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ASEAN Approaches to Managing Regional Security

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The ASEAN is one of the regional organizations whose usefulness have outlived the Cold War. By investing in institutions and developing norms, its member-states have overcome obstacles to regional political stability and cooperation in the old order. With the demise of bipolarity and the emergence of a more complex post-Cold War security environment, however, ASEAN faces the twin challenges of remaining a relevant and formidable regional actor and fostering a wider regionalism beyond the confines of Southeast Asia. In this new regional security configuration, the Association needs to expand regional security dialogue to include actors in the wider Asia-Pacific through the ASEAN Regional Forum; broaden the application of its code of conduct, the TACSEA, to cover the entire Southeast Asian region; transform Southeast Asia into a nuclear-weapons-free zone as well as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and get the cooperation of countries with nuclear capabilities; and pursue a self-reliant and collective military posture.

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[1] is one of the regional organizations whose usefulness have outlived the Cold War. Indeed, it is regarded as the most successful regional organization in the developing world. Its relative success can be attributed not only to its cohesiveness and durability but also its effectiveness in preserving and enhancing the national security of its member-states during the old order. By investing in institutions and developing norms, its member-states have largely undermined previous impediments to regional political stability and cooperation.[2] But it can also be argued that ASEAN's success at that time was primarily due to its members' perception of a common threat — the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia — and the predictability of the interplay of major powers in the region.

The old regional order in Southeast Asia was fundamentally determined by the cold wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and China, and the United States and China (only until

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1975).[3] The political and ideological interests of the United States, the former Soviet Union and China intersected in the region, leading them to contain each other's influence in the area and vie for regional allies by supporting local political forces. As a result, external issues were closely linked to domestic politics. The Cambodian conflict, in fact, demonstrated a clear nexus between the interplay of the superpowers and its repercussions on domestic stability.

Consequently, because of the fear that Southeast Asia might be transformed by the superpowers into a battleground, ASEAN member-states saw the need to attain a certain degree of regional autonomy from external forces. It is ironic, however, that while it aimed for regional autonomy, ASEAN members consciously avoided the forging of an insular defense posture in the form of a formal defense pact. Its members' aversion to an insular defense posture (and corollarily, the lack of sufficient defense capability against external actors), and their reliance upon dialogue alone limited their capacity to make major powers conform to their security needs. Thus, member-states had to rely upon the United States' security guarantees, thereby compromising their common objective of attaining regional autonomy.

Nevertheless, ASEAN's aversion to a formal military alliance gave birth to indigenous approaches to managing security, including (1) the concept of regional resilience, i.e., the ability of ASEAN member-countries to settle their common problems and look after their future and well-being together;[4] (2) a web of interlocking mechanisms for bilateral defense cooperation; (3) the declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear-weapons-free zone; (4) the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TACSEA) as the ASEAN's code of conduct; and (5) concerted dialogues and consultations with non-regional actors. Although national resilience and bilateral defense agreements fall short as collective measures and cannot therefore be conceived as regional approaches, they still have a significant bearing on ASEAN's role in managing regional security. All these approaches reiterate the principle that any intramural conflict should be resolved through

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dialogue and consultation within the ASEAN context. Through self-reliance and peaceful co-existence, member-states could minimize the threat of intervention by external actors into strictly domestic and ASEAN affairs.

Now that geopolitical issues associated with bipolarity have dissipated, ASEAN member-states cease to confront a common enemy and, instead, are witnessing an emergence of various security concerns that were once undermined during the Cold War. Situated in a new strategic theater, ASEAN is faced with three broad challenges: first, the ability to maintain cohesiveness in the absence of a common threat; second, the ability to respond to varying security concerns; and third, the ability to foster regionalism beyond a parochial sub-ASEAN focus to include not only the entire Southeast Asia but also the Asia-Pacific region. Meeting these challenges would enable ASEAN to maintain its success and relevance in the changing regional context.

The ASEAN's Approaches to Regional Security

In an era of uncertainty, it is imperative for ASEAN member-states to strengthen their existing norms of conduct and adopt some changes in their approaches to regional security. Thus far, ASEAN's approaches to security are understood in terms of four major responses. The first is the Association's effort to expand regional security dialogue to include actors in the wider Asia-Pacific via the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The second is the attempt to expand the implementation of the Association's code of conduct or norms, through the TAC, to include all of the ten Southeast Asian states. The third is the commitment to transform Southeast Asia into a nuclear-weapons-free zone through the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) declaration. The last is the pursuit of military self-reliance, combined with a persistent aversion to the formation of a formal military alliance. Each of these responses and approaches, whether multilateral, bilateral or unilateral, supports, in principle, the ASEAN's desire to seek regional autonomy and maintain regional resilience in dealing with Southeast Asian affairs.

The ASEAN Regional Forum: a Multilateral Approach to Security

ASEAN's decision to expand its limited regional security system by way of the ARF is based on the logic that Southeast Asian security cannot be separately addressed or isolated from adjoining East Asia and the Pacific.[5]

This has become specially apparent as a result of the contending claims of jurisdiction in the South China Sea.

The decision to formalize and widen regional security dialogue was influenced by different proposals from Asia-Pacific states. In 1986, then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in his famous Vladivostok speech, called for a "Pacific states conference along the lines of the Helsinki Conference." This policy statement was followed by a proposal by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in July 1990 for a Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) — "a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly new set of institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia, just as in Europe." These proposals were later dropped on the ground that the regional milieus of Europe and the Asia-Pacific differ widely.[6]

Within ASEAN, proposals for an arrangement similar to the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were initially met with skepticism and ambivalence. Malaysia appeared to have endorsed some components of Gorbachev's proposal, but the general sentiment of ASEAN echoed the Bush administration's aversion to multilateralism. ASEAN leaders believed that the Asia-Pacific is too complex and diverse for a CSCE-like organization. Moreover, member-states feared that creating a new arrangement led by external powers might undermine ASEAN's identity. They were likewise concerned about Western countries using the envisioned forum to pressure them on the controversial issue of human rights, which is a central theme of the CSCE.[7]

While rejecting formal CSCE-type institutions, ASEAN members were receptive to the use of more flexible and more consultative mechanisms for promoting an exchange of views on security within the region. ASEAN's alternative became the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). The PMC is a dialogue process between ASEAN states and their seven dialogue partners, namely, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the European Union. Jusuf Wanandi, an observer of ASEAN, pointed out several advantages of using the PMC as a security forum. Firstly, although pursuing a predominantly economic agenda, the PMC has already begun to engage in political dialogue, specifically on the Cambodian problem, the Indochinese refugees, the Afghanistan invasion and South African apartheid. Secondly, it is acceptable to all ASEAN members because it was organized by themselves. Thirdly,

with the former Soviet Union, China and Vietnam already eyed as potential dialogue partners, ASEAN could rally more Asia-Pacific states with varying security perspectives into a comprehensive dialogue process. Finally, the PMC can make use of ASEAN non-governmental organizations such as the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) to support the process.[8]

The idea of the PMC as a forum for Asia-Pacific security dialogue was later strengthened by unprecedented Japanese support. Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama stated that the PMC could be used as a process for political discussion to improve security in the region.[9] In addition, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed the need for a "new regional security dialogue" and, in July 1993, endorsed the PMC as an "immediate opportunity to further such dialogue."[10] Unlike Former President Bush, President Clinton views the regional security dialogue process as supplementing United States-led alliances and American forward military presence in the Asia-Pacific. He posits that a multilateral approach on security in the Asia-Pacific can "ensure that the end of the Cold War does not provide an opening for regional rivalry, chaos and arms races."[11]

Meanwhile, the members of the PMC agreed to establish the ARF as a venue for exploring preventive diplomacy. The ARF's formation in May 1993 was a breakthrough in multilateralism as the ARF is the only forum where high-ranking representatives from 19 states in the Asia-Pacific region gather together to address the problem of common security. Since its inception, the ARF has become a practical step towards applying the norms of ASEAN in a broader regional scope.

The ARF offers built-in advantages. First, it is an indigenous model of multilateralism. Unlike a foreign model such as the CSCE, the ARF stands a better chance of taking into account the peculiarities of the Asia-Pacific. Secondly, it is more inclusive than the PMC. Rather than a forum merely for "like-minded" states, the ARF serves as a venue for interaction among states in the wider Asia-Pacific that might have different, and perhaps conflicting, perspectives on regional security issues.[12] The ARF does not only include the seven members of ASEAN and their seven dialogue partners but also Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia as ASEAN observers, Russia and China as ASEAN consultative partners, and Papua New Guinea. Finally, instead of simply following the leadership of major powers,

the ASEAN can keep the initiative in shaping regional security agenda through an ASEAN-led multilateral security dialogue like the ARF.

However, some uncertainties loom over the ARF. For one, the Forum does not have a road map for the long-term. The ARF's effectiveness will eventually hinge on its ability to provide practical solutions to regional problems. ASEAN envisions the ARF to take an evolutionary and non-legalistic course. But a non-legalistic approach might impede the development of concrete measures for preventive diplomacy within the ARF. In this regard, it might be necessary for ARF members to create some permanent, formal structure to define what the agenda of the grouping will be in the future. In this way, the ARF could transcend the impression that it is merely a cocktail party for high-ranking officials.

For another, it remains to be seen how capable ASEAN, as the main architect and the nucleus of the ARF, will be in dealing with issues affecting Northeast Asia. ASEAN members may find themselves drawn into the conflicts of Northeast Asia without fully comprehending their nature and complexity. Moreover, there is the possibility that a pan-Asia-Pacific security forum led by ASEAN may actually diminish the managerial functions of the Association and allow it to be overshadowed by more powerful actors.

The TACSEA as a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asia

It is claimed that the TACSEA has, since 1976, served as a "normative framework for committing the ASEAN members to self-inhibiting and peaceful conduct in international relations."[13] The TACSEA is said to complement the United Nations' objective of promoting global peace and security.

The Treaty obliges ASEAN states to promote peace and stability by pacific settlement of disputes, respect for national sovereignty, independence, equality, territorial integrity and identity of all nations and self-determination.[14] This commitment to peaceful co-existence supports the idea of regional resilience, that is, the ability of ASEAN states to solve their own problems.

While the Treaty may be considered a success in conflict prevention among ASEAN members in the old regional order, it may, however, be viewed as a failure in terms of the rest of the Southeast Asian region. It

manifested the polarization of two opposing systems in the region: the free-market ASEAN states that founded the Treaty, on the one hand, and the "communist" Indochinese states that refused recognition of the Treaty, on the other. The invasion and occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces was considered as the greatest challenge to the effectiveness of the Treaty in the entire region.

In this period of improved relations with the Indochinese states, it is now very likely for ASEAN to have the TACSEA enforced effectively in all of Southeast Asia. In fact, the heads of ASEAN member-states declared in the 1992 ASEAN Summit that TACSEA should provide a common framework for a wider regional cooperation embracing the whole of Southeast Asia.[15] In the same year, Vietnam, in its desire to foster good understanding with ASEAN, acceded to the Treaty, and is now the seventh member of the Association. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar also acceded recently. From the perspective of ASEAN, uniting the entire region through a common code of conduct could strengthen the region as a whole and minimize the possibility of intra-regional conflicts in the future. The adherence to the Treaty, alongside the SEANWFZ Declaration, is a key measure of political and security cooperation in Southeast Asia.

As the Association expands in size and more regional conflicts become apparent, it is imperative for member-states to begin institutionalizing the High Council as provided for by the Treaty. The High Council should take cognizance of regional disputes and recommend to parties in conflict appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. This body was never constituted during the Cold War, somehow indicating the reluctance of the Association to take a proactive role in regional security matters.

■ While noting that peace and stability in Southeast Asia could be promoted through constructive participation of non-regional actors, ASEAN realizes too that full accession to the Treaty might lead to undue intervention by major powers in strictly intra-ASEAN or Southeast Asian affairs.

At present, the Treaty should serve as a formal conflict-resolution mechanism within Southeast Asia. For the TACSEA to become a regional diplomatic instrument for dispute resolution in Southeast Asia, it is imperative that ASEAN states work for the institutionalization of a formal conflict resolution body that actually and actively engages in the settlement of disputes.[16]

The Association is also convinced that the Treaty's usefulness can be strengthened if it is made binding as well upon other Asia-Pacific states. The Philippines has proposed that the Treaty become the code of conduct for participants in the ARF.[17] Some Asia-Pacific states have already indicated interest in making the Treaty the backbone of political and security regimes in the region. But it remains to be seen whether or not ASEAN will allow these states to become full signatories, even as Papua New Guinea already acceded to the Treaty through the 1984 Manila Protocol. While noting that peace and stability in Southeast Asia could be promoted through constructive participation of non-regional actors, ASEAN realizes too that full accession to the Treaty might lead to undue intervention by major powers in strictly intra-ASEAN or Southeast Asian affairs. Thus, whatever forms of accession to the Treaty ASEAN makes available to non-Southeast Asian states (e.g., protocol, covenant or convention), it must include adequate safeguards against abuse.

Rethinking Neutrality

In the Fourth ASEAN Summit (1992) in Singapore, the Working Group on ZOPFAN was required to draw up an "appropriate strategy, with clear objectives, to achieve an early realization of ZOPFAN."[18] Apparently, ASEAN believes that the next logical step in the post-Cold War era, in the light of the probable rise of Japan and China as regional hegemons, is the establishment of a neutral regional environment. But contrary to the goal of establishing this regional order, ASEAN states have increased their external linkages with the United States.

Singapore, true to its desire for greater external links, signed a memorandum with the United States on the relocation of major naval logistics from Subic Bay to Singapore. Malaysia, after it was identified as having engaged in secret defense cooperation with the United States since 1984, declared that it will expand the coverage and frequency of the bilateral agreement, including the type of assets involved thereunder. It has also allowed the American navy to have access to its ship repair and air force facilities. Likewise, Brunei finalized an agreement allowing U.S. warship visits and joint military exercises. Indonesia has allowed American use of its naval facilities. Additionally, the Philippines and Thailand remain bound by their defense pacts with the United States, and Singapore and Malaysia, by the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA). In defense of their actions, the ASEAN members argue that their individual foreign policy decisions do not run counter to the objectives of the ZOPFAN since foreign

bases are no longer allowed in any ASEAN country. But the absence of foreign military facilities in the region is not a sufficient indicator of neutrality. On the contrary, external military alliances and agreements are inconsistent with the pursuit of neutrality.

Thus, for ASEAN to realize a ZOPFAN, the only way is to insulate itself from the politics of external actors, which could be achieved through a collective defense posture. However, given its aversion to such a military endeavor, neutrality will remain an elusive aspiration for the Association. At the same time, ASEAN cannot afford to isolate itself from non-regional actors in the midst of an unprecedented economic interdependence. Thus, neutrality as a strategy in promoting regional security has apparently become less relevant for ASEAN in the post-Cold War era.

While neutrality may have become less relevant after the end of the Cold War, the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free Southeast Asia has become more important. The reason is that nuclear weapons have already proliferated not only in the United States and Russia but also among middle powers, including regional players.[19] Specifically, Southeast Asia is located between China and the Indian continent, which both possess nuclear capabilities. Any form of nuclear testing, targeting or fallout in these areas will undoubtedly affect many, if not all, countries in the region.

Some important aspects of the Draft Treaty of the SEANWFZ, however, need to be made clear. First, ASEAN states must agree on the coverage of the Treaty — whether to include only the boundaries of the signatory-states or the whole of Southeast Asia. The former option, though definitive in terms of territorial scope, might still be problematic because of overlapping maritime and territorial claims by ASEAN and neighboring states. Moreover, the area that will be covered under this option would constitute less than a "zone." The second option has its own limitations. It lacks a legal definition of a region because "Southeast Asia" is more of a geopolitical than a legal concept. Second, the concept of "nuclear weapons" and the provisions covering its emplacement, transportation, stockpile, storage, installation and deployment have to be made clear in the Treaty.[20] Lastly, ASEAN needs to specify the extent of the application of the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels within the zone — whether or not to allow warships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous substances through the territorial sea of Southeast Asian states.

The future implementation of a SEANWFZ Treaty is not far-fetched as none of the Southeast Asian states possesses nuclear capability. But since the main objective of such a Treaty is to protect Southeast Asia from a nuclear imbroglio, the support and cooperation of countries with nuclear capabilities is essential. Such an arrangement could be provided for in a protocol which forms part of the Treaty. However, the recent nuclear testing conducted by France in the Pacific illustrates the difficulty of negotiating with states insistent to develop nuclear capabilities. If it is already difficult to deal with countries known to have nuclear weapons, then, *a fortiori*, negotiations should be more complicated in the case of states belonging to the former USSR — the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazolik — and those states not known or recognized as nuclear powers.[21] In the final analysis, therefore, the success of transforming Southeast Asia into a nuclear-weapons-free zone depends on the cooperation of both Southeast Asian and non-regional actors.

Building a Self-Reliant Military Posture

While ASEAN's effort to widen and deepen security dialogue to include a greater geographical scope is an important development in regionalism, intra-ASEAN security and defense measures will also be crucially important, particularly in the light of simultaneous force modernization programs in ASEAN states.

The current force modernization by ASEAN states is geared towards building a self-reliant military capability that could respond effectively to regional contingencies that involve primarily the defense of maritime territories. This pursuit of military self-reliance is largely a response to diminished U.S. security guarantees and uncertainties over the growing prominence of China and Japan in the region. In addition, the greater purchasing power of ASEAN states and the availability of high quality and affordable weapons have also made it relatively easier for member-states, in general, to enhance their military power. ASEAN members are now in the process of procuring sophisticated air and naval weapons systems.[22]

This simultaneous defense procurement by ASEAN states leaves the impression that an arms race is taking place in Southeast Asia. But this perceived arms race is far from being conclusive. The development of ASEAN's militaries should be understood carefully in the light of other factors. First, the ASEAN states' arms expenditure is, in proportion to their

respective GDPs, not increasing. Second, no ASEAN state has thus far acquired weapons of mass-destruction, including biological and chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.

Nevertheless, military modernization can still become a threat to regional stability considering that most procurement plans have been achieved, and the naval and air weapons recently acquired are most suitable for projecting force at great distances. Preventive measures are, therefore, warranted to counteract the possible negative impact of these developments.

Within ASEAN, proposals for an arms register have already been put forward. In April 1992, Datuk Seri Najib Abdul Razak, Malaysia's Minister for Defense, proposed that a "regular register" be established to support the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms regime, in order that "suspicion could be minimized and managed" in the Asia-Pacific.[23] Indonesia's Foreign Minister also acknowledged the role of transparency in enhancing peace and security. In October 1992, he argued that "greater transparency in military arrangements pertaining to the region could be effected through a regular exchange of data...on military budgets, doctrines and future force projections."[24] During the ASEAN Special Official Meeting (SOM) and the first meeting of the ARF, the Philippines also put forward a proposal for a Southeast Asian Register of Conventional Weapons and Military Expenditures (RCAME). The proposal specifies that besides data on arms transfer and procurement through national production, reports on military expenditure and data on military holdings should also be made transparent. The ASEAN Secretariat, in cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Regional Center for Asia-Pacific, can be tapped as a monitoring body for this purpose.[25] The Philippines, however, still has to classify the types of arms to be included in the register.

The extent to which military establishments of the ASEAN states are amenable to an arms register in the near future is still uncertain. A country that is economically constrained at this stage, like the Philippines, can afford to call for the creation of an arms management regime. However, for relatively better-off countries, the idea of an arms register may not be easily accepted. Exposing the level of military development of one country may be viewed with distrust due to existing territorial and maritime disputes. However, whether or not ASEAN

members agree to the formation of an arms control regime in the region, the need to institute transparency measures is paramount in order to ensure that force modernization will not degenerate into an arms race, and that independent military programs are not undertaken at the expense of each other's security. The formation of an ASEAN arms control regime could help strengthen existing bilateral defense arrangements among the members of the ASEAN.

Conclusion

The end of bipolar politics in the international system opened an era of transition to a new regional order in Southeast Asia. In this new regional configuration, the challenge for ASEAN is to remain a relevant and formidable regional actor. To this end, the Association must not only be responsive to new and old issues impinging upon the member-states' security but also cohesive and able to foster wider regionalism beyond the confines of Southeast Asia.

Thus far, ASEAN has already taken some remarkable steps toward a continued reassertion of its role in managing regional security. It has indicated interest in playing a more active role in regional security. Clearly, the end of the Cold War has demonstrated to ASEAN member-states that dependence upon the major powers' security reassurances, especially upon those of the United States, is no longer adequate to guarantee the regional stability. Although some of ASEAN's pressing problems are externally conditioned, member-states must also reckon with problems that are region-specific and with issues not necessarily related to major powers.

Hence, the most practical step for ASEAN is to continue to engage in various cooperative security measures. Of course, these measures would still have to face the litmus test of being able to promote a stable regional order or not.

Within ASEAN, the successful adoption and adherence to the principles of the TACSEA and SEANWFZ will become the key measure of Southeast Asian cooperation. Thus far, the normalization of relations among the Indochinese states, Myanmar and the ASEAN states has indicated the possibility of the TACSEA and SEANWFZ becoming the norms or codes of conduct for the entire Southeast Asia. But these norms must be

complemented by concrete measures, such as a formal conflict resolution body that will have the capacity to manage or settle disputes. This body is necessary especially for bilateral conflicts that ASEAN members are reluctant to discuss, much less settle, at the Association's level. Moreover, the success of the collective visions of Southeast Asians is also hinged on the support that will be extended by other Asia-Pacific states.

While the TACSEA and SEANWFZ, as political and diplomatic measures, are needed to create a stable region, intra-ASEAN defense confidence-building measures (CBMs) are also important in encouraging cooperation among member-states. Considering that most ASEAN states have already embarked on upgrading their military capabilities, some CBMs will be useful in preventing states from engaging in an arms race.

Beyond the ASEAN subregion, the formation of the ARF is already a success providing, thus, a venue for forging close personal ties and expressing different views on security across a huge number of countries in the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, the long-term success of the Forum will ultimately rest on its capacity to provide concrete solutions to problems facing not only Southeast Asian but also Northeast Asian states. ●

Notes

1 ASEAN is composed of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.

2 William Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), p.14.

3 It must be noted that US and China normalized their relations beginning in 1975.

4 The concept of regional resilience is derived from the notion of national resilience, first coined by Indonesian President Suharto. It is based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the defense umbrella of a greater power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism. As a national policy, national resilience, therefore, entails "the strengthening of all component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of all resilience in the ideological, economic, social, cultural and military fields. See Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1987), p.19. See also Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and GCC", in Brian L. Job, *Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (New York: Reiner Publishers, 1992), p.150.

5 Michael Leifer, "Expanding Horizons in Southeast Asia?" *Southeast Asian Affairs 1994*, p. 4.

6 David Dewitt, "Concepts of Security for Asia-Pacific Region," *The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific* (Proceedings of the Seventh-Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 6-9 January 1993) pp. 4-25.

7 *Ibid.*

8 See Jusuf Wanandi, "Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," Document No. 17 (Paper presented at the ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s, Manila, 5-7 June 1991).

9 Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama during the July 1991 ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur.

10 President William J. Clinton's Remarks to the Korean National Assembly, Seoul, Korea, 10 July 1993.

11 *Ibid.*

12 See Amitav Acharya, "Preventive Diplomacy: Issues and Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific Region" (Paper presented to the Eight Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 6-8 June 1994), p. 12.

13 *Ibid.*, p.10.

14 Article 1, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

15 "ASEAN Political and Security Measures Through TACSEA and SEANWFZ," Philippine Discussion Paper, ASEAN Working Group on ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ, Bangkok 29 July 1994, p.1.

16 *Ibid.*

17 "The Use of the TAC as a Code of Conduct," Philippine Discussion Paper, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila (Undated).

18 "Programme of Action for ZOPFAN," Special Meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials (Special SOM), 7-9 March 1994, Bangkok, p.1.

19 "ASEAN Political Security Measures Through TACSEA and SEANWFZ," p.3.

20 See Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, "The Prospects of Establishing a NWFZ in Southeast Asia," *The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific*, p.299.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 300.

22 The Institute for International Strategic Studies in London reveals the following procurement and orders: Indonesia received the first of the ships of the former East German Navy, including five frigates and three LSTs. The Malaysian Air Force has received the delivery of ten Hawk 108, six Hawk 208 FGA (12 more are yet to be delivered). Malaysia also ordered 18 MiG-29 fighters from Russia and eight F/A-18D multi-role aircraft from the US for delivery in 1996. Its Navy has ordered two British-built frigates. The Singapore Air Force is now equipped with French Mistral SAM, and 18 F-16A/B FGA aircraft; 11 are still in the US. It also announced the decision to buy 18 more F-16C/D in July 1994. Singapore's F-16s will be equipped with air-to air surface missiles. In addition, Singapore's fleet of helicopters will be increased by 16 UH-IHB Iroquois, and six AS-532 Cougars. Its Navy has commissioned its first new minewarfare vessel, the Bedok coastal minehunter. A total of four mine warfare vessels are being acquired.

The Thai Air Force has acquired 36 L-39 armed trainers from the Czech Republic and the Python air-to-air missile from Israel. The Thai Navy has postponed buying the second helicopter carrier and the acquisition of a submarine is now unlikely. But two US Knox frigates are due to be delivered to Thailand. The Philippines has just received from South Korea twelve Sea Hawks. And finally, Brunei is buying a Hawk COIN aircraft. (Military Balance 1993-94, p.146; and 1994-95, p. 166.)

23 Roger T. Uren, "Enhancing Confidence: Transparency in Defence Policies and Military Acquisitions I," *The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific*, p. 159.

24 *Ibid.*, p.153.

25 "Enhancing Confidence Through A Regional Arms Register," Philippine Discussion Paper, ASEAN Special SOM, 7-9 July 1994, Bangkok.