

# SEC. RAUL MANGLAPUS

## on Philippine Foreign Policy

(Decades ago, Philippine Presidents and Cabinet Ministers would come to the University of the Philippines to defend before the Academe their policies and programs. It was through these dialogues that the University acquired the label as a "social critic." Seeking to revive this tradition, the Third World Studies Center, in close cooperation with the office of the President of UP, have embarked on a dialogue series called "Academe Meets Government." Starting with this issue, *KASARINLAN* shall publish the proceedings of these dialogues.)



I wondered on my way here what I was expected to tell you. I already have been through this engagement of the diplomatic Kapihan where the distinguished Ambassador from Bangladesh was present. There I was asked to develop a rather difficult subject on the contrast between dictatorship and democracy — having in mind, I think, that we have just begun the process by which we are supposed to hold this year, in June, a meeting in Manila of the newly restored democracies of the world.

In my last year of exile, which I spent at Harvard University, I had occasion to do a study commissioned by the Center for International Affairs at Harvard which, by the way, was the same Center where Ninoy Aquino was posted for a couple of years before he came back. I did a study on the countries that had experienced transition from dictatorship to democracy in the last 15 years. Of course, I was making judgments. I had to start with a judgment that a certain country was under authoritarian or dictatorial rule, and the second judgment was that country, at a certain point in its history, managed to return to democratic rule. I chose as my period for study the 15 years or so which began in 1973. At that time, I counted about 14 countries. Mind you, this was before the EDSA revolution. I was supposed to study these models so that I might draw up a model for the Philippines itself. Unfortunately, as I was writing my conclusions, the EDSA Revolution took place and events overtook my study. However, it is still proving to be useful to me in my position as Foreign Secretary because I now am able to comment a little more intelligently on events around the world and using this study as a kind of base, I have now gotten permission from President Aquino to hold this year this meeting of the recently restored democracies of the world.

I mentioned this to you because I think I am expected this afternoon to deal with foreign policy — the foreign policy of the Philippines. I can think of no other event than the ASEAN Summit which fortunately we were able to hold with considerable success last month. Even more than that, I think what is forthcoming in June might be important for all of you, for all of us to understand the posture which the Philippines would like to strike — not only for its own people but for the rest of the world.

If there is any message that we can gather from the EDSA Revolution, and I mentioned this to my audience this noon, it is this — that the Filipino people are determined to be democratic. They cannot be stable unless they are democratic. They cannot move forward unless they are democratic, and there is a suspicion that we may not be alone in the world in this determination. I think what happened in those other countries deserves our attention, and therefore in June, when we hold this meeting, we are looking forward to sharing experiences with these countries, to exchange views on how to solve the problems of the threats to stability, including such esoteric questions as the



external debt each of these countries has incurred, as we incurred, during their period of dictatorship.

We expect, therefore, in the second half of June the holding of this meeting, and we hope that it will enable us, Filipinos, to deliver a message to the world about the true character of the Filipino. As you know, there are other movements and there are other groups of nations around the world—in some of which we are not able to enter as full-fledged members. One of them, as I have mentioned in my talk just now, is the Non-Aligned Movement. In the Non-Aligned Movement, we are not accepted as a full-fledged member. We are only allowed in as observers for the obvious reason that we are still hosting foreign bases in our country. But in the June meeting, I hope that the Philippines will be able to deliver the message that it is engaged in an independent foreign policy. This initiative is our own and nobody else's. We have, of course, gathered in the Department of Foreign Affairs representatives from the countries that may be regarded as having experienced this transition but the initiative is ours and nobody else's. We deliver the message of being independent and being democratic and I can think of no better and more dramatic way of achieving this end.

This year, we are engaged in other matters that have to do with the objective — mainly the stabilization of our democracy. The ASEAN Summit, as you know, delivered that important message — that this country is capable of holding serious conferences of that kind and holding it successfully. As you know, when I assumed office last October, there were serious forebodings that were going around about the capacity of this country to hold such a meeting successfully.

It is not true, as others would like to say, that I am to be credited with having gotten that meeting held successfully. Actually, the meeting was prepared for many, many months before I assumed office. All the security arrangements, even the documents that were the subject of discussion in the Summit and that became official documents at the end of the Summit, were already in the process of being drafted in those months before my assumption of office. If there is any modest contribution I have made to the effort it is that I may have injected a little of my quixotic optimism and got a few people convinced, it could be done. I went around Southeast Asia and although publicly, the heads of governments of other states were not eager to make statements of doubt about our capacity to provide the Summit with security. Nevertheless privately, I knew from them that they had these serious doubts. I had to infect them with this quixotic optimism, and I'm proud to say that they did come, and they exceeded some of our expectations. Some of the heads of government of ASEAN went beyond what we were hoping they would say in expressing open concern for the stability of this Republic.

We are facing this year a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community, and the ASEAN in Dusseldorf, Germany. This will be held in the first week of May. In the meantime, we look forward to develop and strengthen our relations with Eastern Europe. I hope to make a trip to countries of Eastern Europe in the second half of this year. I have already enunciated the position of the Aquino government that this government will embrace all countries of the world, regardless of ideology. However, this country will never allow itself ever again to be embraced so tightly by any other government that its freedom and its dependence are stifled. This is the basic foreign policy that we hope the events of these years will be able to help us dramatize before ourselves and before the rest of the world.

As to the relationships that we obviously have with the United States, which are rather unique from the rest of the world, I would say there's a certain speech I delivered as a private citizen in 1986 and which I repeated as a Senator in 1987 in Singapore, five days after which I was appointed Foreign Secretary. That speech has been haunting me since then. I keep telling people that I didn't deliver that as a Foreign Secretary but they just won't have it that way. They want to hold me responsible for everything that I said before I became Foreign Secretary.

Well, let me tell you a little of what I said in that speech and relate it to the reality of our present policy towards the United States military facilities in the Philippines. In that speech which I first delivered at Fletcher School of Cambridge where, as some of you



may know, every year they have a meeting, a rather big meeting focused on a particular country. In 1986, it was the Philippines that was the focus. I was invited to go out there as a private citizen. I did not yet belong to the government. Vice-President Laurel was invited and he was there with Chief Justice Teehankee, President Angara of the UP, and other high level officials of the Philippines.

I was asked to speak on the bases, which are now euphemistically called "facilities" in the Philippines. The position that I took was as follows: I had seen before I left the Philippines, at that time, official material distributed by the United States Government saying that the military facilities that they operate here in the Philippines were for the benefit of the region. And that they were sure — that was not the word that they used but they declared it categorically — that the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia and the People's Republic of China wanted these bases to stay. Of course, they want them to stay in the Philippines. Having read that then, I used that as the basis of my speech at Fletcher, and I said as follows: If the United States facilities are here for the benefit of the region, and if the United States says that the region's countries, including the People's Republic of China, would like the bases to stay, the only prudent thing that the Philippines can do at this point, as it prepares to enter into new negotiations with the United States over these bases, is to verify whether indeed the position of the United States is accepted, as it says it is accepted, by the countries of Southeast Asia. If, indeed, the countries of Southeast Asia accept these facilities, then I would say it is time for us to sit down and discuss it as neighbors apparently concerned with the same thing, and determine what to do with them, if we want them to stay, then we should have a consensus on them, and perhaps later on even redistribute the facilities among ourselves.

What was the logic of that redistribution in addition to the fact that they are supposed to be for regional defense? The so-called choke points that the United States says it is protecting through these bases in Southeast Asia are not in the Philippines. There are three main choke points that these bases are supposed to protect. The Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits, both of which are in Indonesia, and the Straits of Malacca, which is bounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Since these are not in the Philippines, the question of course is obvious. The bases are in the Philippines — should they not be redistributed so that all may participate not only in the political responsibility for these bases, but also in the physical exposure that one acquires by hosting these bases? Then I said, if the region rejects this position of the United States then we should all get up together and go to the Americans and tell them to leave because the region apparently does not want them to stay, and they say they are here for the region.

In other conversations, I have tried to make an analogy. I say, I live in San Lorenzo in Makati and one day some soldiers came to my house saying that they would be happy to stay in my house and protect my house in exchange for a few things. But after a while they'd get up and say to me, "We are not here to protect your house, we are here to protect the whole San Lorenzo Village, and all of the residents of San Lorenzo Village want us to stay here in your house to protect them." I would say that the only prudent thing for me to do would be to go to the telephone and call up the San Lorenzo Village Association and ask them if indeed it was true that the village residents want the soldiers to stay in my house in order to protect the whole village. That was all that I was asking in my speech.

Five days after that, I was appointed Foreign Secretary. And all of a sudden, this speech begins to haunt me. They refuse to believe that it is not the position of the Philippine government. The position of the Philippine government is that we are holding our options open until 1991 on the termination of the Bases agreement. I then leave it up to you to judge whether in view of the sequence of events that I mentioned to you, I should continue to be haunted by this speech. Nevertheless, I am ready to answer questions in relation even to the speech, provided that it is understood when I answer them, I am not defending the speech as the policy of the Philippine government. The policy of the Philippine government is that we are holding our options open until 1991.



Having said that, I would like to complete the vision that I began to refer to in the opening of my talk — the vision that I personally have and I would like the Department of Foreign Affairs to participate in leading our country to. Thirty years ago, it was generally said that we were already No. 2 in East Asia in economic development. We were supposed to be No. 2 only to Japan. Now we are somewhere in the bottom. *Kulelat na lang tayo*. What happened in between? Of course, it is very tempting to dismiss the whole thing by blaming it all on Ferdinand Marcos — the stealing, the corruption, the mismanagement. He, indeed, deserves a large share of the blame. But, it is too convenient, and in my view dangerous, to lay that blame on the shoulders of one man and forget what others had told me to have been the case.

Somewhere along the line, I am told, even our entrepreneurs began to think more in terms of management and finance — in other words, profits, immediate profits at the expense of technology. In other words, long term planning and long term ambitions. The South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Singaporeans who were all behind us 30 years ago, are now ahead of us because they seemed not to have been guilty of falling into this trap. Yet, the Philippines today is back on track and we're on our way again. We have gained this year, or rather in 1987, a GNP rise which is probably superior to some countries in Southeast Asia. But it is not enough that we be content with advancing economically. It is my conviction that as we face the year 2000, and that is only 12 years away, we should look at ourselves as an economic power. What is an economic power? It is one — if you would like a simple definition — that ceases to be a trading partner of advanced countries and begins to be a trading competitor of those countries. South Korea crossed the line when it started to export to the United States, Europe, and Japan, not only vegetables, rice, wheat, lumber, and minerals but computers and automobiles.

We have in this country the same potential. I look back to Japan of the 1870's which was then an agricultural society. All of a sudden, they got on track: restoring the supremacy of the Emperor and the stability of the Kingdom, of the empire, and they went out sending their sons out to the rest of the world to bring back three things — constitutionalism, armed forces, and industry. In 30 years, that agricultural society defeated Imperial Russia on land and on sea. We, Filipinos, are way ahead of the Japanese of the 1870's. We have our Constitution, we have our armed forces, we have the beginnings of industry and we do not have to send out our people abroad to bring back all these things. They already have in possession not only sophisticated knowledge of history, of philosophy but of technology — in a position to transfer all their knowledge to Philippine soil for our growth, including the dollars that they are earning abroad.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, therefore, in facing its period of reorganization which begins this month, will keep this vision in view. We are creating assistant secretaryships for international trade and for technology to keep the Department of Foreign Affairs closer to the problems of national development and to tap those resources that are abroad among Filipinos, millions of whom are there, not only in the United States and Canada but in Europe and other parts of the world, who should now be listed not as liabilities but as assets. And I think that we can reorganize out there this act that has been provided us by the President and help ourselves achieve this goal of becoming an economic power by the year 2000.

I am happy to report to you that the audiences that I have addressed, of Filipinos who are abroad, accept this vision and if we all get together developing the political will to do it, we shall indeed be that economic power in the year 2000.

Thank you.

#### OPEN FORUM

**Prof. David:** Thank you very much, Secretary Manglapus. I am very certain that foreign policy will be a critical instrument for the actualization of that vision.

The first comments and questions will come from our three invited panelists: Dr. Francisco Nemenzo, Dr. Estrella Solidum, and Mr. Joseph Garcia.



May I call on Dr. Nemenzo first, who will have to be excused after giving his comments because of a very urgent appointment.

**Dr. Nemenzo:** I am sure all of you will agree with me in welcoming Senator Manglapus here. During the Marcos period, if you recall, officials of the government refused all invitations to come to U.P. So I hope this is an expression of what President Aquino calls transparency in her administration. In other words, *wala nang itinatago*.

I made a list of questions, Mr. Secretary, on the assumption that foreign policy should not be kept away from the people so that they can have their say on the making of foreign policy. One of the questions in my original list is, what is our concept of freedom in that slogan. In the acronym of ZOPFAN, the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality? How do we propose to carry that out, considering that our neighbors in the ASEAN are mostly ruled by authoritarian leaders? I am glad that we are planning to have a celebration of redemocratization throughout the world in June, but I hope we go beyond celebration and also do something about the repression of people and I am particularly concerned about the repression of intellectuals in other ASEAN countries. When Marcos was around, to a much less extent than you did, I also did my work in trying to get international support for the struggle of our people. But what have we done now that we have regained our freedom? What did we do when Malaysia started persecuting, imprisoning without trial, intellectuals and opposition politicians? It was like just a few months ago the situation in Malaysia was reminiscent of the Philippines in 1972. We would think it is what we do, how we respond to this that we define also concretely and in practice our concept of freedom in the acronym ZOPFAN.

Now, we also would like to know because up to now this seems to be a closely guarded secret — what really did we achieve in the Summit Meeting which we could not have achieved in a lower level and less costly encounter with our ASEAN counterparts? In other words, was the Summit Meeting really worth the \$60 million that we invested in hosting it? Because in so far as demonstrating our capability to secure the leaders of our neighboring countries is concerned, I think the effect was negative. I was in Singapore around that time and the impression that you got reading papers is the exact opposite — that it was a demonstration of the insecurity that prevails in our country. So, I suppose that the achievement of the ASEAN is more than just to demonstrate that we are capable of providing security, but up to now I do not know what we actually achieved which we could not have achieved without spending \$60 million.

Now, the US bases. I do not know why we have to ask our neighbors whether the bases are good for the region. Why don't we first ask ourselves whether the bases are good for us? Besides with the Americans saying that it is for the security of the region, it's very easy to dispute that. Their own definition of the operational zones of the 13th Air Force and the 7th Fleet — is not just Southeast Asia, it covers the whole of the Indian Ocean and Eastern Asia. So, it's not just Southeast Asia that is involved here. And what do we care if the rest of Southeast Asia and China would like to keep the bases on our soil if in our view the presence of these bases is readily an affront to our sovereignty.

Now, on the idea of redistribution, don't you think that would really exacerbate the tensions in the region? Just imagine how Vietnam would feel to be surrounded by countries with US bases. I think this is going to make the security situation much worse.

Now, since we are about to start this year our negotiations with the U.S. on the future of the bases, I am also interested in knowing what preparatory steps has our government taken to at least present a strong position? For example, have we done something about conversion studies? All the conversion studies I know have been done by private individuals who do not have any opportunity to actually go into the bases. We are just extrapolating from visible manifestations. But I would suppose if the government really wants to keep its options open, it should also investigate the option of termination and without wasting any time, take the trouble of collecting the data that we need in order to cope with the problem if at all we decide to terminate the Agreement by 1991.

We in the U.P. are particularly interested in knowing what the government is doing about the "No-Nukes" provision in our Constitution. Is there any step taken to imple-



ment this or at least, to create the machinery that would implement this provision? Or are we willing to just keep that provision as a dead letter clause in our basic Charter?

Now, I was also wondering about the report saying that you would like to set conditions for the use of the bases in the future. I suppose this is part of our negotiating position. Don't you think that we are all throwing away our ace? Because the Americans would interpret that to mean that we want to keep the bases here, we just want to set conditions on how the Americans would use these bases.

But the second question is even more fundamental. Suppose they agree to a set of conditions. Do you think we have the means to enforce it? Do you think there is a way by which we can restrain the Americans from using their bases in the Philippines as springboards for intervention anywhere in the Indian Ocean? Do we have the means to enforce it if all that we ask for are a set of conditions or are we just going to trust the words of the Americans?

Well, anyway, these are some of the questions that were bothering me even before I came.

**Prof. David:** Thank you, Dodong, May I now call on Dr. Solidum.

**Dr. Solidum:** Thank you Professor David. First of all, I'd like to congratulate Senator Manglapus for his desire to tell the truth to everyone and have his position transparent to all so that he may not be misunderstood. I think that everyone would like to be in such a position and for that matter, Dr. Nemenzo has raised the most stirring questions to be answered with such candor.

Having said this, I would like to add a few questions that have come to my mind to add to Dr. Nemenzo's and I would like to focus really on the forthcoming military bases negotiations, both in 1988 and the fate of the Military Base Agreement in 1991. I would like to know, for example, if the President's statements at the ASEAN Summit and elsewhere after that, regarding the usefulness of the Philippine factor, which means to say the military base here being used by the American military, is already a policy? The second question I would like to ask is: Would the President be making a similar statement in spite of the realities of the disharmony between the Military Bases Agreement and our constitutional provisions?

The third question is: We know that there are statements made by American officials to the effect that the US military presence in our bases are for protecting American interests, and if any aggression occurs that does not affect American interests, the US will not get involved. The question on this is, whether or not the spirit of the military bases — the mutuality concept in the Military Bases Agreement — is violated by this?

And then it comes to my mind if there is really a harmony between the strategic policy of the United States with Philippine defense and security. As far as we know, these concepts have meanings that are different for each of the parties, and secondly, we know that in this asymmetrical relation between the Philippines and the United States, the American concept of mutuality cannot stay. In light of this then, we can see that the Philippine policy cannot be harmonized if we let the military bases stay — even with revised provisions. This will be hard to harmonize with the commitments of the Philippines to ASEAN. And with regards to these bases called "Philippine Factor" by President Aquino, we tend to think like the Americans do, that these bases are good for regional security, particularly the security of ASEAN partners. I think that it is not ethical and not political for us to tell them what they need, but we should wait for them to say whether they really think so, that it is good for their security or not. I am reminded here of Aristotle's statement that the better judge of the feast is not the cook but the guest.

Finally, I would like to say that when we look at the Military Bases Agreement in 1988 and before 1991, we should see whether the claim of the United States that their military presence here in our bases has a deterrent effect is true or not, because for 40 years, the US military has been in our bases and the Soviet strength has in fact increased their Pacific Fleet which is the fourth largest in the world and is their best fleet. In fact, maybe it is not correct to agree with the United States that the US military presence here has deterred Soviet aggression because this kind of logic does not



recognize that the Soviet Union has an initiative to exercise whether or not it wants to commit an aggression.

These are the few questions that come to my mind about the military bases which the Secretary of Foreign Affairs will tackle soon. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

**Prof. David:** Thank you very much Professor Solidum and I now call on Joseph Garcia.

**Mr. Garcia:** When the Honorable Secretary was giving his enlightening insights about our foreign affairs or at least, the direction of our foreign affairs, I could not help but think that he was talking about the Foreign Affairs Department of another country. First, he said that the initiative or at least, the perception is that the initiative of achieving an independent foreign policy is ours. But as I recall past events, that isn't so because we are not taking the initiative. And secondly, when he said that the basic policy of the government is to embrace all countries of the world regardless of ideology — again with the recent comments of the President — I couldn't see how this is our basic foreign policy.

I have here a prepared statement. Here, I reflect on past events and policies, comments by the President herself, etc. So, this is quite a divergent view from Mr. Manglapus' insight.

EDSA initiated a new government. It was shouldered by a mass democratic movement clamoring for change. For a moment of glory Filipinos basked in the international limelight for serving as a model for a new era of change in Third World countries suffering under dictatorships. Indeed, the February Revolution served as a symbol of hope for struggling democratic movements, particularly in Southeast Asia. For a moment, the Filipino people and their leaders become beacons of freedom to the world, even surpassing that freedom which the Liberty Statue symbolized.

For a moment and for once, the Philippines truly became the showcase of a new kind of democracy in Asia. However, momentary events were offset by a resurrection of conventional diplomacy as the government discontinued to rely upon the people which carried it to power. Its political will to defend its own revolution became a mendicant resolution to hobnob with the same forces who propped up the Marcos dictatorship. So much for the Filipinos as the harbingers of liberation upon which other struggling peoples pin their hopes.

An early perception that came with the advent of a new government was that, hopefully, the string of relations that tied us to a superpower would soon be a thing of the past. History tells us that our country's foreign relations have mostly served as an extension in safeguarding the United States' strategic interests in the Asia Pacific Region. Special friendly relations with such a foreign power meant nothing but the domination of almost every sphere of Filipino life by interests opposite to our own.

Comments by the President herself have yet to show a change in the old policies that have kept our nation in the position of a client state. Her comments regarding the need to maintain the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific Region implies the shift of official attitude towards the question of whether to retain or dismantle the US bases in the Philippines. Does this cliché, presidential harking, mean a non-categorical acceptance of renegotiation and eventual retention of the bases?

It is essential for any analysis of foreign policy to take into account as a major factor the underpinnings of an international phenomena, known as US imperialism and its surrogate manifestation — political interventionism. An understanding of this hostile phenomenon and subsequent acceptance by the major foreign policy makers as a hindrance to progress could well mean the advent of a new foreign policy program. Otherwise, a continuation of the hypocritical line of friendly foreign relations vis-a-vis national interests would simply preserve a foreign policy without the US embassy officials meddling, the President was quoted as saying and I quote, "If America intervenes, let her intervene for good." It was an elegant distortion of the concept of friendly foreign relations and quite a word for national sovereignty.

Aside from rubbing elbows with the dictators and the authoritarian leaders of the other five ASEAN nations, the President's performance in the ASEAN Summit perfectly



displayed the faltering determination of a government to pursue its national interest and its ambivalent pronouncements of economic aid from the United States.

Regardless of the call for a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, the President declared her affirmation of the black and white view of international alignments and, for that matter, the annoying delineation of international relations between the red and the red, white, and blue.

We hope that this outlook hasn't yet streamed down to the other levels of her administration. Ultimately, the determination of future policies indeed rests in part in the hands of the Foreign Secretary himself. But as long as the bankrupt policies of the past dictatorship continue to find their way within the government and as long as the ghost of Doy Laurel continues to haunt the Foreign Affairs Department, we will never have a truly independent foreign policy. Furthermore, the Foreign Affairs Secretary, or any government official for that matter, should always open channels for democratic consultation like this forum for example — with different sectors, nationals, groups, and individuals. Without sustained support or pressure from the people themselves, foreign policy may even epitomize the Aquino administration's faltering commitment to genuine independence. Instead of becoming the staunch defender of national sovereignty, our foreign policy may just be a stage version of it — that, if we have any foreign policy at all.

I would like to ask just two questions. First, amid all these statements coming from the President, do we have a clear and defined foreign policy or just a simple wait-and-see attitude vis-a-vis the United States' policy of show-and-tell, meaning they show us what they can do and thereafter, tell us what to do? And secondly, since the message of EDSA was that the people wanted to virtually democratize every aspect of their political life, is there any action coming from the Foreign Affairs Department, or other government extensions for that matter, to proceed with a mass education campaign regarding the U.S. Bases?

**Prof. David:** Thank you very much, Joseph. I forgot to mention that Joseph is a third year student of Philosophy and is head of a student organization called "Student Union for Reforms and Genuine Emancipation". You have some time to answer some of these or all of these questions which have been raised, Mr. Secretary. If you would like to review them, I can do so.

**Sec. Manglapus:** I'm sorry that my friend Dodong had to go. I did have a few answers to his very good questions. One I would like to dismiss very quickly because this is a pure question of fact. It is said, I think if I can remember correctly, that we spent 60 million dollars. It is closer to one million, because we spent close to 20 million pesos, including costs of the cars which will be resold anyway, now that they are no longer used. Twenty millions pesos, which is equivalent to one million dollars.

Regarding the question he said on what was achieved at the Summit that could have perhaps been achieved on lower levels? I would like to reply this way: Summit meetings anywhere in the world today can in fact have results that could be achieved on lower levels, including the Gorbachev and Reagan Meeting last December. You know, of course, that the papers that were issued during the Gorbachev-Reagan Meeting were already prepared by the time that Reagan and Gorbachev met at the White House. That is the way diplomacy is conducted nowadays. The papers and all of the discussions are done before the meeting is held. Now why is the meeting held at the summit? The obvious reason is the impact that is created by the summit meeting. Gorbachev's coming to the United States seen by the American people as he is — an obviously intelligent and sharp human being — contributed immensely to the understanding of the Soviets as they are. And the same thing happened, of course, on the other side because Reagan was televised via satellite to the Soviet Union. That could not have taken place if the meeting had been held only even on the Foreign Minister's level between Shultz and Szczevardnadze. There would not have been the same public interest that was aroused by the meeting of Gorbachev and Reagan.



That is the philosophy behind all summit meetings everywhere in the world today. There was a summit meeting in Venice of the so-called seven advanced nations of the world. That could have been held on economic minister level or even on bureau director level. Because all of the papers that were discussed were already prepared by the time they all met in that island of Venice. But again, Reagan, Thatcher, and the Prime Ministers of England, Italy, and Germany, they all went there — including Nakasone at that time, because they wanted to deliver the message to the world that the heads of government and the states were in fact interested in peace and progress for the rest of mankind. That cannot be done on lower levels and the additional dollars that may be required sometimes for raising the level of a meeting to the summit meeting is justified by the tremendous difference in the impact that can be created at the summit.

Mr. Nemenzo asked if the word freedom in ZOPFAN could be reconciled with the fact that freedom is not really exercised in full in some countries of Southeast Asia. ZOPFAN of course means Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. I think that when this was proposed in 1971 by Tun Abdul Razak in Kuala Lumpur, the word freedom was more identified with the word independence. The Southeast Asians have been passionately aware of foreign intervention and, above all, they were concerned with national freedom and I think that is what the context was when this was used and I agree with Prof. Nemenzo, that indeed many countries around the world — not only in Southeast Asia — are failing us in the observation of human rights.

Regarding the preparatory steps for review of the U.S. facilities agreement, we do have them. He asked whether we were already studying problems of conversion of Subic and Clark to peaceful and civilian uses. We do have those studies being undertaken by the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Senate is also, I think, undertaking its own studies. We do have plans to take this up, you know, in other agreements between the United States and European countries, for instance.

The question of termination and what happens to the improvements on the bases are meticulously and specifically taken up. For instance, in Subic today you have facilities there. What happens if the United States should decide to dismantle them and just take them away? There is nothing in our agreements that seem to prevent them from doing so. In agreements of other countries with the United States, the latter *cannot* dismantle improvements they have put in *without* the consent of the host country. And when they leave, according to the agreement, they should leave these improvements if the host country want them to say.

Regarding the "No-Nukes" provision in the Constitution, we are very much aware of that. As a matter of fact that could be one of the matters taken up in the review. I should remind everyone that there is in existence a draft treaty for Southeast Asia declaring Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. The only reason why it has not yet moved forward is because the ASEAN countries believe, we are told, that this cannot move forward unless we bring in to accede to the treaty other countries outside of ASEAN — for instance, Burma and the Indo-Chinese countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.

It is not true that we in the Department of Foreign Affairs are publicly talking about conditions to be imposed on the bases once they are reviewed. If we did that, we would be violating our own rule that we are holding our options open until 1991. We are not talking about conditions because that would sound very much like we are intending to keep the bases and the option is not yet decided upon.

With regard to Professor Solidum, if I may continue, she took note of the fact that the President of the Philippines in her opening statement at the ASEAN Summit made mention of the so-called Philippine factor in the protection of the air and sea lanes of Southeast Asia for the benefit of the countries in the region, as well as for the benefit of Japan, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China because it is their ships with their imports, supplies, and raw materials that pass through these lanes. May I point out the fact that the President *specifically* was careful to say, to use the words or the language, "*It is said.*" In other words, she was not asserting as her own position that the Philippines hosting these bases was *or is* instrumental in protecting these air and sea lanes. She said, "*It is said,*" obviously referring to the United States. The United States



says so but as Professor Nemenzo points out, and as I pointed out in my speech which is *not* policy because I said it before I was appointed Foreign Secretary, we should not take the United States' word for it. That is why when I went around Southeast Asia, even when I delivered that speech, I was asking, *not* telling, the countries "What is your reaction to this position of the United States, so that we might be guided accordingly?"

You did mention, Professor, that we seemed to be telling our regional partners what to do. But let me say again that we were not telling them, we were asking them, and that when I asked them I was not Foreign Secretary. Therefore, the Philippine Government was not doing the asking, it was Raul Manglapus as a private citizen that was doing the asking in that speech.

I think there were a couple of other points about mutuality. I wonder if you meant that whether we believe that there should be mutuality in our relationship with the United States or was it with the ASEAN countries?

**Prof. Solidum:** With the United States.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Yes, we certainly believe in mutuality. That is the reason why we are holding our options open until 1991. We believe that the events between now and 1991 may make the difference. We are viewing the bases in the totality of our problems, including our national external debt problem. We cannot divorce one problem from another, and I think it would be impolitic or unwise for the President to divorce these problems from each other. In viewing the bases, they should be taken in the context of the totality of our problems and that is, I think, the reason why the President of the Philippines has adopted the policy of holding our options open until 1991.

The Military Bases Agreement and our Constitution indeed has provided that there should be no nuclear weapons in our territory. In some areas of the world, there have been compromises between the "No-Nuke" position and the existence of the bases. As you are aware in some countries, I think like Spain, what they have provided for is that there should be no nuclear arms on land. However, when ships call on the ports or on the naval bases, questions are not asked whether they carry nuclear arms or not. In any case, the argument is made even by the Indonesians, who are against any bases at all, that nowadays, any nuclear warfare is expected to be carried out mostly from water-based craft, notably submarines. Therefore, in effect, the "No-Nuke" ban on land may not in the end prevent nuclear warfare.

With regard to Mr. Garcia's points, I don't remember the President of the Philippines commenting on the need to maintain a balance of power in Southeast Asia. If she has, then it escaped me. I agree that we should keep channels open for dialogue with the people. That is the reason why I was late here this afternoon because I was trying to keep another channel open, with the Ambassador of Bangladesh present there, in the Philippine Plaza.

He asks whether there is a clear and defined policy on the part of the Philippines and not just a following of the United States' show-and-tell policy. As I said, the policy that we are maintaining, of keeping our options open, is a perfect act of independence because it conforms, it seems to me, to a posture of independence when we say we don't commit ourselves but we will decide in our own time what to do. Let me tell you that, as is true in all bargaining affairs, the other side is desperately trying to seek information from us, advance information. And you can be sure that somebody may even be taking notes of what I'm saying here to turn it over to the Americans to see whether they can discover some points that they might use against us in the forthcoming bargaining. But that is what diplomacy is all about. That is why there are intelligence agents on every side. We also want to know what the Americans are planning. I think I now have an idea of what they're planning because while they were trying to dig into me, I was also digging into them.

This morning, a congressman came to talk to me — Congressman Solarz. Yesterday, there were several senators who came to me and I think that these visits were very useful to them. But let me assure you, they were very useful to us because they give us ideas. First of all, you saw that the senators who came to see me yesterday were not united at all in their position towards the linking of the bases with the money question.



Senator Melchor said, "Yes, I want to give more money to the Philippines, the other guy said, "No, I don't want to talk about money when I talk about the bases, they should be separated." This is very useful information for us and it would not have reached us if they had not called on me yesterday and had stayed away from my office.

So, this whole matter of bargaining and independence, I think, is a matter of attitude. I think we are all quite convinced in the Aquino government that whatever position we take on the bases must be in the national interest. Now, what is the national interest? That is something that not only the President, not only the Foreign Secretary decide (and Mr. Garcia, I thank you for comparing me favorably with my predecessor). It is not only the Foreign Secretary that makes policy: the Foreign Secretary *carries out* policy. I certainly not only have to share with the President — since we now have a working tripartite system with the Congress, particularly the Senate that has the power to ratify. And now, of course, in the new Constitution, even the people are involved in foreign policy making because, as you know, under that Constitution, the Congress may call for a referendum on the results of the treaty-making process that we will undertake with the Americans. Thank you very much.

**Prof. David:** I was just wondering, Mr. Secretary, I am aware that we invited you to come to the University as Secretary of Foreign Affairs and not just as Raul Manglapus.

Somebody commented before you arrived that you were a freer person when you were in exile, and we even liked you better when you were Senator. But as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, some people observed you were taking positions that were totally uncharacteristic and inconsistent with your previous political history. I was wondering if you would not answer questions addressed to Raul Manglapus as a person. If you would, wonderful. Then this particular channel is open until five o'clock. Please keep your comments and questions very short so that we can take advantage of the time of Secretary Manglapus.

**Dr. Lallana:** I'm concerned about whether or not we're really implementing the nuclear-free zone declaration in the Constitution. Last week, I received from the U.S. Information Agency a pamphlet called "Background on the Bases," and in the question and answer part, referring specifically to nuclear weapons at the bases, this is how they responded and I quote: "The MBA also obligates the United States to inform the Philippines about the numbers, equipment and weapons system of the U.S. forces in the Philippines, and to advise the Philippines of any major changes in the status."

What I would like to know is has the U.S. been informing us whether in fact there are nuclear weapons in the bases, and if there are, what are we doing about it?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Let me just comment. Would you mind showing me the cover of that edition? Was that the one I got before the New Constitution was passed or is that a newer edition?

**Dr. Lallana:** This is a newer edition.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Oh, okay. This is one thing that we have to clear up in the review. The United States' position has always been — in answer to questions like, "Do you have nuclear weapons?" — neither to confirm nor to deny. Now, do we have examining rights as the host country? The only section of the Clark and Subic installations that may not be inspected by the Philippines is the cryptographic section. That is to say, where they encode their messages. They alleged as the reason, which sounds reasonable, that they cannot share their code with us. So, if they are going to hide any nuclear weapons, it must be in the coding office. I doubt whether that is possible because nuclear weapons are fairly large in size, and we are assured by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which by the way as you know, are in control of the bases. In other words, it is more than just language to say that these are now Philippine bases because I have been to them when the senators have been there. The camp is in a Philippine camp. All the guarding is done by Filipinos and we are told by the Armed Forces that they conduct periodic examination of the bases and that they have not seen any nuclear warheads.

Let me repeat, however, what I mentioned about arrangements with other countries by the United States where they have gotten around this problem by saying, "Okay, no



nuclear weapons on land, but we don't talk about ships that come into port because they will only stay for awhile and then leave again." And if you add to that what I already said — the accepted notion, it seems, that both the Soviet Union and the United States in a nuclear clash, would not be launching their warheads from land, but from water, probably submarines — then you can see how some compromising can be done in this regard.

**Prof. Gonzales:** Well, I'm very glad to be here again to meet you, Raul. When you were in the Senate, you were very much interested in science, and now I'm happy to hear you again say that you would put a section in the Department of Foreign Affairs on science because this is very necessary. You see, you and Dodong Nemenzo mentioned freedom, and you, perhaps, distinguished two types of freedom — freedom of nations vis-a-vis nations, and freedom of people within the nation.

Now Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan even with authoritarian governments are able to produce some freedom because of industrialization. Because of that, the people have jobs and more or less have some freedom. But I think you believe that we can produce industrialization without being an authoritarian country, and prove to the world that we could do that by being democratic. People have asked me about this and I said Raul has been an advocate of industrialization. When I was in the Philippines, he said he even wants motor cars. Isn't Raul the one who produced a law on agricultural reform? Now, may I ask you, do you make a distinction between the comprehensive agrarian reform program and your law so that if somebody asks, we can say that you are not responsible for exaggerations?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Thank you for bringing that up because I've been waiting for a chance to make this clarification. There is in place today an Agrarian Reform Code which is the source for the legal existence of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank and other institutions.

I have the privilege of having sponsored that law when I was in my first term in the Senate. Now, the difference between that law and what is forthcoming as CARP is simply this — that the original law which is now in place and under which land titles have already been distributed to tenants covered only rice and corn. There was strong opposition at that time from the coconut people and therefore, the coconut was not included. The main thrust of that law which I sponsored was the breaking up of the tenancy system. Now sugar — most of the sugar lands are not tenanted. They are cultivated by what is called as the daily wage administration workers. That is how most of the Negros and a lot of Tarlac lands escaped the scope of the original Land Reform Law which is now in place. Now, CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) will hopefully, if passed as drafted, cover coconut, sugar and crops other than the rice and the corn which are already covered by the law that I got to pass. That is the main difference between the first law and this one.

Of course, since there is a bigger population now, there will be probably a smaller retention limit in the law. The law that I sponsored had a rather large retention limit because, at that time, the calculation of the Department of Agriculture and those who drafted the law — one of whom was your cousin, Sixto Roxas — calculated that it was possible to allow a bigger retention limit. I discovered, by the way, much to my interested surprise that in Yugoslavia, the retention limit is bigger than what is now being planned in the CARP here. Probably, because there are less people and more land in Yugoslavia.

**Prof. Gonzales:** Just one announcement. Raul, when I left the Philippines you were very much interested in automobiles. When I was at MIT before I came back to the Philippines, they have produced a model for use of superconductivity so that it is possible that in ten years, gasoline will not be used.

**Prof. David:** May I call on Dean Arcellana.

**Dr. Arcellana:** Thank you, Randy. First allow me to congratulate the organizers of this exercise. There are those who minimize the importance of Philippine bases, of American military facilities in the Philippines. I think that even submarines have limits of



range in their operations and therefore, being berthed in Subic will be much more convenient than being berthed in Hawaii or even in the Pacific Coast of the United States, which would be seven thousand miles away. So, I think that whether or not the next war is fought by means of the nuclear weapons from submarine would not minimize the importance of Subic and Clark in the Philippines. So I would like to take exception to that statement.

Also, when the United States would neither confirm nor deny as a matter of plain coyness about what they have in our own territory, don't you think that it is something like appealing to the fifth amendment that I refuse to answer because I might incriminate myself? I think, in effect, to neither confirm, nor deny is to confirm. Think about it, because if there weren't any such in our territory in these bases, so-called military facilities of the US in Philippine territory, they would certainly *very strongly deny it* because they are known for not telling lies. Remember Washington and the Cherry tree? It's part of the American value system. We hope that hasn't changed over the centuries.

But when Mr. Hays who had specific command of American forces here in the Far East says that they cannot abide the constitutional provision on no-nuclear-weapons, what does that mean? They cannot abide it? Does that mean they cannot live with it, therefore, we have to change our constitution or that they have to impose whatever they have against our constitutional provision? And they certainly can do it because if they use the power that they used in the bombing of Libya two years ago, I think that they can very well do it. But whether they should do it is another question. I think the Filipino people must exert its will, its political will through our Foreign Affairs Department and through the Office of the President to tell them that "You cannot do this and get away with it. The Filipino people will not allow you." And this would be a matter of popular will.

Another question, when the President says keep our options open until 1991, that was a very good campaign gimmick when she was running for the Presidency and I agreed with her completely because she must keep her cards close to her chest. Alright, but after becoming President, I think that she owed it to the Filipino people as well as to the United States of America to say exactly what she intended during her term. Now, you might say that it wouldn't be so smart to say so. I think that it would be pretty smart to do so. Why? And she could have announced it at EDSA, you know, with the proclamation of our revolution. Why? Because at that time, the world was at her feet. She could have done anything. She could have served notice on the bases, the United States would have started packing. Why didn't she? Perhaps, this is the only way we can pursue an independent foreign policy.

Just one little comment on the Marshall Plan. Congressman Solarz spoke about this, just after the revolution, and I was wondering what happened to it: Whatever happened to it? It turns out that it is another ace in the hole for the further retention of the bases.

Next, the last question. I would like very optimistically to believe with Secretary Manglapus about our becoming an economic power by the year 2000. I hope and pray so. Now, the question is: Shall we become an economic power under the aegis of the United States, as a client of the United States under a Marshall Plan? Or can we really be independent as a country and really pursue the policy that promotes the interests of Filipinos and Filipinos alone? Thank you.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Thank you for your favorable review of my play "Manifest Destiny", which is renamed for Philippine consumption "Yankee Panky '98." Let me say that it is going to be restaged in early March, at the Rizal Theater. I'm hoping that students will be able to come. Otherwise, I may suggest that the troupe come here and stage it in the U.P. I should say with some pride that they are considering it for off-broadway staging this year in New York.

In connection with your comparison of the Philippines with the British in Hong-kong, just note in passing that we're probably unfortunate that we come under the United States rather than the British. The British today are in the sunset of their power.



and we're unlucky in having to deal with America that is still at the height of its power, in competition with the Soviet Union, and therefore a little more difficult to deal with since she still feels her muscles strong. The British have decided once and for all that they are no longer a power, and are a lot more eager to leave Hongkong than the United States to leave her military positions in Southeast Asia.

I agree with you that the time has come that President Aquino should come up with her position on the bases. May I plead, however for a little patience since even the Senate has to be consulted on this matter. We had a meeting in Malacañang recently, attended by Senate President Salonga and Speaker Mitra and myself, and it is obvious that the Senate and even the House would like to have a say. And I think they are entitled to under our Constitution. Therefore, what we're doing now is that we are preparing the guidelines for setting up a Preparatory Committee which will be participated in by both the Executive and the Legislative — although, of course, we are called upon to check and balance each other by the Constitution. Nevertheless, in matters of importance of this kind, I think it is useful for both the Executive and Legislative to have, if possible, the same stand and that is what we are going to try to achieve when we form this Preparatory Committee.

**Prof. David:** Thank you very much, Sir. Is there any question from the students? I have some questions here, apparently they come from students who've written them down.

**Student:** Sir, as you yourself said a while ago, as a member of the Cabinet, you have to know the government's line regarding the US bases. So, I understand as Foreign Affairs Secretary, since the line of the government is that we have to keep our options open until 1991, your line also would be to keep the options open until 1991.

But, Sir, if I remember correctly also years before February uprising, you were campaigning with Corason Aquino herself and Ninoy Aquino for an anti-bases position. So, Sir, I would like to ask you now as Raul Manglapus, what is your personal stand regarding the US bases?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Now, the position that the exile movement in the United States took was to get the United States to stop military aid to the Philippines. If I remember correctly, we did not as a movement demand the immediate removal of the bases. We did, however, touch on this point when we looked at the bases and said, this is the reason why the United States seems to be continuing to support the Marcos dictatorship. The bases are there. But beyond the dictatorship, we did not say whether the bases should stay or not. We did demand, Ninoy Aquino, and Cory herself, and all the members of our government, the immediate stopping of military aid to the Marcos dictatorship.

**Prof. David:** There are related questions to that one. Senator Manglapus, you were one of the few people I voted for during the senatorial elections principally because of your anti-bases position. As the new Foreign Affairs Secretary, do you still stand by the same principles? What is your own personal position on the US bases? Are you still for the ouster of the U.S. bases?

One, what is your personal position regarding the retention of US military bases? As Secretary of Foreign Affairs, will you be amenable to initiate a nationwide dialogue regarding the acceptability of bases among Filipinos?

The U.S. claims that the presence of their bases in the Philippines provides stability and security to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region. Isn't it rather the other way around — that the bases' presence provides instability and insecurity to the region?

What does it mean when it is said that the Philippines has control over the bases? What does control mean? How much control do we have over them? Does it mean we have power to mobilize their facilities, arms, weapons, etc.? Do we have power to refuse entry of more weapons, for example?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Let me answer that last question first. Under the Agreement, we do have some say in the use of the bases for military action outside of the Philippines. If you remember during the Vietnam War, the Philippine government took action so that there would be no military use of the bases in relation to the Vietnam War. The answer to the question, am I for or against the bases? It is not possible for me at this point to



divorce myself from my position as Foreign Secretary. But let me say that before I was appointed Foreign Secretary, I did take a position that these bases serve to continue the American father image, and I've always felt that the American father image should be cut down to, not just brotherly, but even cousinly size, and that was my position before I became Foreign Secretary. My present position is that we are holding our options open until 1991.

**P.N. Abinales:** Two things, sir. One with regard to the issue of regional security. Does the Philippines accept the idea of regional balance of power? Because if it does, then therefore, it falls into the diplomatic game of these two super-powers fighting each other. But if it does not, then why don't we just negotiate directly with the perceived threats to the region — which is essentially the Soviets based in Cam Ranh — and say "Okay, we want our bases removed and we would like you to remove your bases." I think that the Vietnamese are in the position to agree to that, having won their war against the Americans. I'm sure that the Vietnamese are still in a position to assert their independence even against their Russian comrades.

The second one is, I feel that your response to the question of Dr. Nemenzo on freedom was inadequate — *kulang* — because the point here is that we are a government, set up by a democratization process looked upon not only by governments in the region but also by their peoples. Yet, we have decided to play the rules of the game by which a previous dictatorship abided in terms of regional relationship. We have decided to go visit these dictatorships in the South Asian region and we have kept quiet about continuing attacks of these autocratic, authoritarian regimes on its peoples.

I would like to think that a distinct part of the democratization in the Philippine government contradicts the very basis of this government. Can you tell us what was the response of the government to one, the arrest of Malaysian intellectuals and opposition leaders; and second, the massive arrest conducted by the Singaporean government on a group of socially committed Christians who wanted social reform in their society and even going to the extent of accusing Filipinos of helping foment this so-called 'Marxist threat' within Singaporean society. We did not even react to the accusation of the Singaporean Minister accusing Edicio dela Torre of having fomented the Singaporean conspiracy.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Yes, I started that when the word "Freedom" was used in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration to which we were signatory in 1971, it is obvious to me as I read the Declaration that Tun Abdul Razak's intent was to equate that word freedom with national independence. That is the way it was worked into the documents and that is the way it was signed.

Now, there are ways of helping the human rights movement in Southeast Asia as well as other parts of the world. Sometimes, a government as *government* is not able to undertake activities that may be undertaken by NGO's or private organizations. Certainly, as an exile, for example, since I was not in office, I felt free to associate myself with other groups in exile who were for the restoration of democracy in South Korea, for example, in Cuba and other places. That certainly is something that I felt had to be done if I were to be consistent with the aims of our Movement for a Free Philippines, of restoring democracy to this country.

One has to make a realistic distinction, however, between the position of an exile and the position of someone in government. For instance, we praised at that time the democracy posters in Beijing and associated ourselves with those who wanted to liberalize the situation there. I simply cannot without risking diplomatic complications with mainland China, go to Beijing and associate myself with the students there who are demanding for liberalization. That is a role that can be and should be undertaken by those who are in a position to do so. But there are certain things that can be done and there are certain things that ought not to be done, so that there is no risk of disorder in the region and misunderstanding between peoples and governments. There's just a limit to what a government can do.

Now, you've heard, of course, the past reports that some communist governments privately or through non-government channels, may be in fact helping communist



movements abroad. The Chinese Government, or the Russian Government itself or any other communist government will always deny it, and it's probably correct that on government-to-government level, these governments are not undertaking any action to support communist movements abroad. However, they may be doing it in a way that will disrupt the good relations between their government and our government, for example. How often have we heard denials and accepted these denials officially by other governments that they are not intervening in this form in our society — at the same time that our intelligence agents are telling us that there are indeed forms of aid that are coming from these countries? But these are the realities of international politics. There are certain things that you can undertake, but there are certain things that you cannot undertake officially.

**Prof. David:** A question here on Kampuchea. What is the official Philippine position on the issue of the Kampuchean conflict, and what has the Philippines done to help in arriving at a peaceful solution to that conflict?

**Sec. Manglapus:** The Philippines subscribes to the move to settle the Kampuchean situation. It supports the moves that would encourage the talks between Norodom Sihanouk and Heng Samrin of the Vietnamese-sponsored Kampuchean government. The Philippines hopes that by these steps, the goal of the whole Southeast Asian region of normalizing the Kampuchean situation by having the Vietnamese withdraw from Kampuchea will be achieved as soon as possible.

Norodom Sihanouk and Heng Samrin will meet again one of these days after their first meeting in Paris. The ASEAN countries are directly involved in these negotiations. We have an interlocutor country with regard to this question and that is Indonesia and Foreign Minister Heng Samrin and Norodom Sihanouk. I showed support for the idea of looking to Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the possible compromise solution for Kampuchea.

**Prof. David:** Sir, may I bring back the question on consultations since the Philippine government appears to be consulting with the ASEAN countries with respect to the bases. Would the Department of Foreign Affairs be amenable to holding nationwide consultations regarding the acceptability of the bases to Filipinos themselves?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Let me first deny that the Philippine government is holding consultations with ASEAN. Let me make the distinction again that when I made that speech, I was a private citizen and therefore, I was calling as a private citizen for consultations. Now, my position is that we are holding our options open until 1991.

**Prof. David:** What about the nationwide dialogues?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Well, that is probably more controversial than just negotiating with our neighbors over our bases here. If the question is asked, why consult our neighbors over what is purely a bilateral question between the United States and the Philippines, the question will indeed be asked even more strongly, why consult the whole world about something?

**Prof. David:** The Filipinos.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Oh, the Filipinos. Well, that consultation, of course, is possible. There are several channels available, as you know. Filipino groups abroad have already expressed themselves one way or the other through the press in the United States for instance, and Canada. There is a plan to open a seat or two in the sectoral portion of the House of Representatives to represent overseas Filipinos. If that should materialize, then the voice of the Filipinos will, of course, be heard in this regard.

**Prof. David:** I would like to call Dr. Abueva.

**Dr. Abueva:** On this particular point, in consultation with the students, and our faculty, if I get a positive response, I would like UP to participate in a nationwide discussion and debate on the retention or the removal of the US Bases at the appropriate time — in conjunction with all universities, public and private, and of course, other public fora.

**Prof. Quisumbing:** Mr. Secretary, I would like to give witness to the fact that you did say at Fletcher School about ASEAN's possible participation with regard to regional security. The UP, through the Academy of ASEAN law and jurisprudence actually



sponsored or co-sponsored that seminar. But my particular question has to do with human rights.

We all note that there are certain non-traditional new dimensions to foreign policy and foreign relations. I speak particularly of the very personal elements that touch on our foreign policy, and these are with regard to contract workers as you had said a while ago—women particularly who are entertainers, all these elements which were not present when we're talking about traditional foreign policy. May I ask since we're talking about rights of everybody else outside of the Philippines, what about the human rights of the Filipinos abroad? What is the foreign service doing? We had heard of some good things about our foreign service personnel abroad and what they are doing beyond the call of duty, but we also have heard of some disturbing reports of the insensitivity, the lack of readiness and perhaps, the lack of personnel and facilities to protect the interest of Filipinos abroad. Can you tell us what your plans are?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Thank you. In the short span of my tenure in the Foreign Affairs Department, the only travels that I have made are those to capitals of Southeast Asia. And I can tell you that the situation in these countries is indeed something for concern. Perhaps, some people who don't quite realize how many Filipinos, for example, are already in Singapore and Malaysia. Well, I'm speaking first of Southeast Asia. I haven't been to Japan yet during my tenure, but I can say to you that in Malaysia and Singapore, there's a large number of Filipinos, particularly Filipinas, who are engaged in domestic work and who oftentimes are abused by their employers. One of the phenomena that has been going on is that they run to the Embassy and you are correct that there's lack of personnel, lack of facilities. I saw our Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur building an annex to our Embassy out of its savings in order to accommodate these women who are being persecuted by their employers. There is a fund in POEA, that's the welfare fund which is available for this sort of thing and we have been trying to get it expended in this direction.

Let me say that among other things, our Passport Division has been hard put to screen applicants for passports particularly to Japan. We're going now to Japan. Women who are obviously, in appearance at least, going to Japan to be entertainers are being carefully screened and usually refused passports at this time. We have undertaken a joint program with the Japanese government to prevent Yakuza people from coming here and recruiting these women for Japan.

Finally, let me say that in accordance with the Reorganization Act, that is, Executive Order 239, I am now recommending new assistant secretaries. One of them will be an Assistant Secretary of Labor who will operate closely with the Department of Labor in protecting our workers abroad. There are literally millions of workers now. There's less incidence of abuse in richer countries like the United States, Canada, and parts of Europe. But in countries where there's a cultural difference, culture shock for instance, you find a lot of instances of misunderstanding, language problems, and abuse. And we have to cooperate closely with the Department of Labor to protect the rights of these workers, particularly women.

**Question:** Beyond that, Mr. Secretary, I think we have to think also of protecting human rights of people who are not included in your travel ban. In Europe, the image of the Filipinos, Filipinas particularly, is so bad. I think that the Foreign Affairs Department should do something about educating and campaigning, and informing people about the good values of Filipinos. There's so much to be done in that area. Thank you.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Thank you very much. We hope that we can acquire the necessary personnel. Just this morning, I was talking with the UNDP. There is a Filipino who now heads the UNIDO — not Laurel's UNIDO but the United Nation's UNIDO — Domingo Siason: I was talking to him and Turhan Mangun of the UNDP and we hope to find funds for this educational program. I should add, by the way, not in defense of the situation nor to justify it that this is not a problem unique to the Filipinos. I was surprised to find, for example, in Saudi Arabia 300,000 Thais who I am told, are encountering similar problems. And of course within Europe itself, you have Spaniards and Yugoslavs who have been going around seeking work in Germany, Italy, and in other places that also encounter similar problems. This does not justify our problems, but this is not to despair.



We do share these problems with other countries, and we will do our best to solve them.

**Question:** You have anticipated that the Philippines is going to be an economic power at the turn of the century. I don't know if this is in the purview of your Department, but I want to ask if we really have a strong economic program which can be related to foreign policy. What sticks in my mind is what President Aquino said when she came from the United States. When she was asked about what she would do with the money that the US would extend to us, she said, "*Mababait naman ang mga nasa gobyerno ngayon, at hindi katulad ng mga nakaraan.*" I think if I can remember it right, "So just give it to us, and *bahala na kami.*" That seems not to be a very strong economic program.

**Sec. Manglapus:** I think that might have been an answer. Obviously, we have a program. The NEDA is simply stocked full of programs. Solita Monsod's programs are coming out of her ears. But that answer may have been given to someone who may have said something like this: "*Bakit naman kayo bibigyan ng pera, baka nakawin lang ng gobyerno.*" But we do have programs. As a matter of fact, the NEDA is being blamed for having too many programs by some people.

**Question:** Well, they're talking about Thailand, Singapore and South Korea's strong five-year economic plans which we do not seem to have. I am from the Asian Center. There is an impression that we in the Asian Center are given some research inputs whenever the President goes around Asia. You know, it seems difficult to relate the diplomatic part of her tours to some concrete economic programs which we want to have here in our country.

**Sec. Manglapus:** I do not know whether you have been in touch with the NEDA but we do have a five-year Medium Term Program and it seems to be a serious effort. What we do now on Cabinet level is alternate cabinet meetings and NEDA board meetings. What you saw this morning, announced by some papers mistakenly as a cabinet meeting yesterday, was a NEDA board meeting. What that is, in fact, is part of the cabinet and some technicians sitting down as the Board of Directors of the NEDA. And if you saw in the picture while I'm supposed to sit to the right of the President, this time, it was Solita Monsod, because she is the Secretary of NEDA, and we discussed the plan of the government. Yesterday, we had a discussion on the structure of economic planning in the Philippines which involves regions, down to regional development councils where, by the way, the Department of Foreign Affairs is also represented.

Therefore, I now come to the question that you made which seems to require an answer about what the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs is here. Similar to my reply to the earlier question regarding labor, one of the assistant secretaries that we are appointing is a former management expert and banker who will be Assistant Secretary for International Trade and Development. He will be in charge of the operations of the Department in connection with the question raised by Professor Gonzalez about such project as an automobile. I am directly involved in a project that will tap the dollar potential of our Filipinos abroad and the market potential of those Filipinos.

For instance, I am sure you have relatives in the United States and Canada. After the EDSA Revolution, they all got excited, they want to help. But you know, when they get to sit down, and plan how to help, they eventually wind up with the traditional things like sending medicines or old clothes and medical missions, or adopting a particular municipality and help build their hospital or their school room. That is all fine. But what we're trying to do now is plan in such a way that there is an organized drive to tap the dollars directly to a *specific industry* in the Philippines, and not just a spot assistance to communities and things that in the end may not be part of the total plan.

So, this is the response I make to you. The Department of Foreign Affairs is in fact confronting this problem directly, in keeping with the Reorganization Act that is available to us. The President of the Philippines may, upon my recommendation — and I hope to have that done this month, appoint an Assistant Secretary for International Trade and Investment.

**Pres. Abueva:** Many forgot that I asked to be able to ask one question, with two parts. No, one is just a footnote, and that is maybe disturbing to those among our



countrymen who are determined even as of now, that all things considered, we should do away with the bases in the country. It is the fact that the Cubans, Fidel Castro's Cuba with all of its non-aligned strong, socialist, anti-U.S. posture, has not been able to throw out the U.S. Bases in their territory. This is one thing that you will have to bear in mind.

Now, the two-part question. Presumably, calculating the national interest with respect to U.S. bases in the Philippines — there are criteria to use as well as the weighing to be given to this criteria. It's not to reveal our position here, but I would like to have an idea of what are your specific criteria in calculating the national interest with respect to the retention or removal of the U.S. bases. I would imagine that one of these criteria would be what the people themselves in a democratic consultation would feel about the issue. But this leads me to the second question.

In public life, there is a great deal of contradiction and ambiguity which lead leaders to be ambivalent — even the best intentioned of them. Now suppose towards 1991 we have determined through nationwide debate of these issues, that only a minority of our people would like to throw out the bases. But on the contrary, our best reasoning, our reasoned consideration of the pros and cons of the bases leads us — the informed politically conscious Filipinos and the leaders — to the opposite conclusion, that is that they should go, that these bases should be removed — what will be the position of our government?

In other words, this leads us to the ancient issue of the role of leadership. Leaders are supposed to lead, but there are two ways of leading. That is to lead by defining the problem, defining the alternatives, and choosing among the alternatives regardless if it goes against the popular opinion. The other is, of course, the convenient way, following the people is the convenient way, especially when there is just a very narrow difference between those who are for throwing out the bases and those who are for retaining the bases. What would be the role of leadership in such a situation?

**Sec. Manglapus:** Thank you, Mr. President. The grandson of Mahatma Ghandi was here the other day. I accompanied him to see the President, and his visit reminds me of a story that could be apocryphal, but it's a story just the same. One day, Ghandi was sitting away from the heat of the sun and then a crowd of his disciples passed by and he remarked to his friend beside him, "There go my followers, I am their leader," or "There go my people, I am their leader, therefore I must go out and follow them." But as you point out, what happens if the edge is very small and it's difficult to determine whether the people in fact want or do not want the bases to stay. This is why I think there is a risk in the suggestion made around the table here this afternoon, that we engage in really nationwide, maybe even surveys, open surveys — not the private one being held by Mahar Mangahas — but really open surveys.

The risk that we're taking is that a public that may not be thoroughly informed might come to decisions or conclusions that in the end, will cut our options and prevent us from carrying out what we consider to be the national interest. We do go, as you know, my friends, through very expensive electoral exercises every year or so. We're just going to do it on Monday, but we went through it last year, and the purpose of this electoral exercise is that we are in a representative democracy. And as you point out, Mr. President, it is in a representative democracy that the leadership that is elected is vested not only with the power, but often the duty to determine the common good. And I think it is in this context that we might wish to approach this particular problem. Our Constitution does provide, as I mentioned earlier, for the possibility of a referendum, but after the negotiations are finished, and after the treaty is ratified or maybe rejected by the Senate. At that point, there will have been such thorough discussion of the issues and the agreements, that perhaps we would have a better informed public. But I'm a little nervous about going to the people now about this, perhaps in many ways, sophisticated subject, and expect them to come up with a guiding decision that will tie our hands when the time comes.

I know that there are many in this room for instance that would like the bases to go. What if a survey, a public survey, an open survey should show that the people want to keep the bases? Are we going to tie our hands with that? That would infinitely strengthen the



hand of Ambassador Platt when he sits in front of me in the negotiations. He would come up and say, "What are you talking about? Your people want us to stay, come on, let's stop talking about nonsense here." You see, I would caution against such a move but I would favor the reverse process as provided for in the Constitution. If the people want to have their say they could by choosing their leaders—peaceful elections. And I think we should let the processes of representative democracy work themselves out, particularly in this rather delicate case. Thank you.

**Prof. David:** Well, for the last two and a half hours, we have been bombarding you with questions and comments, and this is supposed to have been a two-way dialogue between academe and government. I was wondering if you would like to use the remaining time to tell us what you expect of Academe.

**Sec. Manglapus:** Well, thank you, I want to be as specific as possible. There are ideas bruited about a serious Foreign Service School or Course in a reputable university like U.P. I would consider that a very valuable addition to our Foreign Service.

One of the problems I face, as I told you in the beginning of my talk, is that of people who literally come to me and ask to be thrown to Paris and Washington. I tell you this is true not only of unemployed people. This is true of decent, high level people who suddenly developed the notion that they are entitled to be an Ambassador. Now, I think that we have models around the world, particularly in Europe, of first class Foreign Services that are thoroughly groomed in training. I look to models like the British, and maybe, the French and the German, the Soviet. I don't look to the American foreign service. There are so many political appointments. I'm not referring to Platt. Platt is a professional. But there are many, many American diplomats who are political appointees, and following that example as you know, "*Bakit ang Amerikano, eh di tayo din sana?*" So what happens? People come to us and expect the Foreign Service to be a Christmas tree from which to pluck all of these plums.

Therefore, I would appeal to students to interest themselves seriously in a Foreign Service career. We're going to try our best to make it as rewarding as possible. It is already rewarding. I think if you ask friends who were abroad, they do earn very decent pay, once you are abroad. When you are here, it's not too high, but once you are abroad you get good pay and allowances, plus the fact of being abroad and absorbing all that foreign experience. My appeal, therefore, Dr. David and Mr. President, is for the U.P. to take a lead in this regard, and help the Foreign Service professionalize itself by providing us with the hardheaded and thoroughly trained young men and women to enter our Service. It used to be that you had to be rich to be in the Foreign Service. That's not true anymore. We are sufficiently specialized in the Department of Foreign Affairs so that even if you are not particularly rich, you may be assigned to a good post and do credit to your country. Thank you.

**Prof. David:** May I, on behalf of the University community and the Third World Studies Center, in particular, express our deepest gratitude to Sec. Manglapus.

## FORTHCOMING IN KASARINLAN

- Secretary Fidel Ramos  
*Department of National Defense*
- Secretary Alfredo Bengzon  
*Department of Health*
- Secretary Philip Ella Juico  
*Department of Agrarian Reform*
- Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing  
*Department of Education, Culture and Sports*