

Re-democratization in the Wake of the 1986 People Power Revolution: Errors and Dilemmas

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After the swift, dramatic and unexpected fall from power of Marcos, the people power-installed government of Aquino was confronted with four crucial issues: the foreign debt; agrarian reform; the crony properties; and human rights. The record of the Aquino administration on these issues in the ensuing years not only showed its essential conservatism but also reflected the dynamics of the power struggle that besieged the presidency. A reading of the democratization process following the EDSA Revolution yields six fundamental tension points that transitional democratic governments face upon the termination of a dictatorship. In the absence of a clear program pushed from below, the democratization process and the creation of a new ethos — a new political culture — was stymied by the *afficionados* of politics and the technocrats of policy. Thus, in the revolution's aftermath, came elite restoration.

Introduction

Ferdinand Marcos' actual fall from power was swift, dramatic and unexpected. He had ruled the country for more than 20 years, like no other Filipino politician had, and therefore it was natural to expect that his involuntary exit from politics would be prolonged and possibly violent. The truth is that he never thought of giving up power. He had always envied his rival next door — Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore — who never lost his grip on his country's political life, even after he transitioned himself into the powerful role of Senior Minister. Marcos also believed he would outlast another neighbor — Suharto of Indonesia — who came to power at about the same time as he, and remains, to this day, the central and most powerful figure in Indonesian politics.

But Marcos had no such luck. Singapore is a manageable country with a prosperous economy. Lee Kwan Yew tolerated no dissent or criticism and offered no excuses about not following the American way of democracy. Indonesia, on the other hand, had oil. And being a general himself, Suharto held an iron grip over his generals in the Indonesian

This article was based on the lecture entitled *Redemocratization despues de la Revolucion del Poder Popular de 1986: Errores y Dilemas* presented by the author at the UNAM, Mexico City, on 2 February 1996.

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army. He too permitted no dissent under his dictatorship. Above all, these two Southeast Asian dictators were in better health at that time than Marcos.

Marcos suffered from a rare debilitating illness which was diagnosed as *lupus erythematosus*. It attacked the immune system of the body. It was not AIDS, but like this dreaded disease of our time, it lowers the sufferer's resistance to all kind of infectious diseases. His health rapidly declined after a closely concealed kidney transplant operation, almost mirroring the massive deterioration of the Philippine economy itself through the critical years of 1984 and 1985.

The entire world watching CNN could not have missed the sight of the ailing dictator stumbling out of the US Air Force plane that evacuated him in February 1986, first to Guam and then to Hawaii. He was a picture of defeat and humiliation, the complete opposite of the president who in 1972 arrogantly staged a coup against his own government in order to install himself as dictator. In Hawaii, which became his home until his death a few years later, he complained that the United States had taken him against his will and was treating him like a prisoner.

It is useful to briefly recount the events that led to this, not only because Filipinos are commemorating in February 1996 the 10th year of their liberation from the Marcos dictatorship, but also because the manner of the regime's overthrow tells us something about the essential fragility of all governments, including those of the most entrenched dictatorships. More importantly for our purposes, it explains to us why the government of Mrs. Corazon Aquino which came to power in the aftermath of the dictatorship's overthrow, contented itself with the restoration of formal constitutional democracy instead of using its vast powers, under a provisional revolutionary government, to reform Philippine society itself and thus give substance to constitutional democracy.

The Four Days of February 1986

During the two years that followed the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., the resilience of the Philippine economy was put to a test. The Philippine peso suffered a series of drastic devaluations as Filipinos speculated against their own currency. Rich Filipinos took their money to safer havens abroad at precisely the time the economy needed capital. The scarcity of US dollars prevented the importation of essential raw materials needed to produce goods both for domestic consumption and export. The growth rate registered a negative five percent in 1984 and a negative 4.5 percent in 1985. The collapse was precipitated by the drastic withdrawal of all foreign credit, forcing the Marcos government to admit its inability to pay interest charges and outstanding principal obligations to foreign banks.

Discovering that their pesos were becoming worthless day by day, Filipino consumers went on a panic-buying spree, emptying store shelves, thus sending prices to unimagined inflationary levels. Marcos pleaded for the restoration of foreign credit because the country could no longer afford to pay for all its imports in cash. The IMF responded by proposing an economic adjustment plan in exchange for a re-structuring of existing debts. The IMF cure further constricted economic activity, and Filipinos were left wondering which was worse, the illness or the medicine.

Yet surprisingly, at the height of all these economic troubles, Marcos remained politically in control. There was much agitation on the streets, fueled by the activism of the awakened middle classes. The demonstrations were becoming more and more confrontational. But Marcos refused to be provoked into imposing tighter restrictions on daily life, perhaps hoping that the anger in the streets would soon exhaust itself.

The central issue put forward by the anti-Marcos movement was the loss of confidence in his presidency, which, the demonstrators claimed, was what produced the economic crisis. Marcos, they said, must immediately resign from the presidency in order to give way to more competent and credible leaders. The US media picked up this line, and in a live interview with Marcos on the David Brinkley show in November 1985, reminiscent of the interview given by Mexico's Porfirio Diaz to an American magazine, the interviewers provoked Marcos into calling for

snap elections to settle the issue of confidence once and for all. The stage was thus set for the entry of Cory Aquino, the widow of the murdered martyr Benigno Aquino.

Marcos was very sure that the opposition would not be able to put up a common presidential candidate. Moreover, he was very certain about his political machinery and its capacity to manipulate election results. It was a miscalculation. With the help of Cardinal Sin, the influential Archbishop of Manila, the leaders of the anti-Marcos movement, minus the underground Left which opted to boycott the elections, chose Cory Aquino as their candidate. The choice of Cory Aquino was brilliant. Against the old fox Marcos, she was totally inexperienced and untarnished by any charge of corruption. Cory was the personification of luminous and cheerful virtue against the dark and brooding image of a corrupt Marcos. This was not to be a simple election; it was to be nothing less than a battle between good and evil. It was no longer just a political contest. This was a moral war.

That message reverberated throughout the country and found a home in every Filipino's heart. Ordinary folks contributed their last pesos to Cory's campaign, and they put up home-made banners and posters to signify what they thought of Marcos. On election day, the entire country went out to vote, registering the largest percentage of voter turn-out ever. But instead of going home after casting their votes, the people stood vigil at the polling precincts to make sure their ballots were counted. That vigil lasted more than two weeks and marked the birth of people power.

As expected, Cory Aquino won the vote but lost the count. Computer technicians who were in charge of tabulating the results walked out in the middle of counting, declaring that they could no longer morally accept the cheating that was being done before their eyes. The cheating was massive and palpable, but Marcos went on brazenly to declare himself winner. The rubber-stamp legislature, dominated by his own party, seconded this by pronouncing his re-election. But the public refused to accept the manipulated results. They called for an indefinite boycott of all establishments identified with Marcos. They held prayer rallies everywhere and everyday to protest the election results.

Two weeks after the disputed elections, young officers belonging to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement or RAM persuaded Defense

Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos to join them at a press conference at Camp Aguinaldo, the main headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In that press conference, extensively covered by the foreign press which had come for the election, Enrile and Ramos announced their resignation from the Marcos government and urged their comrades in the military and the government service to likewise do so. Perhaps it was the first mutiny ever in contemporary history to be launched at a press conference.

But Marcos was very much in control of the major service commands of the military. His loyal soldiers immediately surrounded the mutineers, but before anyone realized what was happening, a big crowd started to gather in front of the camp, bringing food and blankets for the embattled soldiers inside. Cardinal Sin went on radio to urge the public to pray for them. That was 22 February 1986. In the next three days, millions of Filipinos gathered on the main highway known as EDSA, just in front of the camp, as well as in the other principal city centers of the country, to keep vigil. Some came as organized groups, many came as individual citizens united by a common anger for the Marcos regime. Some came to protest because they understood the issues; many came just to watch, sell food or souvenirs. They prayed, they sang, and they talked about the country's future. Unarmed, they pushed back with their bare hands the tanks that Marcos sent one day to disperse the crowd. They offered flowers, rosaries, food and cigarettes to the soldiers loyal to Marcos. The rest, as they say, is history.

On the morning of the 25th of February, a justice of the Supreme Court swore Cory Aquino as president of the republic. In the afternoon of the same day, Ferdinand Marcos also took his oath as re-elected president. Only Marcos' oath-taking was televised because up to that point he still controlled the TV stations. But as he read his oath, TV screens suddenly went blank. The military rebels had seized the TV stations and cut him off the air.

There were sporadic armed clashes during those four days in February, mostly between loyalist and rebel soldiers. The total casualty for the entire period was four dead: 3 soldiers and 1 civilian. It could have been a bloody and disastrous civil war. But the world monitoring these events on satellite television, it became a little impossible for Marcos to bomb the crowd, as his loyal Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver, had

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proposed, without completely losing whatever standing he still enjoyed in the international community. The Philippines was not like China, which could afford global isolation, and Marcos was not Deng Hsiao-Ping, who remained the fulcrum of Chinese politics at the height of the Tiananmen events.

In the Philippines, the decisive moment was still the defection of the military, which was no doubt also impelled by the massive display of public support for the anti-Marcos movement. The role of the Church could

not be underestimated. It supplied all the symbols and the language by which ordinary people grasped what was happening. Statues of the Virgin Mary were everywhere, and nuns and priests led the prayers for peace. So too must we acknowledge the role of the foreign media, whose obvious bias against Marcos hastened his loss of legitimacy in the international community. While Marcos brooded in his palace, contemplating his next move, the ambassadors of major foreign countries began paying their respects to Cory Aquino as President. The poor ambassador of the Soviet Union who had just arrived in the country made the mistake of not recognizing and waiting for the new president. He presented his credentials to Marcos just before he was deposed. The Russian ambassador was, however, not alone in his folly.

The underground Maoist Left got left behind not because it sided with Marcos, but because, operating on the basis of outmoded models of revolution, they refused to see that Cory Aquino had actually become the symbol of the people's aspiration for a new order. They had called for a boycott of the elections, and, now faced with a people's uprising, they chose to ignore what the people were saying. The Maoists saw the events as nothing more than intramural politics within the elite. They refused to see that the events were open-ended, rather than scripted by a hidden conspirator. They were waiting for the right revolutionary moment, according to the formulations of their theory, and of course, that moment never came.

It is said that victory has many parents, but defeat is an orphan. So it was with the People Power Revolution at EDSA. Every group that thought it had a stake in these events tried to interpret the events in the light of their own respective paradigms. The businessmen and the politicians thought of the February events within the framework of the presidential elections. The military rebels of the RAM, together with Minister Enrile and General Ramos, saw it as a separate and new event altogether — a product of the historic partnership of the people and the military. The social movements, on the other hand, saw the events as a fitting culmination of more than two decades of sustained struggle to correct the basic inequalities of Philippine society and to end its neo-colonial dependence on the United States. Each group, therefore, was claiming authorship of the revolution. Unfortunately, the underground Left, which had played a crucial role in the struggle against the dictatorship, had chosen to disparage the EDSA events by insisting that the entire thing was a CIA-scripted show. To understand the nature of these competing narratives is to appreciate the dynamics of re-democratization during the first few years following the so-called EDSA revolution.

After the Revolution

As Marcos and his family fled the Malacañang palace aboard US helicopters, the leaders of the military rebels and the civilian advisers of President Aquino were busy negotiating the composition of the transitional Cabinet. Ponce Enrile retained his post as Defense Minister while Fidel Ramos was named Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The traditional politicians and business people who drafted Cory Aquino for the presidency took most of the other seats in the new government. A number of social movement figures were appointed to a few government departments and agencies.

Everyone seemed happy except the military rebels of the RAM who felt that their role was being downgraded and were not being consulted. They were not mistaken in their suspicion. For indeed,

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the civilian leaders wanted them to return quietly to their barracks and leave governance to civilians. It was a clash of paradigms. Mrs. Aquino's group intended to run the government as a purely civilian enterprise. On the other hand, the soldiers thought they deserved to be equal partners in the new government, at least until a new Constitution was drafted and an entirely new set of officials chosen in a new election.

The first order of business of the new government was to throw away the 1973 Marcos constitution, disband the Marcos legislature, replace all the local government officials, and declare a provisional revolutionary government, with President Cory Aquino exercising full revolutionary powers until a new constitution was drafted and ratified. The military was completely excluded from the formal exercise of these revolutionary powers. But so were the social movements, except when the president met with their leaders for occasional consultations.

Cloaked with revolutionary powers, President Aquino was in a position not only to dismantle the odious structure of the Marcos dictatorship but also to promulgate social reforms that would benefit the vast masses of the people. She had more than one year to do so, while the country awaited congressional and local elections under a new constitution. The crucial issues that confronted her would decide which constituency she identified herself with: the elite community of bankers, traditional politicians and landlords — or the new social movements of peasants, workers, students, human right activists, professionals, community organizers and Church people.

Four issues, in particular, put her government to the test, namely: (1) the foreign debt, (2) agrarian reform, (3) crony properties, and (4) human rights. Her record on these issues showed her essential conservatism, but it also reflected the dynamics of the power struggle that besieged the early years of her presidency.

The Foreign Debt

Marcos left behind a debt amounting to more than US\$26 billion. Forty-seven percent of the national budget every year went to debt service. Half of the country's earnings from exports were set aside just to pay the annual interest on these debts. The debt burden had become the single most important impediment to the economic development of

the Philippines. The IMF program in force during the last year of the Marcos regime dictated restrictions on money supply and government expenditures, and maintained a regime of tight credit and high-interest rates. The country was being forced to tighten its belt in order to pay the foreign debt, when what it needed most was a momentary relief from the debt burden so that the economy could grow and expand its capacity to pay its debts. That relief could have come in various forms: debt forgiveness on some official debts, debt repudiation of fraudulent debts, liberal re-scheduling of terms on legitimate debts, debt swaps, etc. President Aquino's global popularity and the worldwide sympathy earned by Filipinos in their quest for democracy gave her new government sufficient leverage to negotiate better terms than had been possible under Marcos. But that advantage was never used. On her first visit to the United States, speaking before a joint session of the US Congress in September 1986, President Aquino announced that her government was honoring all the debts left behind by the previous regime.

Mrs. Aquino was particularly worried that a radical approach to the debt problem might invite retaliation in the form of cancellation of import credits that, in turn, could result in production cut-backs and further unemployment. She did not want to take that risk because her primary concern was to normalize economic activity as soon as possible so that she could smoothly proceed to the restoration of democratic institutions and processes.

Agrarian Reform

When Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, one of his first acts was a land reform program that sought to liberate the Filipino peasantry from bondage. But the Marcos program was limited to lands planted to rice and corn. Excluded were sugar and coconut lands which were the economic base of a large segment of the oligarchy. President Aquino had every opportunity to correct this while she possessed absolute powers of legislation if only to ensure the continuing support of the landless peasantry. But land reform was not her priority. It was only much later, bowing to pressure from the social movements and people's organizations, that she issued an executive order declaring the entire country a land reform area regardless of the crop planted. But even that belated order proved to be inadequate. It left open the two basic issues which would have distinguished her agrarian policy: land retention limits or how much the landowners could keep of their land, and compensation or how much

to pay the landowners. She wanted these issues resolved by Congress, which as everybody anticipated, would be dominated by lawyers for landowners and landowners themselves.

There are two possible explanations for this indecisiveness about agrarian reform. The first is that Mrs. Aquino's family owns the 6,000-hectare Hacienda Luisita, one of the largest *haciendas* in the country, and she did not possess the kind of understanding that would have permitted her to transcend her own family's interests. The second is that she was unsure of the impact that a radical land redistribution program would have on agricultural production, especially in the sugar and coconut sectors. Again, she wanted to remain on the safe side with regard to economic issues, preferring to toss the delicate questions to a duly-elected Congress, instead of taking full responsibility for any attempt to re-structure Philippine society. In the end, that post-Marcos Congress passed an agrarian reform law that was so full of loopholes it made it virtually impossible to break up the large landholdings. Ironically, the first *hacienda* which successfully avoided actual re-distribution was Hacienda Luisita.

The Crony Properties

One of the battle-cries of the EDSA Revolution demanded the immediate return of all stolen wealth to the national treasury. The clear reference was to the Marcos family and the cronies who had amassed enormous wealth and corporate assets over the two decades that they were in power. A Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created immediately after the EDSA revolution for the purpose of sequestering all properties suspected to be stolen. With respect to wealth located in the Philippines, what the government did was to seize the properties first, operate these as state assets, while waiting for the findings of the courts. The government continues to use these seized assets, e.g., TV stations, even as the cases pertaining to them drag on in court. It is a situation inviting the forging of compromise settlements, in which a tremendous amount of discretion comes to be exercised by the commissioners of the PCGG.

In almost instances, indefinite sequestration for the purpose of securing the assets, while their status (whether stolen or legally acquired) is being determined, has led to the freezing or downright collapse of these

businesses. Their indeterminate status has tended to scare away potential investors and clients. By the time the case is resolved or a compromise settlement is agreed upon, usually the business has so deteriorated that its sale nets the government only a pittance, often not even enough to pay the lawyers.

Certainly, it would have been immensely preferable if the government, during its revolutionary phase, had seized whatever stolen properties it could lay its hands on, dispose of these or allow them to be run by the workers, and then file the appropriate cases against their illegitimate owners. But the Cory Aquino government was a government of lawyers. Lawyers had a definite notion of due process, and they wanted this as a check against possible abuses by their own people.

Today, the largest of these disputed assets, amounting to anywhere between US\$5-10 billion, are locked up in Swiss banks. Only the banks have profited from them. The cases that cover them remain unresolved. In the meanwhile, several other claimants, apart from the Marcos family, have come forward. The most successful of them are the victims of human rights violations who have filed a successful class suit in an American court, and the American judge has ruled that these human rights victims be compensated from the Marcos estate. Ironically, the Philippine government and the Marcos family have joined hands to oppose these claims over the Marcos stolen wealth. It will not be surprising if eventually, a compromise solution is arrived at between the Philippine government and the Marcos family so that the assets could be legally withdrawn from the Swiss banks. But the point that I want to highlight here is the utter powerlessness of the government in recovering stolen wealth and in prosecuting the thieves from the previous government. It is nothing short of a scandal that, until now, no one from the Marcos regime has been put in jail for stealing.

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Human Rights Violations

Apart from corruption, the other issue that normally hounds leaders of authoritarian regimes after they are removed from power is human rights violation. From Argentina to East Germany to South Korea, the brutality of the police state has been one of the most outstanding targets of the new leaders in the immediate aftermath of democratization. In the Philippines, a Presidential Commission on Human Rights was forced to receive and document complaints by victims who had suffered in the hands of the police or the military during the dictatorship. The first chairman of this commission was a prominent human rights lawyer, Jose Diokno, whom Marcos had placed on solitary confinement for over two years. His commission immediately went to work, interviewing victims and filing cases in court. Unfortunately, he died from cancer without ever seeing a major military figure put behind bars.

The cases dragged on in court. Witnesses disappeared or withdrew their depositions out of fear of the military. And leaders of the military establishment began to put pressure on the government, complaining that the Commission was engaged in a witch-hunt which was causing demoralization and restlessness in the military. The soldiers who were being prosecuted claimed they were just following orders from above. It was a typical answer. But it brought to the force a truth that the Cory government had tried to minimize, namely, that the chief of the dreaded Philippine Constabulary during the dictatorship was no other than the

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hero of the EDSA revolution himself, General Fidel Ramos; and that the Martial Law administrator for many years was no other than Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, another hero of the EDSA revolution. Was it possible to go deeply into these investigations of human rights violations without somehow implicating these two important men? The answer clearly was no, unless the Cory government was prepared to take the risk of further aggravating the already polarized situation between the civilian leadership and the young officers of the RAM (Reform the Armed Forces Movement).

The Coup Attempts

The military launched at least six coup attempts against the government of Cory Aquino during its first three years. The most serious of these were the ones led by Colonel Gringo Honasan — the 28 August 1987 and 1 December 1989 coups. The principal issues raised by the coup plotters referred to the continuation of patronage politics within the military, the emergence of new cronies and the absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan to defeat the communists. The RAM accused President Aquino of being under the influence of leftist advisers in government, which they claimed led to widespread demoralization in the military.

These coup attempts had the effect of pushing Mrs. Aquino to the right and of making her rely increasingly on General Fidel Ramos to defend the government. To the credit of General Ramos, he stood by President Aquino at the most crucial moments in 1987 and 1989, even if it meant turning his back to the young adventurous officers who brought him to EDSA on that crucial day in February 1986. In contrast, she questioned the loyalty of Juan Ponce Enrile and dismissed him from his post as Defense Minister after the August 1987 coup.

But interestingly, the unintended effect of the coup attempts on the social movements was to marginalize their role in the government. Mrs. Aquino decided that coup attempts were a military problem requiring military solutions, and that therefore there was little that the unarmed mass movements could do to defend her government. To do this, she had to win the loyalty of the remaining elements in the military that had not joined Honasan. General Ramos became the rallying figure of these elements. On his advice, President Aquino proposed to raise the salaries of soldiers by 60 percent immediately after the 1987 coup. She launched a total war against the communist insurgency, terminating all possibility of resuming peace talks with the communists. She dismissed the human rights lawyer Joker Arroyo as Executive Secretary because of his well-known anti-militarist leanings. And she recognized and validated the role of the notorious para-military groups formed and armed by the military as a buffer against the communist insurgency.

■ The first problem that transitional democratic governments face upon the termination of a dictatorship is deciding what should be their priority — immediate sweeping reforms or political consolidation?

This "new" image endeared Cory very much to the United States and the business community. Having at first alienated the business community by appointing a human rights lawyer as her labor secretary, she tried to win the businessmen back by ordering a crackdown on all illegal pickets and barricades in strike-bound companies. In contrast to the unequivocal position she had taken on the US bases question when she was a presidential candidate, she now said she was keeping her options open on the bases, signaling a clear readiness to support their continued stay on Philippine territory.

Concluding Points

1. The first problem that transitional democratic governments face upon the termination of a dictatorship is deciding what should be their priority — immediate sweeping reforms or political consolidation? It became very clear during the first 18 months of her government that Mrs. Aquino was determined to remain in office, and that she would not be heckled into stepping down from the presidency. Finishing her six-year term of office became her most abiding obsession. Her political survival became her most important accomplishment.

Looking back, one wonders how long she would have stayed in office had she chosen to become the reforming president that the social movements wanted her to be. She could have once and for all repudiated all the fraudulent debts incurred by Marcos. She could have permanently broken up the economic base of the landed oligarchy by decreeing a radical agrarian reform program. She could have seized all the Marcos and crony assets without hesitation and used these to improve the lives of her people. She could have used her global popularity to shame the Swiss banks into returning the Marcos deposits to the Filipino people. But she could have done all these things only if there was a powerful constituency for social change — a force from below that could shape the direction of national

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policy and, more importantly, defend the government against its enemies when necessary. That force was not there in 1986. The people power that was there was united more by what it opposed than by what it stood for.

2. The termination of the dictatorship is never a clean break. There are discontinuities as well as continuities: some old faces in new roles, some new faces in an unchanged bureaucracy. Movement leaders became bureaucrats overnight, isolated from one another by the intimidating chores of running a government from day to day. They could not initiate meaningful changes within their own departments and offices because they discovered, to their dismay, that the very things they wanted to change fulfilled certain functions. And the alternatives were not easily available.

Nothing was more frustrating for them than to realize that they often had to make use of the old presidential decrees of Marcos because it was expedient to use them, at least in the short term.

3. When and how to respond to elections called by a dictatorship is a tricky question. On the one hand, they can always be trusted to be rigged, in which case it is but proper to boycott them. On the other hand, they may provide vital occasions within which a unified movement can be galvanized into action. The radical Left made the mistake of calling for a boycott of the 1986 snap presidential election called by Marcos. As a result, the moderate forces completely assumed the role of opposition in the electoral terrain. The public saw the election as an opportunity to express their unified dissatisfaction with Marcos. The important question, it appears, is what the people are actually prepared to do in the name of change at any given moment, not what they should be prepared to do if they knew better.

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4. The termination of a dictatorship is an open-ended process. The risk of a violent civil war is ever present. In a military confrontation, unarmed civilians are usually marginalized and unable to play a meaningful role. What was different about people power in the Philippines is that masses of unarmed civilians dared to intervene at the crucial moment, interposing themselves between rival elements of the armed forces but also indicating very clearly where their sympathies lay. In this regard, the role of the Church in the Philippines in providing the necessary language and narrative that permitted ordinary Filipinos to perform such acts of madness, as pushing tanks with bare hands, cannot be underestimated.

5. Transitions are constant struggles for legitimacy. In a world of satellite communications and global mass media, the attitude expressed by the world at large, not just by official government entities, but by elements of the global civil society, is crucial in deciding the fate of a democratization process. Marcos was aware of this, which is why he dispatched his most articulate representatives to the United States to explain to international media his government's perspective of the events. But it was too late. Mass media organizations were already reporting and interpreting events from where they were happening.

6. And finally, social movements are powerful agents for waging campaigns, but they are nearly helpless for the equally important task of negotiating policy reform. In the day-to-day policy debates that took place in the government of Mrs. Aquino, the activists found themselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the technocrats and the professional politicians who were more familiar with the ways of government than they were. It was easier to overthrow the dictatorship than to form a government that would be different. The building blocks for a different government — a new ethos, a new political culture — should have been created in the course of the struggle. But the transfer of power came too fast. In the absence of a clear program pushed from below, the *aficionados* of politics and the technocrats of policy took over. This was how the revolution led to elite restoration. ●