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Social Movements as Agents of Revolutionary Change in Egypt: The Decreasing Returns of Path Dependence

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ABSTRACT. Using the post-Tahrir political trajectory (2011–2015), this paper aims to address the limits to the capacity of old and new social movements in constructing a new order by examining the effectiveness and adaptability of a repertoire of methods in the past to new situations and environments, and whether path dependence engenders or decreases the return of both old and new social movements. Three years after the January Revolution of 2011, new and old social movements that took part in initiating the revolution and sustaining it until the overthrow of the authoritarian regime were at a loss to find in their now common repertoire any skills or techniques useful in shaping political change in the country in the way each of them had hoped for. Both were haunted by path dependence (falling victim to the memory of one historical moment in the hope that dwelling on its repertoire would enable them to relive the past at present) and the influence and reach of a neutral armed force. For both old and new social movements in Egypt, path dependence could be effective under a "permissive" institutional order but the move from "soft authoritarian" society that permitted both movements to operate with a relatively mild dose of repression to a "harsh authoritarian regime" that inculcated the association of post-revolutionary protests with disorder and a regimented way of life with Islamists, the current institutional order in Egypt is far from permissive.

KEYWORDS. old social movements · new social movements · Islamist movement · path dependence · Egypt · post-Tahrir revolution

Introduction

What are the limits to the capacity of social movements, old and new, to construct a new order? Are these limits to be found in their use of a repertoire of methods that proved effective in the past but are no longer adequate in a new situation? Does such repertoire constitute a burden? When do assets of social movements become a liability? Could past successes of these movements become a stumbling block in

adapting to new environments? Path dependence was assumed to engender increasing returns for social movements. When does path dependence engender, to the contrary, decreasing returns for both old and new social movements? This paper would strive to answer these questions using the post-Tahrir political trajectory (2011–2015) as a case in point to show how memories of past successes can distort understanding of the present and contribute to the failure of revolutionary movements to introduce the radical changes they strive to bring to their societies.

According to Paul Pierson, "path dependence" can be defined in two ways. A broad definition of path dependence attributed to William Sewell (1996) suggests that it is "the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence" or that simply "history matters" (quoted in Pierson 2000, 252). A narrower definition attributed to Margaret Levi (1997) would mean that "once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements [can] obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice" (quoted in Pierson 2000, 252).

James Mahoney (2000) explains why path dependence produces such effects. He argues that certain contingent events create sequences that are seen as favorable to collective actors. With time passing, their actions would be conditioned by what they had experienced in the past. The replication of what happened in the past is endorsed by collective memory, acquired skills, and institutional structures.

While the notion of path dependence has not yet been used in explaining the political trajectory of Egypt since the Tahrir revolution, the social movements' perspective was adopted by several authors in analyzing the role that both the Islamist movement and the young revolutionary groups played in this trajectory (Bayat 2007; Hafez 2013; Beinin 2012). This paper introduces a distinction between old polyclass social movements—comparable to the Socialist and Catholic movements that Europe has known since the nineteenth century—and the new social movements—often of the single-issue type, such as women, human rights, environmental and urban protests, which made their presence felt in different parts of Europe and Latin America since the 1960s (Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009). This distinction is found in many writings on social movements. Alain Touraine, for example, makes the distinction between "old social movements," "actors of central conflict in society, embodying fundamental

oppositions regarding the direction of the historical process" (1981, 6), and "new social movements" (1995). He takes as an example of the first the working class movement of the nineteenth century in Europe and found the best examples of new social movements that led to the overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and authoritarian regimes in Latin America. The old social movements were highly concerned with issues of equality and control of the state. The new social movements are more interested in cultural and moral issues and do not consider control of the state to be their major goal. They are described by McCarthy and Zald (1977) to be merely the expression of preferences that organizers are supposed to mobilize and turn into real action. Touraine did not elaborate very much on the question of class character of these movements. The old social movements, including the workers' movements in nineteenth-century Europe, were indeed polyclass movements; majority of their members were workers, but they comprised socialist parties and intellectual societies, such as the Labor Party and Fabian Society in the United Kingdom whose members were middle-class people who espoused the workers' cause. On the other hand, several studies pointed out the dominant presence of the middle-class—namely, students and white-collar employees and professionals—in the new movements (Fuchs 2005; Touraine 1995; Heberle 1968).

Based on the author's analysis of old and new movements, as well as several studies of both, the following lines of distinction between the two types could be made:

1. As to the social background of members, the old movements are mostly polyclass in character, whereas the new movements are made up usually of members of the same social class, often the middle-class.

2. The old movements elaborate a broad vision of society of a global nature, suggesting a program of reform affecting politics, social conditions, the economy, and culture, whereas the new movements have limited goals and could be of the single-issue type.

3. Old movements could include people from different age groups, while the new movements mostly find their members in young age groups.

4. Finally, historical old movements used a variety of tactics in their collective action, ranging from associations, to syndicates, political parties, and media, whereas new movements are limited in the tactics they use and are prone to engage often in protest actions.

Examples of the historical type of social movements can be found in both Socialist and Catholic movements in nineteenth-century Europe, which continued until the second half of the twentieth century. The newer movements are to be found in the United States and Europe among advocates of human rights and disarmament, feminist groups, and urban protesters.

The author has identified the Islamist movement as an example of an old social movement, and the several other groups that were active in the January Revolution of 2011 as new social movements. The Islamist movement is indeed the major actor in a central conflict in society—namely, the place of religion in its development. Should Islamic teachings become the major guidelines for the shaping of Egypt's institutions in all fields—political, social, economic, and cultural? Or should the people of Egypt freely seek guidance in this respect from their own experience and that of other countries, without necessarily being constrained by a specific interpretation of Islamic teachings? This has been indeed a central question in the country's search for modernity, with the country's rulers since Mohammed Ali in the early part of the nineteenth century opting for adaptation to a model of development inspired largely by Western liberal or Socialist traditions. The Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brothers, insisted on seeking guidance in Islamic texts. The new movements, on the other hand, have not risen to the status of being major actors in this historical debate. Largely committed to Western ideas of democracy, they mostly advocate political reform or improving the well-being of the majority of citizens. Differences between the two types of social movements relate therefore to the scope of their vision of the transformation they would like to effect in society, their class composition and age structure, as well as the range of methods they use in their collective actions. The Islamist movement is much older, as one of its factions started its activities in 1928, more than eight decades ago. The second trend within the Islamist movements made up of Salafis had also decades-old organizations. Other trends within the Islamist movement grew in the 1970s.

It is difficult to find reliable studies on the social background of the Islamist movement in Egypt. Documents of the Muslim Brothers offer some indications of the class background of its leaders. According to the Muslim Brothers Encyclopedia, the first Maktab Al-Ershaad (Guidance Bureau), the leading organ of the Muslim Brothers formed in July 1931, was made up of ten members, including the founder Hassan El Banna. Three of them were members of the Muslim clergy, six were government employees, and one was described as *a'yan* (dignitary), referring usually to wealthy prominent people. In this sense, the bureau was indeed polyclass, comprised of a majority of the middle-class and one wealthy man.[1] The Guidance Bureau elected in 2009 was definitely made up of the upper middle class. It included eighteen members. Ten of them were university professors and four were medical doctors. They also included one Azharite[2] and three government employees. The university professors were teaching either medicine or engineering. One could say therefore that the Muslim Brothers leaders in recent years were mostly engineers or medical doctors.[3]

The same source provides some information about the professional background of members of *sho'ba* (local branches) of the Brotherhood[4] in the 1930s. No information of such nature was given for later years, perhaps for security concerns. Thus, in the governorate of Beheira in the Northern part of Egypt, the Kafr El Dawwar branch was led in 1935 by a Shura (Advisory) Council of fifteen members, eight of whom were local wealthy dignitaries, five were members of the clergy, and two were government employees. Another branch of Mansh'at Helbawi in the same district was made up of eleven members, ten of whom were with the clergy and only one was a government employee. The pattern in Sharkiyya governorate was more varied but also pointing to the polyclass character of the Muslim Brothers. The twenty-four members of the Shura Council of the governorate included thirteen members of the clergy, nine government employees, two professionals (a lawyer and a medical doctor), and three local wealthy people.[5]

There is only impressionistic evidence on the social background of the Brotherhood members at the local level. However, an analysis of the constituencies of Muslim Brother candidates who won in the parliamentary elections in 2011–2012 leads to the conclusion that their bases of support must include people of different social classes. These candidates won a considerable number of seats in different parts of the country, urban governorates, and in constituencies in the Delta—

the northern part of the country—and in its southern part. Their impressive victories could not be reasonably due to support from within a single social class. No observer noted that the Muslim Brothers drew backing from one specific social class. Looking at the electoral districts where Muslim Brothers were competing as individual candidates with other individual candidates under the majority electoral system and disregarding those who figured in party lists under the proportional representation system, Muslim Brothers candidates won 66 percent of the seats in the Delta, 56 percent in Southern Egypt, 51 percent in major urban governorates like Cairo and Alexandria, and only 33 percent in desert governorates, which were divided between governorates that rely on tourism and others where Muslim Brothers candidates were facing rivalry from the Salafis of the Nour Party. As these constituencies included urban and rural districts where Muslim Brothers won mostly comfortable majorities, it would be difficult to attribute their success to the backing they got from one single class.[6] These observations of the multi-class character of the Islamist movement are supported by Joel Beinin (2004, 11–27) of Stanford University who found that the movement includes the business elite, professional middle class, lower middle class whom he called "lumpen intelligentsia, and urban poor."

As for the new social movements, it is also difficult to get information about the social background of their members. The two most famous ones—namely, Youth of April 6 and Kollona Khaled Sa'eid—were led by engineers. The first was led by Ahmad Maher and the second by Wa'el Ghoneim, both of whom graduated from the Engineering Faculty of Cairo University. There was more information about the founders of Kefaya movement, which gave birth to most of these other movements. The founding statement of Kefaya on 22 September 2004, was signed by the middle- and upper-middle-class, many of whom were prominent journalists, writers, film directors, and university professors. Of the 127 signatories to this statement, only two could be identified as militant workers. The middle-class and upper-middle-class dominated the new movements in Egypt (Sha'ban 2006, 268).

The two types of movements exhibit two different age structures. Leaders of the Islamist movement are mostly in their sixties, but the movement also has a large presence among the young. The new social movements have existed only mostly for less than a decade. The oldest, the Egyptian Movement for Change, known as Kifaya, is eleven years

old. Other movements were established much more recently, with some organized only a few months before the January Revolution. The author's direct observation of many of their activists points often to young people in their twenties or early thirties, of middle-class background. The April 6 Movement calls itself April 6 Youth Movement. It has chapters in Egyptian universities. Its known leaders were in their twenties or early thirties in 2011. Ahmed Maher, the movement's coordinator was thirty one, Mohammed Adel, its information spokesman, was only twenty three, and Asma' Mahfouz, who urged Egyptian people to revolt against Hosny Mubarak on the eve of the January Revolution, was twenty six. Wael Ghoneim, the administrator of the "Kollona Khaled Said" Facebook page, was thirty years old in 2011. Both Maher and Ghoneim were engineers, who graduated from Cairo University. The first was an employee of a construction company and the second, of a computer company, who ended up working for Google as head of marketing in the Middle East and North Africa prior to the January Revolution. Mahfouz has a degree in business administration from Cairo University.[7]

The paper will compare the strategy of each type of social movement and examine how they deployed different methods in their struggles, either by using their own repertoire or later by borrowing from other movements. The paper will then show that path dependency, after having exhausted whatever past repertoire they could find, eventually offered them decreasing returns.

STRATEGIES OF OLD AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN EGYPT: THE OLD REPERTOIRE

The final goal of the Islamist movement is to establish what its members conceive of as an Islamic order in all Muslim countries. It aims to shape societal conditions in all domains to correspond to what the leaders believe are the true teachings of Islam. For the leaders, this goal is not a theocracy, which has been defined as rule by the clergy. Although they denounced democracy in the past, the Muslim Brothers in the 1990s gradually came to the conclusion that they could win the majority in any elections. At present, they proclaim adherence to rules of "procedural democracy." Calling for Islamic Shari'a to be the major or even the sole source of legislation is in their view compatible with democracy, since this would be the choice of the majority of the electorate. Those who would preside over the enforcement of Shari'a

do not have to be members of the clergy, but they would be laymen elected by the people in free and fair elections. However, when asked who would be authorized to interpret Shari'a, they have no answer but to go back to Ulama, religious scholars who constitute the Muslim clergy. But they would not accept the views of any of those religious scholars. They mistrust official religious institutions, which they consider to be too submissive to unjust rulers. They prefer to seek the advice of either their own religious scholars or some of their leaders who claim that they are as competent or even more competent than the official clergy in interpreting the true message of Shari'a. The ideal state they aspire to establish is close to a modern version of the Caliphate.[8] The General Guide of Muslim Brothers stated in late December 2011 that the successful struggle of the Muslim Brothers would be crowned in the future by the establishment of a Caliphate (*Al-Masry Al-Youm* 2011).

The Islamist movement in Egypt is not limited to Muslim Brothers. Other factions include former militant groups, the most important of which are former members of the Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization, who did not hesitate to take up arms against the government, secular intellectuals, Christians, and foreign tourists in the 1980s and the 1990s. The Salafis, who have a stricter interpretation of Islam, constitute a third faction. One may even include some followers of the official religious establishment as a fourth faction within the Islamist social movement as the lines of demarcation in terms of adherence to the goal of applying Shari'a between them and the other factions are not always very clear.[9]

To attain this goal, the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis would do their utmost in order to persuade other Muslims to conform to what they consider as the right interpretation of Shari'a. This they would do peacefully, believing that Egyptians are in fact good Muslims who would accept the advice to adhere to the sound principles of Shari'a only if they know what these principles and teachings are. However, it is true that Muslim Brothers had a special branch called the Secret or the Underground Organization that engaged in acts of terrorism against judges, senior police officers, movie theaters, and even a prime minister. The organization was outlawed under the monarchy because of its involvement in such acts. The Brotherhood was accused of attempting to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser in August 1954. This assassination attempt came at a moment of tension between the Muslim Brothers and the Nasser-led faction of the Revolutionary

Command Council, which led to the coup that overthrew the semi-liberal regime that ruled the country since 1924. The Muslim Brothers denied the charge, accusing Nasser of masterminding the assassination attempt as a way of building up his popularity in the country.[10] In fact, the Muslim Brothers admit that the secret organization was indeed established under Hassan Al-Banna, the first General Guide "Murshid," but its members acted under no instructions from him. They also claim that the plot to assassinate Nasser was a fabrication of his secret services used as a pretext to outlaw the organization and arrest almost all its members (Kamal 1986). Young members of the Islamic Group and of the Jihad Organization resorted in the 1980s and 1990s to armed struggle against the government, police forces, Christians, writers, and foreign tourists. The government succeeded in defeating this armed rebellion. Following their release from prison under President Sadat, the Muslim Brothers did not resort to armed action against the government, although the government of Hosny Mubarak continued to accuse them of either inciting violence or even preparing violent engagements. Both the Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization have abandoned armed struggle in Egypt since the late 1990s; leaders of the Islamic Group issued fatwas and studies arguing that using armed struggle against other Muslims is incompatible with the teachings of Islam (Al-Sayyid 2003).

The new social movements, however, do not share a common goal as explicitly stated in their pronouncements. One could simply conclude that they aspire to establish a more democratic and just society in Egypt. The major slogans of the January Revolution—Bread, Liberty, Social Justice, and Human Dignity—point to the aspiration to have a system that will satisfy the citizens' basic human needs, protect their human rights, and guard against large disparities in the distribution of wealth and power. Some of them focused on more specific objectives. Kefaya, the oldest of these movements, was identified with its struggle against the extension of the presidential terms of Hosny Mubarak and the passing over of the presidency to his son (Sha'ban 2006, 269–71). The March 9 Movement of university professors was defending university autonomy against intervention by security agencies and the government (*Al-Ahram Weekly* 2007). The April 6 Youth Movement (2014) supported workers' strikes and called for respect of civil and political rights. The campaign in favor of Mohammad El-Barad'ei as president mobilized people to support the election campaign of the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Opposition to police brutality was the driving force for the establishment of the Facebook site known as "We Are All Khalid Saied" (Ghoneim 2012). All these movements relied almost exclusively on mobilization of mass protest action as a way of exerting pressure on the government to respond to their demands. Kefaya leaders continued to dream of a million-citizen demonstration that, in their view, would put an end to Mubarak's regime. But the largest number that the movement was capable of mobilizing did not exceed probably seven thousand persons on 7 September 2005 (Koheila 2014).

That was approximately the number of people who participated in a Kifaya-initiated demonstration in December 2005 to protest fraudulent People's Assembly elections that took place in the autumn of that year.[11] Egyptian judges under the leadership of Councilor Zakariyyah Abdel-Aziz called for judiciary independence against the executive power. They held a conference in 2006 that formulated several propositions to turn this goal into a concrete reality. Government procrastination in responding to their demands led them to engage in protest actions, including sit-in in the headquarters of their club in downtown Cairo and even to envisage a march to the Presidential Palace on 27 April 2006, to press their demands (Williams 2006). The April 6 Movement was obsessed with the idea of a general strike. It had allied itself in April 2008 with striking workers at the textile industry center in Mahallah Al-Kubra. On this occasion, it called on all people in the country to engage in a general strike to put an end to Mubarak's regime. Few people heeded this call outside of Mahallah Al-Kubra where demonstrations suppressed by the police turned into riots. Egyptian workers engaged in various protest actions in order to get the right to establish independent trade unions free from the tutelage of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt, which was heavily controlled by government supporters (Beinin 2012). Only in few cases would such movements test other methods of collective action, such as litigation. Apart from human rights organizations, only the March 9 Movement did just that. It got a ruling in 2010 from the Council of State banning the presence of security forces on campus.[12] Human rights organizations practiced litigation as a favorite mode of action. The Hisham Mubarak Center for Human Rights got a ruling to nullify fraudulent trade union elections several years ago. The Center for Economic and Social Rights obtained a favorable ruling from the Supreme Administrative Court nullifying contracts of the sale of a

number of public sector enterprises as illegal. Workers opposed to privatization of state-owned companies managed to get similar rulings.[13]

NETWORKING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: PAST REPERTOIRE

Social movements have devised several ways of engaging with civil society. This should not occasion any surprise as they are part of civil society. Gaining civil society support helps social movements in their confrontation with the state. Since some of these movements aspire to transform the whole society according to their ideals, establishing a strong presence within civil society could be part of a strategy of war of positions that could finally lead them to capture the state.

The old social movement was definitely more successful in its attempt to establish a strong presence within civil society. In fact, apart from the more radical faction that espoused a strategy of armed struggle in the 1980s and the 1990s, the two mainstream groups, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, started off as civil society organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood had the legal status of a *gam'eyyah* (citizens' society) since its establishment in 1928 until it was outlawed by the Revolutionary Command Council in 1954. Muslim Brothers continued to be a banned organization until the death of Nasser on 28 September 1970. Nasser's successors—namely, Anwar El-Sadat (1970–1981) and Hosny Mubarak (1981–2011)—allowed the Brotherhood to come to the open, practicing mainly charitable activities under the first and expanding under the second into participation in elections and membership of leading organs of professional associations. It also gained membership in the two houses of the parliament, notwithstanding occasional arrests of its leaders under both presidents.[14] Following the January Revolution, it opened large headquarters in the Moqattam district of Cairo in a well-publicized ceremony attended by senior officials of the government. It had offices throughout the country. With the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi as one of its members, it managed to get a formal status from the Ministry of Solidarity as an association having its name but led by former members of its Guidance Bureau and not by its leaders at the time.[15] Its registration as a civil society organization became controversial since the officially recognized officers did not include the actual leadership of the association. Its spokespersons claimed that theirs was an all-purpose association engaged in multiple

activities: disseminating Islamic teachings, carrying out social work, and getting involved as well in political action.[16] No other association in Egypt claimed to engage in such a broad range of activities. Political involvement, in particular, was banned by the very law under which the Muslim Brothers was given a legal status. Leaders of the Brotherhood were hoping that a draft of a new law of association prepared under their president would enshrine this new status as an all-purpose association. Had this happened, there would have been no problem for such an association to practice politics. Activities exercised by its political arm—namely, the Freedom and Justice Party—would have been then seen as perfectly legitimate as one method of propagating Islamic teachings. This legal status was revoked following the de facto removal of President Morsi from office on 3 July 2013. A declaration on 25 December 2013 by Dr. Hossam Eissa, the then deputy prime minister in the interim government (September 2013–June 2014), stated that the Brotherhood was a terrorist organization. This declaration therefore banned the Brotherhood's activities and called for the confiscation of all its assets as well as those of its leaders and affiliated associations.[17]

The Salafis, in their turn, have been acting for a long time through civil society. They had established a number of associations to disseminate their ideas in the country, the most important of which are the Shar'eyyah Association (Al-Jam'eyyah al-Shar'eyyah), the Islamic Charitable Association (Al-Jame'ayyah Al Khairiyyah Al Islamiyyah), and the Society of Partisans of the Mohammedan Tradition (Jame'yyat' Ansaar Al-Sunnah Al-Mohammadiyyah). Both the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi associations have engaged in social action for years, providing medical, educational, and charitable services to the poor and lower middle class.[18]

The Muslim Brotherhood in particular had embarked on a new mode of engaging with civil society since the 1980s. Its activists were prominent in student bodies since the 1940s, but what was new since the 1980s was the intensity with which Muslim Brothers fought in elections for seats in several professional associations. This mode of action was soon to be crowned with success as Muslim Brothers managed to capture almost the totality of seats in some of the most important professional associations in the country, beginning with the engineers', then the medical doctors' syndicates in the 1980s and the lawyers association in 1992, besides smaller syndicates like those of scientists and most university professor clubs. The government of

Hosny Mubarak, alarmed by this continued success of Muslim Brothers activists, decided to curb this dominance by introducing a law in 1993 that raised the quorum for the validity of professional syndicate elections. As it became clear that this new condition would not bar repeated electoral successes of Muslim Brothers activists, the government decided to indefinitely postpone elections in professional syndicates and put the three major syndicates of engineers, medical doctors, and lawyers indirectly under the administration of government loyalists.[19]

The lawyers fought a legal battle to regain control over their association. Their legal fight was also accompanied by street demonstrations. They succeeded as they forced the government to accept a court ruling allowing free elections in the Bar Association. These elections put the association under a coalition of Islamists and Nasserite lawyers who were not always on good terms with each other, but Muslim Brotherhood held the majority seats. The engineers and the medical doctors had to wait for the January Revolution to regain control over their syndicates. In the new elections that followed, Muslim Brothers succeeded in getting the majority in the medical doctors' national council in May 2011, but many provincial chapters were won by secular doctors known as the Independence Current. They also managed to get the majority in the national council of the engineers' syndicate, but with a relatively slight edge given their candidate for president of the syndicate and a rival candidate of the Independence Current.[20] The harassment to which leaders of the Brotherhood were subjected following the removal of Muhammad Morsi from office in July 2013 perhaps weakened the resolve of Muslim Brothers members in the medical doctors' syndicate to maintain their dominance of the national council of the syndicate. Their fellows in the engineers' syndicate also failed to keep one of theirs as president of the syndicate, which was due to elect a new council in 2014.[21]

Engagement with civil society had taken another dimension when an attempt was made to coordinate action among several civil society organizations, particularly professional syndicates, in view of defending civil rights—notably, freedom of association. Some of the professional associations led by Islamists took the initiative in 1994–1995 to establish what was described as the Civil Society Conference that brought together a number of associations, including film and theater professionals' syndicates. This attempt was short-lived as the government moved to exercise control over the Islamist-led syndicates and suspended elections in other syndicates.[22]

Following the January Revolution, both trends within the Islamist movement established television channels and started to publish daily newspapers in the hope of reaching out to a larger public. The Salafis preceded the Muslim Brothers' running of channels, which was quite successful with poor Egyptians, thanks to the oratorical talents of their speakers and talk show hosts and guests. The television channel of Muslim Brothers (Masr 25) started to beam later and was not even known to many Egyptians.[23] The Muslim Brothers took the lead among Islamists in publishing a daily newspaper, which carried the name of their party—*Al-Hurriya wa al-'adalah* (Freedom and Justice)—whereas that of the Salafis started publication in January 2012, under the name *Al-Fat'h*, which refers to what Muslims call the "military campaigns of Prophet Mohammad." Following the removal by the armed forces of the Muslim Brothers government led by Dr. Mohammed Morsi on 3 July 2013, all Islamist television channels were banned and the publication of the Muslim Brothers' *Al-Hurriya wa al-'adalah* was eventually suspended in December 2013. The paper continued its online version in Arabic and in English, although the English edition was not always updated. The rationale behind these measures was based later in the year on a declaration by the deputy prime minister Dr. Hossam Eissa that Muslim Brothers was a terrorist organization, which was confirmed later by some court decisions. The declaration followed a car explosion in front of the Police Directorate in the Delta town of Mansoura on 24 September 2013, which killed sixteen policemen and injured 140 people. The explosion was claimed by Ansaar Bayt Al-Maqdes (Partisans of Jerusalem), another Islamist organization, but the government blamed Muslim Brotherhood for it.[24] Several court decisions later confirmed the charge that Muslim Brothers was a terrorist organization (see *Fanack Chronicle* 2015).

The new social movements, on the other hand, did not match this multi-modal engagement with other civil society actors, although they received much support from intellectuals. The Kefaya movement in the beginning at least had some theater and film actors[25] taking part in meetings of its leading organs.[26] Their closest associates in the civil society were human rights organizations, particularly the Hisham Mubarak Center. Some human rights organizations had to pay the price for sympathizing with the new social movements. The Hisham Mubarak Center was broken into by security agents during the days of the January Revolution.[27] The Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and Law Profession was investigated on flimsy charges

(Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 2011). Some leading members of the national council of the journalists' syndicate were either sympathetic to these movements or even active members in some of them. Most of the Kifaya protests took place on the front steps of the journalists' syndicate. Some of the conferences of these movements, including international meetings with world civil society activists, also took place on the premises of the syndicate. The World Anti-War Movement held two conferences there (Smith et al. 2015,160). The initiative to establish independent trade unions owes much to the involvement of these movements' members. Membership in the new social movements overlapped. For example, some members of Kifaya were also members of the March 9 Movement and the Egyptian Association for Change.

The most impressive success of the new social movements was their use of the electronic social media as a way of communicating with people, offering an alternative to state-controlled media. In this way they provided a source of information and a tool for coordinating their protest activities. In fact, all social movements, old and new, have used the electronic social media, but the new social movements have been more imaginative in their use of Facebook and Twitter. The government of Hosny Mubarak was definitely aware of their use of the social media and had arrested a number of bloggers. But it never realized, until very late, that this media would be effective in mobilizing young people for protest action. Part of the reason for its failure is its underestimation of the seriousness of purpose of the Egyptian youth. When the government had grasped how effective the role of this media was, it ordered the suspension of Internet services during the early days of the revolution and arrested Wa'el Ghoneim, the administrator of "Kollona Khalid Sa'eid," the most popular of the Facebook sites of the young revolutionaries. Those who accessed this Facebook site rose to hundreds of thousands during the period that preceded the January Revolution.[28] Another popular Facebook site was that of Nawwara Negm, daughter of the late Ahmed Fou'ad Negm, a well-known poet whose poems and songs were popular among revolutionary young people since the 1970s, and that of an activist woman journalist who had been seen often in recent years taking part in protest demonstrations.[29] Nawwara had been investigated on the discredited charges of offering money to young thugs who were setting fire to important buildings in downtown Cairo in late December 2011. She was later acquitted by the court.[30]

Engagement with the State: Path Dependence

There is no doubt that hopes that the January Revolution would open a new chapter in relations between social movements, old and new, and the state were gradually dashed following the second wave of the January Revolution in June 2013. The Muslim Brothers were the first to suffer. At first there were restrictions on their activities. Then the organization itself and its affiliated associations were banned. The new movements also found their image tarnished by most pro-government media, which described them as agents of foreign powers. In fact, many leaders of Muslim Brothers and the new movements found themselves in prison since the summer of 2013. Several of the new movements described what happened on 3 July 2013, as a coup d'etat and condemned the brutal suppression of the Islamists encampment in two squares in Cairo and similar protests in other parts of the country.[31]

In fact, relations between the Muslim Brothers trend of the Islamist movement and the new social movements on the one hand and the state on the other were characterized by confrontation at times and reciprocal suspicion at other times. Even before the July 1952 Revolution led by Free Officers, relations between the Muslim Brothers and the government turned from tolerance to declared war when some activists associated with the Special Organization of the Brotherhood started a series of assassinations that targeted, among others, a judge and a senior police officer, ending in 1949 with the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmy Al-Noqrashi. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers, was assassinated afterward, presumably by the secret police. The prime minister had been assassinated for his outlawing of the Brotherhood, seen as a threat to political stability in the country in the wake of the armed activities carried out presumably by its members (Kamal 1986, 120–52, 173–249, 259–356).

It is true that Al-Banna denied that he gave orders to Special Division to engage in such acts. The fact remains that the Muslim Brothers maintained two lines of activities: a public one carrying out social work among the poor and diffusing the Muslim Brothers' views on Islam among the people in general, and an underground group that did not hesitate to resort to armed action against citizens and foreigners alike. That was definitely the belief held by successive governments in Egypt following the July Revolution of 1952. The Free Officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasir, confirmed their suspicions about an "alleged" attempt on Nasir's life in August 1954 and another "conspiracy"

inspired presumably by Sayyid Qutb in the summer of 1965. Both Sadat and Mubarak thought that they could persuade the Brotherhood to abandon armed methods. Sadat released its members from prison and allowed them a voice in the public sphere. Mubarak went further by opening the way for their participation in elections of the legislature and professional associations, while denying them a legal status and subjecting them to police harassment from time to time. In fact, despite some official charges under Mubarak that some members of the organization led by Khayrat Al-Shatir were trained to undertake terrorist activities, there was very little evidence that the organization contemplated such actions following the release of its members from prison under Sadat (Lewa' Fou'ad 'Allam 1995).

That was not the case with more radical factions of the Islamist movement, particularly the Islamic Group, the Jihad Organization, and other splinter groups. Their leaders thought that the peaceful methods associated with most activities of the Brotherhood did not enable them to either succeed in establishing a true Islamic society or at least gaining them a legally recognized status. One group after the other tried to "reform" society by force instead of non-violent means, which they thought had failed. The beginning was in 1977 with the Shukri Mustapha-led Group of Muslims, and other groups followed suit, recruiting their members particularly among university students in Upper Egypt, a relatively less developed and marginalized part of the country. They denounced the Muslim Brothers for their inclination toward peaceful social and political action (Habib 2001, 25–26, 77). In the eyes of the public, such differences of method between the Muslim Brothers and the more radical groups were simply a division of labor within the same movement.

The Mubarak years almost convinced the more militant Islamist groups that peaceful methods of the Muslim Brothers were more effective as a way of gaining support for the Islamist cause. Armed struggle against the government, which started in mid-1970s and escalated in the 1980s until mid-1990s, ended in complete failure. The Muslim Brothers, on the other hand, were consolidating their presence in society, winning majorities in professional associations and getting one-fifth of seats of People's Assembly in elections of 2005. The Islamic Group, the largest of the militant organizations, abandoned armed struggle, so did most members of the Jihad Organization in Egypt, with leaders of the Islamic Group publishing six books arguing why it was harmful to the Islamic cause for Muslims to take up arms against a

Muslim government. Despite a little setback for Muslim Brothers in the massively fraudulent People's Assembly election of 2010 in which almost no member of an opposition group won a seat, the Islamists did not change their minds about the wisdom of pursuing a peaceful path to political power (Habib 2001, 125–42).

Confronted with a new situation following Mubarak's departure from the political scene in February 2011, the old social movement used this wealth of skills and experience in order to advance a strategy of political empowerment that would enable them to translate their vision of an Islamic society into a concrete reality. Muslim Brothers in particular had a long history of dealing with successive governments, under the monarchy, briefly for two years with the Revolutionary Command Council following the revolution of 23 July 1952, and under both Sadat and Mubarak. They did not hesitate to strike deals with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled the country following Mubarak's departure from office on 11 February 2011. At other times, they would mobilize all Islamists all over the country in order to put pressure on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, when they thought that it might opt for a secular state. Their nationwide organization and affiliated associations as well as the social services they provided to the poor, particularly in the Delta and major cities, enabled them to win millions of voters to back their positions in the many electoral consultations that took place in the aftermath of the January Revolution. The electioneering skills that the Muslim Brothers in particular had acquired in professional associations and in legislative elections since 1984 proved very useful. They won support for their position to amend the Constitution of 1971 rather than draft a new one, in a referendum on 19 March 2011. Together with the Salafis, they denounced those who called for the drafting of a new constitution as heretics who wanted to drop the reference to Islamic Shari'a in the constitution that was drafted under Sadat and remained in force under Mubarak. That constitution, though amended several times, still kept reference to Islamic Shari'a as the major source of legislation in its second article. Again together with the Salafis they got almost three quarters of the seats in the People's Assembly and a massive majority in the Shura Assembly, the upper house of the parliament, in the legislative elections that took place in the fall and winter of 2011–2012. Muslim Brothers candidate got 52 percent of the votes in the second round of presidential elections in June 2012. When a new constitution, drafted by a constituent assembly largely

dominated by Islamists, was put to a referendum, it got the support of 63 percent of those who participated, or only 33 percent of all registered voters.[32]

A social movement expands in many ways, one of which is when its repertoire inspires other groups. Thus this model of engaging in social action as a pious religious duty and a useful way too of building electoral support was soon emulated by other Islamist groups. Both the Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization established their own parties as well as the Salafis who joined political action through their newly founded Nour Party (Light Party). They were joined by the Wasat Party (Center Party), which gained recognition in 2011 after many years in courts. All of them managed to be well-represented in the two houses of the parliament elected in 2011–2012.

The new social movements, on the other hand, were suspicious of the sham democracy under Mubarak. They did not trust elections and did not show any interest in the kind of social activities that Islamists were practicing. Apart from few independent trade unions that some of them had helped establish, they had very little presence outside of the political sphere.

Having learnt how to mobilize masses through the social media, they thought that the same trick would always succeed. During the first transitional period under SCAF, they would call for a million-people protest on Facebook and Twitter. But no more than a few thousands would respond in most cases. They numbered on one occasion perhaps tens of thousands but mostly in Cairo and a few large cities. The protesters did decide to camp in Midan Al-Tahrir and stayed there for weeks, barring the square, a central meeting point of traffic in heavily crowded downtown Cairo, to thousands of buses, cars, trucks, and pedestrians, emulating what happened in the glorious days of January–February 2011. With the time passing for these encampments, people and even protesters would forget the original cause of the protest. The protesters of the new movements who endorsed the encampment against the opposition of other factions would still hope that with such protests the SCAF-led regime would fall in the same way as Mubarak's regime did months ago. Those who continued to espouse the use of these methods did not probably realize that Mubarak's regime was overthrown not only because of the massive popular protests but because the army took finally the side of the people. That was confirmed later when "Tamarrod" (rebellion) succeeded in getting perhaps millions of people to sign its petition calling on President

Mohammed Morsi to organize early presidential elections. President Morsi did not give in to such demands despite massive demonstrations throughout the country on 30 June 2013. He too was forced to leave the presidential palace of Ittehadiyyah when he was surrounded in early July 2013 by hostile army officers asking him and his closest associates to accompany them to detention in the barracks of the nearby Republican Guard.[33]

Thus old and new movements have acquired through their past practices a variety of skills that proved to be of increasing returns. The Islamists who abandoned armed methods found that the electioneering tactics they had used in professional associations equipped them to contest several national electoral consultations, which they won. The new movements found also that use of the social media enabled them to bring millions of people to the streets in mass rallies that brought down Hosny Mubarak. The repertoire of the Islamists was far richer than that of the new groups. It included armed and peaceful methods, covering large cities and provincial towns, middle-class districts and poor neighborhoods. The repertoire of the new movements was, by contrast, relatively thin, limited mostly to the use of social media and organizing collective protest actions, with their presence felt mostly among young people, particularly in major cities, although such repertoire was quite effective in the glorious days of the January revolution.

Social Movements Changing Tactics: Learning from the Other

At different moments, the two movements realized that their skills were producing decreasing returns. Some leaders of the new movements thought that the transition to a democratic system required moving from being largely virtual groups into formal political organizations, either by joining one of the existing parties or establishing a party of their own, and becoming directly involved with the masses. They were envious of the Muslim Brothers and Salafis who were seen to be successful in mobilizing voters, thanks to their networks that provide social services. These networks put them in direct contact with ordinary citizens, gaining their appreciation for the services they provided and easily winning their votes in elections. Muslim Brothers also found that once their president was removed from office on 3 July 2013, their organization and party alike practically banned, they had

to use the social media in order to continue communication with their members and sympathizers to mobilize them for collective protest. Social media and even several friendly television networks were used to inform the public of their positions and the persecution they were subjected to.

Leaders of the new movements were not of one view as to how to adapt to the post-revolution situation. Some preferred to continue as a Facebook group, others moved to social action, a third group joined other parties, and a fourth set up their own parties. Almost all suffered internal dissension and thus split into 130 to 190 different groups, all of them considering themselves the legitimate spokespeople for the revolution.

The April 8 Youth Movement split into three groups: two remained political organizations (April 6 Youth Movement and April 6 Youth Movement–The Democratic Front) largely operating through the social media, while a third group led by Tariq Al-Kholy tried unsuccessfully to establish a political party.[34] Wa'el Ghoneim moved to social action, setting up a development-oriented association (Hayden 2011). Some of the young activists joined other parties, mostly of liberal or Marxist orientations, such as the Dostour Party (Constitution Party), the Patriotic Front (liberal orientation), the Democratic Labor, the Popular Socialist Alliance (leftist), and the Strong Egypt (liberal Islamist). A fourth group founded new parties led by young people (Al-A'dl Party [Justice Party]).[35] Seven of these parties have obtained a legal status from the Committee of Political Parties. These include the Revolution, the Justice (Adl), the Revolution Continues, and Egypt Freedom parties, all mostly of liberal or at best social democratic orientation.[36] The status of the three other parties is uncertain as they have yet to win the approval of the Committee of Political Parties—namely, the Workers Democratic, the Egyptian Current, and the Tamarrod parties.

The Islamists shifted to rely almost entirely on social media as the offices of both the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party were closed by the government following the removal of Dr. Morsi from the presidency on 3 July 2013. The major website of Muslim Brothers is Ikhwanonline, which is managed in two languages: Arabic and English. The same site informs the visitors about no less than nineteen other sites that address either members in different governorates or specific groups of people. The national site is updated daily and is often a source of news and instructions to members to

engage in protest actions.[37] Protest marches of the Brotherhood usually started following the Muslim Friday prayer, although they took place also on other days and at other times.

As for the Salafi Nour Party, it relies less on social media. Having endorsed the removal of Dr. Morsi from office on 3 July 2013, it succeeded in maintaining its offices and affiliated associations. It had only one website, as well as a Facebook page, like the Muslim Brothers, but the number of visitors rarely exceeded tens every day.[38] The use of social media was also common among the so-called Jihadist groups, but mainly to issue their statements mostly declaring responsibility for attacks on Egypt's security forces.[39]

The borrowing by the Muslim Brothers in particular of the repertoire of the new social movements was quite evident during the period of encampment in the two squares of Cairo—namely, Rab'a Al-Adawiyyah in Nasr City and Al-Nahda, close to Cairo University—from 28 June 2013, when the sit-in started until 14 August 2013, when security forces drove them away. The sit-in started in anticipation of the big protest that the Tamarrod movement called for on 30 June 2013, to press its demand for the removal of Dr. Morsi. Islamists' protests were accompanied by marches and other protest actions in different parts of the country in the hope that such expressions of solidarity with Dr. Morsi would ignite a popular revolution that would force the military to back down and restore Morsi's presidency. The protests brought together most of the other Islamist parties, such as the members and sympathizers of the Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization as well as the Wasat (Center) Party besides the rank and file of the Nour Party who did not accept the position of their leaders. They were also joined by a smaller number of people who did not accept the way Morsi was removed from his office, considering it a coup d'etat. Muslim Brothers hoped to replicate the scenario of the January Revolution when the encampment in the Tahrir Square led to the breakdown of security forces, and inspired millions of discontented people throughout the country to back the call to end Mubarak's rule. Social media was used by Muslim Brothers to mobilize support and inform members and sympathizers about what they should do. The organization of the encampment was similar to that of the Tahrir. A podium was constructed and loud speakers were installed to be used by leaders of Islamist parties and the prominent figures who supported them. Those speakers would address the protesters every night, denouncing what they considered a coup d'etat against a legitimate

government of the country. They promised the faithful that in a few days' time the imprisoned Morsi would be back in the presidential palace. These speeches were always aired by Al-Jazeera television channel and some Islamist channels not authorized by the Egyptian interim government. Islamists opposed to the interim government framed their fight to be a struggle against a military regime adopting the same slogan of the new movements whose supporters had shouted in the Tahrir Square "*Yasqut hukm al-askar*" (Down with the military rule) during the period of SCAF official rule of the country.

The shift by Islamists to methods typical of the new movements did not bring the outcome they hoped for, mainly toppling the new incumbent regime as what happened in January–February 2011. The toleration by the interim government that was formed in the aftermath of the removal of Dr. Morsi could not last long with people opposed to the Ikhwan putting pressure on the government to end the encampments soon. The interim government did in fact exert much patience with the protesters, hoping that the crowds who gathered in the two places during the holy month of Ramadan would disperse peacefully or out of tiredness with the festivities that usually mark the end of the Muslim fasting month. From the government's point of view the hoped for "happy end" did not materialize. On the contrary, the number of people camping in the two places increased, and protests led occasionally to clashes with people hostile to Muslim Brothers or with security forces or with both, particularly when protesters attempted to block traffic on major roads in the capital and in the country or to assault military institutions. Some of the speakers on Rab'a podium used threatening language, calling for the assassination of General Sisi, the Dr. Morsi-appointed minister of defense who supported his removal. Speakers on Rab'a podium also denounced the Coptic Pope and Christians of Egypt who in their view backed the overthrow of Muslim Brothers-dominated regime.[40] Clashes did take place on several occasions, once when the protesters surrounded the Presidential Guards Club where they believed Dr. Morsi was detained, and a large number of people were shot dead. Many others were murdered on another occasion when the protesters tried to expand the encampment area outside the Rab'a Al-Adawiyya Square. The encampment ended tragically when, following brief warnings, security forces proceeded to drive protesters away from the two encampments by shooting at protesters. The National Council of Human Rights of Egypt conducted an inquiry into what happened on that day of 14

August 2013, and concluded in its report that security forces did not allow the protesters much time after the warning and that they used excessive force. It stated that 632 people were killed, including policemen, but the Muslim Brothers declared that 3,000 of the protesters were killed on that day.[41] A report of the Human Rights Watch put the figures at 817 to 1000 killed and was severely critical of Egyptian authorities (Human Rights Watch 2014a). The way the encampment ended was really ugly, no matter which report is accepted as accurate.

Borrowing from the new social movements' repertoire, leaders of the old social movement in Egypt overlooked two important considerations, which were absent in their protests. One was that while methods were the same, the context of the mobilization in the summer of 2013 was very different from that of the popular mobilization in the winter of 2011. The success of the new social movements in January–February 2011 was due to the fact that their action expressed popular demands for bread, justice, freedom, and human dignity, which resonated well with the masses who consequently joined them in the millions. These were not factional slogans, and all social groups and political forces who resented Mubarak's rule could identify with them. The Muslim Brothers framed their protest as a call for the restoration of legitimacy and the end of military rule. However, large numbers of Egyptians—including people of various social classes in major cities and provincial towns, including judges, intellectuals, and Christians, wealthy and poor people alike—believed that the Muslim Brothers' rule lost its legitimacy through their incompetence in the exercise of power. Millions of people thus signed the statements of Tamarrod, calling on Dr. Morsi to accept anticipated presidential elections, which he vehemently rejected. Dr. Morsi expressed his preference for the conduct of legislative elections first under his own government. Suspecting that Muslim Brothers would rig such elections in their favor, this demand by Dr. Morsi was rejected by the opposition coalition that called itself the National Salvation Front, which included Tamarrod leaders as well. Instead, the opposition to Dr. Morsi, which was supported by many of the new movements, called on the army to intervene to remove him by force. The army commanders issued an ultimatum to both parties on 23 June 2013, to settle their differences within a week. As the week ended with no agreement, Dr. Morsi was given two more days to reflect on the matter, and on 3 July 2013, he was removed from office. An interim government was called in to run

the country, with Defense Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the new strongman of the country, keeping his post as defense minister. The second consideration that the Muslim Brotherhood did not grasp was the crucial role of the army in the events in the winter of 2011. Without the initially neutral and later sympathetic position taken by the army toward the revolution, Mubarak would have remained in power or at least a bloodbath would have been opened in the country to crush the revolution, this time with army support. The armed forces were not on the Brotherhood's side in June–July 2013. The encampments in Rab'a and Nahda Squares were doomed.

Following the removal of Dr. Morsi, the Brotherhood raised demands for his return to the presidency, reinstating the Shura Assembly elected by a small number of voters, dominated by Islamists and led by Dr. Morsi's brother-in-law, and bringing back the controversial 2012 Constitution. Undoubtedly many people in the country supported these demands, but many others as well either did not like them or felt indifferent toward them. These demands were perceived by large sections of the people, if not by the majority, as simply a call to bring back an unpopular president who won the presidency with a slight majority over his rival in a free and fair election and who moreover did not accept the challenge to go for an early presidential election.

As borrowing from the repertoire of the new social movements failed to bring the hoped-for victory, Islamists, desperate to get the power they had lost, went back to the old repertoire of armed struggle under the monarchy and during the last two decades of the twentieth century under both Sadat and Mubarak. Terrorist attacks escalated in the country, initially in Sinai but later in other parts of Egypt, more particularly in major cities of the Delta and even in oases in the Western Desert. Some of these attacks were claimed by two Islamist underground organizations—namely, Ansar bayt Al-Maqdes (Partisans of Jerusalem) and Agnaad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt), which carried out well-planned assassinations of army and police personnel. Not so well planned actions targeting trains and electricity grids were blamed on Brotherhood sympathizers (Ashour 2014). Thus, the old social movement in Egypt has nearly exhausted every repertoire, its skills that had worked in the past and that of the secular new social movements. The old social movement, or some of its factions and members, did not hesitate to resort to the old methods, namely armed struggle, which had proved to be disastrous for the movement under both the monarchy and all

presidents since 1954. All paths were crossed by the old social movement but led nowhere.

Some of the new social movements also tried to borrow certain methods of the old social movements. A few of them had the resources or skills to engage in providing social services, which was the hallmark of the old social movements. Some established new parties. Others joined existing parties, and very few went into social development activities. Many also took part in parliamentary elections. The record of success has been modest if not quite disappointing. Those who decided to contest elections of the People's Assembly in late 2011–2012 got less than 10 seats out of 498 elected seats. Their failure was due to many factors—mostly their lack of financial resources, a necessary asset particularly for those who dared to run as individual candidates and not as members of party lists. The parties they established did not survive long. The leaders of the most successful of these parties—namely, Adl Party—had to suspend its activities shortly after its establishment due to serious divisions among its members. On two occasions, the young revolutionaries were very effective in sparking revolutionary waves, but they failed miserably in shaping the evolution of the post-revolutionary regime. They spearheaded the first revolutionary wave in January 2011, but power was exercised successively by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brothers. A second occasion, inspired by Tamarrod, coincided with what is considered in the country as a second wave of the revolution in June 2013. Tamarrod had contributed to the drawing of the agenda of the post-Morsi regime, including the choice of new ministers, and the drafting of a largely amended constitution. As with earlier new social movements, it later had little influence on the practices of either the interim regime or the newly elected president who had championed the removal of Morsi. The interim government persecuted many of their colleagues and put several of their leaders in prison.[42] President El Sisi is adamantly opposed to reverse any of these practices and had expressed the belief that the country could be ripe for democracy perhaps in twenty-five years' time or even longer.[43] The new social movements could be instrumental in overthrowing authoritarian rule, but are hardly effective in influencing policies and practices of the regimes they bring to power, either as civil society actors or even when they move from civil society to political society as parties and parliamentarians.

CONCLUSION

Three years after the January revolution, new and old social movements that took part in initiating the revolution and sustaining it until the overthrow of the authoritarian regime find their members persecuted and most of their leaders either in prison, exiled, or demonized in the country's media. Both shouted the slogan "Yasqut hukm al'askar" first echoed in young revolutionaries' protests as early as April 2011, to the dismay of Islamists, and later by the Islamists themselves constantly since the overthrow of President Morsi on 3 July 2013. The military are masters of the political scene in Egypt since then and perhaps for many years to come. This is not the political system that both hoped for when they joined ranks together during the eighteen days of the January Revolution.

Both were at a loss to find in their common repertoire any skills or techniques useful in shaping political change in the country in the way each of them had hoped for. The variety of methods that constituted the repertoire of the old social movements dominated by Islamists enabled them to win five electoral consultations between 2011 and 2012, but did not shield them against the overthrow of their regime following a popular revolt on 30 June 2013, supported by the army three days later on July 3. Since then, they shifted to the use of the tactics of the new social movements, intensifying mobilization of their supporters through social media, directing them to engage in a variety of protest actions. They paid a heavy price, with several hundreds or even more than a thousand of their members and sympathizers, sons and daughters, murdered by security forces and nearly all their leaders ending in prison or in exile. Not trusting any elections under their civil and military adversaries, and with some of them resorting to armed struggle, there is no prospect at present that they could defeat the army and police and overcome the resentment of millions of citizens to regain power.

The new social movements, on the other hand, were skillful at igniting the spark of popular enthusiasm, which eventually attracted all opposition groups, including Muslim Brothers, and large masses of the people who all jointly, supported by the military, overthrew an authoritarian regime. A new generation of young revolutionaries tried the same methods of social media use and got millions of people to sign petitions calling on an incumbent and incompetent president to accept early anticipated elections by 30 June 2013, and to participate

in massive demonstrations when he rejected their demands. Once again, or it seemed, they got the military and police on their side, arresting Dr. Morsi and removing him and the Muslim Brothers from power. Some members of Tamarrod took part in the meetings of the Commission of Fifty that drafted the new constitution, but with the country ruled by the same former military who was their ally in the struggle against Muslim Brothers, all the young revolutionaries of the new social movements, including Tamarrod, find themselves divided and marginalized and not capable of influencing the turn of events in the country, if they were lucky to have escaped prison. Attempts to fall on methods of the old social movement, engaging the masses through social action and establishing political parties to reap the benefit of this social action in terms of expanded membership of political parties and votes in elections, came almost to nothing.

Path dependence of one sort haunted the two movements. They both fell victim to the memory of one historical moment, in hoping that dwelling on its repertoire would enable them to relive the past. This was the repertoire of the four glorious days from 25–28 January 2011, when the small demonstrations on 25 January ignited the enthusiasm of large masses of people of all strata to come together to defeat the dictator and his security forces.

Leaders of the two movements failed, in fact, to realize that the decisive move that enabled the young revolutionaries and the Muslim Brothers to remove the authoritarian regime was the neutral and then the supportive stand of the armed forces. It was also the position of the armed forces that made Tamarrod's initiative in the spring of 2013 a success story. Now, the two movements have the armed forces against them. The context has changed. It is a different game altogether.

In fact, what made the armed forces take the side of the revolutionaries in January–February 2011 and again on 30 June 2013, was the massive support the revolutionaries got from the people. Large crowds joined them on the two occasions. The revolutionaries lost the support of the people in their protests under SCAF. Muslim Brothers, while managing to mobilize tens of thousands of their supporters in their confrontations with security forces since the ouster of Dr. Morsi on 3 July 2013, failed definitely in turning the majority of people to their side. The number of people who took part in their almost weekly protests dwindled. The cost of repression would have been much higher for the armed forces had the millions of people who descended to the streets in January–February 2011 and 30 June 2013, joined the

Muslim Brothers. Lacking massive popular support, defeating both the old and the new social movements in such confrontations was thus relatively easy, though with a considerable measure of human suffering.

A more fundamental condition for the success of social movements during the last months of the authoritarian regime was the institutional framework under which they operated. It was definitely one variety of "soft authoritarianism," which allowed both movements to operate with a relatively mild dose of repression. Under both the interim government and the former defense minister becoming president, it was no longer "soft authoritarianism." Mubarak stopped short of arresting the boss of the Muslim Brothers—namely, Al-Murshed al-'Am (the General Guide). Under both successive regimes that came to power since 3 July 2013, the Murshed al-'Am of the Muslim Brothers was arrested, tried, and even condemned to death, together with hundreds of leaders and thousands of the rank and file of his organization. Nothing like this happened under Mubarak. At that time, members of Kefaya used to meet in an apartment in downtown Cairo and keep their website. The websites and the Facebook and Twitter accounts of both old and new movements are now closely watched by security forces, and their administrators often arrested. Muslim Brothers could take part in elections under Mubarak. Under the interim government, Muslim Brothers has been declared a "terrorist" organization, which gives security forces a legal ground for arresting all of them if they wished. For both old and new social movements in Egypt, they are confronted by a "harsh authoritarian regime" but one supported by millions of people who fear the disorder associated with post-revolutionary protests of the new social movements and the regimented way of life associated with Islamists.

For both old and new social movements in Egypt, path dependence could be effective under a "permissive" institutional order. For them, the present institutional order in Egypt is far from being "permissive."

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Notes

1. See the link to Al-Ikhwan bel Mohafazhat (Brothers in Governorates), accessed 4 August 2015, www.ikhwanwiki.com.
2. Clergyman, graduate of the Islamic Al Azhar University.
3. See www.ikhwanwiki.com.
4. The terms Muslim Brothers and Muslim Brotherhood are used interchangeably to refer to the same organization. The term Muslim Brothers is closer to the name of the organization in Arabic.
5. Ibid. See the entry for Muslim Brothers in governorates.
6. Ibid. Names of members of the People's Assembly in 2012 (The Parliament of the Revolution). In Arabic.
7. Information derived from several Facebook pages including the two pages of April 6 Movement and Wehood are all from Khaled Said.
8. On the ideology of Islamist movements in Egypt, see Al-awa (2004), Habib (2001), and Bayat (2007).
9. On other components of the Islamist movement in Egypt, see Zahran (2013).
10. Muslim Brothers deny that they were involved in this "fabricated event." Their version of the story is to be found in their "Historical Encyclopedia." See "Al-Ekhwan wa hadith al-mansheyyah: Shubhat wa rodoud" (The Muslim Brothers and the Mansheyyah incident: Charges and responses), accessed 8 August 2015, www.ehwanwiki.com. A more neutral version is Witte (2004, 40).
11. On Kifaya's activities, see Sha'ban (2006, 269–71).
12. On the ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court to ban the presence of police forces in university campuses, see Hassan (2010).
13. On the use of litigation by human rights groups and on such rulings, see Al-Sayyid (2008).
14. On Muslim Brothers under Sadat and Mubarak, see Pargeter (2010).
15. "The Official Opening of the Headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Presence of Presidential Candidates," accessed 21 January 2015, www.islamstory.com/ar.
16. See the official site of the Brotherhood: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/.
17. Muslim Brothers declared a terrorist organization (Ahram Online 2013).
18. On Salafist associations in Egypt, see Hayati (2014).
19. On Muslim Brothers and professional associations in Egypt, see Hamzawy and Brown (2010).
20. The term "independence" in this context refers to the wish to dissociate the syndicates from control by Muslim Brotherhood activists.
21. On elections in the medical doctors' and engineers' syndicates, see "Jama'at al-ikhwan fi misr takhsar entekhabaat al-atebba" (The Ikhwan Group loses doctors' syndicate elections). http://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARCAE9BE06A20131215; Ahmad (2014).

22. The author was present in the meetings that led to the formation of this Civil Society Conference. Meetings were organized by the medical doctors' syndicate led then by Muslim Brothers.
23. The pro-Muslim Brothers satellite channel was Misr 25; Salafi channels include Al-nas, Al-Shabab, and Al-Hafiz.
24. See www.alarabiyya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/2013/12/25, accessed 7 August 2015.
25. Both Abdel-Aziz Makhyoun and MohsenaTawfiq, film and theater actor and actress respectively, participated in some meetings of the Kifaya secretariat, of which the author was a member.
26. See list of names of signatories to the founding declaration of Kifaya in Sha'ban (2006, 268).
27. To read the statement of the ten human rights organizations denouncing such raids, see Carr (2013).
28. On the use of the Internet during the January Revolution, see Ghoneim (2012, chapter 3).
29. See their Facebook page: www.facebook.com/nawaranegm.
30. See AlQahera ALYoum, "Al-tahquiq ma'a nawara negm wa mazhar shahin wa alkholi-Nawara Negm," (Mazhar Shahin and Al-Kholy are interrogated), www.alqaheraalyoum.net/videos/0.
31. Twenty-seven UN-member countries expressed concern over the human rights situation in Egypt during the March 2014 meeting of the UN Human Rights Council (Human Rights Watch 2014b).
32. On electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt, see Otterman (2005) and Tadros (2012).
33. On renewed protests by revolutionary groups under both SCAF and Dr. Mohammed Morsi, see Hassieb (2013) and Zidan (2013).
34. On dissension within April 6 movement, see El-Gundy (2011).
35. On El-Adl Party, see "Al-Adl (Justice Party)," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sada-Middle East Analysis, accessed 14 March 2014, http://Egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011?09/22/al-adl-justice-party.
36. For the list of political parties in Egypt, see State Information Service, "Egypt Democratic Track: Parties," www.sis.gov.eg?En/template?Categories/tmpListOfArticles.aspx?CatlD=260#.
37. See www.ikhwanonline.com.
38. Visit www.alnourparty.org, www.facebook.com/Elnour.Party.News/posts/450722508321588.
39. A number of jihadist sites are listed in www.nourelyaqin.worldpress.org. An example of such declarations could be found in Barnett (2014).
40. Direct observations by the author who, living in Nasr City, passed by the encampment of Rab'a al-Adawiyah almost daily.
41. A-Shorouq, 7 March 2014, 4.
42. See www.tamarud.org.
43. See the statements of presidential candidate Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on two Egyptian television channels CBC and ONTV on 7 May 2013 on YouTube.

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