Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Support Operations and Disaster Relief: A Case from the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Disaster Relief Mission

ATSUSHI YASUTOMI AND SAYA KIBA

ABSTRACT. Because the nature of civil-military cooperation in the Peace Support Operation (PSO) and in the disaster relief contexts differs from each other, the studies of civil-military cooperation have developed in each domain based on the presumption that these contexts hardly intersect. This article, however, points out that the two contexts sometimes do mingle and that the philosophy, strategy, policy, and other bases on which the military practices civil-military cooperation in disaster relief contain those from the PSO domain. A case from the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ experience in its disaster relief mission in the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan illustrates such “mixture” in the civil-military cooperation contexts. The article attempts to provide some explanations as to why such mixture sometimes occurs.

KEYWORDS. civil-military cooperation · disaster relief · peace support operations (PSO) · Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) · Typhoon Haiyan

INTRODUCTION
While some may overlap, the nature of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the Peace Support Operation (PSO)\(^1\) and the disaster relief environments differs from each other.

The concepts and philosophies of civil-military cooperation in PSO differ from those in the disaster relief environment. Discussions of civil-military cooperation in PSO have emerged from debates on how to maintain civilian supremacy during humanitarian activities where the militaries are largely involved. The discussions are rooted in the civilians’ concerns that their essential principle of neutrality could be compromised by the militaries’ involvement in their PSO activities.

Approaches to civil-military cooperation in PSO vary from country to country. The United States tends to regard civil-military cooperation...
in PSO as a part of its civil-military operation doctrine, whereby the military has to maximize the use of civilian capacity for gaining hearts and minds in PSO ground activities. The United Nations (UN), on the other hand, has its own civil-military cooperation principle called civil-military coordination. The UN identifies four stages for civil-military coordination: combat, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacetime deployment. It emphasizes that the relationship between the military and humanitarian agencies should be one of co-existence in the combat stage, coordination (essential dialogue and interaction) in the peace enforcement and peacekeeping stages, and cooperation in the peacetime deployment stage (Center for Excellence 2014, 22).

The Oslo Guidelines and the Military and Civil Defence Assets Guidelines (see later section) set rules for the militaries to protect civilians’ supremacy over the military. The former stipulates that the militaries should only be utilized in humanitarian assistance activities as a last resort when other civilian means are exhausted. The latter guidelines identify conditions under which the militaries’ assets can be utilized in humanitarian assistance activities.

The civil-military cooperation philosophy in disaster relief context differs from that in the PSO context in that the former seeks to pursue reasonable division of labor between the militaries and civilian agencies in the limited time granted for emergency relief activities. In this environment, the discussion focuses on how the military and civilian assets can effectively be combined, and how disaster relief information can best be shared among them. This is not to say that the militaries’ roles are particularly prioritized over those of civilian agencies. Indeed, the Oslo Guidelines and Military and Civil Defence Assets Guidelines are also often applied in disaster relief context. Nonetheless, civil-military cooperation in disaster relief aims for effective performance so that the militaries that performed in an earlier stage could gradually withdraw and relegate other subsequent relief and recovery activities to civilian agencies.

Secondly, the period of time granted for preparation for civil-military cooperation in these different environments entails different coordination planning. In the PSO environment, a relatively longer period of time is spent to devise a national strategy for consistent coordination among the military and civilian aid agencies operating in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities unique to a particular mission in a specific area. Such a strategy is studied, reviewed, tested, practiced, and evaluated by a wide variety of internal and external experts to
maximize operational effectiveness of cooperation between the military and civilian agencies in both domestic and international settings. In the disaster environment, however, no ample time is given to design such a plan for civil-military cooperation on the ground unique to a specific disaster environment. Particularly in the initial critical relief stage where the military is often the first to arrive at the disaster site, the military and civilian agencies decide on prioritized tasks through their own on-site information collection activities and relief activities.

Thirdly and because of the difference of time allowed in the two environments, the civil-military command mechanism in the PSO environment also differs from that in the disaster relief environment. In the PSO environment, coordination for the military’s cooperation with civilian agencies is integrated under the UN Peacekeeping Operations Headquarters and other multinational forces command structures. In order to materialize civil-military cooperation in the PSO environment, representatives from each military responsible for civil-military cooperation take part in an integrated coordination structure (e.g. the UN Peacekeeping Operations Headquarters) to discuss with the UN, non-government organization (NGOs), and other civilian agencies. Civil-military cooperation activities are thus formulated in the command structure and executed under this command. In the disaster relief environment on the other hand, there is no such integrated command structure for on-site civil-military cooperation activities. The military of a host nation (in an affected country) usually sets up a multinational coordination center, a center where the assisting militaries share relief information for effective coordination among them. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) also usually sets up a civil-military coordination center/humanitarian-military operation coordination center in which the militaries dispatched from various countries directly exchange relief information with civilian relief agencies on-site. These centers do not function as an integrated command for civil-military cooperation, but they do provide opportunities for the military and civilian actors on the ground to carry out on-site civil-military cooperation.

Because of the distinct nature of the PSO in disaster relief contexts, the studies on civil-military cooperation that have developed in each domain are based on the presumption that civil-military cooperation in these contexts rarely relate to each other. This article, however, points out that these contexts of civil-military cooperation are sometimes interrelated, and that the philosophy, strategy, policy, and other bases
on which the military practices civil-military cooperation in disaster relief also contain those from the PSO domain. This article presents an illustrative case from the Japan Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) disaster relief activities in 2013. It also attempts to explain why such “mixture” occurs and identify what components of civil-military cooperation are common to these two perspectives by examining the existing literature on lessons-learned from civil-military cooperation in the two contexts.

**THE JSDF’S CURRENT PRACTICES OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

The Confused Practices of the PSO and Disaster Relief Contexts in Civil-Military Cooperation

For the past few decades, the importance of civil-military cooperation has been emphasized both in the areas of PSO and disaster relief domains. Civil-military cooperation in these two discrete environments has its own distinct purposes, roles, significance, challenges, philosophy, and disciplines. Thus, recent major studies of civil-military cooperation in the disaster relief context have developed independently from those conducted in the PSO context. Two civil-military cooperation contexts are hardly discussed from the same perspective.

This trend, however, is hardly applied to cases in Japan. The recent major policy papers and strategic documents addressed by the Japanese government have all regarded these two different contexts from the same perspective so that challenges in civil-military cooperation in the disaster relief contexts are also often discussed in the PSO context. Japan’s “confusion,” so to speak, can be observed at least in the following three dimensions.

**Confusion in the Interpretation of the Civil-Military Policy Documents**

First such “confusion” of civil-military cooperation between the PSO and disaster relief contexts is reflected in existing policy documents regarding foreign and security strategy issued by the government of Japan.

The prime example comes from the concept of the “All-Japan” approach—a civil-military cooperation strategy that promotes the JSDF’s active utilization of the official development aid and cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the
NGOs for the JSDF’s civil assistance activities in the PSO context. As will be demonstrated below, despite the fact that the JSDF’s military activities abroad have essentially been rooted in the “All-Japan” concept, it only refers to civil-military cooperation in the PSO and not to that in the disaster relief context.

The first mention of civil-military cooperation in Japan’s formal policy document appeared in “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation,” a report produced by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era (2010), and submitted to the Democratic Party of Japan’s administration. The document encourages the JSDF’s cooperation with civilian organizations in the areas of humanitarian assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation, and peacebuilding, through which effective inter-agency coordination needs to be developed (Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era 2010, authors’ translation). In 2011, the Advisory Council on Peacekeeping Operations, an independent expert group formed by the prime minister, issued a medium-term report emphasizing that the JSDF should strengthen PKO’s civil assistance functions by utilizing the Japanese official development aid in collaboration with civilian organizations, including NGOs, so that the cooperation could involve “All-Japan” actors (PKO 2013). Most recently, Japan’s National Security Strategy released in 2013 also stipulates that, emphasizing the importance of realizing the “All-Japan policy,” Japanese peacekeeping operations should implement effective coordination with official development aid projects and with NGOs (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013).

Since 2002, at least eight policy documents and strategic papers have been issued, including the three mentioned above. While all these documents stress the significance of, and the JSDF’s challenges in the civil-military cooperation in the PSO, none of these mention policies toward civil-military cooperation in the disaster relief activities (table 1).

On the other hand, the Japanese government’s policy on civil-military cooperation in disaster relief abroad has never been clear. In fact, such policies and strategies have never been formally structured to date. The 1987 Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Team only stipulates that the JSDF is a part of the four JDR components—three of which are civilian expert teams—and provides conditionality for the JSDF’s dispatch. It permits the JSDF to assist
only in three services including search and rescue, medical activities, and overseas transportation of relief goods, facilities, and personnel, but prohibits dispatches of engineering units.²
In the absence of a clear civil-military doctrine in the disaster relief environment, the “All-Japan approach” has been applied to the context of disaster relief abroad. This is exhibited in some officials’ statements regarding recent activities. Upon arrival at Tacloban, Philippines in 2013, the deputy commander of the JDR team briefed the media stating that “the situation is devastating so that our work needs to be done through the ‘All-Japan’ approach” (Jiji 2013). An official from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) also responded to the media, saying that “Japan’s assistance to Tacloban is now ready to proceed through the ‘All-Japan’ approach by combining the efforts of all related ministries and the JSDF” (Kyodo 2013). Upon completion of their work in December 2013, the JDR team apprised the Prime Minister’s Office of the end of the Philippine mission; Prime Minister Abe congratulated the JDR team’s work by stating, “the emergency relief is vast in many fields and I felt our strength in that it could be done
only through ‘All-Japan’” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013).

Confusion in Interpretation of the Current Legal Framework on Civil-Military Cooperation

Japan’s confusion over civil-military cooperation contexts also comes from the fact that the Self-Defense Forces Law has blurred definitions and labelling of the JSDF’s missions on “international peace cooperation” that incorporates their peacekeeping operation activities with disaster relief activities. The Self-Defense Forces Law defines in its Article 3 that the JSDF’s roles consist of three primary missions: (1) defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order; (2) activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan; and, (3) international peace cooperation activities.\(^3\) This third mission is further specified in the two separate acts consisting of two activities: a) international peace
cooperation duties such as UN peacekeeping operations based upon the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations”; and, b) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale disasters overseas based upon the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams” (figure 1). The Self-Defense Forces Law refers these two distinct forms of international contribution to missions for “international peace cooperation activities” [authors’ emphasis]. The Self-Defense Forces Law treats the JSDF’s disaster relief mission as one form of contribution to international peace.

The Functions of the JSDF’s Central Readiness Force

The mixture of the PSO and disaster relief contexts in understanding civil-military cooperation is also reflected in the functions of the

Table 2. CRF in JSDF’s peacekeeping operation and disaster relief activities abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping operation</th>
<th>JCO</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>JCO</td>
<td>November 2011–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster relief</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia Earthquake</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti Earthquake</td>
<td></td>
<td>January 2010–February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Flood</td>
<td></td>
<td>August 2010–October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Earthquake</td>
<td></td>
<td>February 2011–March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>JCO</td>
<td>November 2013–December 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for Malaysian Airline Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 2014–April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola protection kit transportation to Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for AirAsia Aircraft in Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2014–January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal earthquake</td>
<td>JCO</td>
<td>April 2015–May 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Through the Joint Coordination Office (JCO) the JSDF directly coordinates and studies assistance programs with local agencies and NGOs.
Central Readiness Force (CRF). It was established on 28 March 2007 under the JSDF to respond, among others, to the needs required for civil-military cooperation as well as research and trainings necessary to perform the above-mentioned third mission of “international peace cooperation activities.” In effect, the CRF has mandated tasks responding to the needs for both PSO and disaster relief activities. The Civil-Military Cooperation Section within the CRF is the only division in the entire MoD/JSDF structure responsible for civil-

### Table 3. Civil-military cooperation studies and seminars hosted by the CRF CIMIC division since 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussions hosted by CRF</th>
<th>Date conducted</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Discussion contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPCAS 2011</td>
<td>01–02 November 2011</td>
<td>o Academe as mentors, JSDF, NGO, ICRC, UNOCHA, JICA, researchers, MoD</td>
<td>o Lessons learned from the South Sudan activities and cooperation with local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCAS 2012</td>
<td>18–19 December 2012</td>
<td>o Academe as mentors, JSDF and NGO staff as presenters, JSDF NGOs, ICRC, UNOCHA, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA</td>
<td>o JSDF-NGO cooperation in peacekeeping operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCMCS</td>
<td>04 March 2014</td>
<td>o JSDF, JICA and NGOs as presenters, CRF commanders, JSDF NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA</td>
<td>o JSDF-MoFA-JICA-NGO cooperation in peacekeeping operation in South Sudan o Lessons learned from Typhoon Haiyan relief operation and JSDF-JICA cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCMCS</td>
<td>03 March 2015</td>
<td>o WFP as keynote speaker, JSDF, NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA</td>
<td>o UN cluster meeting in multinational relief operation abroad and civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCMCS</td>
<td>07 March 2016</td>
<td>o UNOCHA as keynote speaker, JSDF, NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA, UN organs</td>
<td>o Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** These are the acronyms and initialisms used only in this table and not found in the text of the article: International Peace Cooperation Activities Seminar (IPCAS), International Peace Cooperation Activities Civil Military Cooperation Seminar (IPCMCS), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
military affairs. Since its establishment in 2007, the CRF’s CIMIC Division has been dispatched to accompany the JSDF’s engineering and medical units in its major PSO and disaster relief missions abroad to conduct studies and arrange the JSDF’s possible on-site cooperation with civilian organizations. Particularly, the CIMIC Division sent a number of officers to the relief missions in the Haiti earthquake (2001), the typhoon in the Philippines (2013), and the earthquake in Nepal (2015). It has also been active in sending civil-military cooperation officers to the ongoing UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), operating since 2011. During these PSO and disaster relief missions, the CRF’s Joint Coordination Office (JCO), in charge of on-site civil-military cooperation, was active in establishing direct contacts with NGOs and compiled lessons learned from their experiences in civil-military cooperation under both PSO and disaster relief environments for the JSDF’s improved civil-military cooperation performance (table 2).

The CRF’s CIMIC Division has hosted a number of roundtable and panel discussions on the JSDF’s on-site cooperation with civilian organizations during its missions abroad since 2009 (table 3). Throughout these opportunities, challenges in and lessons learned from civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief activities were discussed. In these discussions, the experiences of the JSDF’s cooperation with NGOs in South Sudan during its peacekeeping operation mission were compared with the lessons learned from the events of the Philippine Typhoon in 2013.

Questions Raised

The previous section has presented cases to illustrate how the Japanese government has confused the civil-military cooperation strategies and policies between the PSO and disaster relief contexts. As a result of this confusion, the CRF has run various civil-military cooperation programs and activities at home and abroad with objectives and approaches that are jumbled in the PSO and disaster relief perspectives.

This leaves us with several questions. What explains this confusion? What theoretical explanations may apply to such confusion? To answer these questions, the next section examines the existing literature on civil-military cooperation in these two different contexts. There are a number of lessons-learned studies based on experiences gained from
the past PSO and disaster relief activities as seen both from the military and civilian standpoints. The research results have contributed to shaping policies and strategies for future civil-military cooperation in these operational environments. A review of the current major arguments also leads us to identify some useful hints as to what components and elements of civil-military cooperation are actually being confused.

**Civil-Military Cooperation in PSO and Disaster Relief: Theoretical Approach**

Civil-Military Cooperation in the PSO Context

Peace Support Operations are multi-functional operations involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies that are generally designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions, often in support of international organizations such as the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (NATO 2001). PSOs include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian relief, in which it assists civilian agencies in rebuilding the infrastructure necessary to create self-sustaining peace (NATO 2001).

In order to meet the needs required for today’s complex emergency and post-conflict environments where military and civilian actors from a wide variety of assistance domains are involved, PSOs require interagency coordination among these actors both on the ground and at the headquarters levels. For this reason, a number of studies on how these organizations—whose activity objectives, methods, philosophy, assets, and other operational disciplines and means differ from each other—have been conducted to attain a common goal in a coordinated manner. These studies of interagency coordination—coordination among the militaries and civilian humanitarian agencies—have been developed in PSO assistance strategies often referred to as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the Whole-of-Government Approach (WoGA).

The CA seeks effective interagency coordination among the actors involved in an assistance operation abroad (Nilsson et al. 2008; Olson and Gregorian 2007; Friis and Jarmyr 2008; de Coning 2008). The CA focuses more on interagency coordination with the inclusion of the military in the context of peace support operations than the WoGA, whereas the WoGA is more interested in coordination of a single
The WoGA aims for consistency among the policies and actions of different government agencies of a country (Picciotto 2005a, 9–19). It is often referred to as policy coherence in pursuing foreign assistance in the contexts of international economic development in developing states (Picciotto 2005b). Despite these contextual differences, the studies of interagency coordination drawn from these approaches can provide valuable reference points to understand the military’s strategy for cooperation with civilian organizations.

**Assistance Concepts and Definitions Must Be Agreed Upon Within the Related State Agencies**

WoGA advocates stress that agreements on assistance concepts and definitions within the related state agencies must be present for any interagency operation including civil-military activities. Some assisting states have no agreed definition on “vulnerable state” and thus various ministries within the same state have different concepts and objectives regarding international assistance. As a result, there is a lack of consistency in the interpretation among the various ministries involved. One effective measure to avoid this is to create documents and guidelines on primary issues including objectives, concepts, and methodologies agreed upon and shared by all the agencies involved (OECD 2006, 25; Conflict Research Unit 2008, 2).

**Operation Plans Need to Be Agreed Upon among the Related State Agencies**

The study of the CA raises a number of important points for interagency coordination with the military’s participation in the planning process of a project. Firstly, it emphasizes the importance of good preparation before the planning process itself commences. Identifying the right representatives from appropriate authorities and resources—“Who is on the table” and “How to get the right people”—is one of the key determinants that affects the success of the planning process. Secondly, it warns of a “strategic deficit”—strategic plans designed in the capital are often too vague and abstract to translate them into guidelines at the tactical levels, and few directions are given for realizing effective mechanisms for civil-military cooperation (Nilsson et al. 2008, 53).
The proponents of the CA suggest that, in order to avoid these pitfalls, all the participating military and civilian actors need to agree on who among them should take part in the civil-military cooperation action plans. Moreover, the actors involved need to acknowledge that their own actor-specific plan may be used for designing a multiactor, comprehensive in-theater plan. Planning also requires iterative communication between the strategic, operational, and field levels in order to correspond and adapt to changes happening in the field (ibid., 55).

The CA advocates are convinced from recent empirical studies that even a well-prepared, well-planned project of civil-military cooperation does not exactly fit the realities in the theater. One of the effective measures to narrow the gap is to create a common implementation framework in which the relevant actors are gathered to identify their areas of responsibility, short-term/long-term objectives, time frame of their interventions, etc. (Olson and Gregorian 2007, 34). Olson and Gregorian (ibid.) raise an example of the county support teams, which were established under the UN Mission in Liberia to bring together the knowledge and expertise of the participating institutions, including international humanitarian agencies and NGOs donors, in support of the local authorities’ efforts for capacity-building to restore post-conflict civil authority.

Consistency of Assistance Policy in Internal (Domestic) and External (International) Dimensions

Countries assisting fragile states are often confronted with issues of balancing between two challenges: a) coordinating with other international organizations and with other agencies (e.g., international NGOs) over allocation of operation theaters, timing, division of labor, and other tactical demands—on the one hand; and, b) pursuing their own national assistance operations based on policies—on the other. While coordinating with international actors is important, consuming human resource and time extensively for international coordination may entail the risks of losing opportunities to respond to the needs and demands of local authorities and communities (Patrick and Brown 2007, 136). However, persisting in implementing and prioritizing national operations over international coordination may also mean that their state agencies may increase the risks of losing flexibility in coordinating with the partner country/ies (Patrick and Brown 2007, 135).
**Understanding the Local Needs and Demands of the Beneficiaries**

The WoGA also suggests that sound civil-military cooperation requires understanding of the local needs and demands of the beneficiaries. Equally important is to win support for cooperation from the local beneficiary community members (Patrick and Brown 2007, 122). Donor actors need local cooperation so that their assistance objectives and methodologies are shared and understood through continuous negotiations and explanations with the local community members. Understanding local politics and environments is crucial as they reflect the assistance policy. If there is a lack of consistency in the assistance policy and the methodologies within the donor agencies, the field officers delegated from the donor countries may deliver misguided messages, causing distrust among their local counterparts. Successful interagency coordination for assistance in fragile states depends on how well field officers could attain the shared understanding from the local counterparts that their projects could bring short-term visible benefits but that they equally require long-term commitments and patience from the local communities (Conflict Research Unit 2008, 5).

**Presence of Assistance Strategy Tailored for Each Distinct Recipient State**

Assistance strategies and policies need to be tailored for each recipient state whose political background, culture, and actors involved are distinct (OECD 2006, 26). There is no “one-size-fits all” policy that applies to all recipient states. Accordingly, analyses conducted for interagency coordination must be made flexible taking into consideration the recipient states’ distinct political culture, legal systems, and financial situation (Below and Belzile 2013, 37; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 26).

**Consistent Command and Control between Field Office and Headquarters**

A lack of consistent command and control between the operational field offices and the headquarters in the capital city may fail interagency coordination in fragile states reconstruction. The policy foundations, like foreign assistance objectives and its means, are not always shared and understood by the coordinating state agencies (Patrick and Brown 2007, 78). Likewise, what is deemed to be shared in the state agencies in the capital is not always reflected in the field offices operating in the recipient states (Tschirgi 2005, 13).
The major reason for such lack of consistency between the field offices and the headquarters comes from a lack of knowledge management within the agencies and a lack of communication between them (Fitz-Gerald 2004, 21). Such situations have caused grave confusion on the field by not only stalling the project itself but also increasing the risks of putting the beneficiaries in danger (Tschirgi 2005, 13).

To avoid this failure, WoGA advocates suggest the installation of an integrated information-sharing unit that is made available to all the concerned state agencies, in which crucial information is gathered at a center first and distributed to the related agencies so that possible mistrust and misunderstandings can be better alleviated (OECD 2006, 37). These theories also point out that such an information system must be based on the premise that the participating agencies and actors are equal partners and their relationship is not that of principal and agent (OECD 2006, 41; Patrick and Brown 2002, 129).

Communication among the Military and Civilian Organizations on the Ground

A number of scholars of interagency coordination theories have often pointed out the importance of the presence of a lead agency. A lead agency is expected to function as a coordinator among various donor actors in the field. One of the major challenges facing a lead agency is integrating each of the participating agencies’ distinct intentions and interests in the project into one unified operation and, at the same time, not discouraging the pursuit of these agencies’ own internal interests.

Physical, face-to-face communication in in-theater coordination also plays an important role in implementation. Acknowledging that the CA is a top-down approach where the political objectives and means are established at the strategic levels and that they are to be implemented at the field level, political directions should come from a single focal point where coordination meetings and information exchanges take place in the field (Nilsson et al. 2008, 58). A joint coordination body and information-exchange forums are such examples where regular meetings for information-sharing and coordination activities can be easily conducted among the actors in the theater. CIMIC cells play a specific role in accommodating information exchanges between the military and the civilian actors (ibid., 60).
Monitoring and Evaluation Approach Is Still Underdeveloped

Literature about the CA warns that monitoring and evaluation is not sufficiently practiced, targeting specifically the interagency coordination among the civilian and military actors in the conflict context. It is new and thus underdeveloped, and there is a lack of appropriate frameworks and trained staff to conduct it (ibid., 60). Secondly, monitoring and evaluation has not been practiced during the initial stage of the cooperation project, failing to identify objectives and activities by each relevant actor and assess how they correspond to a multi-actor plan. This has created a risk in which one actor perceives their activities to be a success but could turn out to be a grave failure for others, leading to a potential collapse of the multi-actor cooperation mechanism (ibid.). Still another problem facing the monitoring and evaluation in this area is that coordination among the civilian actors and the military in the post-conflict context is highly political. This means that there are risks of tangible and intangible political pressures against evaluations to be compromised. Pressures for the evaluations to highlight (if not hide) more successes than failures and various demands from donors and the capitals may compromise the evaluation contents (ibid.).

Civil-Military Cooperation in the Context of Disaster Relief Activities Abroad

A number of lessons-learned studies have been made identifying factors that make humanitarian civil-military coordination difficult. The following five points are of particular importance.

Too Many Actors Are Involved to Coordinate

The first explanation as to why coordination among civilian actors and the military is difficult comes from situations in which there are too many actors, both military and civilian, present in the disaster relief on the ground. As disaster breaks out, a number of humanitarian agencies reach the affected country. With average numbers of 200–300 international NGOs and more than twenty foreign military contingents active in the first phase, coordinating such vast numbers of actors with each variety of relief philosophy, priority, and methodology, becomes simply complicated and time-consuming (Wiharta et al. 2008, 41).
Different (Often Conflicting) Goals, Means, and Approaches to Relief Activities

More importantly, civilian actors (particularly NGOs) and the military do not often share common goals, means, and approaches to relief activities. Primarily, many NGOs fear that relief works by the military would be politicized such that allying with them may lead to a violation of neutrality and impartiality. Humanitarian philosophy for many NGOs is to provide aid to all individuals in need regardless of their political, military, and other social positions. They fear that the military is utilizing relief goods as a tool to buy information on insurgency groups and conflicting armed parties. Such cooperation also would generate risks of retaliation against the recipients by opposing armed belligerents. For NGOs, it is also an unacceptable violation of the do-no-harm policy, risking their lives by humanitarians’ act of assistance (Byman 2001, 104). NGOs also fear that cooperation with the military could be viewed by the beneficiaries that the humanitarian agents are taking sides in opposing other armed groups, thus endangering the lives of the affected people (Metcalf, Giffen, and Elhawary 2011). Furthermore, NGOs and the military have different cultures of coordination. Whereas the humanitarian community is generally less centralized, loosely gathered with a weaker chain of command, the military is contrastingly hierarchical (Rana 2004, 570). NGOs often find difficulty in adjusting to processes where hierarchical, time-consuming decision making is required (Byman 2001, 104; Metcalfe, Giffen, and Elhawary 2011).

Mutual Lack of Knowledge and Mutual Skepticism

Mutual lack of familiarity between NGOs and the military and mutual skepticism have been pointed out to be another prime factors rendering humanitarian civil-military coordination difficult. Military officers and NGOs often do not understand each other’s decision-making systems and operating procedures (Byman 2001, 106). Efforts to increase the understanding about each other, including joint trainings, exercises, and study groups, etc. are still limited (McAvoy and Charny 2013, 7). Because of such mutual lack of institutional knowledge, mutual skepticism about each other’s attitudes and behavior for coordination remains high (Byman 2001, 106).
Problems and Limits of Civil-military Coordination Guidelines

There are global guidelines that outline fundamental principles for humanitarian civil-military coordination, including the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (OCHA 2007) and a set of three civil-military guidelines and reference for complex emergencies. In 2004, the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations (revised in 2014, the so-called APC-MADRO; OCHA 2014) was also adopted for countries in this region. Apart from these, country-specific civil-military guidelines have been produced for specific emergency and humanitarian environments, such as that of Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti.

Students of humanitarian coordination have pointed out that a number of challenges exist for these guidelines to function. The first challenge is the implementation. Interpretations of these guidelines, particularly the Oslo Guideline’s “last resort” principle (the military assets should be used only in situations of last resort), vary from country to country and in different degrees depending on its political decision-making in deploying the military in the affected countries (Wiharta et al. 2008; Metcalfe and Berg 2012, 3). Moreover, there is a lack of monitoring and review of the guidelines to examine cases of non-compliance (Metcalfe and Berg 2012, 5). Secondly, while these guidelines tend to focus on the limits of the military’s engagement in humanitarian response, they often fail to address how the two actors should interact on the ground. Some observers claim that the guidelines often fail to indicate how the military and civilian actors on the ground conduct information sharing and communication, one of the principal instruments for civil-military coordination (Metcalfe and Berg 2012, 3). Similarly, the guidelines do not address how the military and humanitarian actors should alter their relationships in response to ongoing armed conflicts and abrupt security crises (NGO-Military Contact Group 2011 cited in Metcafe, Haysom, and Gordon 2012, 18).

Explaining the JSDF’s Confused Practice of Civil-Military Cooperation in the PSO and Disaster Relief Contexts

The major challenges of civil-military cooperation identified in the relevant literature from the PSO and the disaster relief contexts are summarized in the table 4. While some arguments are commonly seen
between the two areas, many of the lessons learned in the two different contexts are essentially relevant under its own environment and it is difficult to regard as interchangeable.

Table 4 helps explain the current features of the JSDF’s confusion of civil-military cooperation contexts. In the absence of a civil-military cooperation policy in the disaster relief environment, the JSDF attempts to incorporate policies against the challenges identified in the PSO into its civil-military cooperation activities in the disaster relief context.

Overemphasizing Policy Consistency between Domestic and International Dimensions in Disaster Relief Context

In the case of the JSDF, an overemphasis is placed on adhering to policy consistency between the domestic and the international dimensions—one of the major challenges in civil-military cooperation in the PSO (P3 in Table 4)—in the disaster relief context. This is not to say that this point is utterly irrelevant in disaster relief context. Nonetheless, adherence to prioritizing the assistance policy formulated through the domestic political discussions—in this case the “All-Japan” approach to...
Table 5. The JSDF’s identified challenges on civil-military cooperation in the PSO and disaster relief contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges identified in relevant literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military cooperation in PSO context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P1) Agreement on assistance concepts and definitions within the related state agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P2) Operation plans need to be agreed among related state agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P3) Consistency of assistance policy in internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P4) Understanding the local needs and demands of the beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P5) Presence of assistance strategy tailored for each distinct recipient state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P6) Consistent command and control between field office and headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P7) Communication among the military and civilian organizations on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P8) Monitoring and Evaluation approach is still under-developed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil-military cooperation in disaster relief context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P3) Consistency of assistance policy in internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P4) Understanding the local needs and demands of the beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D1) Too many actors are involved to coordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D2) Different (often conflicting) goals, means, and approaches to relief activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D3) Mutual lack of knowledge and mutual skepticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D4) Problems and limits of guidelines for civil-military coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

civil-military cooperation in the “international peace cooperation” as described in the preceding section—makes civil-military cooperation incongruent with the disaster relief tenets in the international and disaster environment where on-site alacrity and resilience are required. Such confusion leads the military organization to persist in prioritizing such domestic policy while continuing cooperation with civilian organizations in the inconstant disaster environment.

Adherence to Seeking Out the Local Needs and Demands of the Beneficiaries in Disaster Relief Context

Further confusion is due to another overemphasis on the understanding of the needs and domestic demands of the beneficiary (P4 in table 4)—another important civil-military cooperation challenge in the PSO environment—in the disaster relief context. This component may have relevance because good knowledge of emergency local needs in the affected areas is sine qua non for any emergency relief activities.
Nonetheless, the confusion is caused by the JSDF’s adherence in its disaster relief to try to seek assistance activities corresponding to the local needs. In the disaster relief environment, the limited time given to relief activities usually does not allow the militaries for such behavior. Even if they could identify the local needs for civil-military cooperation, it is standard procedure to let the information be shared and activities coordinated through the humanitarian-military operation coordination centre before executing the cooperation. As explained above, in the disaster relief environment, information on local emergency needs and demands are often centralized at stations like the multinational coordination center and the humanitarian-military operation coordination center. The militaries themselves do not always expend much effort on investigating local needs.

Table 5 indicates that the two challenges are erroneously misplaced with those in the disaster relief context. The government of Japan tends to integrate these challenges that should be identified under PSO with those identified in the disaster relief context.

**JSDF’s Civil-Military Cooperation in Disaster Relief: Operation Sankay**

This section illustrates how concepts, philosophy, and methods of civil-military cooperation in the disaster relief environment have been mixed with those in the PSO context. This section draws examples from the JSDF’s experience in its disaster relief activities in the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan in 2013 in which the JSDF was trying to pursue on-site cooperation with civilian agencies.

*Confused Practice of Civil-Military Cooperation in Disaster Relief Context: Overemphasizing Consistency of Assistance Policy in Internal (Domestic) and External (International) Dimensions*

The “All-Japan” policy—Japan’s civil-military cooperation strategy promoting the JSDF’s closer cooperation with Japanese civilian agencies—was formulated by the MoD and the Cabinet when the JSDF was sent to Iraq in 2003. Since then, the Japanese government has committed itself to implementing this policy in the JSDF’s PSO missions abroad by combining the efforts of Japan’s civilian agencies operating on the same mission sites. The JSDF successfully implemented this policy in Haiti in its operation under the UN Stabilization Mission.
in Haiti (MINUSTAH). During this mission, the JSDF Staff Officers working at MINUSTAH headquarters negotiated for the construction works to be regarded as a MINUSTAH task (Urakami 2013, 200–01). Simultaneously, the JSDF advised NGOs to “request the MINUSTAH Command’s cooperation in a joint activity with the JSDF” so that the staff officers could then request a formal mobilization order from MINUSTAH. In this way, the JSDF succeeded in cooperating with a blend of Japanese public and private actors (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plus Japanese NGOs). An example of such combined efforts includes Japan’s Grassroots/Human Security Grant and the UN’s Quick Impact Project for constructing an orphanage, and the joint construction of community gardens with a Japanese NGO (Urakami 2013, 200–01).

The same policy was implemented in the JSDF’s mission in South Sudan. The JSDF negotiated with UNMISS in such a way that it informed UNMISS of the existence and scope of its own on-site civil-military cooperation projects to ensure that they do not conflict with nor downgrade UNMISS tasks. It also requested that the Japanese contingent could operate under a legitimate UNMISS task order. Using this approach, the JSDF succeeded in ensuring some cooperation with Japanese civilian agencies in Juba, including, among others, the construction of a community road “Na Bari” (with JICA) and job training of street children (with a Japanese NGO).

This successful implementation of the “All-Japan” policy has pressured the JSDF on the ground to continue with this type of civil-military cooperation.

Col. Harutoshi Tsuchiya, then director of JCO, a JSDF office specializing with its coordination with UNMISS, states that “the JCO’s role is to turn ‘All-Japan’ civil-military projects under UNMISS orders. The JSDF’s mission in Iraq is a clear example of such civil-military cooperation where all actors involved were from Japan and their activities were visible to the Japanese people at home. The JCO is aiming at implementing such civil assistance activities under the framework of UN peacekeeping operations” (Kiba and Yasutomi 2013). Of late, South Sudan has been the JSDF’s only peacekeeping mission theater since Japan completed its withdrawal from the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights in January 2013. In these circumstances, the twenty or so officers staffing the JCO were under considerable pressure to realize and develop such civil-military cooperation (Kiba and Yasutomi, 2013).
In return, Colonel Tsuchiya continues, the JSDF has high expectations that their efforts will earn them goodwill from the Japanese taxpayer as well as the South Sudanese population, highlighting the JSDF’s activities in a distant post-conflict part of Africa. An example of the “All-Japan” and civil-military cooperation model may be this: “JICA constructs bridges, while the JSDF prepares the ground for the road construction that follow the bridges. JICA then supports the running of the hospitals and schools that are built along the roads and sidewalks for which the JSDF had laid the ground” (Kiba and Yasutomi 2013).

A number of observers have noted that this “All-Japan” pressure was also present in the JSDF’s disaster relief activities in the Operation Sankay in the Philippines in 2013.

In addition to its USD 56 million financial assistance and a dispatch of a medical support team from JICA, the government of Japan dispatched a 1,180-strong JSDF team to Cebu and Leyte, providing transportation for service staff and relief goods, pest control, and medical assistance. An officer from the CRF of the JSDF in charge of civil-military cooperation in the Operation Sankay revealed that there was a shared understanding within the JSDF that the “All-Japan” approach was essential for their disaster relief operations. For this reason, there was constant psychological pressure from Tokyo among the JSDF staff operating in the field to seek and materialize any civil-military cooperation projects possible, and thus, they explored for such an opportunity. However, this civil-military cooperation officer could not openly admit that realizing the “All-Japan” approach must not be prioritized over responding to the local emergency relief needs. Indeed, there were more pressing needs, he argued, to coordinate with the local authorities and the UN agencies in Tacloban, than seeking opportunities for cooperation with Japanese actors.

A senior officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance echoed this warning that creating an atmosphere that dictates that the “All-Japan” approach must be realized under any circumstance is dangerous and must thus be avoided. The “All-Japan” is only an approach, and it must not be a goal in itself.

A JICA expert who participated in JICA’s emergency medical team opined similarly. According to this JICA expert, JICA’s emergency medical team was understaffed and extremely busy during the operation. It was difficult for the team to provide other Japanese (and other) relief
agencies with extra information useful for the JSDF operations. While the national team by the name of the International Emergency Assistance Unit is comprised of the JSDF and civilian agencies, it needs to clarify itself as to what purports cooperation among these agencies. If any form of cooperation with the JSDF becomes a burden for the civilian actors, and if such a form of cooperation becomes a goal in itself, then such civil-military cooperation must not take place, the JICA expert continued. Civil-military cooperation, according to him, is only one of many means available to more effective and efficient humanitarian assistance, and not the other way around. If strong pressure for civil-military cooperation under the “All-Japan” approach were present among the civilian agencies and the JSDF, coordination between Tokyo and the fields would become highly complicated and time-consuming, and thus many operations would be compromised.

Confused Practice of Civil-Military Cooperation in Disaster Relief Context: Adherence to Defining the Local Needs and Demands of Beneficiaries

The second case of the JSDF’s confused practice of civil-military cooperation in the disaster relief and the PSO contexts can be illustrated by the JSDF’s practice of assigning liaison officers to cooperate with other Japanese civilian actors in order to “excavate” local needs for on-site civil-military cooperation in its disaster relief activities. The JSDF attempted to realize its “All-Japan” civil assistance activities, which were deemed characteristic of Japan’s peculiar approach in its UN missions abroad, in collaborating with other Japanese actors on the ground including the Japanese state authorities and NGOs. In cooperation with Japanese actors, the JSDF has emphasized its function of seeking out—so to speak “unearth” or “excavate”—its own independent non-UN civil assistance projects while coordinating with the UN to be formally implemented as a UN project. Since its first mission in M in Haiti in 2011, the JSDF has established a civil-military liaison office in the mission area, allowing it to visit the the UN, government, and NGO offices where Japanese officials are serving; inquiries about civil assistance projects could be done together as a joint “All-Japan” activity. During its mission in South Sudan, the JSDF followed the protocol in Haiti and established a JCO, giving it a function to “excavate” projects for on-site civil-military cooperation with Japanese civilian agencies on the ground and local actors in Juba. It is this same practice that the JSDF also followed in its disaster relief activities
during the 2013 Operation Sankay in the Philippines—i.e., assigning liaison officers giving the same “excavating” function. The pattern may be drawn from the fact that the JSDF sought to identify its relief activity contents by gaining close cooperation with the Japan embassy’s provisional office.

On 19 November 2013, the embassy of Japan in the Philippines established a provisional office in Tacloban City in Leyte. It was staffed by a counselor of the embassy as the head of provisional office (civilian), and by an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development Assistance Policy Planning Division as the deputy head (civilian), together with a Japanese defense attaché stationed in Malaysia.

The JSDF liaison officers, accompanied by the deputy head, investigated the emergency needs of Tacloban and coordinated with local authorities in its implementation of medical interventions, namely, epidemic prevention, vaccination, and a mobile clinic. The deputy head, acting in behalf of the JSDF, attended the on-site operations coordination center cluster meetings that took place a few times a week. Despite such cluster meetings, the JSDF came to realize that it would be more efficient to directly contact the local authorities and UN agencies operating at the local levels for more effective and prompt response to the needs of the JSDF's epidemic prevention and vaccination activities.

For its first task—epidemic prevention—the JSDF implemented pest control activities. The JSDF’s liaison officers were assisted by the provisional office of the Japanese embassy in contacting a Philippine hygiene officer in Tacloban to study the needs of the JSDF’s activities in the area. The JSDF, together with the provisional office, assessed the emergency hygiene needs at the convention center, one of the biggest evacuation shelters in the area. The JSDF sprayed the chemical agents while the Tacloban authority agreed to implement a temporary evacuation during the aerosol application. The embassy’s provisional office in Tacloban also played a significant role in assisting the JSDF in finding a landing spot for a JSDF hovercraft carrier for cargo vehicles with epidemic prevention equipment. The provisional office relayed crucial information to the JSDF that the part of the seashore was wide enough for the hovercraft to land. The permission for the use of the land was given just before the scheduled aerosol operation was conducted, thanks to the provisional office’s effort.

The second operation of the JSDF was vaccination. The deputy head of the provisional office was advised that the World Health
Organization, to whom the JSDF offered its readiness to conduct vaccination to the residents in the area, had already gathered information on vaccination demand in Tacloban. After the consent from the Philippine state authority, the JSDF applied vaccinations against measles and polio in the areas the World Health Organization identified.

A mobile clinic, the JSDF’s third task, started a day after the completion of the aerosol operation. It began assessing needs with the assistance of the provisional office by interviewing officers from the Department of Health of the Philippines. The Philippine side suggested three towns of Mayorga, McArthur, and Abuyog as potential areas for the mobile clinic. Based on this information, the head and deputy head of the provisional office and the JSDF formed a team and began conducting a series of interviews with the mayors and city health personnel. The interviews were aimed to identify medical demands in the areas and gather logistics information, such as potential temporary helipads for helicopters delivering crews and medical equipment.

As demonstrated in the three instances of the JSDF’s relief operations, the embassy’s provisional office in Tacloban was the key agency that the JSDF needed for its disaster relief operation. The office played a significant role in facilitating linkages among the local authorities, liaison work between the JSDF and the on-site operations coordination center during cluster meetings, conducting studies on the local medical demands, as well as providing the JSDF with community information and language support.

What characterizes the onsite JSDF-embassy bilateral cooperation is not the fact that they collaborated but that the JSDF—while participating in the standard onsite multi-national civil-military coordination process under the UNOCHA structure—assigned the JSDF liaison officers specific tasks—i.e., to identify seek local assistance needs and to collaborate with other Japanese agencies, in this instance, the embassy’s provisional office.

**CONCLUSION**

This article started by explaining distinct contexts in which civil-military cooperation take place and thus studies on civil-military cooperation have developed independently within each domain. However, the civil-military cooperation contexts are sometimes mixed and confused. The case of some of JSDF’s practices in civil-military
cooperation in the disaster relief environment stemmed from the policy adopted to improve civil-military cooperation in the PSO context. The JSDF’s practice in the Philippines illustrated this.

The reviews suggest that there have not been any rigorous theoretical studies explaining such “mixing” phenomenon of the civil-military cooperation contexts between the PSO and disaster relief. Our studies suggest that the “confusion” of civil-military cooperation in the two contexts are derived from the inclusion of at least two elements identified as challenges to civil-military cooperation in the PSO context into the disaster relief context: 1) overemphasizing policy consistency between the domestic and the international dimensions; and, 2) adherence to seeking out the local needs and demands of the beneficiaries.

This study identified that the two elements in the PSO context were confounded in the disaster relief concept when the Japanese government designed the strategy for civil-military cooperation. This study examined only one case from Japan, and other cases may show different sets of “mixtures” between the two contexts. Examinations of further cases may otherwise find this mixture unique to the case of Japan. More examinations of many other cases from Japan and elsewhere are by all means necessary to corroborate this phenomenon.

Whatever conclusions further examinations may bring forth, the very practice of such confusion has a few important implications, at least for the JSDF.

The strategy for the JSDF’s civil-military cooperation abroad, particularly in the disaster relief perspectives needs serious review. As the example in the Philippines demonstrates, the JSDF’s practice of assigning liaison officers in the emergency setting to “excavate” local needs in search of collaboration with Japanese civilian agencies—a method that is becoming classic in Japan’s PSO context—may well delay its relief efforts and cause greater confusion to other agencies, including local civilian partners and the affected people. The MoD and the JSDF need to acknowledge that this practice is caused by misplacement of a civil-military cooperation strategy that originated in the PSO context. They are instead compelled to liberate themselves from the “All-Japan” concept and design afresh a civil-military cooperation strategy germane to the disaster relief context.

At the same time, the JSDF may take advantage of this situation by demonstrating its strength in that it can better investigate the local needs and communicate with local agencies and the affected people. If
the JSDF is to continue with the current time- and energy-consuming method of civil-military cooperation in future disaster relief operations, it must share the information gathered during the “excavation” with other Japanese and other civilian agencies so that their efforts can be better relegated to civilian agencies and make the initial relief efforts consistent with recovery activities to be continued in a later stage. In this way, civil-military cooperation can be realized not in such a way that these agencies attempt to collaborate together in a specific place in the specific period of time, but in such a way that the military’s efforts are subsequently entrusted to civilian agencies.

The JSDF’s experiences and capabilities led the Japanese government to build the “All-Japan” policy that combines the JSDF and other civilian agencies to maximize the efforts so that their activities and achievements abroad can be better visible to the people on the ground and in Japan. JSDF’s activities abroad has itself led to confusions in the interpretation of civil-military cooperation in the PSO and in the disaster relief contexts at both the policy and the operational levels. Indeed, several observers from JSDF officers in charge of civil-military cooperation reveal that ordinary JSDF staff are usually not able to assume the coordination function as it requires expert knowledge and experiences of development assistance and disaster relief. Without these, coordination with local authorities and UN agents is far beyond their capability. For example, they are not familiar with UN cluster systems and the Oslo Guideline, nor are they well informed about how the military’s approaches and mindset are not always compatible with those of the civilian actors.

If JSDF’s current experiences were to guide their future actions in the disaster relief environment, these may risk impeding and compromising the international and multilateral coordination. It may impede the UNOCHA and other lead organizations seeking prompt effective cooperation with local actors given extremely limited time constraint. For these reasons, the JSDF, together with the MoD and other state authorities need to have a clearer understanding of the distinct characteristics, roles, and responsibilities pertinent to the distinct operational environment of disaster relief from that in PSO. In a more time-restricted environment of the disaster relief activities, the Japanese state authorities need to acknowledge that the “All-Japan” approach and the associated methods relevant to the PSO environment hardly engender an effective practice in the disaster relief environment.
NOTES
1. For the definition of PSO, see the later section.
2. The English translation of the law has been provided to date; however, the overview in English can be obtained at JICA (2015).
4. UN calls this “Integrated Mission Approach” defined as a specific type of operational process and design, in which the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family are integrated into a single country-level UN system to undertake complex peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2008). This approach seeks effective civil-military cooperation in peace support operations, including peacekeeping operations.
5. The following studies were examined for the WoGA: OECD 2006; Patrick and Brown 2007; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013; Below and Belzile 2013; Conflict Research Unit 2008; Fitz-Gerald 2004; Cilliers 2006; and Tschirgi 2005. The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee defines fragile states as those countries where there is a lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. In addition, these countries tend to be characterised by poor governance and by being prone to violent conflict (OECD 2006, 13).
6. This is not to say that any monitoring and evaluation frameworks do not exist and are not exercised in the area of international assistance by inter-agency coordination with the involvement of the military in developing states. For example, monitoring and evaluation for security sector reform also looks at how coordination among the donor actors could lead to effective reforms (Rynn and Hiscock 2009). Nevertheless, these studies would rather focus on the effectiveness of the security sector reform, than on the coordination between the civilian and military actor from the donor states.
7. The following studies on humanitarian civil-military coordination were examined: Wiharta et al. 2008; Byman 2001; Metcalfe, Giffen, and Elhawary 2011; Rana 2004; McAvoy and Charny 2013; Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon 2012; SCHR 2010; Greenwood and Balachandran 2014; Metcalfe and Berg 2012.
10. It is noteworthy that the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, while referring to the Oslo Guidelines, does not use the term “last resort” and recognizes that the military could be the first to respond to humanitarian relief and engage directly with relief activities (OCHA 2014, 5).
11. The accounts presented in this section are based on the authors’ interviews conducted in March 2014. The authors are grateful to the interviewees for their generous contributions.
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