Trading-off Foreign Military Bases in the Philippines and Vietnam: The Strategic Implications

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An American plane hovers above Vietnam: threat perception.

In July 1983, in a speech to the Philippine Futuristics Society[1], Narciso Reyes made a proposal for reducing superpower military tensions in Southeast Asia. Reyes suggested that the United States give up its military bases in the Philippines and that in return the Soviet Union forego its access to basing facilities in Vietnam.[2] Reyes was speaking as a private individual, but he was no ordinary private individual. He had a distinguished career in the Philippine diplomatic corps, including service as ambassador to Burma, Indonesia, Great Britain, and China and as the permanent Philippine representative to the United Nations. From 1980-1982 Reyes had been the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Reyes continued as an advisor to the Philippine Government on foreign affairs until 1986 and from 1986 to 1987 served as president of the prestigious Philippine Council for Foreign Relations.[3]

A trade-off of the superpower bases in Southeast Asia, argued Reyes,

> could pave the way for the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality [ZOPFAN] in Southeast Asia which could also be recognized as a Nuclear-Free Zone. It would be a significant contribution to great-power detente and to the reduction of the nuclear peril hanging over Southeast Asia.[4]

In May 1986, at a meeting of US academic and government specialists on the Philippines held in Washington, DC under the auspices of the Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, a retired US diplomat, Paul M. Kattenburg, called for the United States to withdraw from its bases in the Philippines and to seek Soviet disengagement from Vietnam

and other concessions in return.[5] Kattenburg's more than 20 years in the State Department included service as director of the Office of Philippine Affairs and as political officer in the US embassy in Manila. Kattenburg, like Reyes, hoped that some sort of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia would result from a mutual US-Soviet withdrawal from the region, perhaps encompassing a nuclear free zone.[6]

Then, in July 1986, the call for a tradeoff between US and Soviet military bases in the Philippines and Vietnam was reiterated, much less specifically than by Reyes or Kattenburg, but from a much more significant source. In the course of a speech at Vladivostok, Soviet General-Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev called for a mutual reduction of naval activity in the Pacific. He added: "In general, I would like to say that if the US were to give up its military presence in the Philippines, let's say, we would not leave this step unanswered."[7]

Gorbachev's offer was exceedingly vague and it was put forward in the midst of a speech that was noteworthy on at least three other counts.[8] But though the press gave the offer little attention,[9] the implication of the offer was obvious. Don Oberdorfer reported from Washington that US officials said Gorbachev "made what seemed to be an oblique reference to the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam," but Oberdorfer gave no further information on the US reaction.[10]

The first substantive consideration of the tradeoff appeared on August 8, 1986 in the *Washington Post,* where William Branigan covered the Bangkok news conference called by Boris Zhilyaev, the *charge d'affaires* at the Soviet embassy in Thailand. Zhilyaev, wrote Branigan, repeated Gorbachev's "almost casual hint that the Soviet forces would withdraw from their Cam Ranh Bay base in Vietnam if the United States withdrew from its bases in the Philippines." "In Manila," Branigan reported,

> Gorbachev's reference to a possible bargain involving US military bases struck some western observers [unnamed] as a calculated bid to influence a debate in the Constitutional Commission, which is drafting a new Philippine constitution. Among the proposed provisions before the body is one that would ban all foreign military bases.[11]

Thanks to tapes of a conversation between Philippine President Corazon Aquino and her Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, we know quite well which foreign power was seeking to improperly influence the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.[12] But to return to Branigan's report, he quoted from Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and then wrote:

> Zhilyaev said this meant the Soviet Union would "reciprocate," but declined to confirm the widespread interpretation that such a response would involve the Soviet naval and air base at Cam Ranh Bay. In any event, US officials do not consider Cam Ranh Bay a fair tradeoff for the US Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines.[13]

This concluded Branigan's analysis of the Gorbachev offer.

A month later, Clyde Haberman wrote a piece in the *New York Times Magazine* on the growing challenge posed by the Soviet navy in the Pacific. Haberman referred to the Vladivostok speech, but not to the trade-off offer, despite its obvious relevance to his subject.[14] In early 1987, Dan Chapman, writing for the nonpartisan *Editorial Research Reports* published by Congressional Quarterly, discussed the US bases in the Philippines and the Soviet presence at Cam



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Subic and Clark are so much valuable militarily than the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

Ranh Bay. He then mentioned the Vladivostok speech as follows:

> Last July, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev added to US insecurity in the region with a speech outlining the increased importance of the Pacific region to the Soviet Union.[15]

And in June 1987, a well-informed member of the US House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, who had been mentioned as a possible Secretary of State in a Gary Hart administration, acknowledged that he was unaware of Gorbachev's hinted tradeoff.[16]

In short, the proposal to trade US bases in the Philippines for Soviet bases in Vietnam has received very little coverage, except to dismiss it as a "calculated" Soviet ploy or an obviously unbalanced offer. What is striking, however, is that recent attempts to justify confinued US access to Subic and Clark advanced by officials in Washington or their supporters center precisely on the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay.

Thus, Admiral S.R. Foley, Jr., the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet: If bases in the Philippines

> were not available to us, even if we had substitutes elsewhere, our ability to support our strategy in the Southwestern Pacific and Southeast Asia and to preclude the Soviets from operating their huge installation at Cam Ranh Bay would be sorely limited.[17]

In a paper published by the air force-funded Rand Corporation in 1983, Guy Pauker wrote:

> Before the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the region, which the Vietnamese government has made possible, the neutralization of Southeast Asia was a goal that could perhaps have been achieved at the time of the expiration of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement of 1947 [i.e., in 1991]. This is no longer a realistic expectation.[18]

A. James Gregor, writing for the conservative Heritage Foundation:

> The only realistic US response to the inevitable Soviet military build-up in Indochina is a corresponding replenishment of its own forces in secure bases in the region.... Although at one time it could have been argued that either ASEAN or the United States could put together a realistic security policy for Southeast Asia without basing US forces in the Philippines, such a position no longer is tenable.[19]

In 1986, the US Information Service published a glossy 68-page booklet entitled "Background on the Bases" for distribution in the Philippines. The publication provided a detailed (and exaggerated[20]) description of the Soviet facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, pictures of a Soviet jet fighter, a submarine, and an aircraft carrier, and maps showing the reach of Soviet naval and air units operating from Vietnam. It was in this context that the security role of the Philippine bases was defined:

> US naval and air forces stationed in the Philippines can effectively protect regional air and sea lanes, maintain a balance to Soviet forces based in Vietnam, and provide a security shield behind which the countries of Southeast Asia can pursue peaceful economic development.[21]

According to the commander of the US Pacific fleet, the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay has been "the second most dramatic change to the strategic equation" in Asia, second only to the invasion of Afghanistan. The growing Soviet threat in the Pacific "brings into sharp focus the tremendous importance the role that our facilities in the Philippines play with regard to regional stability."[22]

With Cam Ranh Bay of such apparent military consequence, one would think that US officials would be eager to pursue Gorbachev's Vladivostok proposa]. True, Gorbachev's offer was vague, but Soviet diplomats in Manila made the General Secretary's offer a little more explicit.[23] In any event, however, it would seem that at a minimum, US officials should have approached Moscow with a request for clarification or an offer to negotiate on the matter. In fact, of course, the US response has been nearly total silence.

Anyone seriously concerned with promoting peace, security, and justice would ask some obvious questions in response to the Gorbachev offer. First, what are the current prospects for achieving these goals in the Asian-Pacific region, given the presence of US and Soviet military bases in the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively? And, second, what would the prospects be in the absence of these bases? Naturally, one would not ask whether the same functions that are now served by the Philippine bases could be accomplished elsewhere without considering the prior questions: would the current functions of the Philippine bases be necessary in the absence of Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay? and, indeed, are these functions necessary in any event?

Strikingly, most of the studies of the Philippine bases avoid these questions, and, on the contrary, take for granted that the bases are necessary, that their functions are necessary, and that the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay is inevitable.

One congressional study in 1977 affirmed the importance of Subic, but dared to challenge the prevailing assumptions by concluding that the future value of Clark Air Base was "questionable unless the United States intends to maintain a capability to mount and support major military operations on the Southeast Asian mainland.[24] The air force promptly responded that Clark was essential as a back door to resupply Israel in the event European bases were denied during another Mideast war.[25] Why the Philippines, with

its restive Muslim population, would be more likely to allow its territory to be used in such a circumstance than would NATO allies was never explained. In any event, however, this congressional study was apparently an aberration caused by the "Vietnam syndrome" virus. On that same year a study of basing alternatives found nothing comparable to the Philippine facilities. For the purposes of the study, "currently defined missions" were "taken as givens."[26]

With the development of Cam Ranh Bay as a Soviet facility the assumptions became even narrower. Alva M. Bowen of the Library of Congress framed his analysis in terms of two cases: (1) "where the Soviet Union retains access to bases in Vietnam but does not gain access to bases in the Philippines"; and (2) "where the Soviet Union gains access to bases in the Philippines and retains access to bases in Vietnam."[27] These were apparently the only assumptions worth considering.

Writing in 1985, Richard Kessler of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that the Philippine bases were "irreplaceable" and "vital", given present US strategy, but that strategies can change. But Kessler's new strategies were in the service of the same policies:

> No defense dictum states that there must be one large air base and one large naval base sitting astride Southeast Asian Sea lanes. US strategy could be adapted to fit a different set of support facilities conditioned on retaining the quality of US force projection capability and on covering salients, ensuring strategic denial to opposing forces.[28]

Few analysts have asked the right questions. Naval specialist Michael MccGwire did better than most when he noted some years back that before inquiring as to the use of the navy to project military force, one ought to ask the prior question: "whether the projection of military force will further US interests."[29] But just as we would dismiss as a Soviet apologist a scholar in Moscow who said the crucial issue was the interests of the USSR -- rather than world peace or social justice -- so too MccGwire's way of framing the issue is unsatisfactory. The former US Ambassador to Malaysia, Francis T. Underhill, has recently written:

> The question has been, "How can we do elsewhere what we are now doing at our Philippine base?" We should instead be asking ourselves, "Could we be doing it at greatly reduced level?" and "Do we need to be doing it at all?"[30]

When Underhill asked such questions while in the foreign service, his views were characterized by his superiors in Washington as "nutty" and "stupid."[31] He was not given another ambassadorial post after Malaysia.

I will try to deal with Underhill's questions. That is, first I will look at the various missions with which the Philippine bases are expected to deal. Some of these missions may be conducive to world peace and social justice and some may not. This will require an examination of the interests not just of the United States, but of all the countries – or, more accurately, the people of all the countries -- in the region. Then I will inquire which of the worthwhile missions would be furthered by maintaining US bases in the Philippines *and* Soviet bases in Vietnam and which would be better served by the removal of *both* sets of military facilities. This will permit an evaluation of the merits of pursuing the Gorbachev tradeoff proposal.

A Soviet missile submarine.

The missions of the Philippine bases have been frequently enumerated in the testimony of US government officials.[32] They are: (1) to help protect the Philippines from external attack, (2) to help protect other nations in Southeast Asia from external attack, (3) to lend support to US forces defending Japan and South Korea, (4) to defend vital sea lanes and chokepoints upon which the survival of Japan and our other allies depends, and (5) to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Protecting the Philippines

There is general agreement among analysts that the external threat faced by the Philippines are all extremely remote.[33] Moreover, any consideration of the security role of the bases must take account as well of the possibility that the US installations might serve as magnets for attack in the event of a US-Soviet conflict. Soviet SS-20s are currently

targeted on the Philippines, no doubt aimed at the US military facilities.[34] In May 1987, Gorbachev offered to remove the Asian SS-20s if the US would remove its nuclear weapons from Japan, Korea, and the Philippines and pull its aircraft carriers back beyond some agreed line.[35] The Philippine government, speaking through its foreign secretary, Salvador Laurel, backed this proposal,[36] but in July, Gorbachev modified his position, offering to eliminate his Asian missiles unilaterally, with only the hope that the US nuclear presence in Asia would not grow.[37] If, as now seems likely, an INF agreement is signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, SS-20s will no longer be targeted on the Philippines. But this will not mean that the Philippines will no longer be in danger of nuclear attack. The Soviet Union maintains a fleet of ballistic-missile firing submarines in the Pacific, and it can be assumed that the advanced models are reserved for targets in the United States, while the older ones are assigned to regional targets[38] of which the Philippines is surely one, given its role in US nuclear war fighting plans.[39]

The argument has been advanced by the USIS that there is always a tradeoff between deterring and attracting an attack, but that history has proven that bases and alliances provide protection from foreign aggression. After all, asserts the USIS, nations like Cambodia and Afghanistan -- without such protection -- have been invaded, while in the years since World War II "no country with US bases and a US mutual defense treaty has been attacked."[40]

This is a rather disingenuous argument. There are of course other countries that might have been selected as examples of countries without alliances or bases that have been attacked: such as the Dominican Republic in 1965 or Vietnam from 1965 to 1973 or Nicaragua today. Some US allies have been attacked, though not by the Soviet Union: Britain in the Falklands. And as William Sullivan, the former US Ambassador to the Philippines and veteran State Department official, has acknowledged, (despite his enthusiasm for the Philippine bases) Japan attacked the Philippines in 1941 because of, not despite, the presence of US bases.[41] While it is true that US allies in NATO, Japan, and a few other countries have not been attacked since World War II, there are many times more countries that have likewise not been attacked. There is one case of a country with a US base, that was part of a regional defense organization with the United States, that was invaded -- by a force organized by the United States: namely, Cuba during the Bay of Pigs. The US has declared that ANZUS is no longer operative with respect to New Zealand. Is New Zealand thereby in danger of attack (by someone other than French government agents, that is)?[42] Where is war more likely, on the Korean peninsula, where the US has bases and a mutual defense treaty, or in New Zealand, or neutral Burma?

What all these examples show is that generalizations about alliances that abstract from the specific situation, particularly the specific threats that a country faces, are quite meaningless. What matters for the Philippines is not whether West Germany would be safer without US military bases (though it is perhaps worth noting that neutralized Austria is not considered as likely a site of war as militarized Germany, and that such neutralization of Germany too might have been possible in 1952, but was rejected by Washington[43]). What matters for the Philippines are the external threats *it* faces, and here opinion is uniform that such threats are negligible.[44]

Some point to an aggressive Vietnam as a potential invader of the Philippines. Vietnam does not have the naval units that could support any such invasion, so it would have to be assisted by the Soviet navy. But this highly marginal possibility would of course be even less likely in the event of a Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam as a result of a tradeoff.

Against these improbable outside threats must be weighed the likelihood of the US bases attracting a nuclear attack on the Philippines. (All-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union might well cause deadly fallout or climatic changes even in nations not explicitly targeted or hit by nuclear weapons; but nuclear strikes on US bases in the Philippines would cause immediate devastation.[45]) The odds of nuclear war are certainly low, but not perhaps as low as is sometimes believed. The Deputy Chief of Staff in the Pentagon in 1984 considered that a US-Soviet war was an "almost inevitable probability."[46] And though he believed that such a conflict could be kept localized and non-nuclear, US strategy militates against such a possibility. US officials have planned for horizontal escalation: that is, to attack in the Soviet Far East in the event of a conflict elsewhere, not just to bottle up Soviet forces, but to destroy them, including potential strikes against Soviet ballistic missile carrying submarines.[47] And Navy Secretary John Lehman's view that "Who gets to shoot first will have more to do with who wins than any [other] factor"[48] does not bode well for crisis stability. Nuclear weapons are so fully integrated into US and Soviet naval and air power in the Pacific that it seems certain that a horizontal escalation would lead to vertical escalation.[49]

One final matter regarding threats to the Philippines must be considered. Some analysts acknowledge that while it is true that, even in the absence of US bases, a Soviet invasion of the Philippines is highly improbable, yet the threat will come in the form of "Soviet and Vietnamese support for the communist New People's Army with money and weapons."[50] The Philippines no doubt faces a serious problem of internal insurgency, and will continue to face such a problem as long as the living conditions of so much of the population remain so desperate. But the threat envisioned here seems dubious.

First of all, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) still retains elements of its Maoist origins, for example, referring to itself as the party of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought,[51] an orientation not very conducive to close Soviet ties. The CPP has tried to steer a neutral course between China and the Soviet Union.[52] And to date there is

no credible evidence of any significant Soviet (or Vietnamese) support for the NPA.[53]

The real point, however, is how the US bases affect potential Soviet support to the NPA. Military bases are hardly efficient means of preventing Soviet money from being smuggled into the Philippines, nor could they do much to avert weapons smuggling into the southern Philippines – just as they were of no consequence in this regard when Muslim separatists were being supplied from outside. In fact, the US military bases provide the NPA with more weapons through the thriving black market than they keep out of the country, and major areas of guerrilla activity continue to include the vicinity of the US bases.[54]

Presumably the argument about the bases' role in deterring Soviet support to the NPA refers not so much to the physical presence of the bases as to their symbolic importance: the bases serve as an announcement that the United States is concerned about the future of the Philippines and would be willing to commit resources, even troops, to keep the NPA from coming to power. But the situation might well operate the other way around. The USSR would have little to gain in destabilizing a neutral Philippines that hosted no foreign military bases, given that an NPA victory would lead to a rather independent regime, something no more attractive to Moscow than to Washington. On the other hand, so long as US bases remain in the Philippines, smuggling funds and arms to guerrillas is a relatively low-cost way for the Soviet Union to undermine the usefulness of an important Pentagon asset. When the former commander of the Pacific fleet was asked whether the US would home port a naval battle group at Subic, he replied:

> Certainly if we thought the country had political stability. That has been the shortcoming across the board. We would have gone in there a long time ago except for that.[55]

Protecting Southeast Asia

Let us consider now the second mission of the US bases in the Philippines, the protection of Southeast Asia in general. The ASEAN nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines – do not see the Soviet threat in the same way Washington does. According to one authority, "Although the USSR is not admired or trusted in the region, its presence in the Pacific is generally judged differently by Asians than by Americans." There is a "widespread view among Asian-Pacific states that Americans exaggerate the Soviet threat to the region."[56] Another US scholar writes that "the prevailing Southeast Asian point of view seems to be that the United States, particularly under the administration of Ronald Reagan, greatly overemphasizes the Soviet threat."[57]

Each of the ASEAN countries has its own particular view of the threats it confronts. Thailand and Singapore are generally the most anti-Soviet in orientation. The Thai elite views the Soviet Union and Vietnam as its major external threat,[58] and of course Thailand borders on Kampuchea where Vietnamese troops are now engaged. It seems clear, however, that Bangkok views China and not the United States as its means of keeping Hanoi in check. One should recall that Thailand ejected US military bases after the Vietnam war and has not invited them back in.

Singapore has indicated that it looks to the United States to ensure that the Soviet Union and Vietnam do not try to intimidate the nations of the region, but it doesn't want Washington to complicate the situation in the area by trying to bring in China to counter Soviet strength.[59] Singapore's assessment of the security environment in Southeast Asia, however, is indicated by the fact that it raised no objection to the withdrawal of the New Zealand defense force that has been stationed on its territory since 1955.[60] When Singapore officials are asked if they would be willing to host US bases in the event they have to be moved from the Philippines, they coyly (though accurately) respond that Clark Air Base is larger than their whole country,[61] suggesting a threat perception that is less than overwhelming. In addition, Singapore "feels comfortable enough with the Soviet presence to provide repair services to Soviet naval units passing to and from the Indian Ocean."[62]

Malaysia and Indonesia are much less concerned about the USSR and Vietnam than are Thailand or Singapore. In their view, a strong Vietnam is beneficial in that it poses a counterweight to China.[63] "Living in Malaysia," wrote a US Fulbright scholar in 1985, "gives the impression that the USSR is almost a non-factor in the region. There simply seems not to be a great deal of attention paid to it."[64] And the head of Malaysia's most important strategic think-tank has written, "We should not be overly concerned about the Soviet threat, firstly because the Soviets do not have the capability, and secondly because they do not have the intent."[65]

To Indonesia, China is seen as the serious threat, given its geographical proximity, its historical role in Southeast Asia, and the large overseas Chinese community. Indeed, it sees China's behavior as inviting the very Soviet presence in Vietnam that has aroused concern. Indonesia rejects the dire warnings about possible Soviet aggression. Such warnings confuse "Soviet military capabilities with Soviet intentions. In point of fact, for that matter, the US military forces based in the Philippines are no less capable of doing the same job."[66] An alliance with the United States, in the Indonesian view, would likely "call forth the reaction of the Soviet Union, which almost certainly will perceive it as a threat to its security."

Moreover,

> it is hard to understand the clamorous concern about the Soviet "bases" in Vietnam – which used to be US bases –

> the first the Soviet Union has ever had in the Asian Pacific region outside its own territory, when for many years it has been encircled by US bases and Western alliances along its perimeter.
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> One would rightly wonder, therefore, if the Soviet military buildup in the region has not been part of the Soviet attempt to overcome its sense of insecurity in the face of such an environment. And what is said to be the US resolve to restore its power, including its military power, may possibly be no more than an attempt to regain the loss of its supremacy.[67]

One final point on threat perceptions in Southeast Asia is that the US government, generally so concerned to press its allies to spend more on defense, has deemed ASEAN defense expenditures to be adequate.[68]

As an organization, ASEAN adopted in 1971 at Kuala Lumpur the Malaysian proposal to seek to make Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. The specific terms of ZOPFAN have not yet been defined, but clearly they would be consistent with the elimination of foreign military bases in the Philippines and Vietnam.[69]

Many analysts point out, however, that despite their public stance in favor of ZOPFAN, ASEAN leaders have privately indicated that they favor the continued presence of US military bases in the Philippines. In addition, individuals known to be close to the ASEAN governments, but who can speak unofficially, have expressed similar pro-bases views.

It is always difficult to know how much weight to attach to views that are advanced in private, where the speaker is unwilling to say the same thing in public. Former Ambassador Underhill notes that telling visiting US officials what they want to hear in private is a relatively inexpensive way to humor a major nation, that is as well an important trading partner and source of capital. On his visit to Southeast Asia after leaving the US foreign service, Underhill found ASEAN government officials dodging questions on the role the Philippine bases played in their own security, insisting that the question was a bilateral matter between the United States and the Philippines; at the strategic institutes, there were no locally produced studies defending or supporting the prevailing US strategic doctrine regarding the bases or the US military role in the region.[70]

But there is another, more significant reason not to put too much stock in the privately expressed ASEAN support for the Philippine bases. If one examines the private or unofficial statements carefully, it is quite possible that they are actually not inconsistent with the publicly espoused ASEAN position. The latter holds that Southeast Asia should be a region free of great power contention. And the private statements support the presence of US bases *so long as the Soviet Union maintains its military presence in the area.*

Thus, a fellow at the well-connected Malaysian think-tank ISIS, writes:

> US bases, in the absence of a termination of Soviet base facilities in Vietnam and Cambodia, would tilt the balance in favor of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.[71]

Influential Indonesian experts have called the US bases in the Philippines "an absolute necessity for the US presence in

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Southeast Asia," but they say this after describing the increased Soviet presence "because of the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang" which needs counterbalancing by the United States and Japan.[72]

A *Washington Post* reporter in Manila wrote in early 1987:

> While next year's negotiations will be between Washington and Manila, the Philippines' Southeast Asian noncommunist neighbors as well as Japan have made it clear that they see the American presence in the Pacific as vital for regional security, in the face of the growing Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.[73]

And a US scholar with wide experience in Southeast Asia has written that any pullback of US forces from the ASEAN area "would be opposed by ASEAN members so long as the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance continues and Soviet ships and planes are based in Indochina."[74]

Another US scholar who has travelled extensively in the region has stated that the ASEAN nations are likely to react with extreme caution to any Soviet peace proposals for the Asian-Pacific area (including Gorbachev's bases tradeoff proposal) until there is some settlement of the Kampuchean problem.[75] And certainly it would be a little incongruous to be promoting a zone of peace within which war rages. It is significant, however, that the ASEAN position and the Vietnamese position on the Kampuchean situation are not so far apart. It is not the case, as is sometimes claimed, that Washington has been following ASEAN's lead on this matter. Rather, the US has aligned itself with Beijing's much more uncompromising stance. In the words of Justus van der Kroef, no friend of Vietnam,

> Over and over again the US has acquiesced in attempts by Beijing to block a more compromise oriented policy by some ASEAN countries.
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> It was at the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea in New York (ICK) that strong Chinese opposition, agreed to by the US, scuttled an ASEAN proposal which, among other points, would have envisaged a UN-supervised Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the disarming of all present armed anti-Vietnamese Cambodia factions, including Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. Then democratic elections for a new government would be held, after a UN "temporary administration." Precisely because the ASEAN proposal would have meant the disarming of China's client, the Khmer Rouge, and because any "temporary administration" was seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of the (Khmer Rouge), China blocked it.
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> . . . from the period of ICK controversy onward, through all the various formulas for compromise and discussion with the Vietnamese devised by ASEAN in following years, not only an absence of US initiative has been noticeable, but also an implicit endorsement of Beijing's protracted "bleed Vietnam white" strategy.
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> It is therefore not ASEAN but basically China which the US is prepared to accept as the boundary setter in Cambodian policy discussions.[76]

Another conservative scholar has written:

> United States policy has become bound to the Chinese view of what is an intensely private quarrel between the Vietnamese and the Chinese leaderships and has adopted a strategy that bludgeons Vietnam and the Soviet Union together. The Vietnamese have had no other alternative other than to seek Soviet support.[77]

If the US, in the context of a tradeoff of foreign military bases in Southeast Asia, backed a solution to the Kampuchean situation along the lines of the ASEAN ICK proposal, the conflict could probably be brought to a rapid conclusion. Such a solution would likely have the support of most interested nations. ASEAN would obviously approve such a settlement, since it would essentially represent the ASEAN position, but this sort of resolution of the Indochina conflict could serve the interests of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the United States as well.

Press accounts suggest that one reason why the USSR has not been taking a more constructive role in pushing for a settlement is its fear of losing its Vietnam bases[78]; this would no longer be a consideration. And an end to the Kampuchean conflict would free Moscow from the obligation to subsidize Vietnam. Vietnam would be able to extricate itself from a

draining military venture and diplomatic isolation. Hanoi has publicly called for the elimination of all military bases in Southeast Asia as a condition for the establishment of a zone of peace, friendship, and neutrality in the region.[79] There is some ambiguity in the Vietnamese position, because it maintains that Cam Ranh Bay is not a foreign military base, but with a settlement of the Kampuchean situation, the Soviet military presence would be less useful to Hanoi. Thus, it would seem unlikely that Vietnam would object to a bases tradeoff and an end to the Kampuchean conflict. And for the US, Vietnam would become less dependent on the USSR and the region less tense. Only China might oppose such an arrangement,[80] but with Vietnam rid of Soviet bases and exclusive Soviet ties, the need to "bleed" Vietnam might be less pressing. "According to official Beijing sources, an American presence in Southeast Asia is acceptable to China as long as the Soviets are in Vietnam."[81]

Two other issues have to be taken into account in considering the response in Southeast Asia to the elimination of US and Soviet bases from the region. First, the withdrawal of US and Soviet forces might allow other powers -- specifically China or Japan -- to dominate the area. Second, even if Chinese or Japanese domination could be prevented, the absence of US (and/or Soviet) bases might permit local bullies to intimidate their neighbors.

China is the one major power physically present in Southeast Asia, not by virtue of overseas bases, but by its own territory. There is thus no way to keep China out of the region in the same way that other powers might be excluded.[82] Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for concluding that the departure of the United States and the Soviet Union need not lead to Chinese domination of Southeast Asia.

First, China has been the great power most supportive of the ASEAN call for ZOPFAN.[83] Thus, if the withdrawal of US and Soviet bases from the region were followed by the proclamation of such a zone, prohibiting military shows of force, China would find it extremely difficult from a political point of view to flex its military muscle. Beijing has also supported the Malaysian-Indonesian assertion that the Strait of Malacca is a national water; its motive was to place diplomatic obstacles in the way of the USSR in moving its naval vessels from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, but such a stance also makes it more difficult for China to readily move its navy through these waters.[84]

Second, the Chinese leadership seems distinctly committed to economic development, a goal not readily pursued simultaneously with military adventurism. China has a very full internal agenda, including for example, the issue of Tibet, that will likely take priority over foreign policy matters -- except those deemed essential to national security. Indicative of China's inward focus is the fact that in the same period that the Reagan administration has vastly expanded US military spending in alleged response to the Soviet threat, Beijing has been cutting back its defense budget.[85]

Third, China's military power vis-a-vis its neighbors is not as overwhelming as is sometimes thought. Recall that China was unable to decisively punish Vietnam while the latter was engaged in Kampuchea. Vietnam, of course, will also be in any Southeast Asian country from which the two superpowers have withdrawn. China's ability to conquer the offshore state of Southeast Asia is extremely dubious. It does have the ability to seize contested islands in the South China Sea, but it is publicly committed to a peaceful resolution of the claims[86] and the gains from any aggression hardly seem worth the enmity that would be engendered throughout the region.

Japan is another nation whose military potential causes concern in Southeast Asia. Memories of Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere during World War II linger in the region, and few would welcome Japanese hegemony were the US and the USSR to withdraw. Tokyo's economic power, its preeminent trade and investment position, already leads many to refer to "the second Japanese invasion."[87] Japan's postwar Constitution restricts its military to self-defense forces only, but Japan has recently announced that its defense perimeter extends 1,000 miles from Tokyo. As with China, however, there are strong grounds for believing that a tradeoff of US and Soviet bases would not leave Southeast Asia vulnerable to domination by Japan.

First, Japan's more active defense role has been encouraged by the increased pace of the US-Soviet military

David Jenkins



Edwin Tuyay

buildup in the Pacific. A decrease in US-Soviet military activity in the region should make it politically more difficult to justify further defense spending to the Japanese people.

Second, the declaration of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia would make Japanese naval vessels unwelcome patrolling the region's waters. Of course, Japan has great leverage on many nations of the area because of its economic clout, but the leverage does not only operate one way. Japan needs markets for its capital and goods and resources for its factories, and the good-will of Southeast Asia is thus important to Tokyo.

> Many, probably a majority, in Japan's conservative ranks are thoroughly familiar with the economic advantages Japan has gained by maintaining minimal armed forces. Not only has Tokyo been able to divert such resources to economic goals, Japan's low profile on the security front has also served it well by minimizing apprehensions on the part of Japan's worldwide trading partners, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A clear majority of Japanese – conservative and liberal – are still averse to doing anything that might jeopardize Japan's economic security. Adding to this is the prevalent inclination among Japanese to view the problems of "security" in extremely broad terms. Nearly all Japanese reject a narrowly military view of security in favor of a perspective which places priority on economic considerations, with military, political, and ideological factors well behind trade and investment.[88]

This does not mean that Japan would refrain from aggressively pursuing its economic interests. But it does this now, and it is difficult to see how a neutralized Southeast Asia would make things any worse. It hardly seems credible that in the present international environment Tokyo would resort to outright conquest to further its economic agenda. Japan might try to subvert a government that threatened foreign investment, but US military bases do not prevent this, and indeed if the US were present it would likely join in the subversion.

A similar response applies to the question of local bullies. If the US, the USSR, China, and Japan all kept out of Southeast Asia, what would prevent one country in the region from pushing around another? But such bullying goes on now, as when Indonesia invaded East Timor, with tacit consent of Washington.[89] There would be two advantages to a neutralized Southeast Asia. First, where there is little great power contention, the United Nations might be able to take steps to deal with armed attack by one state against another. Where the great powers compete, the UN is impotent. Moscow has recently urged an increased role for the United Nations, including in the area of peacekeeping.[90] Second, the exclusion of the major nations would make it easier to establish a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia which in turn would make it much less likely that any regional power would acquire its own nuclear weapons. Some Indonesians, for example, reject their government's proposal for a nuclear-free zone because "they feel the nuclear option for Jakarta should not be closed."[91] The consequences for all the countries in the area of an Indonesian bomb need no elaboration. The sooner a nuclear-free zone can be established, the less likely this outcome will be.

Protecting Japan and South Korea

A third general mission assigned to the Philippine bases is the support of US forces in Japan and South Korea for the protection of these two countries.

The definitive study by the Library of Congress of potential alternatives to the US bases in the Philippines readily concedes that for supporting operations in Northeast Asia, the US bases on Guam "are as well located" as the Philippine bases.[92] In general, to the extent that the defense of Japan and South Korea requires a rear area, Guam could fulfill this role, and all other defense needs could be relocated to Japan itself. Another US government study points out the following problem:

> The Japanese government, although permitting some basing, has been beset on numerous occasions by anti-military and anti-American antagonists and would not be responsive to additional basing of an unrestricted nature. Sovereignty and host nation limitations on base usage are already serious concerns for existing Japanese bases; to seek additional bases under these conditions would not appear to be beneficial for either nation.[93]

But if the Japanese people are unwilling to accept additional US military bases, then we must wonder how seriously they take the Soviet threat of which US officials constantly warn them. There are good reasons, however, to discount these US warnings. First, the Reagan view that the "Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on" in the world[94] betrays a certain lack of grounding in reality. Second, despite claims of the gargantuan Soviet military buildup in the Pacific, the United States and its allies still maintain a decisive lead: "There is widespread agreement among policy analysts that the position of the United States in Asia is stronger than at any time since the end of World War II."[95] And third, if Washington officials can encourage Tokyo to purchase US fighter planes or invest more of their national resources on military spending, this helps the US economy relative to its chief international competitor.[96]

Moreover, a compelling case can be made that after a US-Soviet bases tradeoff in Southeast Asia, the defense needs of Japan will be reduced, not increased; the Northeast Asian missions of the US military formerly carried out from Philippine bases would certainly not have to be replaced to an equivalent extent.

First, a less tense superpower environment in Southeast Asia would likely mean a less tense relationship between Tokyo and Moscow, and thus there would be less need for a Japanese military buildup.

Second, the actual military uses to which Cam Ranh Bay has been put include the support of reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan (Bear TU-95s fly from Vladivostok to Cam Ranh Bay whereas before they could only travel half as far from Vladivostok and then had to return). Japanese officials see this increased flight activity as enhancing the threat to Japan.[97] In the absence of Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay, however, the Soviet threat would be reduced.

Third, the removal of Soviet SS-20s from Asia will reduce somewhat the threat environment that Japan faces. As was noted above with respect to the Philippines, as long as the United States maintains military facilities that play a role in nuclear war fighting, these facilities and the territories that host them will be targeted by Moscow in one way or another. Nevertheless, the elimination of the SS-20s will diminish the threat to Japan to some extent.

In sum, Northeast Asian missions pose no obstacle to a bases tradeoff involving the Philippines and Vietnam.

Defense of Sea Lanes

In President Reagan's celebrated February 1986 press conference in which he declared that there had been fraud on the part of both Aquino and Marcos supporters, he was also asked which was more important, military bases or democracy in the Philippines. Reagan replied:

> One cannot minimize the importance of those bases, not only to us but to the Western World and certainly to the Philippines themselves. If you look at the basing now of the blue-ocean navy that the Soviet (sic) has built, which is bigger than ours, and how they have placed themselves to be able to intercept the 16 chokepoints in the world. There are 16 passages in the world, sea passages, through which most of the supplies and the raw material and so forth reaches not only ourselves but our allies in the Western World. And obviously, the plan in case of any kind of hostilities calls for intercepting and closing those 16 chokepoints. And we have to have bases that we can send forces to reopen those channels. And I don't know of any that's more important than the bases on the Philippines.[98]

This view of the importance of the Philippine bases for controlling strategic chokepoints is held not only by rightwing ideologues. A liberal Democrat, who sits on the Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee of the House, gave a similar rationale: the Philippine bases allow the United States to protect the straits and sea-lanes that are essential to the well-being and very survival of our Japanese ally.[99] Japan depends on the Indian Ocean region for 85 percent of its oil supplies and for much of its iron ore, copper, zinc, coal, and uranium.

USIS



Aerial view of the Soviet military base in Cam Ranh Bay.

The Indian Ocean carries Japanese manufactured goods to Afro-Asian markets.[100]

To evaluate this argument, it is important to distinguish five different context within which the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) might be obstructed: (1) US-Soviet nuclear war; (2) US-Soviet war that does not involve the use of nuclear weapons; (3) war between two non-superpowers; (4) peacetime interference by the USSR; and (5) peacetime interference by other nations.

In the case of US-Soviet nuclear war, control of the chokepoints is of no consequence. Either power could target nuclear strikes on the narrow straits. And a Japan that hosted US bases would be so obliterated by nuclear attack that oil supplies would be the least of its worries. Finally, if the USSR wished to deprive Japan of oil, it would be far easier to destroy the oil at its source, by targeting the Middle Eastern oil fields, than by sea denial.

Conventional US-Soviet conflict is the second case to consider. At the outset it must be pointed out how unlikely such a contingency is. This is because (a) the United States has refused to rule out first use of nuclear weapons, not just a rhetorical refusal, but at the level as well of strategy and force structure; (b) US strategy, as mentioned above, calls for attacks on Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the event of war, a strategy that could well convince Moscow to launch a preemptive strike before its nuclear deterrent was destroyed; and (c) US strategy also calls for encouraging Chinese military initiatives against the USSR, [101] a move that could easily provoke nuclear war.

Let us grant, however, that there were a conventional US-Soviet war. What then would be the utility of the Southeast Asian straits? Three points are relevant here.

First, as in the nuclear war scenario, it would be senseless for the USSR to try to starve Japan by controlling the seas when it would be so much easier to attack the oil fields, either by sabotage or direct military attack.[102]

Second, the straits are by no means a life-and-death matter for the survival of Japan. Even if we ignore the possibility that Japan could be supplied westward from the United States, for cargoes from the Middle East the straits are not vital. A redirecting of Persian Gulf oil around the southern end of Australia increases the length of passage by some 80 percent, which raises shipping costs about 75 percent, which raises the costs of Middle Eastern oil about 11 percent,[103] hardly a decisive burden in the context of global war. (Recall how inconsequential was the impact of the closure of the Suez Canal, a waterway considered equally vital.[104])

Third, we must consider how the Soviet Union would be able to threaten the chokepoints. At present, Soviet naval and air units based in Vietnam could reach the straits. Cam Ranh "assures Soviet proximity to critical sea lines of communication."[105] Now in fact US officials state confidently that Cam Ranh Bay would not last beyond day one of a US-Soviet conflict.[106] But let us grant that Soviet access to Vietnam increases the threat to the SLOCs. If so, the trading-off of US bases in the Philippines for Soviet facilities in Vietnam would remove the source of the Soviet SLOC threat all the way to Vladivostok or from positions within the Indian Ocean. In the event of a US-Soviet war, US naval strategy calls for bottling up, if not destroying, the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Japan around Vladivostok[107] so any threat to the SLOCs from this direction would require the defeat of the US Navy in Northeast Asia. If this occurred, of course, straits 1000 miles away would be of little consequence, for the USSR would control the waters around Japan. But US naval officials, of course, do not anticipate any such defeat.

As for threatening the Southeast Asian straits from the Indian Ocean side, the US base of Diego Garcia lies between the straits and any Soviet facilities, and, in any event, the Soviet Union is on record as favoring the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean region,[108] a matter to which I return below. Thus, whatever threats do exist to SLOCs are likely to be lessened if there is a tradeoff of Philippine and Vietnamese bases.[109]

Consider now the potential threat to chokepoints and sea-lanes in the case of a war between two states other than the superpowers. Despite US assertions that the Soviet Union has no genuine defense interests in Southeast Asia,[110] in fact Moscow too is highly dependent upon free passage through the straits bordering Indonesia and Malaysia. Given the vulnerability and limited capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway and the impossibility of using the Arctic route during much of the year, sea transportation via the Indian Ocean is increasingly important to Moscow to supply its Far Eastern region, both in peacetime and in the event of war with China. Additionally, the Soviet Union has one of the world's largest merchant fleets.[111] Therefore, it stands to reason that in any local conflict that spilled over into international waterways, the Soviet Union would be as eager as the United States to maintain freedom of navigation.

The current situation in the Persian Gulf illustrates the point well. The Soviet Union has not encouraged any Iranian closing of the gulf, but instead agreed to help protect Kuwaiti shipping, then it proposed that the major powers withdraw their naval forces from the gulf, and then it called for a UN role in assuring freedom of navigation. Washington, which is far more interested in preserving the gulf as an American lake than in protecting shipping, responded by military strutting, intended in part to reassure Arab allies shaken by Reagan's clandestine dealings with Iran.[112] The US is now leaning heavily on the side of Iraq, which began – and continues – the tanker war. And the result of US policy has been that navigation in the gulf is now more precarious than before.

In the event of a war between, say, Indonesia and Malaysia that interfered with international shipping through the straits, it is hard to see how the US presence in the Philippines would help matters. If one of the nations were determined to obstruct the straits, they could not be prevented from doing

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so.[113] And it would invariably be cheaper to go around the straits than to try to keep them open by force.[114] Diplomacy would offer the best hope of restoring free navigation. For the reasons outlined above, the Soviet Union could be expected to favor such a solution. If the US were more determined to shut out Moscow than to reach a settlement, however, diplomacy might not be of much avail.

The next case to be considered of threats to SLOCs is peacetime interference by the USSR. But, first of all, it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union could obstruct US or Japanese vessels on the high seas without it leading to war. Second, as already noted above, it is hard to imagine any gain to the Soviet Union of such an action that would outweigh the costs, given Moscow's strong stake in freedom of the seas.[115] It is significant that the Soviet Union has generally sided with the United States and other maritime nations in international controversies involving freedom of navigation.[116] And, third, without access to Cam Ranh Bay, the ability of the Soviet Union to interfere with passage through the straits would be severely limited.

The final threat to the straits comes from peacetime interference by a littoral state. Indeed Malaysia and Indonesia have claimed the straits as part of their territorial waters. In the Law of the Sea Conference, however, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur compromised their position, as part of wide concessions by many nations. The Law of the Sea Treaty does not accept that the straits are national waters, but does require that vessels transiting the straits do so according to the rules of innocent passage.[117] In a remarkable display of bad faith, the United States has since refused to accept the treaty, and so the status of the straits remains in doubt.[118]

Indonesia also claims the "archipelagic principle," whereby all waters between its outermost islands are part of its territorial sea. The US does not recognize the claim, which was first enunciated by Jakarta in 1957 as a way "to demonstrate the integral unity of a state fragmented by interposing water ways" "at a time when the very integrity of the republic was subject to threat"[119] – a threat promoted by Washington.[120] Neither the archipelagic principle nor the other claims of the littoral states need interfere with free navigation, since none of the states involved rejects the right of innocent passage. The straits, however, might be endangered if the US were to try to provocatively challenge some of the claims, as it has done in the Gulf of Sidra. Short of such an eventuality, there is no likelihood that the littoral states would prevent passage through the straits that are so important to their own economic well-being.[121]

The right of innocent passage through the straits gets more complicated when it comes to warships. I will deal with the matter of projecting conventional US military power into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf in the next section. Here I will consider only the issue of US ballistic missile carrying submarines. Potentially such vessels might want to transit the straits in order to be on station in the Indian Ocean. Submarines conforming to the rules of innocent passage are sup-

posed to pass through the straits above the surface. However the logic of a sea-based deterrent requires that one's adversary not know the location of one's strategic nuclear submarines. Nevertheless, this is not a compelling argument against a tradeoff of the Philippine bases.

First of all, Indonesia apparently allows US (but not Soviet) vessels to transit the straits submerged.[122] Second, new sea-launched ballistic missiles have a range that allow targets in the Soviet Union to be hit from more distant waters than the Indian Ocean. Third, Soviet surveillance of the Southeast Asian straits – and hence of US submarines passing through these straits – takes place from Cam Ranh Bay. With a tradeoff, the ability to perform such surveillance would be much reduced. And, fourth, it would simply be ironic if the reason the United States needed bases in the Philippines was to make sure that Indonesia did not try to assert its maritime claims.

Projecting Power into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf

We come now to the fifth and last of the missions supposed to be accomplished by the US bases in the Philippines: namely, supporting operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. This is the crucial mission from the point of view of the Pentagon, but this does not mean that the mission is necessary for the genuine security of the United States and its people, nor that the mission promotes world peace or the interests of those living in the Indian Ocean region.

Between 1955 and 1975, the US Navy sent warships to protect "US interests" in East Asia and the Indian Ocean twenty-six times.[123] And such activity continues, as one enthusiast wrote in the US Navy's journal:

> The US Navy has been particularly active in the 1980s. Each year, US warships have demonstrated their power in the Persian Gulf, in the Mediterranean, off both coasts of Central America, in the Northwest Passage, in the Caribbean, and even in the Sea of Okhotsk. The navies of Argentina, Britain, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Honduras, Israel, South Korea, and Sweden have also had a go. But the US Navy has deserved first place on three counts:
>
> * It used or threatened limited naval force more often than any other navy.
> * It did so on a grander scale.
> * And, although it sometimes failed in its purpose, it never got itself -- as Argentina did -- into outright war.[124]

Although the Pentagon regularly portrays the massive US defense budget as necessary to counter the Soviet Union, in fact Third World military intervention accounts for the biggest chunk of defense expenditures.[125] As another expert notes, "crises involving US naval forces in operations against Third World states are becoming something of a norm in this decade -- Grenada, Lebanon, Libya."[126] "No area of the world is beyond the scope of American interests," declared President Reagan[127] but the Persian Gulf is perhaps the key focus of US intervention. Alvin J. Cottrell, a prominent naval scholar, described the problem in the Gulf this way:

> . . . a king rules in Saudi Arabia, a sultan in Oman, and ten sheiks and emirs in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Until 1979, the shah ruled in Iran. Only in Iraq have non-royal rulers been in power for very long. But there are many reasons to doubt whether the present state of affairs in the gulf can last. ... The key state in the Persian Gulf region is Saudi Arabia because of its vast oil reserves and the influence it exerts on the smaller gulf states. If it were to shift from royal rule, this might well put continued Western access to oil resources of the area in doubt.[128]

The last point is, of course, utter nonsense. Libya and Iran continue to sell oil to the West, except insofar as the West has refused to buy it. A shift from royal rule would not end oil sales, but might limit the profitability of such transactions to the Western oil companies. In any event, Cottrell continued:

> Naval deployments especially can play a key role in undergirding regional stability and inhibiting rapid and destabilizing political change.
>
> ***
>
> The immediate cry of some academicians to the above will be that it offers a military response to socio-political problems. Those arguing this view fail to understand that the navy has two roles, one as a political instrument of foreign policy, the other as a war-fighting instrument. At present the US Navy is being utilized in the Indian Ocean in its peacetime mode as a political instrument, protecting American security interests by encouraging greater political stability in the area.[129]

Some have argued that in a nuclear age a superpower does not need a large fleet and bases all over the world. But Cottrell, writing with the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ridiculed such "blithe argument." Among other things, "such an approach ignores the political benefits that can accrue to a country with the capability of employing its naval forces in support of foreign policy."[130]

The United States has always considered itself to have the right to intervene wherever it chooses in pursuit of its interests, despite its having signed the UN Charter which expressly prohibits the use of threat of force (except in cases of self-defense against armed attack). Treaties signed by the US Government are, according to the US Constitution, the "supreme law of the land," so US intervention has been illegal not just in terms of international law, but in terms of US law as well.

South

Making the concept of ZOPFAN a reality.

Sometimes we excuse law-breaking when some higher moral purpose is served, but US interventionism has not had such purpose. Washington has helped to overthrow governments that threatened US corporate interests in Iran, Guatemala, Chile (the latter two, democratically elected) has intervened in civil war on the side of the status quo and a corrupt elite (Vietnam, Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965),[131] and in sub-Saharan Africa was the instigator of "the very first coup" in the region's postcolonial history, "the very first political assassination, and the very first junking of a legally constituted democratic system."[132] It is not humanitarianism that motivates US interventionism. When hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were massacred in 1965, the US considered this a great victory; when the Pakistani army went berserk in 1971, raping and murdering East Bengalis, Washington "tilted" toward Pakistan.[133]

In the latter case, the US might have intervened more directly but for the countervailing presence of Soviet vessels in the Bay of Bengal.[134] And it is this that represents the Soviet threat: "In the event of local upheavals, Soviet surface warships in the area might well inhibit US intervention. . ."[134] The Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean do not pose a serious threat to the US carrier task forces in the region, but they do limit the freedom of action of the United States to intervene at will. In the words of one US Navy officer, "Put a Soviet aircraft carrier off Libya and see how that changes that situation."[136]

This is not to suggest that Moscow is disinterestedly seeking to prevent US interventionism, or that it -- any more than Washington -- seeks through its foreign policy to promote humanitarian values. On the contrary, the Soviet Union, like the United States, though on a smaller scale[137], uses its military assets for political purposes, to further Soviet interests, as defined by its leaders. Through ship visits, naval exercises, overflights, and the like, the USSR tries to intimidate Third World nations. And though Moscow resorts to outright military intervention less often than Western nations, its actions in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe demonstrate that it is not incapable of such actions.

It is sometimes concluded that both superpowers should be present militarily in Third World regions because they will check each others' more flagrant interventions. This may indeed be preferable to domination by a single superpower, but there are good reasons why many of the nations in the Indian Ocean region reject this approach.

First, great power contention often exacerbates regional tensions. Second, the presence of both superpowers generates an arms race, with each seeking to balance or surpass the other, a situation that is inherently unstable. Third, having the US and the USSR in the area increases the likelihood that a conflict that occurs between them elsewhere will be fought in the Indian Ocean region as well, possibly with nuclear weapons. Fourth, US interventionary forces are nuclear equipped -- in order to discourage any Soviet interference with US intervention[138], this might turn a local conflict into a nuclear holocaust. Fifth, although the presence of the other superpower has inhibited interventions, it has not prevented them. And, sixth, there will be times when the interests of the two superpowers are the same, but contrary to the interests of a regional state. Nothing in the moral record of the superpowers justifies their serving, even jointly, as a global police force.

For these reasons, the littoral states have sought to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, excluding from the region all foreign military bases and military forces. Such a proposal has been endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union; it has been rejected by the United States and Western European nations. In 1977 there was some reason for optimism when the US and the USSR began Naval Arms Limitations Talks and President Carter called for the "complete demilitarization of the Indian Ocean." Within a week, however, the US changed its position to one of seeking "mutual military restraint." And after four inconclusive meetings the US withdrew from the talks, ostensibly in protest against Soviet-Cuban intervention on the Ethiopian side in the Ogaden war -- not a compelling reason given that the Ogaden is part of Ethiopia, and was being invaded by Somalia -- but actually because Washington was unwilling to give up its military advantage in the region.[139] The United States had established a position in the Indian Ocean before the Soviet Union,[140] and continues to maintain naval superiority there.[141]

This US military superiority is not primarily designed to check Soviet expansionism, but to permit the United States to intervene in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), for example, was conceived as early as August 1977, well before the Soviet move into Afghanistan. It has been intended to maintain an "intervention capability" for the US to be able to use unilaterally in Third World contingencies.[142] Is such interventionary capability necessary for the security of the United States or, more importantly, for promoting peace and justice? Consider the answer to just the

security part of this question from Japan, a nation much more vitally dependent upon the resources of the region than the US:

> The likelihood of intra-regional conflict is much greater in Japanese eyes than that of a Soviet military invasion of the region. Indeed, one such conflict has been going on between Iraq and Iran. The fact that the presence in the Persian Gulf waters of some thirty ships of the United States sixth and seventh fleets, including two formidable aircraft carriers, did not prevent the outbreak of that conflict suggests the rather limited utility of the RDF for the prevention of future intraregional conflict even if the RDF units were deployed in close proximity to the contending states. This, however, is not the only problem in such a contingency. "US military intervention to prevent or stop a conflict between states in the area or to support a friendly ruler in trouble would elicit broad-based opposition to the United States," argues David Newsom, a seasoned specialist. Such intervention "would very likely result in exactly what it sought to avoid: severely curtailed oil production."[143]

As for internal problems,

> America's experience in Iran seems to suggest the high probability that external intervention in a politically unstable state of the region for the purpose of shoring up its incumbent regime would prove to be counterproductive. At the very best, such intervention would amount to a high-stakes gamble unless the RDF were prepared to occupy the country in question. As Newsom contends, "Political upheaval can but need not result in the loss of either production or access [to oil]; outside intervention will almost certainly destroy both."[144]

Genuine US interests, and the interests of all those living in the Indian Ocean region, would be far better served by demilitarizing the area than by maintaining the capability to project US power. Both the US and the USSR would be less able to obstruct self-determination for the people of the Third World. The danger of superpower conflict would be reduced. Neither Washington nor Moscow would have to worry as much about its adversary obtaining geopolitical advantage in the region. And the immense military expenditures that now go to power projection, to purposes far beyond any legitimate notion of defense, could be redirected to support urgent social programs at home and desperately needed economic development abroad.

Conclusion

The various missions of the US bases in the Philippines have now been examined. Some, like the mission of supporting intervention in the Persian Gulf, should not be performed at all. Others, like countering the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, would be easier performed by accepting Gorbachev's tradeoff proposal.

Because Subic and Clark are so much more valuable militarily than the Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, there will obviously be some reluctance to having a simple one-for-one exchange. And indeed it makes good sense to couple any Philippines-Vietnam tradeoff to a number of other agreements: the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in Southeast Asia; a settlement of the Kampuchean conflict along the lines of the ASEAN position; denuclearization of Southeast Asia; and then demilitarization and denuclearization of the Indian Ocean as well. All would face little obstacle from Moscow – indeed all have been endorsed by the Soviet government. With the proper political will in Washington none of this would be utopian. Moreover, in the context of these sorts of agreements, a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan should not be too difficult to obtain.

Trading off the US bases in the Philippines for Soviet bases in Vietnam offers a major step toward the creation of a more peaceful and just world. As the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement is renegotiated in the next few years, it will be important to urge the tradeoff option.

Notes

[1] Reyes, 1983. Reyes confirmed in a talk at Tufts University in late 1986 that his Philippine Futuristics Society speech represented his first public suggestion of the tradeoff. (Reyes, 1986, pp. 2-3.)

[2] Reyes included any future Soviet access to bases in Kampuchea in his proposed tradeoff. Hanoi maintains that the Soviet Union does not have actual military base rights in Vietnam. But, as with the US bases in the Philippines, which, under the 1979 amendments to the Military Bases Agreement, are now technically US facilities within Philippine bases, the uses to which the installations can be put is more significant than the formal locus of sovereignty. In the Philippine case, the US military enjoys "unhampered military operations" (see US Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1983, pp. 13, 285); no evidence has come to light regarding any restrictions that Vietnam has imposed on Soviet operations.

[3] *Curriculum Vitae* of Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes, 1987.

[4] Reyes, 1983, p. 9.

[5] Kattenburg, 1987, pp. 556-558.

[6] Kattenburg, 1987, p. 557. Kattenburg was somewhat vague on whether ZOPFAN would be the result of a Soviet withdrawal or part of the pressure to encourage such withdrawal.

[7] *Pravda*, 29 July 1986, excerpted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 38, No. 30, 27 August 1986, p. 8.

[8] Gorbachev announced a pull-out of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan; called for a reduction in tensions with China; and acknowledged that a nation does not enhance its own security by making its adversaries feel less secure (see Richard Nations, "Moscow's New Tack," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 August 1986, p. 31). The latter point has been a key insight among peace researchers (see e.g., Fischer, 1984), but never before acknowledged by any superpower leader.

[9]The *New York Times* report on Gorbachev's speech by Philip Taubman (29 July 1986, pp. A1, A6) covered the offer only in the last two paragraphs of a 28-column inch story, stating that Gorbachev "suggested that the United States consider removing some or all of its military forces from the Philippines" and then quoting the offer. The accompanying "Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech" (29 July 1986, p. A6) omitted the General Secretary's mention of the Philippine bases entirely. Articles on the Vladivostok speech in the *Wall Street Journal* (29 July 1986, p. 31), the *Washington Post* (29 July 1986, pp. A1, A10), and the *Christian Science Monitor* (29 July 1986, pp. 1, 36) made no reference to the tradeoff hint, though the *Post's* next day story on the US reaction to the speech (see note 10 below) mentioned the offer.

[10]Don Oberdorfer, *Washington Post*, 30 July 1986, p. A15.

[11]*Washington Post*, 8 August 1986, pp. A17-A18.

[12]Keith B. Richburg, *Washington Post*, 24 January 1987, pp. A13, A20.

[13]*Washington Post*, 8 August 1986, pp. A17-A18. There are other US military facilities in the Philippines, but Subic and Clark are the main ones and the others are sometimes considered their subsidiaries. I shall follow the practice of letting Subic and Clark refer as well to Cubi Point Naval Station, the San Miguel Naval Communications Station, and the other lesser facilities.

[14]Haberman, 1986, p. 112.

[15]Chapman, 1987, p. 60.

[16]Author's interview with Robert Torricelli, 11 June 1987, Hackensack, NJ. Torricelli's possible role in a Hart administration is referred to in *New York Times*, 16 August 1987, p. 6NJ.

[17]Foley, 1985, p. 36.

[18]Pauker, 1983, p. 7.

[19]Gregor, 1984a, p. 8. The same point is made in Gregor, 1984b, p. 21.

[20]For example, reference is made to the number of Soviet ships at Cam Ranh Bay at any one time compared to the lesser number at Subic, with the suggestion that this represents a Soviet advantage (USIS, 1986, p. 8). In fact, however, a much larger fraction of the Soviet ships are auxiliary vessels (Wilkes, 1986, p. 6) and Soviet ships leave port much less often than their US counterparts (John McBeth, "Cam Ranh Bay: Soviet Threat," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 May 1985, p. 45). Indeed, US analysts have been trying to explain the rather modest scale of Soviet deployment at Cam Ranh (Hamish McDonald, "The Cam Ranh bugbear," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 June 1987, pp. 34-35.

[21]USIS, 1986, pp. 8-11.

[22]US Navy, 1987, sect. 2, p. 2; sect. 4, pp. 1-2.

[23]"Soviet ambassador to Manila, Vadim Ivanovich Shabalin, took a crack at the sensitive issue by suggesting that the best way to achieve peace in the Asia Pacific region is for all foreign powers to dismantle their military bases in the area." Nick G. Beneza, "Soviet presence has RP jittery," *Philippine News*, 25-31 March 1987, p. 10

[24]US Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 1977, p. 12.

[25]Bernard Weintraub, *New York Times*, 14 August 1977, p. 14.

[26]Gannon, 1977, p. 1.

[27]Bowen, 1986, pp. 2-3. Analysts who talk of the Soviet Union obtaining military bases in the Philippines give no evidence that this is even a remote possibility. Thus, Owen Harries, writing in *Commentary* in 1985 (p. 52), states without fact or argument:

> It is by no means unlikely that a situation may develop, sooner rather than later, in which the American government and people will be faced with an excruciating choice: either to involve themselves in 'another Vietnam' in the same part of the world, or to reconcile themselves to seeing the reality and the symbolism of Cam Ranh Bay repeated in the case of Clark and Subic.

No known opponent of US bases in the Philippines has called for their replacement by Soviet bases. The New People's Army and its political allies are vigorous nationalists and, unlike the Vietnamese communists, extremely critical of the Soviet Union. Efforts by some sources to show a Soviet connection to the NPA have been unconvincing. See Rosenberg, 1985, for a telling refutation of Rosenberger, 1985. This is not to say, of course, that Washington could not engineer a self-fulfilling prophesy: if it took steps to isolate and destabilize a Philippines without US bases, it might be able to force it into Moscow's hands.

[28]Richard J. Kessler, "The US may not stay around to be kicked," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 August 1985, p. 28. Kessler apparently changed his view in 1986 when he declared that the bases were not vital to US security interests. (Kessler, 1986, p. 212.)

[29]McGwire, 1975, pp. 1074-76.

[30]Underhill, 1987, p. 575.

[31]Bonner, 1987, pp. 213-14, based on an interview with Richard Holbrooke.

[32]The list that follows is drawn from US Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1983, and Bowen, 1986. I do not specifically list communications functions, many of which are quite important, because they are subsumed under the five categories listed. Thus, for example, communications for naval units deployed in the Indian Ocean will be considered under the heading of power projection into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

[33]See Shalom, 1985, for documentation and discussion.

[34]The rather blase attitude of US officials toward the nuclear threat to the Philippines is indicated by the fact that a member of the Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee of the House denied that SS-20s could reach the Philippines (author's interview with Robert Torricelli, 11 June 1987, Hackensack, NJ). For evidence that the Philippines is within range and probably targeted, see Berman and Baker, 1982, p. 21; US Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1983, p. 70.

[35]See "Gorbachev Makes Proposal on Arms," *International Herald Tribune*, 20 May 1987; Yuri M. Verentsov, "Moscow's View on Eliminating Missiles," *New York Times*, 14 July 1987, p. A27.

[36]Francis Cevallos, *Manila Times*, 22 May 1987, p. 1, 6.

[37]Sophie Quinn-Judge and Robert Manning, "The missile message," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 August 1987, p. 10. See

also Nayan Chanda, "Phasing out the force," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 October 1987, p. 32.

[38]As is the case in Europe: see Daniel and Tarleton, 1986, p. 104.

[39]See Bello, 1983, pp. 10-11; Simbulan, 1985, pp. 217-30; 327-33. The US propaganda agency has stated that the Philippine bases "are of little significance in a nuclear exchange between the superpowers." "Nothing at Clark or Subic threatens the Soviet homeland." (USIS, 1986, p. 30.) This assertion disingenuously ignores the communications facilities and anti-submarine warfare assets located in the Philippines, essential for nuclear war-fighting.

[40]USIS, 1986, p. 30.

[41]Sullivan, 1987 p. 541. For a more detailed analysis of this point, see Shalom, 1987.

[42]Liberals and radicals in New Zealand "do not see the Soviet Union as the most troubling outside influence in the Pacific. That honor belongs to France, the only colonial power remaining in the region." (Hanson, 1987, p. 150.)

[43]LaFeber, 1980, p. 132.

[44]See in addition to the sources cited in Shalom, 1985: Fraser, 1970, p. 45; Connell et al., 1977, p. 6; US Committee on Foreign Relations, 1979, p. 163; Nivera, 1983, p. 127; Center for Defense Information, 1986, p. 4.

[45]Emmanuel, 1983.

[46]Hayes et al., 1986, p. 124.

[47]Hayes et al., 1986, pp. 124-25, 129-30; Michael R. Gordon, *New York Times*, 7 January 1986, pp. A1, A14; Stefanick, 1986; Arkin and Chappell, 1985. The Pentagon also views Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea as potential horizontal targets, meaning that the United States would consider attacking non-belligerents, including one (North Korea) that hosts no Soviet forces.

[48]Hayes et al., 1986, p. 124.

[49]Hayes et al., 1986, pp. 148-49.

[50]Richard J. Kessler, "The US may not stay around to be kicked," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 August 1985, p. 29. Kessler states that the US presence "is in part the reason why the Philippines is welcomed in the ASEAN Club." Noting that intra-regional economic links are weak in Southeast Asia, Kessler then declared without further explanation: "Take away the American relationship and the ties with the rest of Asia, the Philippines will be set adrift in the Pacific." The implication here is that without the bases the ties to Asia would have less in common with its neighbors than with the bases. This is certainly contrary to the widely held view that it is precisely the Philippines' special relationship with the United States that interferes with its fully joining Asia. For example, among the reasons advanced by Indonesian elites in the early 1970s for Jakarta rejecting military alliances was that it would "run the risk of ending up like the Philippines, a country with no real identity of its own." (Simon, 1982, p. 5. citing a study by Frank Weinstein.)

[51]See the cover of the publication of the party's Central Committee, *Ang Bayan*, May 1986.

[52]E. g., it does not take sides in the conflicts between Vietnam and Kampuchea and between Vietnam and China, hoping that "the countries concerned sit down at the conference table and settle their differences in a fraternal manner." (*Ang Bayan*, April 1985, p. 18.)

[53]See US Select Committee on Intelligence, 1985, pp. 7-8; Rosenberg, 1985, pp. 86-87; US Foreign Affairs Committee, 1986, pp. 24-25, 50, 56. Rosenberger (1985a; 1985b) has tried to make the case for Soviet - NPA ties, but it is a rather lame effort. Among the evidence he cites for a USSR-CPP connection is the fact that both oppose US policy in Nicaragua. (Rosenberger, 1985b, p. 137.) A. James Gregor told assembled specialists in February 1986 that there was evidence of outside support for the NPA, but when pressed his only substantiation was Rosenberger's article (1985b) (US Foreign Affairs Committee, 1986, pp. 15, 22.)

[54]In 1969, the administration had to assure Congress that "Although the dissidents have profited from the bases, they are not dependent on them. . . ." (US Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 1969, p. 355.) These dissidents, of course, were not the NPA, but today Bataan, near Subic Naval Base, is one of the insurgents' strongholds. See also a current report of rival communist-led rebel groups in Angeles City, near Clark Air Base: "HMB reported resuming armed operations," *Philippine News*, 107 April 1987 p. 6.

[55]US Foreign Affairs Committee, 1986, p. 94.

[56]Gordon, 1983, pp. 200-201. Gordon disagrees with the Asian perception. He writes:

> Reflecting precisely that spurious parity about which Secretary of State Haig has so bitterly complained in Europe, in the view of some Asians, US bases in the Philippines have somehow entitled the USSR to its presence in Vietnam. In this perspective, if the United States has bases at Clark and Subic, then who can complain about the (implicitly) equivalent Soviet use of Cam Ranh and Danang?" (p. 202)

Gordon is right to note the spurious parity, but it operates in the opposite direction: the Philippine bases are of much greater military significance than the facilities in Vietnam.

[57]Horn, 1985, p. 685.

[58]Viraphol, 1985, p. 69.

[59]Pauker, 1983, p. 12.

[60]David Barber, "Phasing out the force," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 January 1987, p. 15. Australian and British units were also stationed in Singapore until 1974.

[61]Quoted in Weatherbee, 1987, pp. 17-18.

[62]Underhill, 1987, p. 569.

[63]Simon, 1982, p. 59; Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 52

[64]Underhill, 1987, p. 566, citing a report by Robert C. Horn.

[65]Underhill, 1987, p. 566, citing a report by Mohamed Noordin Sopiee.

[66]Djiwandono, 1985, pp. 24-27. This is not just a debater's point. In the late 1950s the United States, from its bases in the Philip-

pines, supported rightwing rebels trying to overthrow Sukarno (Wise and Ross, 1964, pp. 145-56).

[67]Djiwandono, 1985, pp. 29, 33-34. In practice, of course, Indonesia is not as neutral between the United States and the Soviet Union as these comments imply. Economic ties with the West are much stronger than with the USSR (Simon, 1982, pp. 29, 31), military aid comes overwhelmingly from the West (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985, p. 132), and apparently favoritism is shown to US naval vessels in traversing the straits adjoining the Indonesian archipelago (Vertzberger, 1982, p. 15).

[68]Betts, 1985, p. 371, citing comments of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in late 1982.

[69]For discussion of ZOPFAN, see Saravanamuttu, 1984.

[70]Underhill, 1987, pp. 568-69.

[71]Muthiah Alagappa, "Securing a future for Southeast Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 March 1987, p. 23.

[72]Wanandi and Hadisoesastro, 1983, p. 96. Two years later Wanandi wrote that if in 1991 the Philippine government refused to renew the US military bases agreement, a phasing out of the bases could be arranged.

> Such a solution would certainly be acceptable to the rest of ASEAN, as long as the overall military balance of forces in the region can be maintained. After all, only if such a balance is preserved can ASEAN realize its aim of establishing a Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality in Southeast Asia. (Jusuf Wanandi, "Not so cut and dried as it is sometimes seen," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 November 1985, p. 61.)

[73]Keith Richburg, *Washington Post*, 16 August 1987, p. A24.

[74]Simon, 1985, pp. 386-87.

[75]Weatherbee, 1987, p. 18.

[76]Van der Kroef, 1986, pp. 63-64.

[77]Buszynski, 1983, p. 236. This is by no means an idiosyncratic view: "There is a strong conviction among many in Southeast Asia that it is the stalemated Indochina situation that is leading to a greater Soviet presence; as long as Hanoi has no options, it will continue to lean heavily on Moscow." (Horn, 1985, p. 687.)

[78]Murray Hiebert, "The subtlest hint," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 March 1987, p. 17.

[79]Chay O. Florentino, "SRV envoy urges removal of all bases in region," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 24 April 1987, p. 1, 8, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, IV, 27 Apr. 1987, p. 7 (I am grateful to Wicks Geaga for bringing this article to my attention.) See also Ellen Tordesillas, "US using Cam Ranh Bay to justify bases in RP," *Malaya*, 14 August 1987. A year earlier, Vietnamese officials called for a freezing of the superpower presence in the region. (Nayan Chanda, "Thach's new tack," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 April 1986, p. 48.)

[80]For a Chinese view on Kampuchea, see Guoxing, 1986, pp. 983-85.

[81]Indorf, 1984, p. 28.

[82]Fear of China by the nations of Southeast Asia has some legitimate sources and some illegitimate. Historically, China has sought to control the region, though one should also note that China's record of aggressiveness since 1954 has been much exaggerated (for discussion, see, for example, Chomsky, 1969, pp. 364-65n29). And Southeast Asian claims that Beijing uses the overseas Chinese population as a fifth column often hide the continuing discrimination suffered by ethnic Chinese in many of the region's countries.

[83]See Chang, 1979-80; Guoxing, 1986, pp. 985-86. China has also unofficially let it be known that it would raise no objection to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. (Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Milestone or mirage? " *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 March 1987, p. 16.)

[84]Simon, 1982, p. 60.

[85]Gordon, 1983, p. 201.

[86]See Guoxing, 1986, p. 981.

[87]Constantino, 1979; Vertzberger, 1982, p. 12.

[88]Olsen, 1981, pp. 272-273.

[89]See Chomsky and Herman, 1979 pp. 129-204; Chomsky, 1982, pp. 320-370. The invasion, sharply denounced by the UN General Assembly, is referred to by one scholar as the "suppression of separatist forces." (Simon, 1982, p. 44).

[90]Paul Lewis, *New York Times*, 8 October 1987, pp. A1, A16. This of course raises the danger of a potential US-Soviet condominium to control the Third World, but the two superpower probably have less power through the UN than they do in a free-for-all international environment, and superpower intervention, whether jointly or unilaterally, should be rendered less likely by the removal of foreign bases and a ZOPFAN prohibition against naval shows of force, etc.

[91]Susumu Awanohara, "The bear at the door," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 March 1987, p. 19. A nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia is favored by the USSR and opposed by the US.

[92]Bowen, 1986, p. 21. The study goes on to say that, if US bases were removed from the Philippines, there would be increased demands on Guam to support operations in Southeast Asia, which together with its Northeast Asian role, would place excessive burdens on it. Under the tradeoff proposal and same versions of ZOPFAN, however, the United States' Southeast Asian role would not be a factor.

[93]Connell et al., 1977, p. 29.

[94]Quoted in Steel, 1981, p. 15.

[95]Leslie Gelb, *New York Times*, 18 Apr. 1985, pp. A1, A8. For further discussion of the military balance in the Pacific, see Hamish McDonald, "The Cam Ranh bugbear," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 June 1987, p. 34; Arkin and Chappell, 1985; and the evidence collected in Hayes et al., 1986, pp. 291-320; Bellow, 1984, pp. 8-9. Experts know that the Soviet navy has improved, while its numbers have declined (Daniel and Tarleton, 1985, p. 90; Daniel and Tarleton, 1986, p. 98); the same logic should lead one to be very wary of propagandists who report only numbers of vessels in describing the US-Soviet military balance.

[96]". . . Some Japanese even tend to argue that Americans overstate the Soviet threat mainly as a prod to bring about a rise in Japan's defense budget." (Gordon, 1983, p. 201).

[97]Telephone interview with Yoshi Murakamie of *Asahi Shibun*, 3 March 1987. On the Bear, see Polmar, 1985.

[98]*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 17 Feb. 1986, vol. 22, no. 7, p. 218. The president never mentioned democracy in his reply.

[99]Author's interview with Robert Torricelli, 11 June 1987, Hackensack, NJ.

[100]Singh, 1987, p. 174. One scholar notes, "The irony is that the states most dependent on gulf oil appear the least interested in taking concrete steps to guarantee supplies...." (Byers, 1985, p. 98.)

[101]Hayes et al., 1986 p. 133.

[102]MccGwire, 1985, p. 405. A Japanese expert notes that sea power is of no use if the oil fields themselves are lost, and thus a Japanese naval presence in the Indian Ocean "could not address the types of threats that Japanese analysts fear most." (Tsurutari, 1985, p. 497.)

[103]MccGwire, 1975 p. 169-70; also p. 162.

[104]MccGwire, 1985, p. 405; Betts, 1985, p. 360.

[105]Daniel and Tarleton, 1985, p. 361. For other sources referring to the SLOC threat arising from the Soviet presence in Vietnam, see Richard Nations, "The reasons why," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 May 1985, p. 44; Derek Martin de Cunha, "A Moscow naval cordon around the 'Yellow Peril'," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 Sept. 1986, p. 29; USIS, 1986, p. 10. Bowen, 1986, p. 6; Fitzgerald, 1986, p. 51.

[106]Hamish McDonald, "The Cam Ranh bugbear," *Far Eatern Economic Review*, 18 June 1987, p. 34; Susumu Awanohara, "Crusading navigator," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 June 1987, p. 34. See also Gregor, 1984a, p. 6; Nayan Chanda, "American big stick," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1985, p. 48; Bowen, 1986, pp. 8-10; Bowen, 1987, p. 461.

[107]Chappel, 1985, p. 38; Hayes et al., 1986, pp. 306-08. And Soviet naval strategy – as judged from its ship construction and its naval activities – seems intended to defend Soviet territory and waters from US attack. (See Hayes et al., 1986, p. 295; Arkin and Chappel, 1985, pp. 484-85.) Even the construction of its first large modern aircraft carrier (the US has 13) will not give Moscow a significant power projection capability in this century. (Baker, 1985; Bill Keller, *New York Times*, 16 January 1986, p. 11.)

[108]See Ustinov, 1984, p. 120-22.

[109]In wartime, US control of Southeast Asian SLOCs would deny the Soviet Union access to the Persian Gulf from the Pacific (Bowen, 1986, p. 12). But a Soviet fleet bottled up in the Sea of Japan, with no forces stationed in Vietnam, would be unable to get to the Indian Ocean whether or not there were US bases in the Philippines.

[110]USIS, 1986, p. 10.

[111]MccGwire, 1985, p. 406; Leifer, 1983, pp. 21-22; Singh, 1987, p. 166; Underhill, 1987, p. 567.

[112]David Shipler, *New York Times*, 12 July 1987 p. E3; Paul Lewis, *New York Times*, 25 September 1987, p. A8.

[113]Vertzberger, 1982, pp. 6-7.

[114]Mcc Gwire, 1975, p. 73.

[115]Liefer, 1983, p. 22; Lehrack, 1985, p. 58; MccGwire, 1975, p. 1072; Grinter, 1980, p. 30; MccGwire, 1985, p. 404.

[116]Vertzberger, 1982, pp. 4-5; Leifer, 1983, p. 21; Underhill, 1987, p. 567.

[117]Simon, 1985, p. 379.

[118]See Mark Valencia, "ZOPFAN and navigation rights: stormy seas ahead? " *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 March 1985, pp. 38-39.

[119]Leifer, 1983, p. 17.

[120]Wise and Ross, 1964, pp. 145-56.

[121]MccGwire, 1985, p. 403.

[122]Vertzberger, 1982, p. 15.

[123]Hayes et al., 1986, p. 171.

[124]Cable, 1986, p. 38.

[125]Morland, 1986.

[126]Vlahos, 1986, p. 146.

[127]Quoted in Indorf, 1984, p. 22.

[128]Cottrell, 1985, p. 454.

[129]Cottrell, 1985, pp. 455, 457.

[130]Cottrell and Moorer, 1977, p. 35.

[131]Chomsky and Herman, 1979, passim.

[132]Kwitney, 194, p. 75.

[133]Chomsky and Herman, 1979, pp. 205-217, 105-106; Van Hollen 1, 1980.

[134]Singh, 1987, p. 168.

[135]Cottrell and Moorer, 1977, p. 65n19, quoting James Theberge.

[136]Singh, 1987, p. 170; Bill Keller, *New York Times*, 16 January 1986, p. 11. For a cogent analysis of the lawlessness involved in the US attacks on Libya, see Chomsky, 1986, pp. 129-74.

[137]E.g.: "The Soviet Navy tends to bring its ships out of port only for large, well-prepared maneuvers," a US Seventh Fleet intelligence officer said. "The United States Navy, by contrast, keeps at least half its fleet at sea on a constant round of maneuvers and port calls." (*New York Times*, 28 October 1985, p. A6).

[138]Hayes et al., 1986, pp. 145-150. As Paul Nitze put it, "To have the advantage at the utmost level of violence helps at every lesser level." (Hayes et al., 1986, p. 146.)

[139]Bukarambe, 1985, pp. 57-58.

[140]Bukarambe, 1985, pp. 52-53.

[141]Bowman and Lefebvre, 1985, p. 427.

[142]V.G. Kulkarni, "An ocean of conflict." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 April 1987, p. 44.

[143]Tsurutari, 1985, p. 498.

[144]Tsurutari, 1985, pp. 498-99.

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