Local-National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements

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ABSTRACT. This article discusses the dynamics of anti-base coalition movements in South Korea, with particular attention to the role of framing. With two anti-base movement campaigns as case studies—the movement against base expansion at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and the anti-base movement that led to the eventual closure of Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri—the author argues that effective mobilization in anti-base movements requires striking a balance between the movements' focus on local and national issues regarding US military bases. Moreover, although political opportunity structures and mobilization resources are often given more weight within the political process model of social movements, local-national tension that exists within South Korean anti-base movements highlights the importance of framing contention in anti-base movements.

KEYWORDS. anti-base movements · coalitions · South Korea · protests · framing · mobilization

INTRODUCTION

On May 4, 2006, some twelve thousand riot police entered Daechuri village in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. While 2,800 South Korean infantry and engineering troops erected barbed wire around the base-expansion land outside Camp Humphreys, two thousand activists battled riot police who stormed Daechuri Elementary School, the makeshift headquarters of the Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek (KCPT). Activists and local residents, refusing to leave their farmland, which was legally acquired by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) in November 2004, were making a last stand to block Seoul and Washington’s US base consolidation and relocation plans to Pyeongtaek. Some 120 activists, police, and soldiers were injured, and 524 protesters were taken into custody (Jang 2006). Of the 524 protesters apprehended by
authorities, only ten were local residents (Jin 2006). What was at stake for thousands of students, laborers, and nongovernment organization (NGO) activists fighting in a little farm village 70 kilometer south of Seoul? How does a local issue of forced eviction mobilize thousands of anti-base and anti-American protesters?

In this article, I discuss the characteristics and dynamics of anti-base coalition movements in South Korea, with particular attention to the role of framing. While anti-US bases and anti-United States Forces, Korea (USFK) protests are not new in South Korea, anti-base movements (ABMs) in South Korea have taken on their own identity within the context of South Korean social movements. Using two anti-base movement campaigns as case studies—the movement against base relocation and expansion at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and the anti-base movement that led to the eventual closure of Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri—I argue that effective mobilization in anti-base movements requires striking a balance between the movements' focus on local and national issues regarding US military bases. Moreover, although political opportunity structures and mobilization resources are often given more weight within the political process model of social movements, local-national tension that exists within South Korean anti-base movements highlights the importance of framing contention in anti-base movements.

My argument will be structured in two parts. The first section presents a theoretical framework for thinking about anti-base movements in South Korea. Based on Snow et al.'s (1986) classic article on framing, I contend that as ABMs' shift from the local to the national level, activists at the national level draw in additional frames at a higher level of abstraction, which raises the potential for tension between local and national actors in the national-level ABM campaign. ABM activists, learning from the past, thus attempt to maintain local residents as the central focus of the movement. The second section then provides a brief history of anti-base movements in South Korea, followed by an analysis of two South Korean anti-base movement campaigns—the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri in 2000 and the current movement to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The Pyeongtaek case highlights local-national dynamics and the use of frames in sustaining the movement. The Maehyangri case, in addition to pointing to local-national dynamics, demonstrates the potential for tension between residents and national civic groups once scale shift takes place.
ABMs and the Political Process Model

US military bases generate both benefits and costs for the surrounding local community. The most obvious benefits are economic, such that the existence of US military bases contributes to local business and the overall economic prosperity of the community. On the other hand, US bases create negative externalities in the form of social, environmental, and even private costs. Crime, usually committed by intoxicated young servicemen, is of particular concern to communities surrounding foreign military bases. For instance, in Okinawa and Seoul, local communities frequently cite how the presence of eighteen- or nineteen-year-old single men, many of whom are living abroad for the first time, undoubtedly increases the potential for crimes such as battery, assault, or rape. Moreover, these crimes are fostered by the types of local businesses that flourish in nearby military camptowns such as bars and brothels. Military bases also create considerable amounts of waste, including high quantities of toxic waste. Noise pollution is also a major concern in communities located near air bases or firing ranges.

Crime, environmental pollution, and noise are some of the issues faced by the local community. Regarding domestic bases located in the United States, community members may petition or file complaints to the base public affairs office, or contact or lobby their Congressional representative. These formal channels may lead to an investigation or the formation of a committee to examine the impact of bases on the local community. While these channels are also available in communities located around foreign bases, the effectiveness of formal channels is constrained since host state governments cannot unilaterally make systematic changes to address disturbances or problems originating from US bases. In other words, the host state government may not be able to address formal complaints by citizens since bilateral relations between the host state and the United States must also be factored into any decisions made regarding US bases (i.e., changes in the Status of Armed Forces Agreements [SOFA], changes in military operational procedures to alleviate noise or environmental pollution, or the establishment of cleanup campaigns).

The lack of formal channels in addressing US base issues may lead local residents to take action through informal modes of contentious politics. However, social movements do not just automatically appear whenever a crime is committed, or a roaring jet screams by at dawn. Concepts from classical social movement theory—such as political opportunities, mobilizing structure, and collective action frames
employed in the political process and resource mobilization models—
can be used to explain why forms of contentious politics might arise
against military bases. While crime or pollution may serve as sources
of contention, political opportunities and constraints are what channel
these sources of contention into action (Tarrow 1998, 141). Political
opportunity structures may include longer-term factors such as political
structures, institutional constraints, or state capacity for repression as
well as shorter-term factors such as external events (i.e., accidents) or
shifts in elite alliance (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 15). Thus one might
expect to find more instances of anti-base protests in politically open
regimes where states do not (or cannot) severely repress civil society. In
South Korea, this argument certainly seems to fit as anti-base protests
proliferated only after democratization in 1987. Moreover, changing
opportunity structures in Korea (i.e., the continual shift toward more
left-leaning governments) have also provided political space for anti-
base protesters to mobilize and even forge ties with the elites. Contention
may also increase when citizens are threatened with a sense of extreme
injustice or face increasingly unbearable costs brought on by the
presence of bases.

In addition to political opportunities, the sustenance of coordinated
collective action against military bases requires actors to utilize collective
action frames and mobilizing structures. The framing will vary depending
on the particular grievance caused by the presence of a specific military
base. Whether the issues deal with the environment, crime, or dispute
over property rights, an underlying commonality in the framing of anti-
base contention is the notion of injustice. As Snow and Benford
(1992) write, “[collective action frames] underscore and embellish the
seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable”
(quoted in Tarrow 1998, 110). Moreover, with local anti-base protests,
“injustice frames” are often used to evoke injustices directed at the local
community. For instance, environmental degradation caused by the
dumping of toxic waste is framed as an injustice directed at the
community surrounding a local base. Sexual crimes like rape are
framed as an injustice toward vulnerable individuals, and which are
likely to recur within the community as long as US military bases are
present.

Mobilizing structures, such as formal organizations and social
networks, contribute to the sustenance of social movements, including
anti-base protests. While ABMs might be organized locally, local units
are often networked with other organizations at the local level, as well
as larger, more institutionalized organizations at the regional and national levels. For instance, in the town of Bupyeong, home of Camp Market outside of Incheon, the Incheon City Council teamed with NGOs to form the “Citizens’ Congress for the Return of Land Used by the USFK in Bupyeong” to reclaim land used as a junkyard by the US military. Protesting outside the gates of Camp Market, civic groups from Bupyeong and Incheon argued that the base was obstructing city plans to build a park. Protesters claimed that Camp Market’s garbage dump and incinerator created an environmental hazard. Moreover, officials of fourteen local governments housing US bases met in May 2000 to form a nationwide consultative network for the local government (Moon 2003, 152-53).

As demonstrated in the preceding example, scale shifts from local to the national level are possible when information regarding base protests in one area reaches a distant group that finds itself holding similar attributes to the initial insurgents and begin engaging in similar action (Tarrow and McAdam 2005, 127). Through emulation, different sites of anti-base movements begin coordinating action. Brokerage may also link different organizational networks, leading to scale shifts. For instance, women’s rights groups protesting against bases may link with environmental groups or nationalist groups that also advocate the removal or relocation of military base, thereby bringing together “previously segmented actors” into growing contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 334).

In more extreme cases, both scale shift and object shift take place. For instance, nationalist groups may deliberately target and link with various local social networks. In this case, frames of injustice evoking environmental or safety concerns may initially be used by a local network of activists advocating the removal of bases. However, as scale shifts occur through brokerage with nationalist groups, the movement’s object target may shift from the removal of US bases and instead target the host government. For instance, anti-base groups may begin evoking sovereignty claims and protest against their own government for selling out to the United States.

**Framing and Coalition Building: Scale Shift from Local to National**

Whether ABMs transform from a local-based to a national-level movement, or local ABMs join forces with national-level actors, some form of frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, or frame
transformation is needed to translate a particular grievance in a manner understood by actors not immediately affected by local base issues. As Snow et al. (1986) have argued elsewhere, convergence theory (Turner and Killian 1972) and resource mobilization approaches to social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973) downplay the use of frames in explaining movement mobilization. Convergence theory, or psychofunctional approaches, assumes “an almost automatic, magnetic-like linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement participation.” Resource mobilization theory also circumvents framing issues “by assuming the ubiquity and constancy of mobilizing grievances” (Snow et al. 1986, 465). However, mobilization and collective action require actors to revise the manner in which they look at issues of grievances. The problem should therefore be interpreted as an injustice rather than a misfortune. Rather than investigating the presence or absence of grievances, Snow et al. (1986, 466) conclude that mobilization has more to do with “the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations.”

As ABMs in South Korea shift from the local to the national level, movement leaders introduce new frames or modify existing ones to capture a wider audience. Because US base grievances come from multiple sectors, a variety of injustice frames can be interjected into the movement. Often, these frames capture a higher level of abstraction that goes beyond simple “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) grievances. Thus South Korean ABMs in the past had focused their campaign on issues such as sovereignty, peace, or national respect, which have the potential to arouse nationalist sentiments.

Using frames at higher levels of abstraction broadens the cause to a national level where theoretically all citizens have a stake. In practice, however, the use of sovereignty and peace frames in ABMs is usually less effective in mobilizing the unorganized who may not find any personal stake in investing time and resources toward an abstract cause. Removed is any sense of immediacy or injustice attached to the issue. Thus, Korean ABM leaders will continue to make the local issue and the local resistance movement the central focus of their campaign, even if the ABM has taken on a national dimension and the ultimate goals and objectives of the movement are found in the more abstract causes. This can be done through frame bridging, defined as “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue” (Snow et al. 1986, 467). An example of this is the concept of transforming areas hosting US bases such as
Maehyangri or Pyeongtaek into a peace village. ABMs also characterize local residents affected by base expansion in Pyeongtaek as simple farmers who desire nothing more than to farm their lands and live in peace. Thus an abstract concept of peace is intertwined with the issue of local residents’ livelihood, thereby bridging local and national goals under one frame.

Relatedly, ABMs may also resort to frame extension as the movement evolves toward a broader coalition campaign at the national level. The boundaries of the initial framework may need to be extended to capture interests and varying points of view considered secondary to the movement’s prime objectives. Snow et al. (1986, 472) state, “in effect, the movement is attempting to enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents” (Snow et al. 1986, 472).

As scale shift takes place from the local to national level, ABMs also employ frame amplification, described as “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue” (Snow et al. 1986, 469). As Snow et al. argue, movement support and participation requires “clarification and reinvigoration of an interpretive frame.” This is particularly true when scale shift takes place in ABMs because movement goals and objectives may become muddled if a variety of frames across different sectors and levels of abstraction are employed. ABMs in South Korea usually confront this issue by putting forth clear organizational statements and position papers once ABMs coalesce into a national coalition campaign.

Although frame alignment processes are utilized by ABM movement leaders, either strategically or unintentionally, to reflect a new set of values and beliefs in attracting a larger coalition movement at the national level, ABMs in South Korea continue to maintain their central focus on the initial grievances of local residents. In other words, even as frames are bridged, expanded, and amplified, South Korean ABM leaders return to the initial frame of injustice centered around local grievances. In this sense, the final frame alignment process discussed by Snow et al., frame transformation, is less salient in South Korean ABMs. Frame transformation is used to some extent to draw in a larger base of support, or to adjust or reframe “misframes” as events unfold or new information is revealed. However, the core argument of ABMs never abandons the narrower frames of injustice, highlighting the plight of local residents. In sum, the dynamics between local- and
national-level actors and the use of frames by national-level actors to maintain coalitional solidarity are critical components in the analysis of South Korean ABMs. As demonstrated in the proceeding cases of Pyeongtaek and Maehyangri, this decision is often strategic and, as South Korean ABM activists have learned, necessary to maintain movement solidarity. On the other hand, although actors at both the local and national levels recognize the necessity of national solidarity, the Maehyangri case highlights the potential for tension between local residents and national civic groups as the movement begins to shift scale.

**Anti-base Movements in South Korea**

**Overview of anti-base movements**

A general consensus exists among scholars and activists that the Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 helped propel anti-American sentiment among progressive forces in South Korea (Oberdorfer 2001; Choi 1999). While anti-American sentiments existed in South Korea even before 1980, the rise of such sentiments did not necessarily lead to an organized, systematic movement against US military bases or USFK. Unification and pro-North Korean groups, particularly those influenced by national liberation (NL) ideology, had always taken an anti-American, anti-imperialist stance while the mass public generally accepted US military presence. In fact, prior to South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987, social and environmental externalities derived from the US bases attracted little attention from the public.

Awareness of social costs and the first signs of shift in public perception of US bases took shape with the widely publicized brutal rape-murder case of Yoon Geumi in 1992 (Koh 2005, 297). USFK-related crimes were taken more seriously as civic groups pushed for revisions to the “unequal” SOFA. Local anti-base movements and NIMBY protests existed prior to this point, but it was during the mid-1990s when civic groups at the national level, primarily devoted to democracy and unification issues, attempted to form a broader coalition. In 1997, national civic groups joined forces with local residents across different regions where US bases existed to form the Migun Giji Doe-chat-gi Jung-guk Gongdong Daechaek Wiwon-hoe (Pan-National Solution Committee to Return US Bases). The movement demanded the reduction and eventual return of US bases
in South Korea as well as the restoration of resident sovereignty rights, peace, and reunification (Koh 2005, 298).

Despite the formation of the Pan-National Solution Committee to Return US Bases, most anti-base movements continued to focus on region-based issues, spearheaded by local NGOs. However, in early 1999, as Foreign Minister Lee Joung-bin raised the issue of SOFA revisions, local anti-base coalition movements in Kunsan and Daegu, and NGOs in Seoul such as the National Campaign to Eradicate Crimes by US Troops, viewed the minister’s public statement for SOFA revisions as an opportunity to open a broader coalition. In addition to base-related issues, SOFA revisions also encompassed other issue areas such as the environment, labor, safety, and women’s rights. Thus, anti-base activists and NGO leaders from various sectors established the broad-based coalition People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA) in October 1999 to push Washington and Seoul for substantive SOFA revisions (Oh 2001, 202; Moon 2003, 146). The following year, protesters staged numerous rallies and public campaigns pressuring the South Korean government to take a resolute stance in negotiations with Washington. Two events in 2000 also triggered large-scale protests and provided fuel not only for SOFA revision movements, but also for other movements related to USFK and US bases. The first event occurred near Kooni Firing Range in May when an A-10 aircraft dropped its payload early in an emergency procedure, resulting in property damage in the nearby village of Maehyangri. With widespread media coverage, this event eventually triggered a national reaction as national-level civic groups and NGOs joined forces with local residents who had been struggling to shut down Kooni Range since 1988. The second event was the discovery of a USFK personnel dumping formaldehyde into the Han River, again prompting reaction not only from environmental groups but from the general public as well.

Anti-base forces and the SOFA revision movement subsided with the revised SOFA signed by the US and South Korea in 2001, despite civic groups’ disappointment with the specific outcome. However, demands for SOFA revision by the same forces reawakened with the death of two junior high-school girls run over by a US armored vehicle and the acquittal of the two soldiers maneuvering the vehicle.

Anti-base protests continued at the local level in regions where US bases were expected to expand as part of USFK’s consolidation and relocation plan under the Land Partnership Program (LPP) signed in

**Anti-base movement in Pyeongtaek**

The current campaign to block the expansion of US bases in Pyeongtaek is actually the merging of three different coalition movements (table 1). The issue of base relocation to Pyeongtaek dates back to the late 1980s when the US and ROK considered Pyeongtaek a potential relocation site to move Yongsan Garrison outside of Seoul. Although the US and ROK suspended discussions in 1990 when negotiations deadlocked over the costs of base relocation, the anti-base movement in Pyeongtaek can be traced from this period, with the formation of the Citizens Coalition Opposing the Relocation of Yongsan Garrison in November 1990 (table 2). The coalition group, composed primarily of local NGOs from various sectors, evolved into the Citizens Coalition to Regain Our Land from US Bases in 1999, and then the Pyeongtaek Daechaekwi (Pyeongtaek Movement to Stop Base Expansion) in 2001 prior to the announcement of the LPP.

In April 2003, the South Korean and US governments formally announced the decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek. The MND also announced its plan to expropriate land surrounding Camp Humphreys for base expansion. Of the designated base-expansion land, the MND planned to acquire 240,000 pyeong (about 199 acres) of land from Daechuri village. Thus local villagers organized the Paengseong Daechaekwi or Jumin Daechaekwi (Paengseong Residents' Action Committee) in July 2003 to prevent the MND from expropriating their farmland. After the conclusion of the US-ROK Future of the Alliance Talks in 2004, the MND agreed to grant the US a total of 3,490,000 pyeong (about 2,897 acres) of land, 2,850,000 pyeong (about 2,366 acres) coming from the villages of Daechuri and Doduri.5

In May 2004, Father Mun Jeong Hyeon, a well-known activist in South Korea and the founder of the grassroots organization
PeaceWind, met with Daechuri village chief Kim Jitae and leaders of the local residents and local civic group anti-base movements. At that point, Father Mun, along with other prominent NGO leaders, decided that the various anti-base movements in Pyeongtaek needed to unify under one national campaign. The result was the launching of the KCPT or Beom Daechaekwi, a national-level anti-base coalition campaign linking national-level NGOs, local civic groups and residents.
Table 2. Chronology of events in the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>November 4: Formation of Citizens Coalition Opposing the Relocation of Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>August 7: Peace and Unification Rally and Memorial Day to Stop Relocation of Yongsan to Pyeongtaek.</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>October 29: South Korea-Okinawa NGO Peace Forum at Pyeongtaek</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>July 28: Protest against oil leakage at nearby Osan Air Base</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>October 20: Local Pyeongtaek Movement to Stop Base Expansion organized</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>April: U.S. and ROK announce Land Partnership Program</td>
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<td>July: Paengseong Residents' Action Committee to Stop Base Expansion organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>July: FOTA talks between ROK and U.S.; announce Camp Humphreys expansion of 2,897 acres.</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>March: Ratification of Yongsan relocation plans by National Assembly</td>
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<td>July 10: First major rally with 10,000 protesters held outside Camp Humphreys</td>
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<td>November 23: MND legally acquires remaining base-expansion land held by residents</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>March 15: MND enters Daechuri village to conduct surveys for base construction on farmland</td>
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<td>April: MND fills in irrigation canals; protesters and riot police clash</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May 4-5: MND enters Daechuri to fence base-expansion land and destroy activist headquarters at Daechuri elementary school; violent</td>
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<td>clashes between police/military and 2,000 protesters; base-expansion land declared a military zone patrolled by over 10,000 riot</td>
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<td>police</td>
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<td>May 12: Prime Minister Han Myeongsook issues a formal statement calling for peaceful dialogue between activists and the government;</td>
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<td>Han meets with leading civic group activists, but also restates the need to push forward with base relocation; public opinion polls</td>
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<td>indicate violent clashes reflected negatively on anti-bases movements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May 14-15: Activists hold major protests in Seoul and Pyeongtaek; Some 18,000 riot police are sent to Pyeongtaek blocking activists from</td>
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<td>entering Daechuri village; no violent clashes reported; thousands of riot police remain in Pyeongtaek to prevent further breaches.</td>
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<td>June 5: Daechuri village chief and KCPT leader Kim Ji-tae turns himself in to authorities for questioning (for allegedly illegally</td>
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<td>organizing protests); Kim is subsequently arrested</td>
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<td>July 5-11: Protestors take part in a peace march from the Blue House (in Seoul) to Pyeongtaek; as protesters pass through Ahnjungri</td>
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<td>village outside the base, activists clash with pro-base Ahnjungri Merchants Association members</td>
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<td>August 21: ROK government announces that it will forcibly remove activists dwelling in abandoned houses in Daechu-ri by the end of</td>
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<td>August to push forward with base construction</td>
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into one large umbrella coalition. Approximately 120 organizations from labor, student, women’s rights, agriculture, human rights, peace, unification, and religious groups came together to launch KCPT on March 3, 2005. Both the local residents’ coalition (Jumin Daechaekwi) and the local anti-base coalition group (Pyeongtaek Daechaekwi) became member organizations of KCPT. What was originally a local movement in Pyeongtaek had now become a national struggle. However, KCPT has been careful to incorporate the views of residents and local Pyeongtaek coalition groups to ensure that the rights and concerns of residents are represented at the center of the anti-base campaign. Both Jumin Daechaekwi and Pyeongtaek Daechaekwi retain a significant degree of influence in the direction of KCPT’s anti-base campaign, with representatives from both groups in leadership boards of the executive and steering-committee levels.

KCPT serves as the secretariat of the anti-base campaign. The executive board, which includes representatives from the national and local levels, oversees the strategic direction of the movement. However, important decisions at the operational and tactical levels are primarily decided by the steering committee (Gongdong Jiphaeng Wixonhoe). As stated earlier, supporting this umbrella coalition at the national level are NGOs and peoples’ organizations from various sectors. Each organization views the anti-base issue through its own organizational lens. But for whatever reason, they all share a common interest in stopping US base expansion. The organizational structure of anti-base movements raises two key questions in understanding anti-US base issues in South Korea: How do local and national issues and actors interact and how do local-national dynamics influence coalition-building efforts in South Korean ABMs?

The most immediate issue regarding the US base expansion in Pyeongtaek is the forced takeover of local resident farmers’ land. Although the MND and local residents held formal and informal consultations regarding compensation, residents claim that the ROK government designated their land as a base-expansion site without their input. Thus the motivation behind collective resistance from the local residents’ perspective is obvious. Farmers not only have a special attachment to the land they cultivate, but are dependent on the land for their livelihood. While the MND is compensating residents for their land at market value, the remaining residents who refuse to sell their land are, by de facto, being forced out. Local residents argue that they are fighting for their life, and that the MND is unjustly evicting
them from their own land. Moreover, local residents argue that they have already been displaced once after the end of World War II when the Japanese formerly occupied the US-expanded military bases in Pyeongtaek.

For national-level NGOs, the stakes are variegated and are even more abstract. Different sectors such as peace, environmental, or women’s rights groups all view US base issues through their own sectoral lens. For instance, environmental NGOs have a direct stake in anti-base coalitions if pollution and hazardous waste are suspected near base sites. This was certainly the case in the 2000 SOFA revision movement when environmental activists publicized the dumping of formaldehyde into the Han River in July 2000. Peace and unification groups, on the other hand, view US bases as launching pads for military aggression, preventing unification between North and South Korea and creating greater instability in Northeast Asia. Although national-level civic groups and NGOs may have different agendas from local residents and from each other regarding the expansion of US bases, these groups enter coalitions with the understanding that a coalition has a better chance challenging US bases by effectively pooling limited individual capacities into a stronger form of collective action.

Framing the anti-base issue in Pyeongtaek

The anti-base debate in Pyeongtaek has largely followed two types of frames: frames of injustice focused on the issue of livelihood and the forced expropriation of farmers’ lands; and frames of peace, which contend that US base expansion will destabilize peninsular and Northeast Asian security. What is remarkable, however, is that despite the variegated agenda of national-level NGOs under KCPT, the current anti-base coalition movement has successfully maintained a semblance of unity by placing the local land expropriation issue as their central focus. Why has KCPT been careful to place the farmers and the local resident movement at the center of their national-level campaign? The gravity of the forced relocation issue indeed demands immediate attention, but the decision is partly strategic as well. One important factor in coalition building is the urgency and clarity of issues confronted by activists. Framing the anti-base debate in a manner that highlights immediate consequences such as the forced eviction of elderly farmers and the threat to their livelihood is much more effective in capturing a wider audience than framing the anti-base debate in more abstract terms such as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The
relationship between local and national groups is therefore symbiotic. Local residents are unable to engage state actors or mobilize national consciousness without the aid of national-level NGOs. On the other hand, national-level NGOs, without the support or participation of local residents and NGO groups, have no strong, tangible rallying point for their advocacy. Even though activists acknowledge instability and the threat of war as the more serious consequence of USFK relocation, the center of gravity in the current anti-base campaign is still the Pyeongtaek residents and the forced relocation issue.

Use of frames in strategies and tactics
The anti-base movement is essentially a peace movement. The primary agenda of the main stakeholders in KCPT is to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, more deeply rooted ideological perspectives inherent in progressive movements, such as NL or people's democracy strands of ideology, may also be guiding the motives of activists at the national level (see endnote 4). While the message of peace and security is at the forefront of many of the movement leaders and prime actors (i.e., outside NGO activists who have moved to Pyeongtaek to work full time on the base-expansion issue), movement slogans and frames have bridged together local grievances with the issue of US base expansion. A central theme often evoked is, “How can you kick out these farmers from their land, many of them elderly, in order to construct a military base which turns our village into a war zone?” Placing resident farmers at the forefront of the movement was also evident in many of the movement slogans. Until the MND physically blocked off the designated base-expansion site in early May 2006, KCPT’s slogan was “Ol-hae do nongsa jihat-da” (“Let’s farm again this year”).

At the tactical level, KCPT promoted numerous events as part of their campaign to raise public awareness about US base issues and to confront the South Korean government in what activists consider inhumane and unjust actions toward Pyeongtaek residents. The nightly candlelight vigils (officially called “Candlelight Vigil to Protect Our Land”) held outside Daechuri Elementary School, although not necessarily the most effective part of the campaign effort, were a symbolic sign of solidarity amongst residents and activists. Held over six hundred consecutive nights until the schoolhouse was destroyed by the MND in early May 2006, the event also served as a morale booster for local residents. KCPT also mobilized three large rallies in an effort
to attract media attention, and raise public awareness about the anti-base issue. Framing the rallies as "Grand Peace Marches," these were held on July 10, 2005; December 11, 2005; and February 12, 2006, at Pyeongtaek. Gwanghwamun in Seoul also became a stage for anti-base protesters. In addition to occasional protests near the US Embassy, from August 9 to October 25, 2005, well-known folk artist, Jeong Tae-Choon and his wife Park Eun-Ok, performed behind the Kyobo Center as KCPT members handed out leaflets and flyers to those passing by. Jeong originates from Pyeongtaek, and during his performances, he would evoke pain and anguish felt by residents whose homes and land were about to be taken away. A protest in January where farmers drove tractors all around the country bearing signs to stop the expansion of US bases in Pyeongtaek also effectively brought together both frames of local injustice and frames of peace.

Frame transformation after the May 4-5 MND takeover

For various reasons, public attention and mobilization efforts regarding the base-expansion issue in Pyeongtaek flagged throughout the winter. The tide shifted, however, beginning in March 2006 when the MND sent riot police and hired construction workers to gut rice patties, and later fill in the irrigation system with concrete to prevent residents from farming on the base-expansion land. In early May, some twelve thousand riot police were sent to Pyeongtaek as ROK troops surrounded the base-expansion land with barbed wire and razed Daechuri Elementary School, the makeshift headquarters of KCPT, which was sitting on MND property. Violent clashes between activists and government forces resulted in injuries on both sides.

Prior to the takeover, the Minister of National Defense, Yoon Kwang-ung, announced the MND’s position and his intention to proceed with the base-expansion project, bringing Pyeongtaek to the national spotlight. The clashes made headline news the next few days, with the MND and activists releasing several public statements. However, the violent nature of the protests had the damaging effect in alienating the general public from KCPT’s campaign. A poll indicated that 81.4 percent of respondents were against the protesters using violence, and 65.6 percent were opposed to civic-group involvement in the base relocation issue (Jin 2006b). Conservatives also criticized Daechuri residents for stubbornly refusing to receive the government’s relocation compensation, reported by the MND to a minimum of one
billion won (approximately USD 1,000,000.00) per household for twenty-one families who still have not relocated (Yoon 2006).

Immediately following the May 4-5 clashes, KCPT attempted to inject new frames into the anti-base debate. Anti-base forces used media coverage, particularly the Internet, to parallel clashes with police forces and the military in Pyeongtaek with the 1980 Gwangju Massacre. On May 7, the KCPT posted on their homepage a photo of soldiers beating a protester in Gwangju in May 1980, and a photo of soldiers subduing protesters in Pyeongtaek in May 2006. Anti-base factions were using frame extension to evoke past abuses by government authority, claiming that despite living in a “democratic” society, very little had changed since 1980. KCPT also demanded the release of those “arbitrarily” arrested by police in connection with the May 4-5 anti-base protests. Unfortunately for KCPT, the shift toward anti-government frames were ineffective, primarily because the mainstream media and the general public held anti-base and anti-American forces responsible for the eruption of violence. Conservative NGOs and civic groups also criticized anti-base forces for evoking the Gwangju Massacre, claiming there was no basis for comparison. Moreover, the MND released its own statements, accusing outside opposition forces of inciting residents, thereby creating an impasse between local residents and the MND on relocation negotiations.

Civic groups opposed to base expansion outside of KCPT also quickly distanced themselves from antigovernment and anti-American rhetoric, holding a press conference in Seoul to restate their reasons and demands for opposing base expansion. In the text, representative NGOs and intellectuals stated,

“First of all, we want to draw attention that the issue of US base expansion in Pyeongtaek is an issue for local residents, but is simultaneously connected to all of civil society as a national issue” (original in Korean; my translation). (Press Conference 2006)

Meanwhile, KCPT has taken a more “radical” stance, demanding the firing of the defense minister and withdrawal of (ROK) military forces in Pyeongtaek while maintaining their initial frame of “peaceful farming.” Even with frame transformation as new events unfold, however, KCPT has continued to ground their frames and rhetoric on the local issue.
Maehyangri and local-national tension

Like the anti-base movement in Pyeongtaek, the movement in Maehyangri also began as a NIMBY movement long before the cause developed into a national campaign (table 3). Built in 1955, Kooni Firing Range was a machine-gun firing and bombing range used exclusively by the US Air Force. Only 1.4 km from Maehyangri village in Kyunggi Province, USFK trained 250 days a year, averaging 11.5 hours a day. According to one movement leader, about seven hundred families, or four thousand residents, were affected by noise pollution (Y. Kim 2001, 245). After years of suffering quietly, on July 4, 1988, residents from eight villages surrounding Kooni Range formed the Joint Committee on Noise Pollution and filed a petition to the MND and the Blue House (table 4). Receiving no response from either the ROK government...
or USFK, about seven hundred residents physically occupied the range in December 1988. Protesters occupied the range again in March 1989, eventually resulting in the USFK closing off the range and preventing any farming within its premise (Kim 2001, 251).

Led by local resident Chun Man-kyu, over the next decade, the local residents pushed both Korean and US authorities to seek measures to reduce externalities arising from strafing exercises. Villagers claimed to have suffered casualties, physical and mental illnesses, and damaged property from misfirings over the last fifty years (Y. Kim 2001). Similar to the Pyeongtaek case, in 1997, the MND proposed a plan to relocate villagers to a safer location approximately five kilometers from the training range. Local residents strongly resisted the resettlement plan, arguing that it threatened their livelihood as fishermen if they moved inland. Residents instead filed a lawsuit against the ROK government in 1998, demanding 35 billion won as compensation (Kang 2000).

On May 8, an A-10 fighter plane experiencing engine trouble dropped six 220-kg bombs to reduce weight as an emergency measure. Maehyangri villagers claimed seven people were injured and several houses damaged (Kang 2000). The USFK and the MND formed a joint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988 August 17</td>
<td>After sporadic efforts, eight villages around Kooni Range form the Joint Committee on Noise Pollution</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>Residents occupy Kooni Range in first round of major protests</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989 March 6</td>
<td>Residents occupy Kooni Range in second round of major protests; 1,500 protesters participate</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 4</td>
<td>Led by Chun Man-kyu, residents deliver a petition to the MND</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995 June</td>
<td>Residents file a lawsuit in a Suwon Court over damages in December 1994 bombing accident</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 September 9</td>
<td>MND conducts a survey at National Assembly request regarding relocation of residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000 May 8</td>
<td>Bombing accident near Kooni Firing Range</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2</td>
<td>Joint ROK-US Investigation Committee finds no damages; Chun arrested for ripping orange marker flag inside Kooni Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>First round of major protests; about 3,5000 protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Amid suspended training, ROK-US discuss ways to address resident demands</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 18</td>
<td>MND announces strafing exercises at Kooni would end, and bombing practice would be moved further out to Nong Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 March 12</td>
<td>Court orders South Korean government to compensate Maehyangri residents for damages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18</td>
<td>MND announces Kooni Firing Range will close by end of 2005</td>
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task force to investigate reported injuries and damages. In the meantime, local residents formed the Maehyangri Residents’ Task Force. The local residents’ group also stated it would seek solidarity with outside civic groups in a plan to occupy the firing range. Fueled by the ROK-US joint investigation committee’s conclusion that no damages were found by the A-10 bomb dropping, over the next two months, residents and national-level activists under the coalition movement Maehyangri Bumdaewi (National Solution Committee to Abolish the Maehyangri US Air Force Training Range [MB]) participated in a variety of activities. Most significantly, residents and activists occupied the firing range, on several occasions suspending USFK training.

**Framing and local-national dynamics in Maehyangri**

Like the Pyeongtaek movement, MB became the coalition group uniting the local resident committee with civic groups from various sectors. Rather than spreading the movement too thinly with overlapping groups from the ongoing 2000 SOFA revision campaign (PAR-SOFA), progressive groups used both issues to confront the ROK government on US military issues. After the Maehyangri local residents’ committee called for joint solidarity with national-level activists, several NGO representatives and important personalities involved in ABMs held meetings at Maehyangri, with PAR-SOFA acting as the secretariat. However, movement leaders realized that tighter coordination was necessary. To provide stronger unity and solidarity, movement leaders formed MB on June 30. Residents realized that the base-closure issue would never reach a national scale without the wider participation of outside civic groups and NGOs. Thus, the organization of MB brought residents and NGO activists together in an effort to shut down Kooni Firing Range (Y. Kim 2001, 267).

Like the coalition movement in the Pyeongtaek, Maehyangri Bumdaewi (MB) also focused their movement on the residents. Frames of injustice were evoked as the focus turned to the dangers of excessive noise pollution faced by local residents for the past several decades. Movement leaders active in both the Pyeongtaek and Maehyangri movement, however, cite that of the two movements, MB was better organized and more tightly coordinated (Oh 2005). In addition to a series of USFK mishaps that brought widespread media attention to USFK issues, one factor that helped facilitate the movement was the nature of Kooni Firing Range: the ear-splitting noise of roaring jets and dangers associated with strafing exercises were made obvious to the
public through media television coverage. Surveys indicated that the noise level in villages nearby Kooni Range ranged from 100 decibel (dB) to 133dB, more than the 90dB level usually permissible in residential areas (Korea Times 2000). A former Korean Institute for Defense Analysis researcher who studied the Maehyangri case and wrote policy recommendations regarding safety measures at Kooni Range for the MND in 1999 even admitted that noise pollution was blatantly obvious. According to the official, “unlike Pyeongtaek, the residents actually had a real case to present to the government.”

Even before the 2000 incident, the MND had discussed relocation plans, and his own study recommended at least reducing the number of training hours and halting training altogether on holidays.

The nature of the situation naturally led MB to frame the struggle against Kooni Range in terms of injustice, focusing on the plight of residents. In an essay analyzing the Maehyangri movement during the demobilization phase, steering committee leader Kim Jong-il acknowledged the significance of the Maehyangri movement from a national perspective. Kim argued that the Maehyangri campaign helped transform the ABM into a “larger, continuous, national movement,” bring public attention to USFK-related problems, and instill a national, anti-American consciousness (Kim 2001). However, the formation of MB, and the shift from a local-to national-level ABM also brought tension between a few of the leaders of the local Maehyangri Residents’ Task Force and national-level civic-group leaders regarding the direction of the Maehyangri movement. In his critical analysis, J. Kim (2001) argued that the current state of Maehyangri Bumdaewi was fragile due to cooperation issues within the leadership committee, the waning energy of NGOs and the general public, and the lack of a clear sense of long-term direction among leaders within the Maehyangri Residents’ Task Force movement.

The biggest weakness with the Maehyangri movement, according to Kim, was the inability to maintain the local residents at the center of the movement. Particularly disappointing to Kim was the inability to dispatch, organize, and execute a strong local residents’ organization. To rectify this problem, Kim wrote, “close ties between the national movement and local residents’ committee must be forged, and both organizations must hold each other responsible when managing the organization and carrying out tasks” (my translation) (J. Kim 2001). Kim added that cooperation and relations between the national Maehyangri movement and the residents’ committee were too loose.
He stated, “for the Maehyangri movement to achieve victory, the residents’ committee has to stand out as a sponsor and play a big role.”

When asked about solidarity between the local- and national-level groups, Maehyangri Task Force leader Chun Mankyu (2006) acknowledged, “we wouldn’t have had any chance if there were no solidarity. The issue wouldn’t have carried.” At the same time, however, Chun suggested that differences existed between the residents and outside NGOs, even regarding the issues at stake in Maehyangri. Chun quoted, “NGOs had a different type of consciousness from residents,” implying that NGOs had other agendas beyond the residents’ movement. According to Chun, these issues go “beyond” those of residents, and sit at a “higher level.” More concerned about compensation issues or reduction of noise pollution, local villagers do not always subscribe to or even understand the larger issues at stake regarding peace or equality in US-ROK relations (Chun 2006). As one activist at the National Campaign for the Eradication of USFK Crimes noted, Chun’s only goal was to shut down Kooni Range. However, to achieve this goal, Chun recognized the need to form solidarity with outside NGOs. After Chun’s arrest for trespassing into Kooni Range, however, the activists at USFK Crime observed that afterward many of the movement’s organizational functions were taken over by outside civic groups.

The differences resulted in rifts between local residents and the Bumdaewi steering committee. Throughout the movement, Chun feared that if protests came out too radically, the MND might take an even more resolute stance and relocate residents by force (Chun 2005). Additionally, to draw in more supporters and sustain the movement as a widespread national movement, the Maehyangri campaign needed to avoid heading toward a radical direction. “Radical” according to Chun, however, refers to strategy rather than tactics. The point of tension, therefore, was in the framing of the Maehyangri campaign. Both national and local activists recognized that the local NIMBY issues were drawing media attention and national support for resident “victims.” The formation of MB, however, led to frame bridging, frame extension, and to some degrees, frame transformation to connect local resident issues with the interests and agenda of outside civic groups. Fortunately, despite tensions between local resident activists and national civic groups, the fast pace of events and anti-USFK public opinion enabled MB to pressure USFK and the MND to make concessions and, eventually, close down Kooni Range.
CONCLUSION

Although KCPT activists see greater “success” in terms of mobilization with the Maehyangri movement, despite some reported tension between local residents and national activist leaders, ABM leaders have taken Kim Jong-il’s heed and grounded the Pyeongtaek movement in the local issue. In every public statement released by KCPT outlining the agenda and demands of the movement, the issue of residents' rights and forced relocation is always listed first. At the time of writing, however, it remains to be seen whether KCPT can win any concessions from the MND. Currently, KCPT is requesting the MND to re-evaluate the USFK base relocation project in hopes of accommodating local residents by reducing the size and scope of base expansion.

The anti-base movement cases in Pyeongtaek and Maehyangri highlight the dynamics of anti-base movements in South Korea. Of course, each ABM campaign has its unique features particular to the context, situation, and nature of the issue. However, because ABMs are always rooted with a specific military installation, campaigns often find the natural center of gravity at a physical location. Therefore, unlike other current social movements in South Korea with an international dimension, such as the anti-Free Trade Agreement movement, anti-base coalition movements in South Korea are characterized by local-national dynamics. One advantage in having a physical center of gravity in a movement is the identification of an immediate, tangible frame for broad-based coalition movements. On the other hand, local-national coordination becomes a sensitive issue, and creates the potential for tension and obstacles within coalition movements. In two-level movements such as ABMs, careful framing of the debate and issues is needed. As scale shift takes place, ABM leaders must carefully strike a balance between the movements’ focus on local and national issues through strategic use of frame bridging, frame extension, frame amplification, or frame transformation.

I have remained relatively silent on the “success” of movements, limiting my argument to mobilization and the use of frames. Movement “success” is a conjunction of multiple factors, with effective mobilization being a necessary, but not sufficient condition for such success. The Maehyangri movement and the closure of Kooni Range in 2005 is identified as a successful campaign among ABM activists in South Korea. This success was due to a combination of favorable circumstances sustaining anti-USFK/anti-American inertia: unforeseen factors such as the construction of Incheon International Airport nearby, which
made strafing exercises more dangerous; and the persistent demands of residents and activists in applying pressure not only on the ROK government but on the US as well. Until today, the anti-base movement in Pyeongtaek has delayed base-expansion plans. With USFK and the ROK government emphasizing the need to begin base construction beginning in October, it remains to be seen whether KCPT, together with local residents, can produce concessions from either the ROK or US government.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1. Various English translations of the national anti-base group in Pyeongtaek have appeared, but their official website refers to their group by this name and acronym. I will refer to the national-level coalition group as KCPT.

2. However, sovereignty and peace frames capable of evoking nationalism may clearly have stronger mobilizing effects. This was demonstrated in 2002 when the acquittal of soldiers who were involved in the armored vehicle accident killing two junior high school girls led to mass candlelight vigils and demonstrations.

3. The US had no direct role suppressing mass demonstrations in Gwangju. However, because South Korea's military chain of command was subordinate to the United States Forces, Korea (USFK), South Koreans often cite that the release of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Twentieth Division implied US complicity, or at least acquiescence to Chun Doo Hwan's decision to brutally crackdown protestors.

4. The South Korean Left, and in particular the South Korean student and labor movements, followed three divergent ideologies in the 1980s. The national liberation (NL) faction, influenced by juche (self-reliance) ideology, focused on independence from US neocolonial rule and reunification with North Korea. NL groups are often characterized as pro-North Korean. The greatest supporter of juche ideology was none other than the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. On the other hand, the people's democracy (PD) and national democracy (ND) factions, influenced by Leninism, focused on the rise of the proletariat in a broad coalition for social change. While different ideologies during South Korea's democratization period in the 1980s continue to influence different South Korean coalition movements today, the ideological lines between NL, ND, and
PD have significantly blurred since the democratic consolidation phase in the 1990s.

5. The figures come from KCPT, http://antigizi.or.kr/. The MND reports 3,620,000 pyeong of land being provided to the US (about 3,005 acres). See Yoon 2006.

6. Activists note several unfavorable circumstances resulting in lower turnout compared with the July protest. Cold weather was one significant deterrent. Another significant factor was the internal crisis faced by trade unions, which prevented labor groups from mobilizing large numbers. WTO events in late December also prevented many NGOs, particularly from labor and peasant organizations, from sending activists to Pyeongtaek in the December rally. Difficulty in sustaining the anti-base issue over the year, and the looming inevitability of MND land takeover also sapped the momentum of anti-base protests.

7. In fairness to KCPT, although the organization resorted to resolute, hard-line tactics, KCPT never “sanctioned” violence. Most of the violent clashes that erupted took place between riot police and students. While students participated in the tactical campaign to block government forces from destroying KCPT headquarters, it is difficult to argue that the actions of aggressive students and civic group activists were directed by KCPT. However, tactical differences employed by different civic groups can be traced to the political and social trends of South Korean social movements. The groups that immediately distanced themselves from the violence can be identified as “Citizens’ movements groups,” which acknowledge and concede to state legitimacy, whereas the majority of KCPT leaders can be identified with the “people’s movement groups,” which maintain hostile relations with the state (Kim 2000, 131).

8. The author attended anti-base protests on May 14, 2006, in Daechuri and noted that the primary chant was for ROK troops to withdraw from Daechuri, and not the closure of US bases.


10. No relation to the North Korean leader. Kim Jong-il is affiliated with Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea.

11. Interview with Korean Federation for Environment Movement activist, January 5, 2006, Maehyangri, South Korea.

12. Interview with activist from National Campaign for the Eradication of USFK Crimes, January 10, 2006, Seoul, South Korea.

13. On the issue of resident relocation, the MND stated that the prohibitive costs of resident relocation and compensation made this course of action untenable (Cha 2005). However, Chun (2006) claims that the MND continued to threaten residents with relocation.

14. In fact, at the tactical level, Chun’s actions were extremely radical. On one occasion, he illegally entered the training range and ripped down the orange marker flags. The action had the effect of suspending strafing exercises that day, but also led to Chun’s arrest and incarceration.

REFERENCES


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