their total budget—although “administrative costs” reached 20 percent—with the greater part of the funds going to microenterprise development. Ultimately, despite the push to formulate and disseminate organic standards and processes, there were no special considerations about land reform or land tenure in PRIME, even if smaller and poorer farmers than the average recipients of the BAP constituted its target clientele.

Local Governance Support Program in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

This project was without doubt one of the single largest that the Canadian government had ever supported in the Philippines, with disbursements of almost CAD 18 million in five years. Three thematic objectives underpinned the Local Governance Support Program in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (LGSPA): leadership development, civil society strengthening, and promoting peace and human security. The escalation of violence in the region since elections in 2007 brought some implementation issues according the 2007/2008 AWP. Nevertheless, hope for a lasting peace between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government of the Philippines (GOP) has been an impetus behind pushing the activities forward despite the tense climate.

LGSPA is a very broad, comprehensive program that signaled Canadian government recognition of the linkages existing between sustainable peace and economic development. Land distribution is a particularly contentious issue in Mindanao, so it is no surprise that we find some space for land policies inside the “Peace and Human security” theme. Two subprojects seem particularly relevant for our study: Project #79-1202-2007-T: Developing Local Agricultural Productivity for Food and Economic Security, and Project #94-2201-2007-P: Peacebuilding through Land Tenure.

The first subproject, Developing Local Agricultural Productivity, included annual funding of CAD 128,792 and has the primary purpose to build LGU capacities, along with the autonomous regional government, to develop the local economies and, of course, to reduce the poverty considered not only a consequence of the violence but also one of its main causes. Local Government Support Program Phase II
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(LGSP II), the predecessor of LGSPA, focused on “enabling LGUs to promote, expand and diversify agri-fisheries based livelihoods and enterprises” (CIDA 2007a, 68) while considering the challenges of isolated and poor coastal barangays struggling with deficient infrastructure and underdeveloped services and transportation.

In 2005, LGSPA supported nineteen LGUs to execute industry promotion strategies, and further helped up to forty-nine LGUs “bring technologies to the ground” and establish marketing linkages with prospective buyers in and outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Practical examples include the municipality of Sitangkai (Tawi-Tawi), where the local government attempted to rejuvenate the seaweed industry. In the Sulu Province, several products have been identified that can be produced with comparative advantage (seaweed, abaca, cassava, rubber, coconut, and coffee). Specialization and industry clustering was encouraged so as to profit from external economies of scale.

Information transfer to improve agricultural productivity was also part of the project, with the provision of hands-on technical support to farmers in the later phases. Even those not part of the so-called multistakeholder mechanisms were to benefit from this aid, which permitted the claim of LGSPA to be sensitive to local conflicts and allocate resources “accordingly,” as well to broaden citizen participation. Unfortunately, no further precision is offered on this point in CIDA documents that were accessed (see note 1).

Training in “poverty reduction” (not actual poverty reduction) was provided, as well as coaching, field guides, study tours, and participation in Mindanao business forums and trade exhibits. Symptomatic of the emphasis mentioned earlier toward a “business management education” model to substitute a proper land policy, was the following snippet from the 2007-2008 AWP: “a key accomplishment for the reporting period was the Coach program for Local Economic Development (LED) specialists, conducted by a Canadian LED coaching expert in 2006. Individual skills and confidence were built in the group” (CIDA 2007a, 70).

The second subproject, Peacebuilding through Land Tenure, was very small but very relevant to our topic and may constitute what comes closest to a proposition of land redistribution by CIDA. The stated goal was to strengthen the participation of civil society organizations in peace-building negotiations relating to property ownership in ARMM. The intriguing element at the start of the analysis is the fact
that CIDA recognized that land tenure is a barrier to peace negotiations in ARMM, and even that “the skewed ownership and control of land resources is at heart of the conflict in ARMM” (CIDA 2007a, 171). These statements emerged despite the fact that CIDA has only handed out a measly CAD 22,000 annually for this project. In terms of the total LGSPA program, it amounts to less than 0.5 percent. When we consider total Canadian ODA in the Philippines, the part allocated to land tenure reforms reaches an underwhelming 0.12 percent. This weak effort is rather puzzling since peace in Mindanao has been the top priority of the Canadian government for the Philippines, as demonstrated by the amount of aid that has been channelled in this province.14

Despite its modest means, what did the project entail? First of all, CIDA found that there was a lack of comprehensive data about land ownership, and from that a lack of understanding about the conflict in the Moro area. The poor amount of data, as well as some confusion about the delimitation of land, often with contentious borders in the sea, and competing ancestral claims meant that “government programs aimed at addressing agrarian problems have not been effective in ARMM simply because of this lack of in-depth understanding in the nature of control or ownership of the land” (ibid.).15

In short, the project Peacebuilding through Land Tenure was misnamed because it failed to actually take steps to improve land access or tenure—proposing instead a two-pronged strategy: (1) to improve the participation of CSOs in the peace process and (2) to study the geography of the region to understand the conflicts in land and aquatic resources.16 As for CSO participation, the problem is that while some have lobbied for inclusion, there has been limited success. In fact, there has been only one exception: the Mindanao Peoples Caucus “Bantay Ceasefire.” Part of the project was thus to lobby MILF and government officials to institutionalize and expand this participation. Second, the policy research proposed included a survey of existing maps, case studies on land tenure and participatory interviews with stakeholders to permit disinterested findings and recommendations to participants in the dialogue. Overall, the land tenure policies of CIDA in the Philippines seemed to be directed at understanding conflicts, to try to minimize them, and include everyone in the discussions. That is noble and, at the same time, a modest objective, but it leaves on the wayside the important question of how to bring about land reform that is truly “pro-poor.”
Canada Fund

Apart from the bigger projects directly financed by CIDA, the Canadian government, through its embassy in the Philippines, finances the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI). The program started in the Philippines in 1972. According to the Philippines-Canada Cooperation Office website, its role is to “provide direct funding assistance to community groups and NGOs for small projects addressing technical, economic, educational, and social development issues,” with the objective of developing sustainable projects, self-reliance, and community organization.

The amount allocated to the Canada Fund in the Philippines is small but fairly stable. It totalled CAD 370,000 in the fiscal year 2008/2009 and reached the same amount in 2009/2010. Each project can receive up to CAD 30,000, but in some cases the grant can reach CAD 50,000. While a full listing of Canada Fund projects relating, directly or indirectly, to “land policies” would be beyond the scope of this article, we can nevertheless give an example of a recent project to illustrate the work of the Canada Fund.

The Integrated Development Project for B’laan, Maguindanaon Muslim, and Settler Community, in Maguindanao, took place from 2007 to 2008. Situated in a very poor rural village, this project aimed at integrating separate local factions into an overarching village association involving technical dissemination, education in good governance, the provision of basic health care, the construction of a “seed nursery,” and other small works. The ultimate goal was to form a lasting community organization that could become responsible for various local projects, to ensure that the impact of the project can be sustained in the longer run.

First, considering beneficiaries, the project targeted sixty households, with an available grant of PHP 1,073 million, although the village also contributed toward a few elements such as travel expenses. Agricultural projects were on top of the list of priorities, and besides the seed nursery, the transfer of knowledge and techniques, particularly related to farming in the upland and hilly terrain, was privileged.

Second, men and women were supposed to be equal recipients of the grant money; unfortunately, it seems that in practice, men were twice more likely to be a direct beneficiary, although the organizer seemed to be at pains to demonstrate the participation of women and their subsequent empowerment. How much of this empowerment is
real, or how much is put in the report to appease CIDA’s strong requirement of gender mainstreaming is rather unclear. Also, the activity about the provision of primary health care was limited to training sessions and did not include the actual provision of services.

Nonetheless, these activities seemed to have created momentum in strengthening the social organization of the village, and led to plans to construct a multipurpose community center that was not planned by the project, nor included in it, but was to be built entirely with local money and labor. The project organizer finally noted that the reluctance of villagers to participate in another “development project” because of bad experiences in the past was overcome with community discussions and coordination with municipal officials.22

**Effectiveness of CIDA Policies**

Having surveyed the two different periods of CIDA’s funding to the Philippines between 1986 and 2010, it becomes possible to offer a critical assessment of the effectiveness of the programs and projects in relation to the issue of land policies and rural development. A problem commonly emerging though with such assessment of development assistance is how to handle the lack of compatibility between foreign policies, commercial policies, and development policies. In the case of the Philippines, these clashing objectives can be downright deadly.

**Foreign Affairs and CIDA: Clashing Objectives**

First of all, the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) manages a Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP), which has included the Philippines since 1997. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) get training in Canada on “peace support operations,” staff training, and language, despite the fact that AFP is involved in an armed conflict and linked with human rights violations, which is clearly against existing Canadian policy. Canada also has a similar training program for the police (PTAP), where Canadian experts teach classes on “major crimes investigation techniques” in Southeast Asia.

Yet, with the counterinsurgency campaigns launched in 2001, extrajudicial killings attributed or linked to the AFP are thought to have numbered at least 850 by mid-2008, according to Stop the Killings Network–Canada (2008). In 2007, Philip Alston, then special rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council, pointed to the Arroyo
government as “encouraging or facilitating the killings” through the AFP. While the so-called global fight against terrorism continues to rage, MILF, a legitimate partner in the peace process with the GOP, is still officially labelled a terrorist organization by many countries, including Canada.

While CIDA spends millions trying to improve governance in Mindanao, facilitate the peace between the GOP and the MILF, and help the displaced rebuild their lives, DFAIT trains the very army and police that seem to be committing the killings and perpetuating the violence. This is why many organizations, like the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, allied with sister organizations in Canada and submitted recommendations to review Canada’s development assistance and trade with Philippines in order to put pressure on the GOP to stop the killings, implement reforms in the criminal justice system to eliminate the pervasive sense of impunity, and to rescind its national security policy that makes no distinction between combatants and noncombatants (NCCP 2007).

In recent years, many left-wing activists and peasants have been killed (Franco 2007). Those killings, according to Franco (2007), have a definite link to the criminalization of some agrarian reform cases, as well as the slow treatment of land redistribution; once farmworkers petition for their legal land rights, they become extremely vulnerable to economic or violent retribution from their landlord. And so we arrive at full circle back to land policies. Instead of stalling for time, and trying to accommodate all the powerful players, CIDA could do much more to push for a fast implementation of the CARP/ER reforms. However, this will not happen unless the agency changes its position from a neutral, disinterested entity aiming to “understand the conflict,” to a proactive, involved player supporting human rights and poverty reduction through redistributive land policies.

It is Not Enough to Focus on Microeconomics

As we have seen especially with the BAP and PRIME, CIDA’s programs tend to focus primarily on private sector development in their efforts to reduce poverty. Marketing, lobbying government officials, and communications plans are among the strategies valorized. This is useful in part, because business efficiency training and networking efforts can help jumpstart a local economy from its stupor, as well as progress toward the ultimate goal of promoting opportunities for individuals to reach their full potential, thus creating more income and reducing
poverty. But we must keep in mind that success in this area can come at the expense of a competing local or national entrepreneur who is not part of the project. Marketing cannot increase disposable income or alleviate poverty, even at the local level, unless it can be successfully linked to a national or international trade strategy. And, even then, it could cause a “beggar-thy-neighbour” situation. For example, the success of the Philippine seaweed producers could come at the expense of Indonesian producers. That is one of the main shortcomings of a development policy that focuses almost exclusively on the micro or “business” side of economic development.

A similar shortcoming can be seen in the microfinance projects. They can work very well for a few individuals, but they cannot transform a whole population into successful entrepreneurs; by definition, the capitalist business model means that there will be winners and losers. This faulty logic has been called by some economists a “fallacy of composition” (Marshall 1998), in that the sum of rational decisions at the micro level (how to build a successful enterprise) may not give a rational “collective decision” at the macro level (cutthroat competition depressing wages and increasing poverty).

This is not a criticism of microfinance or microeconomic development as such; we simply stress that such development has to be complemented by a macro outlook and mechanisms of redistribution to directly improve the disposable income and other well-being indicators of the majority of the population. It is not enough to help the “losers” to compete better. What this policy does is rather to displace the problem. Competition can foster efficiency, but unless the product of efficiency is equitably redistributed, poverty might actually go up. Moreover, the non-entrepreneurs have to also be taken care of. In other words, supply is but one side of the economic problem. Considering the demand side, effective development needs among other things a growth in the real wages (and not just job creation). All the “leadership coaching” and “marketing enhancements” in the world will not change the overall structure of the problem: how to make everyone work a decent job and gain at least a living wage.

On the neoliberal character of ODA in the Philippines, the Alternative People’s Development Forum (APDF) held in Quezon City in March 2008 offer many insights through its well document and prepared report (APDF 2008). For participants at the forum, ODA often benefits the lending countries as well as local “loans brokers” who facilitate transactions, leaving Filipino citizens with the short end of
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those deals as the country’s debt burden increases. Moreover, it seems to be a consensus among ODA reviews that “development assistance has become an oxymoron” (APDF 2008, 1), as the results of ODA programs in past decades have contradicted their stated objectives. Indeed, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism found that, out of seventy-one projects covered, 70 percent fell short of the promised economic benefits. Failed projects are explained by flaws in identification, design, evaluation, and implementation, but in some cases, kickbacks to political sponsors have yielded artificially high costs (ibid.). The solutions put forward by the APDF to the various misdeeds of ODA include first of all more accountability. This could be reached by including a strong and independent monitor, and also by a further democratization of the review process so that the average citizen, along with elected representatives, can have his or her say over the allocation of ODA. Second, APDF demands more inclusive development management processes. Third, basic standards of quality should be upheld at all times to make aid really work for the people.

Land Policies: (Good) Priorities and (Insufficient) Practices

Despite repeated commitments and declarations regarding food security and sustainable rural development, our study revealed a mismatch of priorities and funding over time. It is a serious shortcoming in the official policies of the agency, especially since participants stressed a change toward a longer-term outlook to be one of the main problems with CIDA’s land policies (CIDA 2003).

For example, in the case of CIDA’s Peacebuilding through Land Tenure project, we have seen two very important and distinct shortcomings. First, considering the very high priority that the peace process in Mindanao has for the Philippine strategy of the Canadian government, as well as the overbearing impact of the land reform in the region, it seems absurd to devote a mere 0.19 percent of total ODA to this particular issue.

Second, the pro-poor objective of land reform is conveniently glossed over by the project. Land tenure is seen as a bargaining chip in the peace negotiations, with little regard paid to how poverty might be affected by an eventual settlement, as long as there can be any agreement between MILF and the GOP. The project also takes the somewhat naive view that an objective definition of the concept of “ancestral lands” is possible, and that if only someone would come up with a neutral mapping of the area under conflict, the negotiators could come
to an easier agreement. The goal to institutionalize the participation of all “stakeholders” is laudable, even though the power of CSOs in this situation is likely to remain weak.

These considerations leave us no choice but to suggest that pro-poor land reform is not a priority for the government of Canada, even if a lasting peace in the region is in itself a strong priority. At best, pro-poor land redistribution could come as a fortunate consequence of a particular arrangement leading to a sustainable peace. But in this view, the chosen arrangement certainly does not have to maximize poverty reduction. This element contradicts CIDA’s own preliminary analysis showing that poverty, poor land access and ownership are inherently detrimental to the peace process, thus justifying the comprehensive program LGSPA. If CIDA believes its own analytical perspective, it should focus on policies really aimed at pro-poor land reform, not land reform as bargaining chips. Then, CIDA could continue facilitating CSO participation in the peace process without worrying about filling the role of a neutral, objective fact finder.

Even liberal economists agree that redistributive land reform generally has a positive impact on economic growth and also does, as a matter of course, reduce income inequality (Morales 1999). Moreover, land redistribution programs such as the CARP/ER seem to directly improve other human development indicators such as health and education, not only through higher income but also through the social investments and community organization that often accompanies these programs. In other words, land redistribution typically creates social capital that improves the general quality of life. This hypothesis is confirmed by Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas Philippine Asset Reform Report Card (PhilDHRRA 2008), according to which the agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) living in agrarian reform communities (ARCs) saw significantly improved living conditions compared with ARBs staying in non-ARCs. Both populations are in turn enjoying better conditions than peasants that did not benefit from any agrarian reform initiative.

CONCLUSION
What can we make of the above observations? As it has already been seen, land policies promoted by CIDA are usually conservative, emphasizing “access” rather than “ownership,” technical diffusion and production intensification rather than land redistribution. Also, one
could take the cynical view, for example, by saying that all the Canadian
government cares about is the “fight against terrorism” to create a stable
Mindanao open for business, and that concomitant poverty reduction
would only be a happy coincidence of this stability. However, it
appears that a broader and more nuanced perspective might explain
better CIDA’s land policies and rural development programs in the
Philippines.

Involvement in the Pacific Rim and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the promotion of political and economic stability
in the Philippines have been noted as major objectives of the Canadian-
Philippine development aid relationship. As specified by the Public
Affairs Branch of CIDA: “as nations of the Pacific Rim, they [Canada
and the Philippines] both share a common stake in the growing trans-
Pacific linkages in trade, communications and other relationships”
(1987, 2). In fact, while the justification of CIDA’s involvement in the
Philippines is frequently couched in a humanitarian framework and
the improved well-being of the population as a whole, there are
important economic gains for Canadian partners in development
projects as well. For example, the provision of commodities, notably
potash, to the Philippines involves compensation to Canadian
suppliers—and indeed the first contribution of potash to the Philippines
amounted to USD 10 million dollars worth of the commodity (CIDA
1986). This underlying commercial agenda within the Canadian
development aid context is not out of the norm, and it would be
unjust to portray Canada and CIDA as the sole parties with such
motives.

Political motivations explain the majority of the development aid
influx following the ascension to power of the Aquino government,
specifically the desire to lend support to what was perceived as a
“centrist, democratic government allied to Western political and
economic interests” (Evans 1987, 1). However, the argument that
“everyone is doing it” does not make such actions defensible. The use
of aid “as an agent of social stabilization rather than real development”
(Evans 1987, 6) and as a means of perpetuating the status quo over
improving the livelihood options and well-being of disadvantaged or
marginalized members of Philippine society, is a point that shall be
explored more fully and critically in the future.

It is also possible to understand part of policy choices made by
CIDA in light of the recent change in its monitoring and evaluation as
a further bias against difficult, long-run projects. As a matter of fact,
CIDA has been trying for years to improve the monitoring and evaluation part of the policy sequence. The move to a more stringent “results-based management” has been put forward as an improvement in the efficiency of resource allocation, to look “beyond activities and output to focus on actual results.” CIDA’s key agency results (KARs) are governance, social development, economic well-being, environmental sustainability, along with gender equality as a cross-cutting theme. The results-based management (RBM) process, replacing the old system based on a broad assessment of activities and outputs, has its obvious benefits, like improved short-term efficiency, clearer decision criteria, and faster adaptation, which can be useful on a typical five-year program. At the same time, it tends to valorize projects or programs that give fast results. A project with potentially important output may see its funding dramatically cut after a year or two if it fails to quickly demonstrate significant results.

On the crucial issue of land reform and redistribution, short-term, results-based management may cause CIDA to diminish or even suspend its funding because of a temporary lack of progress. In short, this means that easy-to-solve problems will be relatively advantaged compared to hard-to-solve problems, with no regard given to their actual impact in achieving development goals. But, given a long-term perspective, it does not follow that hard-to-solve problems should be left aside, especially if they are deemed to be of utmost importance. Also, a rational response to early failures might demand more resources, not less. So far, on land policies and rural development, CIDA has talked the pro-poor talk but has so far failed to walk the redistribution walk.

Notes

1. CIDA, “Priority Themes,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/FRA-1015144121-PWW. Many of the CIDA documents cited in this article were obtained through an official access to information request in 2009 after repeated attempts to obtain those and others directly from CIDA did not succeed.

2. For more on liberalism in international relations and cooperation, see Battistella (2009, chapters 5 and 12) and Macleod and O’Meara (2007, chapters 3 and 4).

3. Actually, Putzel (1992) compares conservative to “liberal” land policies. In the United States, “liberal” is often equated with “progressive.” We will prefer the latter term to avoid any confusion with other concepts, such as liberal economic policy or neoliberalism.

4. For a more extensive historical review of CIDA’s food security policies, see Côté and Caouette (2012).
5. As reported in The Economist (January 7, 2010; February 18, 2010).
6. The twenty countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Caribbean Regional Program, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Vietnam, and West Bank and Gaza.
7. Wurfel (1989) wrote about Canadian aid in Negros in the late 1980s, where he talked about the co-optation of CIDA’s goals for long-term development by the local elite. The NRDF Program Committee in particular, was guilty of being almost entirely composed of elite landlords. These landlords in the NRDF board were, in turn, board members of elite foundations which eventually became the primary beneficiaries of NRDF projects (e.g. The Chito Foundation, Negros Economic Development Foundation, First Farmers Human Development Foundation, J.F. Ledesma Foundation/In-Hand Negros). Another notable criticism of NRDF before the 1988 meetings in Canada to review CIDA initiatives, was the anomalous association of NRDF with the landlord-controlled Buasadmalag Inc. NRDF’s largest beneficiary, Buasadmalag was reportedly associated with a suspicious foundation called Kabalaka, which antagonized farm workers, preached against land reform, and has one leader who was also founder of a landlord-backed vigilante group. January-February 1988 saw a series of meetings across Canada to reassess CIDA programs. During these meetings, the NRDF board was prevailed upon to cancel the Buasadmalag project. It was also determined that any new CIDA project would have to have some component for land reform. Six months after, there was a large NGO consultation in Tagaytay. The Philippine Canadian Human Resources Development (PCHR) saw its beginnings in this conference. Eventually, PCHR elbowed NRDF out. CIDA decided to not extend NRDF beyond its expected lifespan of 4 years in view of its being co-opted by the Negros elite.
8. As of February 17, 2012 the Philippine Development Assistance Program has been renamed to Partnership for Development Assistance in the Philippines Inc. with Securities and Exchange Commission approval. PDAP website states that “the change was made to better reflect PDAP’s character and purpose and current thrusts and priorities. It was initiated last year at a time when the new and current business plan took effect following its earlier approval by the PDAP Board of Trustees and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA provided financial support to the PRIME Program (which was successfully completed on March 31, 2011) which included the development of the PDAP business plan” (http://www.pdap.net/).
9. On the strength and resilience of landed elite in Negros, see Aguilar 1998. Although it must be stated that in view of the human rights controversies and elitist characterization that plagued NRDF and PDAP, CIDA began to hold wide-ranging consultations with Philippine NGOs and broadened its reach to encompass the wide spectrum of Philippine NGOs and POs (Wurfel 1989). The resilience of the landed elite (Aguilar 1998) however proved too strong for CIDA’s projects, with one of its goals being permanent social change. Structural conditions proved hard to topple. At the beginning, CIDA also lacked the foresight in avoiding an exclusionist approach in inviting Philippine NGOs. From total acceptance of then Aquino government to a shift towards critical collaboration, CIDA restructured its development programming approach in NRDF and PDAP to include NGOs.
and POs not necessarily on good terms with the government, i.e., conservative board members were required to resign and were consequently replaced by progressive elements from the church.

10. At the time, the governor of the province had proposed a modified and incremental land reform initiative. Governor Lacson had proposed the “60-30-10” land reform project, in which 60 percent of lands foreclosed after the sugar collapse would be returned to planters/big landowners, 30 percent would be opened to foreign investment, and 10 percent would be given to landless peasants. To say this project backed comprehensive land reform would be a mockery, as 90 percent of the land stayed out of the hands of the poor majority. Yet, CIDA enthusiastically backed the proposal.

11. For more on the tense and violent confrontation in Negros around land reform, see Rutten (1996, 2008).

12. Another CIDA-funded project reflected such orientation toward private business development, the Engines of Growth (EOG). It was geared toward the opening of exports markets, favoring the entry of multinationals and private investors in the proposed processing centers and aiding the production of export products (such as fruit, prawn, mushrooms, and silk).


14. In fact, one might wonder, if land tenure is targeted as the main stumbling block in the peace process, why not pour more resources into it? Moreover, the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001—the result of over a decade of negotiations between the two parties in the peace process in ARMM, scheduled to be signed in August 2008 (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP 2008)—recognizes how vital the grant of land tenure is to the people of what was to be called the “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE), which was to be what the Supreme Court termed an “associated state” within the Republic of the Philippines (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP 2008). Under the heading “Resources,” the MOA-AD states the following:

1. The Bangsamoro juridical entity is empowered with authority and responsibility for the land use, development, conservation and disposition of the natural resources within the homeland. Upon entrenchment of the Bangsamoro juridical entity, the land tenure and use of such resources and wealth must reinforce their economic self-sufficiency.

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7. The legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and propriety rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, the GRP shall take effective measures of adequate reparation collectively beneficial to the Bangsamoro people, in such quality, quantity and status to be determined mutually by both Parties.

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9. Forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments of any kind or nature whatsoever granted by the Philippine Government including those issued by the present Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall continue to operate from the date of formal entrenchment of the Bangsamoro juridical entity unless otherwise expired, reviewed, modified and/or cancelled by the latter. (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2008)

Clearly, the right to exercise what was tantamount to sovereignty over the lands that members of the MILF called theirs by the principle ancestral domain needed to be given if a lasting peace accord was to be finalized. Unfortunately, the MOA-AD was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in October 2008 precisely because it would lead to the creation of a sovereign juridical entity outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine politico-legal regime; as the Supreme Court bluntly put it, “[e]ven assuming arguendo that the MOAAD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it . . . runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic” (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP 2008).

With such developments, however, one is forced to wonder if the LGSPA coordinators merely thought it prudent to play only a minimal role in matters pertinent to the MOA-AD—e.g., implementing agrarian reform in ARMM—until the MOA-AD could be finalized, then decided to continue this minimal intervention policy until negotiations could begin anew. In any case, there is no explicit mention of (the continuation of) foreign assistance for the development of the BJE in the MOA-AD. The agreement merely allows the BJE to “enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries [that are not enemies of the Philippines]” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2008).

15. The government of the Philippines (GOP) has put in place two different legal frameworks to resolve territorial claims: the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA). Because CARP operates on the “land-to-the-tiller” principle, it has tended to favor Christian settlers at the expense of the preexisting Muslim and indigenous territorial claims. Indigenous people may also encroach on Muslim land via the IPRA (Collier 2005; ODA Watch 2005).

16. One interesting comment made in the AWP on that topic, is that in 2007, the boundary disputes in farms worsened because of a spectacular growth of carrageen (seaweed), making it harder to delimit each propriety.


19. According to the CFLI website, there are five identified priority themes for Canada’s international assistance—advancing democracy, security and stability, stimulating sustainable economic growth, increasing food security, and creating opportunities for the children and the youth.
Most projects receive between CAD 5,000-30,000—according to the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives page (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/australia-australie/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/fund-fonds.aspx?lang=eng&view=d).

Also, we have no been able to access all the necessary data to look sufficiently far back in time.

More details about this project and many others can be found on the Philippines-Canada Cooperation Office website: http://www.pcco.org.ph.

To learn about RBM, see the CIDA web site: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-31595014-KEF.

According to its website, CIDA claims that its programs are in consonance with the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). The most extensive discussion of land tenure in the 2004-2010 version of the plan is in chapter 2, “Agribusiness,” and chapter 12, “Responding to the Basic Needs of the Poor.” In the latter, it is stated that the “[Philippine] government shall maintain CARP as a flagship program and complete [the] land acquisition and distribution (LAD) component and leasehold by 2008” (NEDA 2004, 159). At the time of this writing, complete LAD remains to be achieved, possibly because the plans listed pertaining to agrarian reform relied largely on the passage of key legislation (necessitating a cooperative congress) and were vague on their means of consulting and capacitating (future) agrarian reform beneficiaries to take full advantage of the land that was or will be awarded to them (NEDA 2004, 159). As its title implies, the bulk of chapter 2 is about improving the national and international market integration of the Philippine agriculture industry, a task that on the surface does not necessarily involve land reform. The Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF), which includes the recovered ill-gotten wealth from the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, is briefly mentioned in both chapters as a means of helping with the accomplishment of the aforementioned activities. The precise means that these funds will be utilized for the implementation of the government’s agrarian reform program is not specified. Lastly, the MTPDP makes little mention of foreign intervention in land reform in the Philippines. According to chapter 12 of the MTPDP, the Department of Agrarian Reform will “[enhance] assistance of foreign donors on land registration/titling, LAD and Program Beneficiary Development (PBD) funding preferably at greater concessionality than current assistance considering CARL-mandated collection terms” (NEDA 2004, 159). It thus seems likely that the Philippine government’s unclear plans for effecting genuine agrarian reform through its own agencies and the limited role that it accords to foreign donors toward that aim was a significant barrier for CIDA to have a larger role in Philippine land reform.

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