Westphalia at the Edge of Chaos?
The Nation-State and the
9/11 Frontiers of Change

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ABSTRACT. This article looks at the impact of 9/11 on International Relations theorizing, examining specifically the claim that events following the 9/11 attacks have necessitated the creation of a "new" international order far different from the one established based on the norms of Westphalia. The article contextualizes the discussion on the new breed of international terrorism within the debate over the prospects of a "new" international order as explained by post-9/11 theorists. The article concludes that the changes trumpeted by the same scholars as heralding the coming of a new post 9/11 international order are not *revolutionary* as proclaimed. Instead, these are actually *evolutionary* in nature and thus, do not result in a complete change in the international system.

KEYWORDS. Westphalian system • state • international relations theory

INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to institute domestic and international order, the peace of Westphalia of 1648 designated sovereignty as the primary constitutive principle of modern political systems (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001, 27). This arrangement institutionalized the relationship of sovereignty and security in international politics. In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, a number of scholars, who this paper will collectively identify as post-9/11 International Relations (IR) theorists argue that this system is being broken down by succeeding events. The prominent claim of scholars belonging to this school is that the events following 9/11 have evinced signs of imminent and axiomatic changes in the post-Cold War international security order. The traditional *features* accorded to the state by the Westphalian order are now full of *fissures*. As such, this is the time, they assert, to recognize

the inevitable—that the demise of the nation-state and the classical Westphalian state system is upon us.

This paper investigates the theoretical and empirical claims advanced by the post-9/11 theorists. The aim is to develop a coherent assessment of whether states are in retreat from their traditional role as the sole political authority within a closely bounded territory. Specifically, the discussion probes the nexus between the supposed transformations in the international system resulting from the 9/11 attacks and the changing state role and its authoritative capacity, specifically in relation to security issues. In doing so, the paper attempts to disclose the nature of this link and offers an analysis and conclusion by critically surveying the claims made by the post-9/11 theorists.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section contextualizes the discussion of international terrorism within the changing world order brought about by globalization. The second part presents and discusses the assertion of post-9/11 theorists that a new international system is in the making as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war against global terrorism. Prominent among these "new" developments are the rise of super terrorism, the reconfiguration of state relations, the blurring of borders, and the crisis of international law. The third part offers an alternative explanation arguing that the changes claimed to have resulted from 9/11 are by no means exceptional. Indeed, closer scrutiny reveals that far from undermining the Westphalian state system these events should be understood as just footnotes to history capable only of being recognized as "noticeable differences" in the midst of the ever present turbulence in world politics (Rosenau 1990). The conclusion suggests that the assertion of a new world system in the making is too sweeping—premature at best, impulsive at worst. While there have been transformations within the interstate system, these do not herald the arrival of a new epoch in international system. The old system of Westphalia may indeed be fading, but the alternative has not yet been born.

Images of A World in Transformation

The mainstream IR literature has, for years, dictated that territorial sovereignty is the master ordering principle under the Westphalian blueprint. With globalization, the end of the Cold War, and most recently, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on mainland United States, it has been commonly claimed by post-9/11 IR theorists that the conceptualization of the state and sovereignty has changed (and must

change) significantly. The central thesis of most recent work along these lines draws attention on globalization and its manifestations—including the rise of a new breed of terrorism—and their impact on the qualities and (in)capacities of the nation-state and international state system to adapt to these changes. As a result, scholars have highlighted events and processes that, they claim, have fundamentally transformed the state and the Westphalian inter-state system. Here, the Westphalian system is understood in the sense advanced by Stephen Krasner in which the framework underpinning the universality of an international system is composed of sovereign states, each with exclusive authority within its own geographic boundaries (2000). From this perspective, states can be treated as autonomous, unified, rational actors. Against Krasner's view of the "unchanging" nature of the international system, most of the globalization literature has been preoccupied with establishing whether contemporary processes of change are enhancing or diminishing the power of the state, the central pillar of the Westphalian system.

In these circumstances, one of the defining events that has steadily attracted scholarly attention (after the initial outpouring of journalistic commentary), and has been credited as creating a new international order, is the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US together with the subsequent global campaign against terror and the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Scholars belonging to the post-9/11 school suggest that these are manifestations of globalization's first war (Campbell 2002). As a result, the future of the international system is at stake. In short, there has been a "post-9/11 paradigm shift" resulting in a "rescrambled world order" (Freedman 2001, Kakihara 2003, Korb 2002).

Westphalia, the State and 9/11

The dominant thinking concerning 9/11 involves the claim that the terrorist attack itself and the subsequent events have engendered actions that have fundamentally reconfigured the international state system. Fundamental to the claims of post-9/11 theorists is the notion of the surrender of sovereignty. If this is the case, then the traditional realist explanation of national interest as defining the international system also falls. Basically, post-9/11 thinking cites the impact of 9/11 in altering norms in the practice of international relations, in particular in the domains of international security and international law. Evidence for this lies in the unimagined shifting of alliances

between and among superpowers, the redefinition and adoption of a wider concept of national security, and the domestication of security issues. Most importantly, the depiction and affirmation of "super terrorism." Super terrorism is defined here as an amorphous movement of non-state actors guided by religious and ideological zeal, as opposed to its earlier form of political terrorism that upholds distinct political and state-sponsored goals as the greatest single threat to international peace and stability. Super terrorism ostensibly heralds the demise of the traditional nation-state as it brings to the fore the seeming failure of the Westphalian state system to respond to this "common enemy" of the new millennium. These monumental changes have thus emboldened some scholars to declare that the Westphalian age is coming to a close (Bigo 2001, 93).

In interrogating this thesis, a number of important questions come to mind. In what precise ways have the 9/11 attacks and the current "war against terrorism" affected the state and the Westphalian state system with particular reference to the field of security? What are the apparent and specific challenges of this new international system to the Westphalian order? Are these alterations reconfiguring the state's traditional capacity as the sole enforcer of law and protector of its citizens? Is the state still capable of confronting this phenomenon of "super terrorism"? If so, how is the state adapting to this new reconfiguration of world security structure and environment? In short, is the state in retreat or will the state endure yet another test?

Reconfiguration of the National State and Security

The preservation and development of security and national interest have always been central aspirations of modern states. Broadly, security is defined as the absence or freedom from threats while national interest has generally been constituted as the attainment of national security. David Baldwin considers security as "the absence of threats to acquired values" and as a situation in which there is "a low probability of damage to acquired values", respectively (Baldwin 1997, 49). Traditionally, defining security has always involved answering three basic questions. These are: security for whom? security from what? which values are to be protected? Conventionally, and especially during the Cold War, the answers to these three questions would be: the state, from other states, and territorial integrity and political independence. These specifications of the concept of security are

intimately related to each other within the dominant framework of international system established through the Westphalian inter-state system. During the Cold War, defence policies of national states were primary guided by the logic of this model based upon the realist assumption of self-help states acting in an anarchical world. The end of the Cold War and the deepening of global forces like international terrorism, transnational crime organizations, international regimes and transnational civil societies, however, created an important challenge to the prevailing perceptions on security and defense.

From the tradition of security policy answering to external military threats, security policy has been extended to cover contingencies for other types of threats (Eliassen 1998, 2). In response to the question of "security for whom" the answer shifted from the state as the referent object to the individual. Correspondingly, the question relative to security values was transferred from territorial integrity to protection and promotion of human rights (Sjursen 2001, 4). As a result, the state—after the "end of communism" (Fukuyama 1993) and "end of the nation state" (Ohmae 1995, Guehenno 1995)—was no longer the prime enemy. Transnational crimes, humanitarian crises, environmental disasters and, more recently, international terrorism in its most virulent form became the new threats to national governments and the international system of states. Among these, terrorism has attracted the most attention in recent years mainly due to the emergence of the "new terror" associated above all with al-Qaeda (Simon and Benjamin, 2001). Indeed, the new breed of terrorism the world is now witnessing has been described as the new "ism" that poses significant challenge to the traditional state (Campbell 2002, 10).

The dangers created by this new international threat led to changes in the specifications of security as well as a shift in state priorities and perceptions of what instruments might be most appropriate to fill in the new security needs. There has been reallocation of resources from military and traditional security to other policy objectives as states restructured their strategic goals. The result has been the reconfiguration of the tools and even authorities originally reserved to traditional Westphalian state. Prime examples here would be the adoption of the United States and the European Union of laws against terrorism, the creation of the former of the Homeland Defense Agency, now considered to be the biggest government agency in the country, and the shifting of security priorities from a defensive to an offensive position against domestic and international terrorist organizations.

In the field of security, post-9/11 theorists draw attention to the failure of traditional tools employed by states such as deterrence, containment, and traditional reliance on military defense in combating transnational terrorism. It has been noted that deterrence and defense in asymmetrical warfare, are now less relevant (Delpech 2002, 38). Asymmetrical warfare as defined by Freedman (2001) refers to a war between two belligerents of quite different capabilities with the outcome determined by one's superior ability to find counters to the capabilities of others. In its original context, asymmetrical warfare calls for situations where the weak employ asymmetrical methods against the strong by choosing methods that depends on the weak's analysis of the strong's vulnerabilities. This is how post-9/11 theorists characterize the present tensions between the US and the "axis of evil." In light of this, these scholars see the pursuit of the new "Bush Doctrine" of preemption over deterrence as heralding the new and preferred state strategy for conflict prevention, engagement and resolution.

GLOBALIZATION AND 9/11: SIGNS OF CHANGING TIMES

When speaking about contemporary change, globalization has been the optic through which new processes and effects have been understood in both popular commentary as well as academic analysis. Little discussion, however, has been allotted to the interesting parallels and connections between the rise of globalization and the growth of international terrorism (Campbell 2002, 10). But the link can no longer be denied. First, both globalization and terrorism advanced spectacularly in the 1990s (Campbell 2002, 10). Second, both have been claimed to disrupt countries and the international system. And third, terrorists equally do not accept the legitimacy of states or the state system in their relentless pursuits (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002). As both globalization and international terrorism exemplify the signs of the changing times, together they also highlight the apparent failure of the state and the state system to adapt to the changes they herald leading, ultimately, to the demise of the state and the inter-state system. For the purpose of surveying this claim, this paper has identified for analysis five key aspects of the relationship between globalization and international terrorism: (1) the transformation of security issues, actors, and mechanisms; (2) the rise of "super terrorism"; (3) the delegitimation of international law; (4) the blurring of borders and surrendering of sovereignty; and (5) the reconfiguration of state

relations as heralding a post-Westphalian international system. Each will be considered in turn.

Transformation of Security Issues and Actors

According to post-9/11 theorists, three general conceptions can be observed from the alteration in the international security agenda. First, there is the shift from hardcore security issues of national security and defense to human, social, economic, and social security. Second, from the understanding of security from the realist perspective of self-help, current security concerns have been pursued along the lines of comprehensive, common, and cooperative arrangements between and among states and regional alliances (Dewitt 1994). Finally, from national and military actors alone, discussions and the pursuit of security goals and affairs nowadays involve non-state, civil society actors, and sometimes, even private and business entities (Alagappa 1998, Zakheim 2000). Collectively, these transformations of security actors, tools, and issues are claimed to have begun a new chapter in the historic rivalry between states and non-state actors in the field of security. Post-9/11 theorists assert that the 9/11 attacks enhanced this rivalry and set in train the reconfigurations in the international security agenda paving the way for the retreat of the state from its traditional security role (Booth and Dunne 2002, 13). As a result, there is a need to refocus security studies from their original realist approach of inter- and intra-state conflicts to looser, yet more pressing, issues of security attached to and identified with the issues of international terrorism, human rights, human security, and identity.

Shifts have also been noted in the priorities of states in the field of security: from the traditional security concerns of national as against international security to transnational crimes and super-terrorism; from the conventional actors, the state and military, the focus has moved to civilian-military defense preparedness; from the original enemies of states sponsoring terrorism to a hub-and-spoke web of international terrorist structures and terrorist-sponsoring states. Illustrating these shifts, international security scholars like Helene Sjursen have emphasized the various internal and external challenges to the state (2001, 4). First, the emergence of new issues in the international political agenda, in particular the abandonment of the conventional hierarchy of policy that gives priority to security and defense, is claimed to have sidelined the state in the international level. Second, the

emergence of new transnational and supranational political and security actors that do not have any territorial claim or base have undermined the capacity of the state as the sole actor/negotiator for issues involving high politics. And finally, changes at the international level characterized by the strengthening of normative and legal dimensions in the international system have said to have contributed to the diminishing role of the state in the maintenance of the international system.

These, in parts and in whole has produced a world order showing that national governments no longer hold the exclusive decision-making power relative to international issues. As a result of these changes in issues and actors that have reconfigured the role of the state in the field of security, the legitimacy as well as the basis of the nation-state as the established security actor and variable in security studies is also now, more than ever, being questioned.

The Rise of Super Terrorism

The foremost consequence of September 11 according to post-9/11 theorists is that it introduced a new and unexpected dimension to the already complicated and porous field of international security studies—that of "super terrorism" (Freedman 2001, 73). While numerous terminologies have been offered to encapsulate the characteristic of this new breed of terrorism, and none has succeeded in gaining wide acceptance is concerned, post-9/11 scholars like Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin agree that the scale, magnitude, and gravity of the challenge this new security threat poses to the state are what separate it from earlier forms. Hence, the rise of super terrorism from its former political and state-sponsored face to an amorphous movement of non-state actors guided by religious and ideological zeal has been seen as a development capable of undermining the state's capacity to rule (see Simon and Benjamin 2000, 2001). This is the time, post-9/11 theorists assert, to recognize the inevitable as the attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon have been characterized as the latest systemic challenge. These scholars declare the coming of "age of terrorism" (Cronin 2002, 119-20) or "the age of sacred terror" (Benjamin and Simon 2002). Empirically, this claim has been primarily supported by the upward movement of super terrorism to the front rank of threats for Washington (Benjamin and Simon 2002).

At the heart of this challenge from super terrorism is the concept of asymmetrical warfare employed by the terrorist networks (Delpech 2002, 32). The core issue involved is that terrorism has ostensibly become a tactic of the weak, represented by insurgent groups to employ against the strong, undermining the foundation of an established state (Freedman 2001, 73). Unlike traditional armies, terrorists and guerrilla groups do not expect to hold any territory and even cannot claim to be guided by the concept of sovereignty that directs the international system of states. Hence, they pose even greater danger to states, which are constrained by the internationally constructed conventions of sovereignty, border controls, and international conventions promoting territorial integrity.

Terrorism viewed from the perspective of the state thus constitutes a threat to the security of all states as it is a political strategy used to strike at both individual states as well as the state system (Mansbach and Franke 2001, 64). Furthermore, the use of terrorism in its grandest scale so far implies a direct challenge to our traditional concept of sovereignty and even the structure of the state system itself. Hence, scholars espousing the emergence of a post-9/11 security arrangement argue that super terrorism is the imperative that will make state leaders recognize the need to look beyond Westphalia. It demands recognition that the boundaries and the order imposed by the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in the seventeenth century must give way to a new world system without the restraints of borders and order of Westphalia.

Moribund International Law

Citing the incapacity of the present international state system to deal with the challenges of super-terrorism, scholars on international law like Marc Weller (1999) and Adam Roberts (2002) claim that the apparent fissures in the application (or non-application) of international law in the current war against terrorism evince the Westphalian state system's lack of mechanisms to cope with the transitional nature of the new threat. The events leading to the "war against terror" prove the need to rethink and reconfigure international law conventions, especially those dealing with the conduct of war. Scholars raise questions about the applicability of international law in the conduct of the war against terrorism, especially when it is already recognized that "international law is an imperfect instrument" (Weller 1999, 81). They question not only the conduct of the parties involved in the current global war

against terrorism, but the adequacy of the law itself in addressing this latest reconfiguration in international relations (Roberts 2002). In supporting their case, these scholars cite the apparent failure of the war against terror launched by the United States against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The failure emanates from the fact that a war conducted under the rules of the Westphalian state system as exemplified by international law which puts the highest premium on state sovereignty cannot eliminate a non-state actor enemy located in almost 60 countries.

Many scholars, especially those in Islamic countries, see the revival of al-Qaeda as terrorists displaced by the campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq who can (and will) still find refuge in many failed states around the world. Hence, security experts like Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002), see the traditional state approach of combating terrorism that includes using a combination of economic sanctions, military attacks, and political pressure as likely to fail in coping with the new brand of terrorism. The looseness and fluidity of terrorists, their movements, and their activities is completely opposed to the rigidity and controls imposed by international norms founded to protect sovereignty and promote the inviolability of borders. As a result of this incongruity between the problem and the responses employed, it is reckoned that the new breed of terrorism is shaking up both the long-held structures of state-centric security system founded on international conventions and the Westphalian state system itself.

Because of the assaults in the constructs of borders and territories, scholars like Roberts claim that the applicability as well as the legitimacy of treaties and laws of the conduct of war is being challenged by the stateless and borderless nature of both terrorism and the war against terror. Hence, from the law relating to the right to resort to the use of force or *jus ad bellum* to the law governing the actual use of force in war or *jus in bello*, the adequacy of the laws themselves to explain and cope with the challenges of 9/11 merits careful examination (Roberts 2002).

This shake-up in the international system, accompanied by the rise of frontiers of change and complexities (Rosenau 1997) results in the evident disappearance of boundaries separating the domestic and the foreign fields of security, the international from local. There has been a disaggregation of the nation-state. The political, communal, and territorial components of the nation-state are being unbundled (Jacobson 2001, 164) and the moribund laws and conventions that

govern inter-state relations are not helping solve the problem posed by super terrorism. For post-9/11 theorists, the whole gamut of agreements called international law has become *the problem.*

Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security

In general, the "end-of-borders" thesis has been closely tied to the premise signaling the demise of the nation-state (Ohmae 1995, Guehenno 1995). With the apparent debasing of international conventions promoting the sacrosanct border as the only legitimate tool keeping the international system in order, the reconfiguration of international norms reflecting an enhanced interplay between social change and territorial politics has also necessitated changes in the social and political functions of borders (Albert and Brock 2001, 36). With the end of the Cold War and the rise of super terrorism, Mathias Albert asserts that there has been a "de-bordering" of national boundaries (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001). The September 11 attack and the changes it dictates on the nation-state have ostensibly furthered the blurring of boundaries between domestic and international realms of security. Internal and external security, traditionally two separate domains that were the concern of different institutionalized authorities, the police and the military, appeared to have converged as a result of campaigns in the aftermath of 9/11, a Mobius ribbon as described by Didier Bigo (2001). Delpech, for instance, notes that the boundaries between military and civil defense are now being blurred, with most developed countries giving new priority to the latter (2002, 36).

The new threats of terrorism have apparently challenged the distinction between the spheres of police and army which has obliged a global-wide security reconstitution of police and army functions (Bigo 2001, 93). The global campaign against terrorism transgresses nationalities and identities resulting in the bleeding of the border separating the national from the international. By declaring and conducting a war on what has been traditionally a police matter, the US has transposed what has been a domestic problem into a global one. This trend has seen the augmentation of the interpenetration of internal and external security as events resulting from the attacks purport to integrate an effort to securitize the state both from within and without. Hence, the boundaries of security are no longer fixed through borders, which originally differentiate internal from external security. As in a Mobius ribbon, the internal and external are now

intimately related (Bigo 2001, 91-116) and must be taken as one and the same.

After 9/11, the precedence accorded to the order that borders provide is under intense scrutiny. Borders which have exemplified the limit of the application of power with a strong differentiation between the use of force inside and outside are ostensibly being eroded by the prevalence of transgression committed against it as exemplified by current campaign against terrorism in different parts of the world.

Reconfiguration of State Relations

Post-9/11 theorists have hoped and predicted that the brutality of the terrorist attacks would ultimately have a positive impact on the conduct of international relations. Primarily, they argue that the threat new terrorism poses not only to nation-states but to the state system in general is so absolute that governments would be compelled by the necessity of survival to put aside their differences and unite against an enemy that threatens their existence. Hence, governments have gone so far as calling for unprecedented levels of cooperation among "civilized nations" of the world to combat the barbarism exemplified by 9/11 (*The Japan Times Online* 2001). This call has ostensibly led to the so-called power realignments among powerful state actors that in turn justifies the emergence of a new structure of international system grounded on stronger cooperation by traditional rival states. After 9/11, an overall sentiment has been that the attacks have become an impetus for unparalleled cooperation among major powers. NATO's first-ever invocation of Article 5, Japan's decision to send its Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean, and Germany's dramatic recasting of its defense and security policies support the thesis that an unprecedented international coalition against terrorism is in motion (Delpech 2002, 35). Further, Antonenko (2001) underscores Russia's response—an unseemly unconditional support to the US's campaign against terror—to the 9/11 attacks as a strategic realignment of world power that puts Russia, for the first time since World War II, into a genuine partnership with the West. A US Ambassador to the UN, on the other hand, sees a unique opportunity in 9/11 for the improvement of Sino-American relations (Holbrooke 2002). It is claimed that the two Pacific powers, now confronted by a common threat, can make a common cause to build a more stable and consistently more cooperative relationship (Friedberg 2002, 33).

Concerted cooperation in the field of intelligence gathering and sharing has also been noted among traditional rival powers (Delpech 2002, 36). Former rivals in the Eurasian region are now working together to manufacture a common security policy. The rapprochement policy of the European Union toward Russia has been at the forefront of the new security policy of Europe. What had been improbable a few years earlier—NATO's closer association with Russia and even Russian membership of the alliance—is now being considered seriously as the major powers aim to respond to the new security agenda (Delpech 2002, 55). The first step towards this goal has been proposed by the UK through the establishment of Russia-North Atlantic Alliance meeting twice a month as a primary vehicle for cooperation to combat terrorism.

Indeed, as the problem of terrorism becomes a shared security concern of all governments, relations among the super powers has apparently become rationalized and altered. They are fostering new ties and strengthening existing ones. Politicians even raised arguments ranging from the creation of a multi-polar alliance of states against the new threats to security to the reorganization of existing security structure and regimes (Blair 2001). One can interpret this as the emergence of "polycentric steering" where the major powers coordinate policies in a wide range of fields to pursue common strategic goals to defeat a common enemy (Hoffman 1990, 120-121).

In the course of history, monumental events like conflicts and incidents of aggression or violence on a grand scale have one quality in common: they tend to contribute to the reshaping of international relations. Post-9/11, theorists bank their claims both on the past and the future. They see the current war against terrorism led by the United States as global in scale and, thus, has end up reshaping the world. Indeed, it is claimed that the striking aspect of 9/11 and its resultant anti-terrorism campaign in many parts of the world is the manner in which many of the norms of the so-called Westphalian system of states were *unhinged* (Booth and Dunne 2002, 13). International Law scholars like Roberts (2002) also claim that interstate relations are bound to change as nation-states are confronted with new and unfamiliar issues that in the end will make the shift from their accustomed and traditional normative anchors to a fundamental change in the standard relations among states centered on newly established global and international norms that will supplant the rigid requirements of the present international law.

Concomitantly and collectively, these demand for solutions beyond Westphalia as they deem it not only fit and necessary but also desirable that solutions to a common transnational threat should be all-encompassing and should not be constrained by the limitations imposed by international norms privileging the sanctity of borders and territories. It has been contended that 9/11 destroyed the rules of social and distributive justice espoused by the demarcation of national and international law. Hence, states no longer know where the inside ends and where the outside begins. Neither do governments now know where security begins and where insecurity ends. As a result, post-9/11 advocates of a new world order declare rules *will* not only change, they *must* change for the better.

THE WILL OF WESTPHALIA WILL ENDURE

In spite of these claims, the argument put forward here is that while the world may have changed and is continually being changed by international and domestic events, the transformation dictated by 9/11, whether in dramatic or in modest ways, still depend on the actions of the key actors involved. Above all, these actors remain the nation- states themselves and the global hegemonic power, the United States. The discussion here thus challenges the prevailing assumption that 9/11 is an exceptional event beyond history and theory (i.e. realism or neo-realism) that is drastically reconfiguring the state system. It is argued that states will strategically adapt to the changes brought about by 9/11 and thus will prevent the demise of the Westphalian order.

Transformation of Security Issues and Actors: Strategic Adaptation for the State

As discussed, post-9/11 assumes that with the demise of the traditional external threats from the nation-state, governments around the world have lost ground as the primary security actors in both domestic and international realms. The irony of the campaign against international terrorism is that while the enemy has indeed been a non-state actor located in many parts of the world and thus cannot be easily defeated by traditional mechanisms of state power, governments around the world have been afforded the opportunity to devise and identify new enemies——both external and internal——to justify the legitimacy of the state's primacy as security provider. This shifting of enemy targets has

given the states continuous use of the primacy of security as a means to repress not only internal but even external dissent. By enlarging the concept and scope of security, states have not only lengthened but broadened the conventional short list of enemies to include private individuals, national and transnational groups, transnational corporations, and even supranational institutions they deem to be undermining their capacity to rule and govern.

It has been said that the coalition against terrorism the United States built was explicitly designed to legitimize and sustain every state's repression of separatist groups, thereby enhancing their position as the sole legitimate agent of violence within their territory (Panitch 2002, 9). Also, the basic response of the European Union and its member states to the attacks was to apply stringently their respective anti-terrorism laws. The policy responses create the possibility of constructing a "Fortress Europe" which means higher insecurity for non-citizens and its so-called second class citizens through strict asylum and immigration policies as well as visa regimes (Sjursen 2001, 11). Thus security issues are now being expanded and used to justify the latest attempts of states to reassert their authority over their citizens as well as those of other countries. Political as well as economic and even environmental issues and policies are now defined in terms of security to add urgency and legitimacy. Even the latest achievement in attaining economic and monetary union of the European Union is seen as a justification for locking European countries into a consensual state system acting as a means of terminating "age old rivalries" (Beetham and Lord 1998, 100). The overall net result of this adaptation is an enhanced capacity of the member states and the Union in the field of security.

By passing statutes and other measures in coordination, aimed at curbing activities by dissidents and terrorists alike, governments have consistently enhanced their power and resources in their security apparatus.One of the clear trends resulting from 9/11 was the coordinated effort of national governments to pass anti-terrorism laws which has to strike a balance between individual rights and the state's redefinition of security arrangements. Some of these laws are the US' Patriot Act and the succeeding amendments to it, EU's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and the draconian laws passed in a number of member states at national level, Canada's Anti-Terrorist Act, and the Philippine's Anti-Terrorism Bill being pushed by the government.

There has been what can be called a domestication of security issues by the state. As such, while the relevance of international law may indeed be experiencing its toughest test so far, the emergence of a globally coordinated effort to strengthen domestic laws and regional alliances and treaties to combat terrorism can be legitimately considered as a true sign of state resurgence. In this sense, then, 9/11 and the global war on terror have not fundamentally altered the dynamic interplay of national interest, territoriality, and transnationalism (Booth and Dunne 2002, 15). Hence, even after 9/11, states, their territoriality, and their sovereign prerogatives continue to rule world politics. Traditional state-centric behavior, in pursuit of eminently realist goals of state independence and power, still explains the course of contemporary events as international order today is still sustained either by the threat of superior military muscle, either through a hegemonic or concert system, or by a balance of military power (Gray 2002, 232).

Reordering Borders

Whatever evidence post-9/11 theorists put forward in support of their claim that borders are disappearing, these can be easily matched by countervailing evidence attesting to the continued existence and health of the "national." In spite of the dramatic changes that purport to support or validate the end of the nation-state or the Westphalian model, the fact remains that there is still an "inter" and a "national" out there (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001, 23). Indeed, territory remains a basic ingredient of state formation and consolidation. While boundaries are being opened——disregarded due to globalization and the changes in the politico-security structure of the international system——new fences are at the same time being erected by states within and without state borders. Primarily, boundaries are not only moved across states, but within states as well. For example, the boundaries between the "incumbent" population and immigrants demarcate the social, economic, and ethnic differences of the population with the objective of arranging spatial classification aimed at securing the country from its own citizens and local society.

As a result of 9/11, these internal boundaries protecting and differentiating the state from the "national society" tend to be guarded more intensely than before even when compared with many international boundaries. Because of this development, security is being turned both into a public and market good without losing its character as a public

and national concern (Albert and Brock 1996, 37). Hence, changes in international relations have to be seen not only in the economic-politico context, but more importantly in the context of national societal change. Borders are not just barriers to change; they are also windows of opportunities for states to reaffirm their role as the primary security guarantor.

The Primacy of National Security, National Interest, and State Power

Are non-state actors, international institutions, and transnational bodies now changing the game of world politics? While al Qaeda is presented as a transnational organization, it owes much of its existence to official state acquiescence and to some extent, even actual state sponsorship. Super terrorism, no matter how fluid and loose its networks are, still needs bases. Certainly, there is more than one reason why terrorist networks need states. Takeyh and Gvoslev (2002, 100) listed four reasons why terrorists still need to have control on a particular territory, in particular in a failed state. Among these include the need of terrorist groups to acquire territory on a scale larger than a collection of scattered safe houses to enable them to establish transshipment points for their operations, the weak law-enforcement capabilities permits terrorist groups to engage in illicit activities to sustain their operations, availability of pool of recruits in harboring states, and finally, the benefits offered by sovereignty such as access to travel documents and purchase of weaponry through the state's military apparatus. Hence, while terrorism undermines the capacity of the traditional state, organization like al-Qaeda has flourished in places where state apparatus and structures are either weak or non-existent such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and countries of the Eastern European bloc.

As for the claim that a multilateral or polycentric world has emerged after 9/11, the one harsh truth remains: powerful countries have always shaped the international system to their advantage. The present US is no different, which is perceived to be engaged in a parallel effort to remake the rules to which international law is made, interpreted, and changed to its favor. The fact that the campaign is not being pursued through the NATO, much less the United Nations, but through a coalition reflective of a "hub-and-spokes" structure in which all the world states are either with the US or against. It is explicit so

far as its intention is concerned——"allow for a maximum unilateralism of strategic and tactical military action" by the only remaining super power in the world (Panitch 2002, 8). More deliberately, it seems the US, instead of seeking a mere change in the existing rules, is attempting to create new and exceptional rules for itself alone (Byers 2002, 125). Contrary to what post-9/11 theorists are describing, today's international order and perhaps even near future's will continue to be ultimately disciplined by the hegemonic power (Gray 2002, 229).

Realignment or Reconstitution?

Post-9/11 theorists wish to paint a new international system revolving around the concept of neoterritoriality, or a world in which sovereign states recognize their interests in mutual respect for each other's independence and in an extensive cooperation (Rosenau 1969, 76-89). However, they fail to account for the fact that images of terrorism and other global threats have been feeding the policies of nation-states for fear of the "coming anarchy" in a "bifurcated world" envisioned by Kaplan (2000) as early as the 1990s. At best, there may have been noticeable differences in the way states conduct their relations with each other, but it must be emphasized that the terrorist attack only accelerated policies already under the consideration of many states, including the US before 9/11 (Rynning 2002, 20).

The cooperation between the US and the former Soviet Union and its allies in West Asia is nothing new as "there has been a great deal of sharing of information among Western powers on activities of terrorists or suspected terrorists" even before the 9/11 attacks (Zacher 1992, 75). Also, there is nothing new about the engagement of the European Union with Russia. Right after the end of the Cold War, German Foreign Minister Genscher already argued that a consistently "stable post-Cold War order had to include at its heart the Soviet Union as an equal partner" (Forster and Niblett 2001, 27-57). Russia's true motives for entering what post-9/11 theorists saw as unprecedented cooperation with its Cold War rival is nothing but a skillful ploy by President Putin to sell his new domestic strategic policy, which his government has crafted and declared as early as November 2000 (Kakihara 2003, 9). By entering into a so-called breakthrough partnership, US-Russia are "in fact serving their own national interests," they are allied but with differing objectives (Kakihara 2003, 10).

The same can be said about the claim that 9/11 has not only galvanized support for the US war campaign against terrorism but has

also built a stable and consistent cooperative relationship between the US and China. This claim is debunked by the fact that unlike the Cold War when the two powers both have unified and identifiable threats preoccupying their security concerns, there is no fertile ground for unrestricted cooperation between the two today. Much like Russia, internal problems of separatists in Xinjiang-Uigur autonomous region and other areas underpin China's decision to support the US-led war on terrorism (Kakihara 2003, 10). Friedberg rightly stresses the fact that "American and Chinese interests and policies may converge to some degree, in certain situations and on some specific issues, but they will not do so completely or for very long" (Friedberg 2002, 3).

Hence, Russia and China brokered partnerships with the US against international terrorism not so much because they share the same concern for the common threat but because they deem the war on terrorism as affording them both the opportunity and legitimacy to deal with their domestic problems effectively. Power politics and strategizing—not shared commitments and goals—caused this realignment among competing major powers.

As for the global campaign against terror, the campaign is built and pursued on a unilateral and not multilateral basis. As the US focuses on global threats of terrorism, it also pushes NATO and its partners to do likewise (Rynning 2002, 21). Indeed, the military dimension of the campaign is *ad hoc*, with the US picking cherries—allies and capabilities—to suit its missions and goals. Hence, instead of breeding multilateralism, there is an apparent example of a unilateral military enforcement of rights and obligations, a condition unseen since 1945. Unlike in 1945, however, the embracing of this new idea of forcing an action upon a state without the clear mandate of the UN or the Security Council will lead us to anarchy and a return to an acceptance of "war" as a means not only of international but also of national policy.

Also, the war against terrorism is not "global" in the first place as the majority of the world's population did not and still does not support the campaign (Panitch 2002). The campaign is nothing but a superpower exercising a right conferred upon itself to deploy unparalleled means of violence around the world (Panitch 2002). Having said this, clearly, this is not the "quantum leap in cooperation" Zacher predicted would come once there is a major act of terrorism on any of the world power (1992,75). Obviously, the 9/11 attacks did not have any strong and lasting impact on the "people's nascent sense of an international community" (Zacher 1992, 75).

In the end, for all the claims of post 9/11 theorists that a post Westphalia system is in the offing, they still have to recognize that the maintenance of this so-called "new international system of states" built on coalitions and alliances and ostensibly based on multilateralism still depends entirely on the type of actions and policies the only remaining super power wishes to pursue (Delpech 2002, 39). At best, the response to the events of 9/11 require only a re-examination of the norms of interstate relations, not a complete overhaul as what 9/11 theorists contend.

In his survey of earlier claims asserting the failure of Westphalia to endure the changes in the international system, Stephen Krasner (1995) established analytical tools to distinguish the new (Westphalia) from the old. He suggests that the new would not only curtail the sovereignty and autonomy of states but would actually lead to the construction of new principles of political order superseding or transcending, instead of just violating temporarily, the Westphalian model (1995, 115-151). Hence, whether one recognises and calls the new international arrangement resulting from the 9/11 attacks as a "latter Westphalian system" or the "post-Westphalian system" as Zacher wants does not really matter (1992, 100). The imperative is to recognize the paradox that while states are evolving and competing with other political units in the "new" order they become increasingly enmeshed in, states will continue to play the central role in international relations. They will also continue to shape and consolidate the new international system of the twenty-first century.

Therefore, the assertion that contemporary events represent a drastic transformation because sovereignty and the traditional state system is so much at risk is not well-founded. It ignores the basic fact that violations of the principles of territoriality and autonomy have been an enduring characteristic of the international system. Richard Mansbach and Frankie Wilmer (2001) argued that as early as the French Revolution, the state's claim to monopolize use of force and violence at home and abroad as well as the distinction between inside and outside enshrined in the sovereignty principle of Westphalia was already challenged. As a matter of fact, history has shown that even strong states have had their sovereignty routinely compromised either by coercion or consent (Booth and Dunne 2002, 13). Thus, far-reaching predictions about the demise of the nation-state or the failure of the Westphalian system are premature. What we are witnessing is not the demise of Westphalia, but its reconstitution.

CONCLUSION

Although the nation-state is still the most significant actor on the international stage, it is undoubtedly facing challenges both internally and externally that undermine its position. This is an undeniable fact. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the nation-state has faced and will continue to face tremendous challenges that weaken its traditional power. It is the interrelationship between integration and fragmentation on local and global levels that along the way challenges both the power of states and the identity of nations. Indeed, there remains little doubt that increasing interdependence has affected the role and capacity of states, in some cases diminishing it and in others strengthening it through strategic alliance.

The argument presented here has established that in many cases the changes after 9/11 saw the strengthening, rather than weakening, of states around the world. For one, the key in preventing local terrorist cells from transforming into a potent network of global threat still remains at the disposal of the state (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 106). In addition, it must be noted that international norms evolve as states react to structural changes, which then change them in the process (Jacobson 2001, 170). Hence, despite all the claims about 9/11 creating a new world order, states remain the key actors in the international arena for the key reason that the states themselves are leading this transfiguration. For whatever policy decisions that result in the yielding of some areas of sovereignty by the state, these are, by themselves, acts of sovereignty.

While we may accept the prognosis that there has been some decay in the so-called pillars of sovereignty, this represents nothing but a modest stalling of the system as a sign of changing times. The Westphalian temple which modern polities have worshipped for over three centuries is not completely collapsing. As noted in an earlier comment prior to 9/11, "the decay does not appear to be so serious as to threaten seriously the centrality of states in world politics" (Zacher, 1992: 61).

That some of the changes trumpeted by post 9/11 theorists may be *revolutionary* does not discount the fact that most of the changes we are witnessing are actually *evolutionary* in nature and do not result in a complete change in the international system based on the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty and organized along the principles of power politics. What is happening is comparable to the "New Mediavelism" depicted long ago by Hedley Bull (1977) where an

international order recognizes a number of different kinds of political units aside from the nation-state as legitimate actors——*but not entirely sovereign*——since these do not possess a degree of political autonomy capable of undermining the capacity or even replacing the authority of the nation-state.

Hegel once regarded the modern state as the pinnacle of human achievement (Hegel [1837]1956, 86). While recent changes in the international system may have brought to the fore some of the vital shortcomings of the Westphalian state system, the international community must still contend with it until a better alternative is found. In the final analysis, there is very little in 9/11 that is *safe* to say (Der Derian 2002, 101). This is the intimate truth that must be understood.❀

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