



The 2004 General Elections and the Virtues of Indonesian Presidentialism

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ABSTRACT. The 2004 general elections in Indonesia highlighted the importance of what Linz refers to as “dual democratic legitimacy” (a political situation in which both the president and the parliament are elected directly by the people) and its relevance in examining the virtues of Indonesian presidentialism. It is argued here that Indonesian presidentialism has been redefined to the extent that the political and constitutional boundaries between the president and the parliament are clearly demarcated and guarded through various means. One cannot replace the other, both sides have to critically work with each other. Each of them is responsible to their own constituents. Indonesian presidentialism is still developing and will continue to be tested in years to come. In the 2004 general elections, relying only on party machinery to win the elections was no longer sufficient because voters now increasingly assess the candidates on the visions, ideas and programs presented in their election campaigns. However, with general elections becoming regular and institutionalized the use of money or financial rewards to gain votes in elections will be an issue that political parties, party leaders and voters will have to address. These are some of the trends developing in Indonesian politics which are likely to shape Indonesian presidentialism in the years ahead.

KEYWORDS. elections · Indonesia · presidentialism

It is important that Indonesians keep in mind that [the] only genuine guarantee for a better and more democratic future, one in which justice and prosperity for all prevail, lies in our continued efforts to build a strong and healthy civil society to keep the proper checks and balances in operation. (Editorial, *Jakarta Post*, September 23, 2004)

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the results of the 2004 general elections in Indonesia and their impact on Indonesian presidentialism. Scholars and observers of Indonesian politics have agreed that Indonesia has

successfully entered a democratic period accompanied by changes in the political, economic and social spheres (Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury 1999, Manning and Van Dierman 2000, Emmerson 1999, for a critical view see Robison and Hadiz 2003). Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, a number of political reforms were implemented including adopting new laws on political parties and elections, forming an independent election commission, and amending the 1945 Constitution to place the parliament in a stronger position with regard to the president. The parliamentary elections that took place in April 2004, followed by the two rounds of direct presidential elections held in July and September enhanced the democratic experience in Indonesia (see Sebastian 2004). What we have seen here are new constitutional arrangements simultaneously emerging with a new balance of power between the parliament and the president in Indonesia. This political phenomenon is healthy for Indonesia's new democracy, still one could be justified in asking how long this change will last in the context of the Indonesian politics.

The convincing victory of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY in Indonesia) in the recent presidential elections shows he has the support of a significant majority of Indonesians, however his *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party [PD]) only gained a few seats in the parliament. What kind of Indonesian presidentialism is developing in Indonesia? How have the results of parliamentary and direct presidential elections impacted on Indonesian presidentialism? In order to answer these questions, we need to examine the recent debates on the amendments to the 1945 Constitution and the redefinition of Indonesian presidentialism. Constitutional reform in Indonesia is extraordinary in itself as for decades the 1945 Constitution had been regarded as something sacred and permanent. By examining the historical and political context of Indonesian presidentialism, we can better understand the changing balance of power between the parliament and the president in Indonesia. The examination of the recent general elections will help us highlight the dynamics of parliament-president relations and the direction of presidentialism in Indonesia.

DEBATES ON PRESIDENTIALISM IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Among scholars of democratization and comparative politics, the choice of political systems (either presidential or parliamentary) in newly democratic countries is commonly debated (Linz and Valenzuela 1994, Lijphart 1992, Von Mettenheim 1997, Mainwaring and

Valenzuela 1998). Much attention is focused on political deadlocks caused by rivalry and fighting among executive and legislative bodies. Juan Linz (1994) argues that historically presidential systems have fared less well than parliamentary systems in terms of providing political stability in new democracies, especially during the democratic consolidation period. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach (1994, 132), drawing on empirical data from emerging new democracies around the world between 1979 and 1989, suggest that parliamentary systems seem to be able to survive better in a consolidating democracy. Political scientists still disagree over which presidential system works best but they agree that there has been a gradual shift toward reforming existing presidential systems rather than replacing them with new ones. Many of the new democratic countries established in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union adopted their presidential systems by reforming their constitutions, to include the principle of separation of power (see Von Mettenheim 1997, and Taras 1997). The only presidential systems that have experienced long periods of political stability are found in the United States and France (Gaffney and Milne 1997 and Jones 1997).

According to Linz (1993, 108-109) there are five potentially problematic areas in presidential systems. First, the presidential system often creates “dual democratic legitimacy.” The people elect both the president (elected through a direct method or by an electoral college) and the legislature and both enjoy democratic legitimacy. Therefore, both can claim a strong mandate from the people. In a time of political crisis or prolonged executive-legislative conflicts, there is likely to be competition over whose power is more legitimate. Of this situation, Linz says “there is no democratic principle to resolve it” (1994:7). The military will often intervene in this situation and this happened in a number of Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s.

The second feature identified by Linz is that the president is elected for a fixed term, which can create rigidity and make the presidential system less flexible than the parliamentary system. The president in a presidential system cannot be easily replaced by the legislative body except in special circumstances (such as impeachment), while in a parliamentary system, parliament can propose a vote of no-confidence to replace the incumbent prime minister. In the presidential system, the process of impeachment can take a long time and be politically costly and dangerous in new democracies.

The third feature is that the presidential system operates based on “winner takes all” and can make politics a zero-sum game. As Linz notes

“winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate” (1993, 113). Constitutionally, the elected president has full control over the whole executive body, leaving the defeated presidential candidates to wait until the next presidential elections. The fourth feature is that the concentration of power in the hands of the president in presidential system often (but not always) produces a strong and powerful president even though he or she might have won the job with a slim majority of votes. This can be demoralizing for opposition parties and leaders. In this situation, the elected president may claim that since he or she has a mandate from the people, the opposition parties have no legitimate base on which to oppose the president’s policies. The fifth feature is that the presidential system makes it possible for political outsiders (or independent candidates) to participate in the presidential race and this can create “destabilizing effects” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1998, 144).

Although Linz’s arguments are convincing there are other scholars who believe that the presidential system is not especially problematic when compared to the parliamentary system. Arent Lijphart (1992, 11-15) argues that there are advantages in the presidential system, namely: (a) it provides a secure and stable executive position based on a fixed term in office; (b) it produces a legitimate president who is elected through direct vote method (compared with a prime minister who is elected through an indirect vote in the parliamentary system); and (c) it preserves the principle of separation of powers, ensuring that there is a check and balance mechanism to avoid the abuse of power by the president. Meanwhile, Mainwaring and Shugart (1998, 154-158) suggest that in presidential systems voters have greater choice in electing different candidates in the executive and legislative bodies, the degree of electoral accountability and identifiability is relatively clear and also the legislative body is more independent in legislative matters.

Post-Suharto politics offers new ground for debating the merits and demerits of Indonesian presidentialism (as mentioned in Indrayana (2004). The presidential system which is outlined clearly in the 1945 Constitution and which was adopted during the independence period, has been the subject of debate and of criticism because it allowed two authoritarian presidents (Sukarno and Suharto), to dominate Indonesian politics in their periods in office. However, subsequent presidents, Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004), governed with greatly reduced presidential power. This was due to the political reforms (including amendment of the 1945 Constitution) implemented from

1998 to 2004 which strengthened the role of the parliament. The political reforms and the amendment of the 1945 Constitution also paved the way for the adoption of new electoral laws in 2003, including that of direct presidential election.

In theory, by adopting a direct presidential election system, Indonesia must face the possibility of having again a powerful president elected into office by a large majority of votes or a massive political mandate. That president will test the constitutional reforms which have been enacted against the return of authoritarian politics or dictatorship in Indonesia. Strengthening the parliament, the court, and the civil society also plays a significant role in this respect.

THE ORIGINS OF INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIALISM

Indonesia has had two very powerful presidents, Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno, the first president, dominated Indonesian politics from the independence period of the 1940s to the 1960s, while Suharto ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, from 1966 to 1998. The original version of the 1945 Constitution allows the president to remain in office for five years (with possible re-election for another term). It also gives the president the power to set up a cabinet and to appoint ministers. The president is also the Chief Commander of the Indonesian armed forces with the power to declare war, sign international treaties, and give amnesty. These powers were guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution, which was drafted and adopted during the transitional period from the Japanese occupation to Indonesian independence in the mid-1940s. It is regarded as an emergency constitution which concentrated political power in Sukarno, the president during the turbulent independence period of the 1940s. Sukarno then had to face the return of the Dutch to Indonesia after the end of the World War II, and the subsequent war of independence.

Indonesia experienced a parliamentary democracy period during the 1950s, and adopted two constitutions, the United States of Indonesia Constitution (1950) and the 1957 Constitution. As mentioned earlier, the 1945 Constitution was an emergency constitution and therefore after the war of independence ended in the late 1940s, a special committee prepared a new and more comprehensive constitution as Indonesia entered a democratic period in the 1950s. Both constitutions outlined a parliamentary system in which the prime minister governed the country, and the president had only a

ceremonial position. However, the Indonesian experience of parliamentary democracy did not last long as civilian governments rose and fell in quick succession during the 1950s (see Feith 1962). With the looming threat of civil war, and regional rebellions occurring throughout the Indonesian archipelago, Sukarno declared a state of emergency in 1957. With this declaration, he abolished the parliamentary system with its constitution and reinstated the 1945 Constitution that gave more power to the president. Sukarno became a dictator as he imposed what was known as “guided democracy” which lasted until 1965.

From 1966 until 1998, Suharto ruled Indonesia. Suharto controlled all the main political actors (the military, the bureaucracy, big business groups and the ruling party Golkar), leaving little room for opposition groups to challenge his authoritarian grip on Indonesian politics (see Robison 1986, Liddle 1996, Hill 1994). Suharto retained the 1945 Constitution, and monopolized its interpretation for his own benefit. For instance, as the 1945 Constitution does not clearly state the limits on presidential terms, Suharto took this to mean that he could be continuously reelected every five years. He ensured his reelection by organizing general elections in which the ruling party, Golkar always won (see Ward 1974, Suryadinata 2002, and Utrecht 1980). Although the president was appointed by the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly (which includes members of the parliament and the regional and functional representatives) the election process occurred in such a way that the incumbent president would automatically win another term. This was done by using a combination of persuasion and repression to get the Indonesian people to vote for Golkar. In this political environment, the parliament and the judiciary were reduced to “rubber stamp” institutions. Both Sukarno and Suharto deliberately weakened the role of the parliament in Indonesia, making it a “second class” institution. The parliament was not able to act as a counterbalance to the executive power. It is often said that the Suharto period was one of political stability, but the so-called political stability of the Suharto presidency was not as solid as many people or scholars thought (Bresnan 1993, Crouch 1988). In fact, it was very fragile and it was maintained at high cost. As mentioned earlier, various forms of repression and persuasion were used to keep Suharto in power for decades. The entire age of the Republic of Indonesia has been shaped by the phenomenon of these two powerful presidents, who still have loyal followers and supporters throughout Indonesia today.

REDEFINING INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIALISM IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

In the six years since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia has been governed by three different presidents: Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Habibie, who was one of Suharto's most trusted ministers, was regarded as "transitional president." Politically speaking, he was a weak president compared to Suharto but he used his short term in office to oversee major political reforms which ironically caused the downfall of his own presidency. According to electoral calculations, Megawati ought to have become president after Habibie. During the July 1999 general elections, her party, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle [PDI-P]), got the highest vote. Through political maneuvering orchestrated by Amien Rais, the chairman of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly, Wahid was elected president and replaced Habibie in October 1999. With Wahid's party only holding 13 percent of the seats in the parliament and Wahid's idiosyncratic personality, the Wahid presidency failed to provide the political stability that Indonesia desperately needed at the time. In June 2001 Wahid was impeached by the Peoples' Consultative Assembly and replaced by Megawati. Each of these three presidencies brought about major political developments in Indonesia. The three presidents differed from Suharto in terms of their power to govern the country and to deal with parliament. Indonesians who had lived under strong presidents for decades now experienced different kinds of presidents and a powerful parliament. Street protests, press freedom, public forums, anarchy, chaos, and political uncertainty became daily fare for the Indonesian people.

The rise and fall of these three presidents brought about pressure to reform the 1945 Constitution or to replace it with a new one. Intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), constitutional lawyers, and students, who argued that Indonesia needs a new constitution that reflect a new era of democracy and acknowledges the principle of separation of powers, advocated replacing the 1945 Constitution. The constitutional reforms that the Philippines and Thailand experienced in the 1980s and the late 1990s respectively were part of their consideration. However, the Peoples' Consultative Assembly took the safest route by choosing to amend the 1945 Constitution instead. In 2002, the Peoples' Consultative Assembly established a committee to work with constitutional experts to oversee

the amendment process of the 1945 Constitution. As a result, the 1945 Constitution underwent four amendment processes in which a number of articles were revised, reworded or extended. One of them was about what I call redefining Indonesian presidentialism, clarifying the boundaries among and responsibilities of the president, the parliament, and other higher state institutions, at least from the constitutional point of view.

In this redefined Indonesian presidentialism, the president still acts as an executive body who runs the country on daily basis. However, the president cannot disband the parliament or vice versa. Since both are elected directly by the Indonesian people, both sides share equal political legitimacy. The Indonesian people elect the president and vice president through a direct presidential election mechanism and both are elected for a fixed term (5 years) and can be elected for one further term. The president can be replaced by the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (which is made up of the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (House of Representatives [DPR]) and the *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* (House of Regional Representatives [DPD]), but only after receiving the recommendations from the *Mahkamah Konstitusi* (Constitutional Court [MK]). An impeachment process can only be pursued if the president is found guilty of criminal conduct.

As far as Indonesian presidentialism is concerned, the adoption of direct presidential election (with two rounds) as the way to elect the president is remarkable. There was much debate about this idea but generally it received wide-ranging support, including from the leaders of the main political parties, who believed that this system would greatly improve their chances of electoral victory. Nevertheless, what the party leaders did not realize was that the Indonesian people (and the parties' leaders as well) had never experienced voting in a direct presidential election. Indonesia entered uncharted political territory as there was nothing that Indonesia can learn from other countries except from the likes of Ireland, Nigeria, and Costa Rica, to name a few (see Notosusanto 2003).

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Indonesia adopted new electoral laws in 2003. These are *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum No. 12*, the law on general elections; *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden No. 23*, the law on presidential and vice-presidential elections, and the *Undang-*

Undang MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD No. 22, law on organizational structures of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional Representatives Council and the Local House of Representatives. According to these laws, the *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (General Elections Commission [KPU]) was established as an independent electoral body in charge of organizing general elections in Indonesia. The KPU membership is independent of political parties and it has branches throughout Indonesia, at provincial, district and sub-district levels. A *Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum* (Monitoring Committee of General Elections [*Panwaslu*]) was also established to act as an umpire to ensure that the KPU holds free and fair elections. Both local and international independent electoral watch organizations are allowed to witness and work in polling stations across Indonesia. In order to resolve electoral irregularities, the Constitutional Court has a mandate to receive complaints submitted by political parties and presidential teams and to give final verdicts on electoral disputes contested by different parties.

According to the new electoral laws, parliamentary elections must be held before the two rounds of direct presidential elections. The primary aim is to elect candidates to fill seats in bicameral chambers at the national level: the DPR (550 seats) and the new DPD (132 seats). Any political party that gains at least five percent of the votes in the parliamentary election are allowed to submit presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the first round. Two rounds of direct presidential elections follow the parliamentary election. The top two candidates from the first round stand eligible to run in the second round. To win in the second round, the candidates must gain more than fifty percent of votes nationally and also win in 26 provinces throughout Indonesia.

The parliamentary elections in April 2004

On April 4, 2004, parliamentary elections were held across Indonesia. Twenty-four political parties contested the elections and more than two thousand polling stations were established to enable more than 100 million people to vote nationwide. Voter turnout on election day was about 83 percent of the registered voters which was very high given that voting was not compulsory (KPU 2004). Under the new electoral law, the voting system for the House of Representatives was based on an open list proportional system in which voters cast their votes for the candidates and the parties simultaneously (Sebastian 2004, 258). In

theory, this open list proportional system and local branch preselection of candidates would ensure that the constituents knew the elected members of parliament. This was a departure from the proportional system used in previous general elections especially during the Suharto period. Under the old proportional system, central party leaders selected candidates, and often the constituents did not know these candidates. The new voting system for electing the members of the Regional Representative Council was based on a single nontransferable vote system which applied to all of the 32 provinces in Indonesia, regardless of the population of the province. The top four candidates in each province were elected as new members of this council representing their respective provinces. The primary duty of the members of this council is to tackle issues related to the decentralization laws which were implemented in Indonesia in early 2001.

The results of the parliamentary elections showed interesting political developments in terms of voting patterns and party preferences. First, votes for the major parties decreased, with Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* [PDI-P]) losing the biggest number of voters, ranking number two after the Golkar party led by Akbar Tanjung (Table 1). In 1999 many voters in the major cities supported the PDI-P, but this time around they deserted it. This has been interpreted as a strong signal of voter dissatisfaction with the Megawati government for failing to address concerns about the economy, security, and the widespread practice of corruption in Indonesia. Wahid's *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party [PKB]) was the only party that was able to maintain its following at almost the same level as in 1999, as it maintained the vote of the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (Renaissance of Islamic Scholars [NU]), one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Another interesting development in the 2004 parliamentary elections was that the votes for the Islamic political parties such as the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party [PPP]), Amien Rais's *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party [PAN]) and the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Star Party [PBB]) also decreased significantly. The political parties who gained significantly were the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party [PKS]) and the newcomer *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party [PD]) each of whom gained about seven percent of the votes. These parties campaigned strongly on anti-corruption, morality, security and leadership change (*perubahan kepemimpinan*). Many voters in the major cities in Java

Table 1. Final result of Indonesian legislative election, April 5, 2004

Rank	Parties	Votes		House seats	
		Votes	% of vote	Seats won	% of total seat
1	<i>Partai Golongan Karya</i> (Golkar Party)	24,480,757	21.58	127	23.00
2	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle [PDI-P])	21,026,629	18.53	109	19.82
3	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party [PKB])	11,989,564	10.57	52	9.45
4	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> United Development Party (PPP)	9,248,764	8.15	58	10.35
5	<i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democratic Party)	8,455,225	7.45	56	10.18
6	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party [PKS])	8,325,020	7.34	45	8.18
7	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party [PAN])	7,303,324	6.44	53	9.63
8	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (Crescent Star Party [PBB])	2,970,487	2.62	11	2.00
9	<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Reform Star Party [PBR])	2,764,998	2.44	14	2.54
10	<i>Partai Damai Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Peace Party [PDS])	2,414,254	2.13	13	2.36
11	Other parties	13,195,079	11.61	12	2.16
Total		113,462,414	100.00	550	100.00

Source: *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (General Elections Commission [KPU]).

(especially Jakarta) voted for these two political parties. This interesting political development demonstrates how the concerns of these voters moved beyond party affiliations to the bread-and-butter and security issues affecting their everyday life.

The use of advertising in television, newspaper, radio, internet, and street billboards as a way to attract voters increased significantly in the 2004 general elections and this is a subject which merits its own study. There is no doubt that the advertising industry in Indonesia benefited very much during the 2004 general elections as billions of rupiah were spent on advertising. The use of public opinion surveys and opinion polling was crucial and a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Several independent research organizations, such as Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), the Centre of Policy Studies-Soegenng Suryadi Syndicate, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and Center for the Study of Development and Democracy (CESDA), produced predictions about voters' preferences prior to the election dates, which may or may not have influenced voting behavior.

The level of support for the Democratic Party surprised many political leaders since it was formed only in 2001 (Kompas 2004).¹ Within a short period of time, this party was able to establish a network of branches across Indonesia. However, the rise of the Democratic Party cannot be separated from the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono factor. According to opinion polls, the popularity of SBY increased gradually over the six months prior to the parliamentary elections in April 2004 (Sebastian 2004: 268-69). The public saw him as a "democrat general" with all the leadership qualities required to lead Indonesia (see Yudhoyono 2004). His good communication skills, which helped a great deal in translating his ideas into national visions, certainly benefited not just himself but also the Democratic Party.

Direct presidential election: The first round

The first round in the direct presidential elections was held on July 5, 2004. Five pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates contested the first round. The presidential election was a contest among the established Indonesian political elite, as the electoral laws did not permit the nomination of independent candidates: candidates were nominated by the political parties who reached the electoral threshold of five percent of total votes in the parliamentary election. The following is a brief discussion on the five presidential and vice-presidential pairs endorsed by the political parties. The PDI-P endorsed

the incumbent President Megawati with Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of NU, one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia on PDI-P's ticket. This combination represented a broad coalition of nationalists and the Islamic community close to the NU in East Java province. On paper, the chances for the Megawati-Hasyim partnership were high especially if the PDI-P voters (who numbered around 21 million in the parliamentary elections) and the NU supporters supported this partnership (see *Gatra*, May 22, 2004). However, this became complicated in reality because the Golkar Party (who selected Wiranto as the party's presidential candidate) also endorsed Solahuddin Wahid (who is the brother of former president Abdurrahman Wahid) with the purpose of garnering votes from NU followers. Thus, by having both Hasyim and Solahuddin in the race, PDI-P and Golkar were competing for votes from the NU followers.

The Democratic Party (with the support of small parties like the PBB and the *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* (Justice and Unity Party [PKP]), endorsed the partnership of Yudhoyono (SBY) and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla in this race. Both of them were ministers in the Megawati government but resigned from their positions just a few weeks prior to the first round of presidential elections. This partnership was an interesting one since it combined a variety of elements to attract voters. Yudhoyono comes from Java where the majority of the voters are, while Jusuf Kalla comes from Sulawesi, in eastern Indonesia. Yudhoyono was a former general but was seen by the public as a "democrat general" as he had advocated reforms in the Indonesian military after the fall of Suharto. His military track record was relatively problematic. Even his implication in the raiding of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta in 1996 did not reduce his popularity (he was then the deputy Commander of the Jakarta Military Command). Jusuf Kalla was a successful businessperson who owned companies throughout eastern Indonesia. Politically, Kalla is a senior leader in the Golkar Party and has many followers within this party which meant that Golkar supporters were split between voting for him and for Wiranto-Solahuddin.

The PAN endorsed Amien Rais and Siswono Yudho Husodo. Amien Rais was a leading reform figure in the post-Suharto era but his own political party, PAN, was not particularly successful in either the 1999 general elections or the 2004 general elections. As the former chairman of *Muhammadiyah*, another important Islamic organization in Indonesia, his chances in the presidential race were considerable, as he would be guaranteed the *Muhammadiyah* vote. The partnership with Siswono was useful for Amien since Siswono was a successful

businessperson and had worked as a minister during the Suharto period. More importantly, Siswono also had strong support coming from his association with the *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia* (Association of Indonesian Farmers [HKTI]).

Finally, the PPP endorsed the leader of the party, Hamzah Haz, with Agum Gumelar (a former general) as running mate. Both of them were in the Megawati government. From the beginning, the prospects of this partnership were slim and it did not receive much support since the public was already familiar with their mediocre track records in the Megawati government.

As mentioned in the previous section, direct presidential election was a new thing in Indonesian politics. In the past, voters usually voted for political parties and their representatives, and the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (Peoples' Consultative Assembly [MPR]) appointed the president and vice president. In 2004, the voters directly elected the president and vice president. The activities of the campaign period generated political excitement as well as confusion for everyone in Indonesia. Most party leaders thought that voters who voted for their political parties in the parliamentary elections would automatically vote for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates endorsed by their parties. Party leaders in Jakarta instructed local party leaders to follow the decisions made in Jakarta regarding how to vote in the presidential elections. However, these activities were ineffective. The results of the first round direct presidential elections (see Table 2) showed that endorsement of the major political parties did not guarantee a high proportion of votes. In fact, the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp (endorsed by the Democratic Party which holds 53 seats in the Parliament), was able to garner about 39 million votes (33 percent) in the first round, followed by the Megawati-Hasyim camp with 31 million (26 percent). The three camps (Wiranto-Solahuddin, Amien-Siswono and Hamzah-Agum) shared the remaining votes. They were eliminated from the second round.

How do we explain the results of the first round in terms of voter preferences? First, voters in direct presidential elections have more independence and freedom to vote for preferred candidates regardless of their party affiliations. In East Java where the NU followers are concentrated, the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp took a significant number of votes from NU vote, while some of the votes also went to the Wiranto-Solahuddin camp. In addition, the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp gained votes (especially in the cities) from voters affiliated with other political parties including the PDI-P. Another issue regarding voter preferences

Table 2. The result of the first round of the Indonesian presidential election, July 5, 2004

Rank	Candidates	Votes	% of vote
1	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	39,838,184	33.574
2	Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi	31,567,104	26.605
3	Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid	26,286,788	22.154
4	Amien Rais-Siswono Yudho Husodo	17,392,931	14.658
5	Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar	3,569,861	3.009
Total		118,656,868	100.000

Source: KPU.

was that the individual character and personality of the candidates were important in attracting voters. It is generally agreed that Yudhoyono attracted many voters because of his personal skills. The way he speaks (polite, soft and measured tones) benefited him politically. He used media extensively to help him communicate his ideas to the public. He also traveled widely throughout Indonesia to listen to and talk with the people directly, which increased his popularity. His direct approach reminded many Indonesians of Sukarno and the other founding fathers such as Muhammad Hatta, Sjahrir, and Tan Malaka who were skilled in communicating their ideas directly to the Indonesian people in the 1940s and the 1950s.

Direct presidential election: The final round

The final round of direct presidential elections was held on September 20, 2004. As mentioned earlier, only the two contenders from the first round competed in the second round. These were the Yudhoyono-Kalla ticket and the Megawati-Hasyim camp. Between July and September 2004, these two camps tried to win the support of the presidential candidates who had lost in the first round. This led to the establishment of two political groupings, the *Koalisi Kebangsaan* (Nationhood Coalition) and the *Koalisi Kerakyatan* (Peoples' Coalition) (see reports in *Tempo*, July 11, 2004). The Nationhood Coalition, made up of PDLP, Golkar, PPP and other small parties, supported the Megawati-Hasyim camp in the second round. In terms of numbers, this coalition was powerful as it represented more than half of the total number of seats in the Parliament. The Peoples' Coalition includes small political parties such as the Democratic Party, PBB, PKS, PAN, PKB and others who supported the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp.

There was no doubt that the establishment of the Nationhood Coalition brought much optimism to the Megawati-Hasyim camp especially as influential politicians such as Akbar Tanjung (Golkar),

Megawati (PDI-P), and Hamzah Haz (PPP) were behind it. They believed that through their party machineries and by instructing party leaders at the grassroots level on how to vote, they could influence large numbers of voters. However, they underestimated the signs of uneasiness and dissent among PDI-P and Golkar followers. In April, just a few months earlier, these two parties had competed in the parliamentary elections, on different sides. During the Suharto era when Golkar was the ruling party, Megawati and her supporters were suppressed and intimidated. Consequently, PDI-P supporters at the grassroots level still mistrusted Golkar, and were suspicious about the real motivation of Golkar in the coalition. At the same time, Golkar was having internal trouble, with a small number of party leaders opting to support the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp. Thus, there was no guarantee that the Megawati-Hasyim camp would get the votes from of all Golkar followers.

The Yudhoyono-Kalla camp saw the disunity of Golkar as something to take advantage of. The role of Jusuf Kalla was instrumental in this respect especially with his involvement in the formation of a new rebel faction within Golkar led by Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman, just a few weeks before the second round of voting. At that stage, opinion polls placed the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp ahead of the Megawati-Hasyim camp with around 60 percent of respondents voting for the former camp and 40 percent for the latter camp. In order to win the undecided voters, especially those in the major cities, Yudhoyono intensified his public campaign on the need for the Indonesian people to replace the status quo and therefore to accept the change (*perubahan*). Perhaps, the “change” factor was very important in the minds of the voters (*Kompas*, July 27, 2004, see also Djwandono 2004). After decades in waiting, voters finally had the chance to elect their own national leaders, just like at the village level where people can elect the head of the village (*lurah*).

The results of the second round of direct presidential elections (see Table 3) indicate that the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp won the race convincingly as predicted by the opinion polls. With the exception of Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and the Moluccan provinces, the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp captured most of the votes in the rest of the provinces throughout Indonesia. This camp received an additional 30 million votes from those who voted for other candidates in the first round. The results also show that many Golkar followers voted for the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp, against the directives of the Golkar leaders in Jakarta. The majority of the NU vote in East Java went again to the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Kalla camp.

Table 3: The result of the second round of the Indonesian presidential election, September 20, 2004

Rank	Candidates	Votes	% of vote
1	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	69,345,331	60.88
2	Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi	43,271,395	39.11
Total		110,616,726	100.00

Source: KPU.

The case of changing voters' preferences in Yogyakarta during the 2004 general elections is also fascinating. In the 1999 general elections, the PDI-P, the PAN, the PKB, and the PPP won the votes, but in the parliamentary elections in April 2004, the Democratic Party and the PKS captured more votes and therefore reduced the number of votes that went to PDI-P, PAN, and PPP. There was no clear majority. In the first round of direct presidential elections, the Megawati-Hasyim camp ranked first, followed by the Amien-Siswono camp with the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp coming third. The results were surprising because Amien failed to win a majority of the votes despite him being a popular political figure that has spent most of his life in Yogyakarta. This might be explained by the fact that Yogyakarta is a cosmopolitan city with many students coming from other parts of Indonesia to study in the many universities and colleges established in this city. They were voters who were open-minded and critical about the political, economic and social issues affecting Indonesia. For them, figures like Megawati and Amien Rais were past their use. My discussions with voters in Yogyakarta in July-August suggested that many would vote for Yudhoyono in the second round because they believed he could improve the economic and political situation in Indonesia (see *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, July 31, 2004). The results of the second round of direct presidential elections in Yogyakarta province confirmed these sentiments. In five districts, Kulon Progo, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, Sleman and Yogyakarta municipality, the Yudhoyono-Kalla camp won most of the votes.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to examine the results of the 2004 general elections in Indonesia and their implications for Indonesian presidentialism. As this article goes to print, there have been further significant political developments in Indonesia. Soon after the inauguration of the Yudhoyono-Kalla administration in October 2004, the tussle between political parties and their elites over seats in

the cabinet developed to the point that Yudhoyono had to delay the announcement of his cabinet members. From the beginning, Yudhoyono promised to set up a so-called professional cabinet, meaning a cabinet dominated by professionals and technocrats with the rest representatives from political parties that supported him. This led analysts to hope that his presidency would not constantly be subjected to pressure from political parties and their leaders like the Wahid and the Megawati presidencies. However, Yudhoyono was not able to materialize his early intention of establishing a professional cabinet and instead bowed to pressure from a number of political parties. The final cabinet line-up showed that Yudhoyono recognized this “political reality,” and appointed ministers mainly from the political parties who supported him in the two presidential races. Only a handful of professionals were given ministerial positions (in economy-related areas).

The new parliament was dominated by the Nationhood Coalition (a coalition of the PDI-P and Golkar) which faced its own unity challenge with the replacement of Akbar Tanjung with Jusuf Kalla (the vice president) as the chief of the Golkar at the party congress held in December 2004. This event weakened the Nationhood Coalition as a constitutional force. The purge and elimination of Tanjung’s followers in the parliament orchestrated by Kalla showed that the establishment of constitutional opposition in the parliament is still far from reality in Indonesia despite the fact that the parliament constitutionally has duties in the areas of budgeting, legislating, and more importantly, check and balances (*Tempo*, October 3, 2004).² One could still hope that without the support of Golkar, a constitutional opposition may still emerge in Indonesia if the Nationhood Coalition is committed to monitoring and scrutinizing the works of the Yudhoyono presidency in the years ahead.

The 2004 general elections in Indonesia highlighted the importance of what Linz refers to as “dual democratic legitimacy” (a political situation in which both the president and the parliament are elected directly by the people) and its relevance in examining the virtues of Indonesian presidentialism. It is argued here that Indonesian presidentialism has been redefined to the extent that the political and constitutional boundaries between the president and the parliament are clearly demarcated and guarded through various means. One cannot replace the other, both sides have to critically work with each other. Each of them is responsible to their own constituents. Indonesian presidentialism is still developing and will continue to be

tested in the years to come. In the 2004 general elections, relying only on party machinery to win the elections was no longer sufficient because voters now increasingly assess the candidates on the visions, ideas and programs presented in their election campaigns. Another issue in the 2004 general elections was the so-called money politics phenomenon (*Tempo*, February 27, 2005). However, with general elections becoming regular and institutionalized the use of money or financial rewards to gain votes in elections will be an issue that political parties, party leaders and voters will have to address. These are some of the trends developing in Indonesian politics which are likely to shape Indonesian presidentialism in the years ahead. ❀

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NOTES

1. The chair of the Democratic Party is Subur Budhisantosa, an academic and an anthropologist teaching at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. Kristiani Herawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's wife, is the vice chair of the party.
2. I believe that tensions between the president and the parliament will emerge in Indonesia in years to come and will influence the current thinking on the merits and demerits of retaining the 1945 Constitution with its amendments. The tensions will likely (re)open debates within and outside the parliament about the need for a completely new constitution. It remains to be seen whether this will happen and further studies on this will be required.

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