

Indonesia: Suharto's Military-Backed Regime in Retrospect

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I. Introduction: A Historical Backdrop

Indonesian society had been characterized by political bickerings long before the dramatic rise of Suharto to power. It all started after the 1955 elections and escalated when President Sukarno was consolidating his "Guided Democracy" which he declared in 1959, on the belief that it was an alternative to liberal democracy which is Western-oriented, and thus, incompatible with Indonesian priorities.

Sukarno's claim, indeed, contained some elements of truth. However, as he pursued his objectives, Guided Democracy turned out to be politically repressive.

Restrictions on political freedom have grown since 1959. The Masjumi (a Muslim Party) and PSI (Socialist Party of Indonesia) were banned in August, 1960, and a number of their principal leaders were arrested in January, 1962. Press censorship has grown more severe, and vows of a narrowly focused loyalty have been required more and more of journalists, teachers, students, and civil servants. At the same time, the government has devoted more and more of its attention to the development and inculcation of the state ideology — *Pancasila*.¹

Pancasila, the supposed state ideology however, became mixed up with Sukarno's idea of *Nasakom* (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism), with the mounting influence of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) on him. Sukarno's close relationship with PKI has had tremendous political impact. It did arouse considerable public opinion unfavorable to his government, resulting to a decline in his popularity not only among the military but also among the Muslims and the students. Contrary to the opinion of these groups, Sukarno may have viewed his alliance with the PKI as a means to sustain his power by carefully balancing military power on one hand and the PKI interest on the other. By doing so, Sukarno

thought that he could prevent the clash between the military and the Communists which will be for his own political advantage. However in 1965, anti-Sukarno and anti-Communist groups and political parties, especially religious parties arose and cooperated with military leaders against Sukarno's pro-Communist position.²

Having the desired support from the Muslims, political parties and student action fronts, the military, seemed bent not only in trying to get rid of the PKI, but more importantly, President Sukarno himself. Brian May succinctly states:

(And) with moral and token material support from the United States, (the military) adopted shock tactics that threw (Sukarno) off balance. Once it was clear that the (military) was determined to oust him, he proposed a new general elections to form a new MPR (People's Consultative Assembly). Had the people been allowed to vote freely, there is no doubt the MPR would have confirmed his election as President. That is why no elections were held as long as he remained alive.³

At face value, May's contention may be true, but I am inclined to believe that even if there were free elections, Sukarno may have had difficulty in getting his presidency confirmed by the new MPR for three reasons namely: 1) his authoritarian posture which found expression in his dissolution and banning of the Constituent Assembly and political parties (Masjumi and PSI) in 1959 and 1960, respectively; 2) his stubborn support for the PKI; and 3) his obliviousness to the rising anti-Communist activities which he scathingly attacked as irrational and divisive. All these contributed to his loss of popular support and consequently, his downfall.

Sukarno's overthrow could have been averted if he maintained tolerance of anti-Communist activities. His position began to be undermined after the 1965 coup attempt. Unable to resist military pressures, Sukarno was compelled, on October 15, 1965, to appoint Suharto as army Commander-in-Chief in place of Major General Pranoto who was selected on October 1, a date which coincided with the murder of officers occupying five of the eleven senior positions in the Army Central Command. As army commander, Suharto moved both to consolidate his control of the army and eradicate the PKI. By end of November, Suharto held the highest position, nine others were held by men politically loyal to him, thereby giving him an army with greater political cohesion than at any previous time.⁴ Alarmed by massive student demonstrations and sensing increased military powers, Sukarno made a desperate move against the students by banning KAMI (Indonesian University Students' Action Front) in February 1966.

Then on February 24, Sukarno announced a cabinet reshuffle. General Nasution was replaced as Minister of Defense. On March 10, Sukarno harangued the leaders of all political parties to condemn the continuing massive student

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"Some are of the opinion that Suharto was using political stability and economic development to buy more time. . ."

demonstrations. The next day however, troops surrounded the Jakarta Palace where a meeting of the cabinet was in progress, forcing Sukarno to hurriedly leave by helicopter for the palace at Bogor,⁵ about forty miles to the South. In the afternoon, he signed the March 11 Order, authorizing General Suharto to "take any steps considered necessary to ensure the security, calm and stability of the government machinery and the process of revolution." Sukarno apparently decided to retreat to prevent the emergence of a civil war.⁶

The flow of events, especially the signing of the March 11 Order, contradicts Sukarno's ambition for power — with the military relegated to the background. Both the appointment of Suharto as army Commander-in-Chief and the issuance of the March 11 Order, therefore, must be the result of coercion and pressure from the military who have ambitious designs to overthrow the Sukarno government and eliminate the PKI, thereby instituting a military rule in Indonesia.

After the issuance of the March 11 Order, Suharto continued to defy Sukarno by abusing his powers. For example, on March 12, Suharto acted to "secure" the president's authority by sending troops to the BPI (Central Intelligence Bureau) Headquarters to arrest Subandrio, Sukarno's most important minister, and seize documents therein. The same day, Suharto moved to dissolve the PKI, thus putting an end to Nasakom of which President Sukarno was the architect.⁷

Suharto was supposedly acting on Sukarno's order. But his move to dissolve PKI was actually an open defiance of Sukarno or was possibly intended to foment strong public

opinion against Sukarno. This contention supports what Donald Hindley said:

Suharto, in control of the army central command, felt it necessary to restrict Sukarno's power. . . Sukarno's continuing intransigence. . . forced him to the reluctant conclusion that the national welfare, as he perceived it, required the complete elimination of the President's power and prestige. His (Suharto) willingness and ability to take action towards that objective increased as he strengthened his control over the armed forces.⁸

Suharto's success in undermining Sukarno's rule, it must be noted, did not solely depend on the military but also on his ability to orchestrate civilian support mainly from the students who were at the action fronts. As described by Hindley:

(The students) organized demonstrations against Sukarno, his aides and his policies, thereby giving the appearance of democratic, popular support for anti-Sukarno moves. They denounced Sukarno as a dictator, a Communist stooge, a corrupt, immoral betrayer of the people's welfare. The action fronts too harangued and harassed the political parties, Parliament and the MPRS (Interim People's Consultative Assembly) into taking a more overt and militant stand on the question of Sukarno's remaining authority. From early September 1966, they raised the demand that Sukarno be brought to trial for his complicity in the September 30 Movement. And they were the first to demand publicly his ejection from the presidency.⁹

Apparently, the civilian action fronts had their own political objective — to achieve political leverage. But as protests worked well along the anti-Sukarno and anti-Communist lines, they unwittingly served the political interests of Suharto who was simultaneously consolidating his power and discrediting Sukarno's government.

While the action fronts and some military activists advocated a radical overthrow of Sukarno, Suharto preferred a constitutionally-based maneuver. He succeeded when the MPRS decided to unanimously appoint him as Acting President on March 12, 1967. The MPRS withdrew its mandate from Sukarno, who was forbidden to engage in any political activity until general elections. To encourage compliance from Sukarno and his loyalists, the MPRS stipulated that the settlement of legal questions concerning Sukarno would be effected under the law, the resolution of which shall be left under Suharto's responsibility.¹⁰

However, some political observers in Indonesia saw the mandate conferred by the MPRS on Suharto as no less than a product of the military's manipulation to undercut the power of Sukarno. Thus, deprived of PKI support, which was his most effective ally in limiting the army's political strength, President Sukarno was eased out from the political arena. He was forced to turn over powers to General Suharto in March

1966 and finally removed from the presidency in 1967 for his continued refusal to submit to military control.¹¹

The fall of Sukarno's Communist-influenced regime gave rise to Suharto's military-backed government, the latter being called the "New Order", and the former the "Old Order." The transition from the Old to the New Order radically transformed Indonesia's political life — with Sukarno's Nasakom yielding to Suharto's Nasamil.¹² This process illustrates the change from a Communist-influenced to a military-dominated political machinery. The use of the military by Suharto to destroy what seemed to be a Sukarno-PKI alliance, assured his eventual rise to power.

To say that Suharto's incumbency is constitutional, therefore is inaccurate for some quarters, knowing how Suharto grabbed a limited mandate from Sukarno with armed confrontation. Supardjo at his trial in February 1967,¹³ boldly accused Suharto and his military associates of rebelling against the legitimate government, and of easing Sukarno from the presidency. Supardjo further accused the junta of being responsible for the death of 500,000 Indonesians. This death toll may have been exaggerated, but the charge was essentially true.¹⁴

For Suharto and the military, the manner they seized power from President Sukarno was less important than the maintenance of the power they are now holding. The consolidation of the military towards the attainment of this objective, is necessary. In a sense, therefore, the military had to devise some strategies: that of using stability and development as convenient excuses for political control. In his "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order"¹⁵ Donald Hindley said:

(Suharto) held firmly to his primary goals of political stability and economic development, but sought to attain them with as much persuasion as possible. He was willing to compromise on what he considered non-essential matters. In his judgment, the radicals' desire for utmost haste motored by coercion would only exacerbate the existing hostilities and divisions within Indonesian society. This in turn would make more difficult the attainment of both political stability and development.

Some are of the opinion that Suharto was using political stability and economic development to buy more time necessary for the consolidation of the military which to him, was a condition for the restructuring of Indonesian society. Suharto and his military cohorts are aware that the restructuring process was not an easy task, as it involves reshaping of the people's social and political consciousness.

Image building, as a means to realize that objective, was the military's first concern. The immediate object was Suharto who, as a military general, got his mandate for the presidency of the Republic of Indonesia from the MPRS on March 28, 1968, replacing President Sukarno who was noted for his brilliance and charisma. Sukarno's popularity even among villagers was apparently a roadblock to Suharto's image building. It was therefore, imperative that Suharto and his



military loyalists devise some tactical move to debase Sukarno's populist image. Towards this end,

Sukarno's picture was removed from all public places, while the former President was confined to the Bogor Palace, cut from his supporters, Sukarno became, as Suharto wished it, an unperson. (Finally) the MPRS Fifth Session noted that the special session of a year earlier had discharged Sukarno as President.¹⁶

All these indicated not only Sukarno's deteriorating political career but also his downfall.

II. Suharto's New Order Government: The Salient Features

With the fall of Sukarno's government, Suharto's New Order regime subsequently emerged, confronting what political format it should adopt to replace the Old. Power under Sukarno used to be contested by different sectors of society such as the armed forces (ABRI), intellectuals, the santri Muslims and the students who under Suharto's government came to be called partners.¹⁷ In a pluralistic society however, the search for a political direction has always been complex, but under Suharto, it has to definitely serve military interests – political or otherwise. This seems needed to maintain military support for the regime. Using this policy, Suharto formed his own "development cabinet", marking in effect, the beginning of the New Order government.¹⁸

Regarding the formation of the "development cabinet", Donald Hindley observes:

On June 6, 1968, Suharto announced the membership of the development cabinet. Of the 23 members, eight were from political parties, six (including Suharto as Minister of Defense and Security) from the armed forces, and nine non-party and non-military. The Minister of Trade was Dr. Sumitro Djohohadikusumo, Indonesia's foremost economist, a former PSI Leader, and Minister of Trade and Economic Affairs of the PRRI.¹⁹ The general level of expertise was high; seven ministers were university professors.²⁰

Hindley shows that the composition of the so-called development cabinet was broadly based in that, the role of the non-military members (technocrats) was considerably significant. Economic growth, during the early years of the New Order government, was attributed to them. The number of non-military members however, declined as the military members in the cabinet increased, especially after 1978. Only government loyalists, principally the elite, were able to maintain their cabinet positions, thus narrowing the base of sectoral representations.

Economic policies, particularly those involving multinational corporations and agricultural credit facilities, began to appear lopsided as they tended to serve only the elite groups. This is quite understandable, since the elite constituted Suharto's compliant partners in maintaining the status quo. Both believe that as long as "economic conditions for the elite and sub-elite continue to stay at high level. . . the New Order government will be able to preserve itself,"²¹ especially with the absence of a united opposition. This implies that the continuity of the Suharto regime depends largely on its ability to

maintain the country's good economic indicators and neutralize a politically organized civilian opposition, especially the Muslims. Exaggerating what seem to be *santri-abangan*²² differences among the Muslims was apparently used by the regime for divide and rule purposes.

The New Order government cannot afford to allow the civilian sector to influence its important political decisions. Ann Gregory says that:

(History taught the regime) during (its) first few years, when Suharto had not yet succeeded in wielding control over the military, that civilian groups in the alliance can pressure the regime into granting some of their demands.²³

Ann Gregory may have referred to nationwide protests in 1973 by the *santri* Muslims concerning the Draft Marriage Bill.²⁴ Such protests according to Muhammad Kamal Hassan culminated in "September 1973, when 335 people broke into the DPR (Parliament) and disrupted the proceedings."²⁵

This angered Suharto and his military cronies, thus, organized civilian aggrupations were discouraged either by tactful or open government manipulations. To carry this out, the military was essential. Therefore, a political format "that would satisfy the military's political, economic, and social aspirations"²⁶ had to be established. Under the set up, the military was expected to effectively and efficiently depoliticize the civilians, principally the youth. Mass organizations may be permitted, but only under the strict scrutiny of the government. Several mass organizations and political parties suffered as military power was further consolidated. More military personnel were given civilian posts, in line with the *dwifungsi* (dual functions)²⁷ scheme introduced by the regime to the satisfaction of the military and that which stifled the meaningful participation of competent civilian bureaucrats. In a sense, *dwifungsi* is nothing but a political movement to militarize the bureaucracy.

III. Towards Forming A Government Party

During the early years of the Suharto government characterized by a broad coalition of military and civilian forces, the former did not feel the need to create a political movement of its own. Gradually the coalition became narrower as the military stabilized and consolidated its power. By 1968, Suharto felt the need for elections to provide legitimacy for both his government and the military's socio-political role.²⁸

However, no elections were held until 1971. President Suharto once said that general elections can only be held if the requirements and conditions for it are met. General elections are important only if they guarantee the democratic rights of the people, free from fear, threats and direct or indirect compulsion. Both physical and political security measures are essential to guarantee people's democratic

"Mass organizations may be permitted, but only under the strict scrutiny of the government".



rights.²⁹ Some political observers however, dismissed this as mere pretense. Suharto's unwillingness to conduct general elections was suspected to be a deliberate delaying tactic while his military partners have yet to come up with a definite and effective scheme of control over the electoral system, the political parties, mass organizations, and students. Harold Crouch in his article, "The Army, the Parties and Elections,"³⁰ confirmed this when he said:

In August (1966) the army held a seminar at Bandung. The purpose of the seminar was to enable the army to work out its ideas on its role in society; for though the army had now become the dominant force in the government, it had yet to formulate a clear program of action. Among the questions for discussion were the coming elections and the party system.

The military concern over the electoral and party system clearly shows the degree of military interference over civilian affairs, if only to guarantee and perpetuate power. Within the military, the common perception is that elections are not the main goals but just the means for achieving greater political stability, and that both the New Order and Pancasila forces must win the general elections.

To ensure victory, the army proposed a single-member constituency instead of the proportional representation system in the 1955 elections, with the condition that every candidate has residence of at least a year in the district he was contesting. It was generally believed that while proportional representation would undoubtedly give the established parties an overwhelming majority of seats, the single-member constituency system would give a locally popular non-party candidates a better chance of winning. Also proposed was a simplification of the party system with the formation of five groups - Islamic, Christian, Nationalist, Socialist Pancasila and Functional.³¹

The shift from proportional representation to single-member constituency was, therefore, proposed by the New Order forces to outpace the established political parties in the elections. Meanwhile, Suharto and the military had yet to decide whether or not they should unite under the PNI (the

Indonesian Nationalist Party). The PNI was the party that most suited the *abangan* from Central Java, which compose the core of the Suharto government. Another option was the creation of a new party, a "Suharto Party" for instance, as Suharto and his military partners doubted their effective control over the PNI, a well-known national party. In early 1969, Suharto increasingly considered the feasibility of using *Golkar* as the state party. *Golkar*³² was organized in 1964 as a military-sponsored organization of functional groups devised to counter the strength of labor federations affiliated with the Communist Party.³³ Its consolidation as a government organization is described by Ann Gregory as follows:

At the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970 after the decision had been made to use *Golkar*, the government made structural attempts to strengthen it: (1) All functional group appointments to the regional and local assemblies had to be made by constituent *Golkar* boards, not by political party functional organization; and (2) A regulation was instituted by the Internal Affairs Minister (Lieutenant General Amir Machmud) requiring all civil servants to be members of civil servant organizations and not of political parties.³⁴

Furthermore, in describing *Golkar*'s stature as a political party, Ann Gregory wrote:

- (1) *Golkar* was the government party and a vote against *Golkar* meant that the chaos of 1965 and 1966 could return;
- (2) A vote against *Golkar* would mean that one would receive no government services or jobs; and
- (3) That *Golkar* had the backing of traditional authorities.³⁵

Golkar, because of its diversified membership consisting of the military, intellectuals and civil servants, is therefore, broadly based. While some emphasized the positive role of the military in modernization and development, the intellectuals opposed it. The latter thought of working from within to influence not only *Golkar*'s goals, but also its tactics, and hoped that through their initiative and participation, they could develop cadres supportive of their "modern" ideas.³⁶

The intellectuals however, failed to achieve structural changes in *Golkar*, not only because they constituted a smaller segment of the functional groups but that the military succeeded in using their intelligence network, the *Kopkamtib* (Command for the Restoration of Peace and Order) to put non-compliant intellectuals under control.

IV. The Military and Political Control

Having gained control over *Golkar*, the Military moved to extend control to the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly), DPR (National Parliament), DPRD (Regional Parliament). The military succeeded in its ploy as can be seen in the MPR, DPR and DPRD bills which stipulated that fifty

percent of the members of each body would represent the political parties and functional groups. Of the functional groups, half would represent the armed forces or about twenty five percent of the total membership. Members from the armed forces would be appointed by nominations of commanders of the four forces. The bill was vague however, on how the balance between parties and functional groups was to be maintained among civilian members who would also compete in the same constituencies during elections.³⁷

It is clear however, that the appointment of military officers to the MPR, DPR and DPRD was an explicit and deliberate design to upset the balance between the political parties, therefore stabilizing a military-backed party – the *Golkar*, in Parliament. The military-backed government of Suharto has succeeded in restructuring the political system, controlling the political parties, and in making *Golkar* a state party, all of which improved the extent of government control over the civilian groups. This control nevertheless failed to build consensus and legitimacy for the Suharto regime and its policies, as evidenced by the 1974 riots.³⁸ Ironically, these mass riots illustrated the weakness of the Suharto regime's policy of tight control. By 1974, the regime had become less representative of the major groups in Indonesian society.³⁹

It took the 1974 riots for Suharto and the military to realize how vulnerable they were to mass action. They became increasingly aware of the serious political repercussions of another mass riot and its destabilizing impact on the Suharto regime. Consequently, the Suharto government was forced to:

Resort to pressure and intimidation to effect its decisions. (It) has developed sophisticated instruments and policies of control, which so far have resulted in stability . . . The regime has decreased political participation by "contracting the politically active, narrowing the circle of those with access to power or the means of political organization" and by curtailing the use of political parties as instruments which can channel the demands of their constituents to the government.⁴⁰

The worse political control measure the Suharto government adopted was the decision to forbid the continuance of political activities by any political organization, including *Golkar*, in the villages and other lesser centers. The justification was that political parties had upset the harmony and development of the village, and that in the name of development, Indonesian villages must be depoliticized. This put *Golkar* on the advantage, since its main stalwarts – the local military and civil administration – were in the villages. Indonesia's political parties, notably the opposition parties, were severely crippled by the regulation.⁴¹

V. Concluding Remarks

Since its establishment in 1966, the New Order government has been using manipulation, pressure and even intimi-

dation to maintain its rule. Such had been the prevalent socio-political condition when the parliamentary elections of 1971 and 1977 were held in which Golkar won. The General Elections of 1982 witnessed practically the same political scenario. The overwhelming victory of Golkar in the recently concluded 1987 General Elections must be seen in the light of all these political developments. In addition, the 1987 General Elections will probably go down in Indonesian history as the most restricted elections ever, thus jeopardizing the opposition parties while giving Golkar undue advantage.

But how long can the New Order government sustain its politically repressive rule before public clamor for justice and political rights is brought to the forefront? Ann Gregory indicated that the difficulty of obtaining popular redress against the oppressive excesses of the regime is due mainly to the lack of information on issues affecting the general population. It is difficult, according to her, to hypothesize about future political developments in Indonesia without knowing the mass of Indonesian society. She asserted that most of political science research on Indonesia has been conducted solely in Jakarta and only on some aspects of elite politics. Little is known about politics in general in the Outer Islands, and in Java, little research has been conducted on regional elites and the general population.^{4 2}

It can be gleaned easily from the present circumstances that the original structure of the New Order government supposedly built on the alliance among the bureaucrats, military, students and political parties had crumbled. The only viable alliance that the regime has now is with the technocrats and top-level bureaucrats (mostly retired military officials). This has, in effect, narrowed down sectoral representation in government, making the regime's legitimacy highly questionable. It may continue to operate but not without losing public trust and confidence.

While all these do not seem to undermine the power of both Suharto and the military, such will generate widespread apathy among the citizens, signalling a precarious decline of popular support for the regime. Considering the necessity of people's involvement and participation in the political process, a withdrawal of public support becomes a serious blow to the regime. The conduct of general elections as a process to regain popular support has always been fraught with public criticism. Both the *Petisi 50* (Group of Fifty Petitioners) and *Golput* (Group of Abstainers)^{4 3} publicly declared its refusal to participate in the elections not only because their interests are not represented accordingly in the existing political system but that general elections since 1971 have never been honest and clean. **K**

Notes

¹Herbert Feith, "Indonesia" in *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia* (G. McTurnan Kahin, Ed.) Cornell University Press, Second Edition: Ithaca and London, 1964, p. 215.

²Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Graham Brash (PTE) LTD.: Singapore, 1978, p. 140.

³*Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order" in *INDONESIA*, No. 9 (April), 1970 p. 38.

⁵It must be pointed out that when Sukarno left for Bogor, Suharto immediately sent three generals by car to trap him when he alighted thereat. After some hours of heated argument, Sukarno signed the document known as the March 11 Order, in which he turned over certain tasks to Suharto. (see Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, pp. 137-138).

⁶Donald Hindley, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁷Brian May, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁸Donald Hindley, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹¹Harold Crouch, "The Army, the Parties and Elections" in *INDONESIA*, No. 11 (April), 1971, p. 177.

¹²Nasamit (Nationalism, Religion and Militarism) represents the political structure under the Suharto regime as compared to Sukarno's Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and Communism). While Sukarno perceived his alliance with the Communist Party as a means to parry the growing political strength of the military, Suharto, on the other hand, used the military to break up such an alliance.

¹³Supardjo - a military general who was sentenced and executed to death under the Suharto regime on complicity charges involving the murder on October 1, 1965 of General Yani and four others in Lubang Buaya, Jakarta.

¹⁴Brian May, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

¹⁵Donald Hindley, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁷See Deljar Noer, *Ideologi, Politik dan Pembangunan* (Ideology, Politics and Development), Yayasan Perkhidmatan: (No place of publication), 1983, p. 69.

¹⁸The New Order government's method of consolidation consists of the following: 1) The creation of "Development Cabinet" composed of both civilian and military men; 2) Continued consolidation of military power; 3) Creation of a government party, the Golkar; 4) simplification of party system aimed at controlling political parties; and 5) Restructuring of political party system by imposing Pancasila as the sole ideological principle of political parties.

¹⁹PRRI which stands for *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was an organized rebellion spearheaded by member of both Masjumi (a Muslim party) and PSI (Socialist Party of Indonesia) against the Sukarno government in 1958.

²⁰Donald Hindley, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

²¹Ann Gregory, "New Order Indonesia: The Constriction of Representation and Political Participation" in *Kabar Seberang - Sulating Maphilindo*, No. 2, 1977, p. 21.

²²The terms *santri* and *abangan* refer to a dichotomy applied to Indonesian Muslims. While *abangan* dichotomized nominal Muslims whose religious practices are characteristically syncretic, *santri*, on the contrary, portrays Muslims who have had formal or non-formal Islamic education. They therefore, practice and observe orthodox Islamic teachings free from folk and other external influences. Historically, the terms *santri* and *abangan* had significant colonial roots as the Dutch used to play up their differences and utilize them as convenient tools for divide-and-rule purposes; notably among the Muslims. Today, a practically identical scheme still apparently exists.

²³Ann Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁴In so far as the Draft Marriage Bill is concerned, eleven articles were, according to Muhammad Kamal Hassan, found to be contrary to Islamic Law. Of the eleven articles however, this paper will only list down three, if only to lend credence to the claim that they are un-Islamic.

1. "Differences due to nationality, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, belief and ancestry, do not constitute impediments to marriage." (Article 11, Sec. 2). Muslim objection to this Provision stems from the fact that religion constitutes an impediment to marriage among Muslim women.

2. "Marriage may be preceded by engagement . . . should the engagement result in pregnancy, the male will be required to marry the female, provided the latter agrees." (Art. 13, Sec. 1 & 2). This Provision might encourage the proliferation of irresponsible premarital sexual relationship which Islam strongly prohibits.

3. "Wealth and property acquired during the marriage period shall become common property (of the spouses)." (Art. 37). This article runs counter to Islamic Law which provides against conjugal property. Islam does not allow the husband to partake of his wife's property acquired before or during the marriage, unless the latter so allows.

For a more detailed discussion about the Draft Marriage Bill, see M.K. Hassan's *Muslim Intellectual Response to "New Order" Modernization*, pp. 147-149.

²⁵Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Response To "New Order" Modernization*, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia): Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p. 147.

²⁶Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia" in *Indonesia* in Pacific Affairs, Volume 36, No. 4, Winder, 1963-64, p. 349.

²⁷Dwifungsi (dual functions) is the socio-political role played by the military. Some high-ranking officers, while in active military service, served as managers or administrators in government offices and other development projects. The idea of *dwifungsi* was introduced by General Nasution during Sukarno's time. But today's concept of *dwifungsi* differed considerably with that of Nasution's since the latter did not advocate military rule.

²⁸Ann Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²⁹see Harold Crouch, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 179.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 179.

³²Golkar (Golongan Karya - Functional Groups) used to be Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golkar - Joint Secretariat of Functional groups) which was "a federation of organizations, such as trade unions, student, women's and veterans' organizations not affiliated to political parties. It was founded in 1964 as an alliance of functional groups under army influence for the purpose of opposing the Communist within the National Front. After the (1965) Coup, it lost its *raison d'être*; but with the decision to hold election, it found a new one. Its main leaders today are army officers who, by the terms of the election laws, may not contest the elections or take part in the campaign. However, as leaders of Sekber-Golkar, they are able to influence the selection of the candidates. In many areas, it can be expected that the Sekber-Golkar candidates will obtain the "backing" of local military commanders. It is generally believed therefore that Sekber-Golkar will be among the 'big four' when the election results are announced." (Harold Crouch, "The Army, the Parties and Elections, p. 189.)

³³Ann Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁷Harold Crouch, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

³⁸The 1974 riots were basically anti-government and anti-Japanese riots. More specifically, they came in protest of the growing gap between the rich and the poor. To protest the dominance of multinational corporations in Indonesian economic activities was also the object of the riots which were made to coincide with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Jakarta on January 15, 1974.

³⁹Ann Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴³Petisi 50 - is a group of fifty Indonesian petitioners who questioned in 1977 the legitimacy of the Suharto government. This group - believed to be the core of the real political opposition - is composed of highly respected retired government officials which includes, among others, personalities like retired General Nasution, former Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin and former Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir. During the 1982 General Elections, this group refused to participate or get involved either as candidates or voters due to their stand against the legitimacy of the Suharto government. As regard the recently concluded April 1987 General Elections, Shim Jae Hoon of Far Eastern Economic Review said: ". . . the Petition of 50 group . . . contends (that) there should be no more elections unless a host of undemocratic laws, such as those allowing the president to appoint members of Parliament or the government to manage various levels of elections, were revised." (Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 5, 1987, vol. 135, No. 6, p. 32).

Golput - is a group of electoral abstainers founded immediately before the 1971 elections by a group of intellectuals and students who felt that their socio-political aspirations were not represented in any existing political organizations. Golput is a "solidarity" group with no formal organizational structure. It has abstained in all four elections (1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987 elections).