Imagining the Terrorist: Racialization of Asian Identities since 9/11

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ABSTRACT. This paper argues that the emergence of the "new terrorism" discourse since 9/11 reconfigures the conventional categories of race and space by conflating "terrorism" with a host of Asian identities. Although the Middle East has become practically synonymous with "terrorism" since 9/11, the US-led global "war on terror" has strategically demarcated all the Islamic-led political dissents throughout Asia as potentially "terrorist" and volatile, thus depicting the region as a fearsome terrain, filled with dangerous and irrationally religious people who threaten civilization with deadly chaos. Indeed, it is only symbolic of the new racialization of Asia that recent studies on terrorism present an inordinate amount of "evidence" to draw linkages between the Islamist groups in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, and Thailand, and the al-Qaeda terrorist network. While these are recent developments, the ideologies underpinning the new racialization of Asia have complex genealogies and discursive contexts. In an attempt to uncover these discursive contexts, this paper contends that the emergence of anthropology as a colonial science has been central to the indoctrination of the cultural-other, while geography has become an imperialist discourse in transforming the cultural-other into spatial categories. Although these discursive contexts continue to shape the otherization of Asian identity, they are being selectively deployed by the newfound discourses of "area studies," "security studies," and "terrorology" in the racialization of Asian identities since 9/11.

KEYWORDS. orientalism literature ethno-terrorism geography space territorial mapping Asia area studies anthropology anthropometry

GENEALOGIES OF THE OTHER

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States (US) government compiled a long list of suspect terrorist countries. Although this list was initially restricted to Afghanistan and the countries in the Middle East, it has been gradually expanded to other regions in South and Southeast Asia. In this respect, anyone bearing the features of Asian or Muslim identity ("brown-skinned") became prime suspects of

terrorism in the Western world (Ludden 2003). While these developments entail reducing diverse cultural identities into singularity, the notion of the Orient as a collective geocultural entity and a cultivating ground of terrorists has become a latent discursive theme in the contemporary academic writing (Connors 2006; Barber 2003). Correspondingly, a complex interaction of state-sponsored research programs, think tanks, academics, geographers, and "area studies" specialists has unpacked a "new terrorism" discourse that informs much of the post-9/11 geopolitics. To this end, a wide variety of local and ethnic struggles and other political unrest throughout Asia have been drawn into the "new terrorism" discourse as well as the global "war on terror." Recent trends in the discourse on new terrorism purport that the Islamist political struggles in Asia are part and parcel of the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Correspondingly, the looming ethnopolitical tensions after 9/11 have been indoctrinated into a more sophisticated racial discourse. Since, for the most part, the racism Arab Americans encounter in the United States is also directed at other minorities, it is argued that the racial stereotypes need to be addressed in conjunction with the minorities at whom racism has traditionally been directed (Salaita 2005, 165). According to Spivak, however, these issues cannot be discoursed in terms of religion or race alone: "there is neither mourning nor execution without imagining the transcendental, and the transcendental, when imagined, has cultural names" (2004, 88). Moreover, cultural names as edifices of difference, Spivak asserts, transcend all other differential identities as they refashion the "impersonal narratives" of colonized/colonizer, East/West within which difference is fetishized and manifested. In other words, the racism that is entrenched in the cultural conscious of the Western world since 9/11 is invoked by the genealogies of Self and Other as its pretext. In much the same way, Sivanandan (2006) argues that the post-9/11 politics is not necessarily a particular reaction to the event. It is an entire culture of imperative ideology of the self (patriotism and European/white identity), including all its "attendant manifestations, that existed years before 9/11, which was merely strengthened by the anxiety manufactured in the aftermath of the attacks" (Salaita 2005, 166).

And yet it became implicit that "terrorist" Muslims and native others belonged to the countries and regions demarcated by the US government. Even though the racial mapping of national boundaries is a modern phenomenon, the cultural mapping of native subjects inside each mapped territory is a historical one (Ludden 2003).

Reinforced by competitive political interests, inscribing civilization and culture within mapped cultural spaces—where natives essentially belonged and others did not—has been a routine course of bureaucratic enterprise throughout colonialism. In Said's view (1994), the deployment of anthropological discourse as a shared academic passion by colonial ethnologists is a glaring example of this cultural mapping. After the formal end of colonialism,[1] however, geography emerged as the new imperialist paradigm to determine "who owns territory and who lives there under sufferance and who is naturally native and who needs naturalizing" (Ludden 2003, 1065).

In line with the genealogical antecedents emphasized in the literature—from "historical crystallization" to the "impersonal narratives"—I suggest that the racialization of Asian identities since 9/11 has been inscribed in a largely unseen historical order of convoluted discursive contexts, most specifically anthropology and geography.[2] As Dirks (2002) argues, a careful reading of historical contexts can serve as a reminder of the *materiality* of all texts, including the institutions that make them possible and serviceable. In this sense, the post-9/11 racial politics cannot be understood as a result of the event itself, but as a genealogical continuum of the texts (anthropology and geography) and the contexts (colonialism and imperialism) that are informed by them.

In developing my arguments on anthropology, however, I will restrict my analysis to the Indian case—not only because it is impossible to offer a consolidating narrative of the anthropology of the Orient in the space available here, but justly because India is touted as the heartland of all colonialisms and, for that reason, a social laboratory of control, governance, and other wild experimentations (Kapila 2007). On the contrary, I will not restrict the analysis of geography to the India case, for the discourse on terrorism has a global and multinational character, albeit essentialist, in that sense Orientalist, implications (Said 1994; Godlewska and Smith 1994; Hardt and Negri 2000). It is thus imperative that a larger milieu of events and evidence is taken into consideration.

COLONIALISM AND CULTURAL MAPPING

The notion of fundamental otherness between Europe and civilizations from the South and East has been prevalent throughout colonial history. For the Hellenic Greece, Persian Empire featured an "Oriental threat," while the Romans were consumed by the fears of the Oriental potentates.

In the medieval to early modern Europe, Christianity was "threatened" by a series of confrontations with the Muslim world (Winant 2004). In this sense, for most European Empires, the alien other was the absolute unknown—a mysterious and explorable subject.

In fact, a closer look at the Orientalist genealogies reveal that European perception of such differential world was embodied by an epistemic thrust of pan-otherness. Despite the marked geographical, cultural, and cosmic disjunctures within the Orient, the European historiography deployed the notion of "organic unity" as the quintessential character of the Orient (Palat 2004a). Pioneered by Colonel Wilks (1810), "organic unity" played a unique role in Henry Maine's (1876, 1916) doctrines on ancient law, economics, and "village communities" in the East. Maine defined village community as an organic body of corporate groups sharing common land ordered by law and custom (1876, 16). Although both Wilks's and Maine's observations were limited to India, the pan-oriental image of the village community was exemplified in Marx's later writings on the "Asiatic modes of production."

Maine believed that the Indian village community is an expression of the patriarchal family. Just as how each member of the household in the patriarchal family is assigned different social roles, the Indian village community, too, is organized around the assignment of roles to different individuals on the basis of caste. However metaphorical Maine's observations may be, the self-contingent model of village community was appealing to the British administrators as they found the idea of "private property" completely absent in India. To that end, Thomas Munro's introduction of private property in the *ryotwari* areas of Madras (in 1812) and Bombay (in 1818) owed a great deal of gratitude to the writings of Wilks and Maine. Murno was in full agreement with Wilks's view that "it was important to keep the communal spirit of the Indian panchayat" in order to implement British law (1810, 119). And Murno's ryotwari system aimed to achieve precisely this: enable the British to grant individual land titles and collect taxes from the individual owners without actually "disrupting" the "communal spirit" of the Indian village (Dumont 1966). [3]

Once the parameters of the village community were drawn, the idea of "communal production" became an epistemic expression of Indian social organization. The customary modes of communal production, which were variably known as "joint proprietorship" and "collective production" in the colonial literature, was portrayed as an

archaic form of social organization; a living museum of history for the curious Westerner. By the time Maine's *Village Communities in East and West* (1876) became influential, myriad ethnological surveys on communal production in various parts of India were already under way. Extensively documented in Firminger's *Fifth Report* (1812), the south Indian systems of communal production—known as *padayal, mirasi*, and *kaniachi*—offered an immense anthropological potential to the British ethnologists. Subsequently, these "southern systems" were found to be embodied by a new ethnological category called "village servants"—on occupational basis by various caste and subcastes, servants who received collective payments from the "entire" village for labor services rendered for collective production. No more than a series of repetitions from text to text, the location of "village servants" as an empirical category posed an impossible anthropological challenge to later anthropologists (Dumont 1966; Fuller 1977).

Regardless, for the British anthropologists of the era, while the idyllic notion of village community invoked the new ryotwari act, ryotwari justified the tenets of communal production. Whereas communal production heralded the arrival of "village servants," village servants rallied around the village community in a tour de force. Dubbed variedly by Maine's contemporaries as the "village republic," "little republic," and "Indian republic," village community was celebrated as the stepping-stone of Indian civilization, while the caste-based division of labor upheld the spirit of the Indian village community.[4] Inversely, among the anthropologists of the day writing on the caste system in India, the concept of village community had a profound influence. As Fuller (1977) remarks, if the customary modes of property ownership were the heart of Indian economy, caste system was the "heart" of Indian anthropology.

Soon after Wilks's *Historical Sketches of South India* (1810) appeared, district commissioners in the Southern and Central Provinces began observing Indian castes for strategic use. The demarcation of caste as India's cultural and genetic boundary, and its precedent fostering, transformation, and categorization were carefully deployed to introduce new land-tenure systems, revenue collection, and privatization of property, while somehow "preserving" the spirit of the Indian organic unity. Consequently, castes such as *rajputs* in North India and *kshatriyas* in the South were recruited into the provincial military regiments. Brahmins, the only English-educated class, were favored in bureaucracy. Land-tenure systems were restructured in accordance with the caste hierarchies.

The caste- and tribe-based censuses produced a vast corpus of gazetteers, manuals, and guides for local-level administrators, army officers, land and plantation owners, as well as "others with the information they felt necessary to know and to manage, the peasants, sepoys, clerks, and coolies who fell under their control" (McBratney 2005, 153). In an effort to "reinstitute" the self-sufficiency of the village community and agrarian structures where needed, castes and tribes were labeled "criminal" with restricted territorial mobility.[5]

In spite of that, the events following the 1857 Nationalist Revolt ushered a new-era cultural engineering and the criminalization of Indian castes. The "thugees" and Phansigars of North India were labeled "hereditary" criminal castes and tribes who possessed occult symbolism, codes languages, and custom (Lal 1995). In 1859, accounts of W. J. Hatch described Kurvaers as "hereditary criminals." During the same era, Railway Robbers were identified in southern India (Naidu 1915).

Following a circular issued by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1866, ethnologists Loyall and George Campbell had embarked on a hunt for "inferior and Helot" tribes, the "wandering tribes" or the "waifs and relics of aboriginal tribes" to be found in the thickety hills and jungles across India (Bates 1995, 18-19). These efforts yielded in a grand-scale physiological project by respective regional commissioners who were commissioned to gather data on Indian "specimens" by deploying anthropometric measures, including the measurements of height; size of nose, skull, arm, lower arm, thigh, and leg; diet; beard and mustache; and so forth (Bates 1995; Freitag 1991). The Italian criminologist Lombroso's theories on "killer footprints" and creatures who barely escape their "bestial origins" have had a boundless influence on the Indian ethnologists—police departments of this era. Anthropometry became an active pursuit in policing the Indian body, and a whole range of castes or subcastes, often interchangeable with tribes and gangs, have eventually been identified as being "congenitally" criminal. As Radhakrishna states:

> In the popular ethnographic literature of the period, a sketch was drawn of a criminal who possessed not just bizarre social customs, but a strange body and psyche as well "which has criminality written all over." (2001, 4)

Similarly, the earlier works of Kali Kumar Das Das, a British-educated phrenologist, had set out to prove that criminal mental capacities were "innate" and that humanity was not "equal." Das's theses were not

only brought into anthropometric limelight but were used to "observe" heads of criminals in the Chandranagore jail (Kapila, 2007, 463). Between 1881 and 1912, a wandering caste or tribe called Sansiahs became a major concern of the British administration. In 1887, a local police officer from the Oudh wrote that Sansiahs could be found all over India, and they are believed to be "ruthless in the destruction of human life," committing "violence and even murder wantonly, [which] they can do so with impunity." And by the 1870s, the administrators invoked this form of identity as "simultaneously genetic and cultural" (Freitag 1991, 247).

A few decades later, Edger Thurston and H.H. Risely, both colonial ethnologists, became immersed in developing a scientific method of identifying criminal castes informed by anthropometry in South and Central India (Bates 1995; Dirks 2002). Subsequent works by local ethnologists went on to identify the Maravars and Kallars in Tamilnadu as fierce groups "with great military prowess and, later on, considerable criminal proclivities" (Dirks 1982, 661). The anthropometric observations notated that they were "of strong limbs and hardy frames and fierce-looking as tigers ... the bloodthirsty Marvar, armed with the bow bound with leather, ... shoot their arrows at poor and helpless travellers, from whom they can rob nothing, only to feast their eyes on the quivering limbs of their victims" (Kanakasabhai 1965, 42-43).

Instigated by the anthropometric evidence, the various Civil and Criminal codes adopted by the British Raj between 1859 and 1871 stipulated and then subjected the criminalized castes to a strict discipline. They were required to register with official authorities, report for roll call, and possess passes to enter other territories. As Lal (1995) notes, surveillance and monitoring of the habitually criminal classes were further aided by innovations such as photography and fingerprinting. In 1904, the Thuggee and Dacoity Department, which was originally set to annihilate "thugs," was altogether abolished, having been replaced by the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID). Subsequently, following the amendments of the Criminal Tribes Act in 1911 in the Madras Presidency, which was established by the need to control the Kallars in particular, some 237 tribes were identified as criminal and treated accordingly (Tolen 1991, 110).

By controlling and criminalizing castes, it was believed that "the nefarious influence of the Brahmins and Maulvis," which supposedly knit the caste system and the Indian despotism in general, could decisively be removed. As Raheja states, "the colonial imagination had

seized upon caste identities as a means of understanding and controlling the Indian population after the blow to administrative complacency occasioned in 1857" (1996, 495).

Presumably, the lack of individuality, property ownership, and governance structure is taken as an adequate proxy for despotism. Caste, village communities, and religion were portrayed as social infirmities of the Indians who were effectively "lazy" and disengaged them from the capacity to rule or rebel politically, but only criminally. In fact, most political protests were immediately construed as criminal acts. From the 1922 Chaura Chaura incident, the suppression of Naxalite minorities in Telangana, Tebaga, and Srikakulam tribal insurgents in the early twentieth century were soundly informed by the colonial criminology (Tolen 1991; Ramanujam 1966). Thus cultural engineering was meant to be a mere instrument in the grand project of rescuing the native subjects from the shackles of despotism and decadence.

Although not all colonial experience and historical processes and transformations across societies and cultures were the same, the social engineering of India has been, by and large, the dominant trope of comparative colonialisms. For instance, the fourfold division of Indian castes influenced the present-day taxonomy of seven racial/physical types (McBratney 2005, 152). Anthropological, anthropometric, and comparative linguistics from Germany to Italy and to India exchanged the knowledge on the natives of all colonialisms (Driver and Gillian 1992). From Malabar's dacoits to Balinese "beasts," the Indian social engineering was "an arrangement that, given the fundamental immutability of type posited by physical anthropology, would likely last for all time" (McBratney, 2005, 152). The application of racial anthropology in the Orient had gained support from the geographical and travel narratives of the European travelers of the preceding centuries. William Hodges's writings directly linked the world of Pacific and Southeast Asia with that of India. The pet theories of H.H. Wilson, a prominent Orientalist, remained central to "the global comparisons between so-called races [that] became embedded with the increasing planetary expansion of the British Empire" (Kapila 2007, 481). And perhaps it would be a great disservice to Wilson's textual authority at length should we reduce his pan-Oriental paradigm into a single statement: "the innate, savage-like character not only of Muslims, but inherent in the very nature and character of the 'Asiatic'" (Kapila 2007, 478).

IMPERIALISM AND TERRITORIAL MAPPING

Although it was anthropology that contributed to the culturalist notions of Self and the Other, its influence on geography and the spatial characterization of its determinants have not received scholarly attention during the colonial period. Its relationship to the implied geographic origins and cultural characteristics—often associated with landscapes, environments, and other ecological characteristics—became popular only in the first half of the twentieth century. To this end, the works of Said (1978), Smith (2003), and Goldberg (1990, 1993) offer a critical historiography on the role of colonialism and imperialism in crafting the geocultural otherness in the contemporary racist discourses. In line with the colonial anthropological vision, the imperialist mapping of social geography meant that

> race is seen both to complement and to counter national formation and character. Those whose "racial origins" are considered geographically somehow to coincide with national territory (or its colonial extension) are deemed to belong to the nation. (Goldberg 2004, 215)

In other words, territorial bounds had to be attributed to, or derived from, the discursive genealogies of race—anthropology. To that, it was in the last phases of European colonialism that a fruitful combination between anthropology and geography yielded pseudoscientific disciplines such as geometric anthropology (Driver and Gillian 1992; Winlow 2001). A few decades later, the political application of such hybrid, often homespun, academic discourses instigated yet another discipline called "geopolitics" (Mamadouh 1998). With the constellations of culture and geography, race and territory, anthropology and geography, geopolitics is described "as the construction of marginality in the act of imperialism [that] occurred and still occurs as an act of anthropological and geographical violence through which space and its inhabitants are 'explored, reconstructed, re-named and controlled'" (Smith 2003, 337). In this sense, the emergence of new disciplinary conventions became chiefly responsible for (a) the emergences of political fissures between the First World and the Third World, (b) a discourse of international security, and (c) the geopolitical construction of the Orient as the terrorist homeland.

While the term "geopolitics" has been popularized by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s (Hepple 1986), its ideological underpinnings have been under way from early nineteenth century. In Britain, the writings of imperial and military scholars such as Halford J. Mackinder, James

Rennell, and Robert Orme were used as geopolitical devices to controlling seas and continents for the global balance of power (Lal 1995). But it was essentially the American geographers Isaiah Bowman and Nicholas Spykman who popularized the expression "democratic geopolitics" to place geography in service of a global democratic doctrine.

After the end of colonialism, the rise of new nation-states challenged the preexisting geographic order of the world. The states created by the disintegration of European empires remained calipers of colonial imagination, often deliberately divided within themselves by arbitrary ethnic and tribal fractures (Ludden 2003). The new cartographic passions elicited prominently in territorial security and conflict as the rise and fall of World Wars instilled fear and instability in Europe; in the metropolis, both external and internal margins required protection from alien threats. Somehow or the other, geographical boundaries needed to be drawn as "those whose geo-phenotypes obviously place them originally (from) elsewhere are considered to pollute or potentially to terrorize the national space, with deadly effects of refugee inflows, ethnic and communal violence" (Goldberg 2004, 215). And once the histories of all peoples have come to be contained within national maps, the racial, communal, and ethnic division of nation-states through cultural identities posed new challenge for geography (Ludden 2003).

With the end of the First World War, as most Empires ceased to exist, the geographers of the era believed that "at no time in the history of Europe have political boundaries more closely expressed the lines of ethnic division" (Smith 2003, 176). For Bowman, in particular, the ethnic sensibilities of the postwar nation building provided a context, if not an opportunity, for imperialist intervention. To bring order into disorder, Bowman believed that empire builders must think in terms of geography.

As chair of the American Geographical Society between 1915 and 1935, Bowman was responsible for the production of the Millionth Map. He took a professional pride in its makers that they "had gone out into the unknown and vanquished and charted it. ... It represents [not only] the indomitable determination of men to know the world and master it, but also the forces of civilizations advancing in spite of the high-barriers" (cited in Smith 2003, 97). Following the Second World War, Bowman produced intelligence information in collaboration with French and British geographers and advised the American government on the configuration of the New World—a term Bowman introduced in his

book in 1928 under the same title (Smith 2003). As the New World became the center of global geopolitics, the socialist societies were designated the second world. The rubric of Third World then was reserved to drawing the territorial margins of traditional societies in their pristine cultural states (Ludden 2003).

While the security issue remained implicit in the creation of the three worlds, it became prominent only after the Cold War. However, during the heyday of the Soviet Union itself, the question of international security emerged, as evinced in the modernization propaganda by the Americans against the socialist forces from the Soviet Union (Baber 2001). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the remnants of socialism and its militant psyche in the Asian region presented a great threat to Europe as well as the New World. To map these threats, mostly during the 1980s and the 1990s, many regional studies were devoted to border conflicts and other geopolitical transformations. According to Mamadouh (1998), much-studied countries and regions in this regard were Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Gulf States, the Persian Gulf, and regions that were directly or indirectly influenced by socialist politics such as India, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Cuba in which the major security concerns were the Kurds, Kashmir, China-Taiwan conflict, and so forth (Hafeznia 1994; Delavaud 1993; Martel 1991). The post-Cold War geopolitical strategy reduced conflicts to an ideological struggle between Good and Evil, and the territorial disputes concerning resources and interethnic conflict that cover national boundaries and the like were neglected, thus geopolitical approaches silently fell into abeyance (Mamadouh 1998).

Following this line of inquiry, Edward Luttwak (1993, 1990)—another American geographer—developed a "geostrategy" of combining economic and military interests in the Third World. Still, more traditional geostrategic approaches combining scholarship and security and military interests have been prevalent as late as the 1990s (Brzezinski 1997; Kemp and Harkavy 1997). It is about the same time that the emergence of Area Studies as a subdiscipline of geography, or just as a variant of geopolitics, began remapping continental boundaries in the interest of strategic imperialism. America drew maps of Asia by lumping countries into regions that officially define East, Southeast, Central, and South Asia. In Rashid's assessment, the boundaries of Asian and Central Asian republics were drawn "not along geographic or ethnic lines but in ways that seemed likeliest to suppress dissent, dividing clans, villages, and ethnic groups" (2002, 36). For example, although the Tajiks acclaimed their own

republic in Central Asia, the cultural and economic capitals of Bukhara and Samarkhand were mapped to belong to Uzbekistan (Ludden 2003). The mobility of "problematic" and "politically marginalized" ethnic nationalities as a result of the Cold War, in a majority of cases, was deemed to be an imminent danger to both national and international security. The fear of the recalcitrant political Other, in fact, became the crux of the subsequent geopolitics in determining which culture belonged where and, more important, which culture should belong where.

But it is not until the Gulf War in the 1990s that the Arab world as a collective cultural entity became a prominent discourse. To this, the pretext was the Iran hostage crisis in 1979-1980, which beamed the popular "Muslim" terrorist image across the world for the first time, and thus was merged, albeit intriguingly, into the Arab world (McAlister 2001). For the same reason, the Arab world of the 1960s and 1970s became "the Islamic world" in the 1980s (Jacobson 2002). Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islam, Arabs, Iran, and terrorism became synonymous with the Middle East in populist terms, although more Muslims live in South and Southeast Asia and in Africa. The then-Asian Afghanistan has been suddenly relocated as part of the Middle East by virtue of its alleged culturalist association with the "Muslim psyche." Such reterritorialization is not confined to Afghanistan alone: in a Yale University Press catalogue, books on Pakistan are listed under Middle Eastern Studies rather than South Asian Studies (Palat 2004b). It is thus not surprising that experts on the American government, area studies, and security studies mapped South and Central Asia in isolation with the Middle East *prior* to their political interventions in the Middle East.

The strategic cultivation of the Muslim world as a collective terrorist world by states and think tanks is clearly informed by the contemporary geographers and area studies scholars, although the criminalization of the Orient has undoubtedly had adherents in the earlier Orientalist fantasies. In an attempt to trace the expansion of al-Qaeda into the East Asian countries, a good deal of studies since 9/11 have been devoted to exploring the terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, including Singapore and Brunei (Veness 2001; Gunaratana 2005; Rodell 2005). Zachary Abuza's *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (2002) and Paul Smith's *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia* (2005) also fall under this category. By ignoring the ethnopolitical context of the militant organizations in Southeast Asia, most of these studies have

played into the Orientalist discourse on Islamic terrorism (Connors 2006). In Barber's (2003) view, not only that the studies connecting local struggles with the al-Qaeda network are weakly supported by evidence, they have also most categorically undermined the historical contexts of internal and external colonialism in Southeast Asia, while joining the ranks of the populist diatribe of "terror from the East."

The religious, racial, militant, and geographical factors notwithstanding, some argue that the modernization and economic liberalization projects pursued by Southeast Asian states have, to a large extent, contributed to terrorism by "aggravating the situation by undermining (older forms of horizontal community solidarity and hierarchical patriarchal sociality) traditional authority and socioeconomic structures" (Chalk 2001, 242). Hence, the underdevelopment of the East Asian countries, struggles for communal life, religion, identity and ethnic questions have been taken as a free pass to Islamic terrorism and political violence. Similarly, as Gilmartin and Berg (2007) note, most postcolonial critiques of imperialist geopolitics remained largely ineffective due to their immersion with deconstructing colonial discourses rather than engaging with their continuity (Flint 2003; Cutter, Richardson, and Wilbanks 2003). In the security studies critiques, too, an appeal for transforming geography into an arena of critical academic knowledge to understanding terrorism, security, and defense strategies situates Western lives at the heart of the issue, while simultaneously depicting terrorism as a hazard from outer space (Mustafa 2005; Beck 2003; Tirman 2004).

Thomas Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" (2003) is an overt case of the outer hazard thesis. Barnett's mapping arises from the conspicuous split between "the West" and "the East." In the latter, Barnett claims that the two crucial reasons for the "contagiousness" are "abject poverty" and "political/cultural rigidity" (2003, 175). Presumably, this "contagiousness" includes terrorism, drugs, disease, instability, "pain," and so forth. Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are "feedback" from the East to the West: "They tell us how we are doing in exporting security to these *lawless* areas [not very well] and which states they would like to take 'off line' from globalisation" (Barnett 2003, 176).

Thus, as Benjamin Barber states, corruption, undemocratic regimes, numerous governments that are weak and unstable, and more than a few Third World countries marginalized by globalization and hostile to America are considered an adequate justification for terrorism and destruction (2003, 117). Posed in this way, poverty, violence, ecology, and irrationality become the dominant features of the terrorist from the

East, when in fact "the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence" (Chua 2004, 9).

Conclusion

From the colonial anthropometry to the American geopolitics, the saga of mapping, farming, and criminalizing the Orient continues until today. Indeed, it is not by chance that Middle Easterners, South Asians, and Southeast Asians became the subjects of retribution and redemptive violence following 9/11. While these events exemplify the arbitrariness of territorializing cultural identities, the necessity of solidarity in the face of nativist discrimination also challenges contemporary ethnic categorizations, since physical differences insulated East Asians, by and large, from those who had the physical appearance of a Muslim, or those who resembled them [South Asians] (Palat 2004b; Salaita 2005).

The ominous Muslim Other is no longer imagined in terms of specific national or territorial identity. The association of "brown skin" with Muslims (and " terrorists") gave rise to collective cultural names and identities. In other words, cultural maps took a territorial form, as the American mapping of the "terrorist" is being inscribed with symbols that contained cultural attachments to spatiality. The Asia that is drawn in Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" extends far beyond the old American Astronomical Society map of Asia. It connects the far West and Northwest of Eurasia to South, Central, East, and Southeast Asia to conjure a nameless Asia that also touches Chechnya, Palestine, Armenia, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Ludden 2003; Roberts, Secor, and Spark 2003).

Deeply entrenched in popular imaginations, it is this nameless collective other, be it territorial or cultural, that appears fearsome and despotic, filled with volatile, bestial, irrationally religious people who threaten modernity, democracy, and civilization; while the Western world persists as a sublime domain of humanity and its prosperity, the enclosure of civility, outside of which lurk the fearsome others in a collective cultural space. Undoubtedly, they are alien people who wandered in the traditional ethnographies of the mobile anthropologists, having mapped in the native spaces and bounded localities in the cartographies of the modern geographers. Anthropologically considered, therefore, the "terrorists" are certainly alien people who could be traced to the cultural

cartographies of the Orient for the Western mind. Geographically considered, they are still alien people who exist within or outside the borders of previously colonized territories, ranging in scope and content from Afghanistan to, more generally, the Philippines and beyond.

NOTES

1. Colonialism, a form of imperialism, involves the establishment and maintenance of rule and/or the tangible settlement of people and the displacement or subordination of others (Said 1994). Imperialism is a broader concept, referring to unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationships based on domination and subordination (Engseng 2004; Asad 1973). However, in this essay, I use the term "imperialism" with reference to the strategic deployment of metropolitan cultural and capital expansion over the ex-colonial territories, in the postwar context.

2. Although both anthropology and geography as imperialist sciences underwent severe criticism, the intricate genealogical lineage between the two disciplines remains largely ignored.

3. One of the district commissioners from the Central Provinces exclaimed that "surely a more striking example of village communism and of village rights going beyond the ryotwari system of Madras or Bombay could not be imagined" (Bates 1995, 30).

4. In a tacit anthropological transformation, the Orientalist theories of Maine, Murno, and Wilks on village communities, servants, and communal production had lent enough anthropological imagination to William Wiser (1936) to develop a more comprehensive paradigm of Indian subcastes known as the *jajmani* system. Like Maine's, Wiser's theory emphasized the role of caste-based occupations in sustaining the self-sufficiency of Indian villages.

5. This restriction applied to the occupational mobility of castes as well. To this effect, the 1891 Census was conducted primarily on occupational criteria (see Bates 1995).

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