



**Theory and Reality of
Democracy and
Thai Democratization***

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN A DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT

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*The real political problem in Siam was and is precisely this: that there was no decisive break with 'absolutism', fueled by social radicalism and indeed mass nationalism.'*¹

The best-seller *Megatrends Year 2000* claims that Thailand must be considered the fifth dragon in East Asia together with South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.² International economists and investors, both Asian and Western, are hailing Thailand as the next member of the exclusive club of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). *Asian Wall Street Journal* describes the Thai stock market as "one of the world's hottest," and the *International Herald Tribune* regularly publishes special features about Thailand's economy as one with the highest growth rates in the world in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The annual GDP growth rate from 1965-80 was 7.2 % and during the international recession period from 1980-90 the annual GNP growth rate was 7.3 %.³ There has been no negative growth rate since 1958 when it was plus 3 %. Thus, growth rates have been about 7-8 % yearly and only on three occasions dropped down to 5% (1971-72, 1982 and 1985).⁴ In unadjusted dollars (that is, dollars not adjusted to intervening inflation), Thailand's GDP rose from US\$ 4 billion in 1965 to US\$ 41.7 billion in 1986.

Thailand is able to offer low wages, a huge cheap labor reservoir, a business climate with great opportunities for business people coming from abroad, and an atmosphere of freedom that is claimed to be even better than in other Southeast Asian countries. This is crucial for investors who consider the question of political stability as paramount. Despite insurgency and occasional violent protests, some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have in recent years been characterized by long-

¹This paper is a draft version of a forthcoming paper, "State and Democracy in Thailand," to be published in *Copenhagen Papers on East and Southeast Asian Studies*, (East Asian Institute, Copenhagen University, Tusculanum Press, Denmark) Autumn 1993.

²Benedict Anderson, "Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies," in Eliezer B. Ayal (ed.), *The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art, History, and Political Science*, (Ohio University Center, Athens, Ohio, 1978)

³John Naisbitt & Patricia Aburdene, *Megatrends 2000 - Ten New Directions for the 1990s*, (W. Morrow and Co., New York, 1990.)

⁴International Herald Tribune (IHT), December, 5 1990.

⁵Bruce McFarlane, "Growth and Cycles in Southeast Asian Development," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.18 no.2, (Manila, 1988) pp.121-124.

lasting regimes – Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Suharto in Indonesia, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Only in Thailand, where governments have been short lived, are investors seemingly accepting that even when the mode of changing governments is through *coups d'état*, there is little threat to investment.⁵ Furthermore, government expenditure has moved away from regional and rural development and towards the creation of an environment suitable for major industrial expansion.⁶ This has led some observers to claim that with her rush to industrialization, Thailand seems determined to become a NIC.

On the surface it seems that the Thai economy is a sunshine example and showcase of how an open liberal economy strengthens economic growth. The lesson for other developing countries, with regard to the role of the state and other political factors, is the importance of a non-interventionist *laissez faire* state in economic policy-making coupled with a soft authoritarian and developmental perspective on coercive and incorporative capacities.

Thailand is currently in a difficult structural transformation process of trying to develop a harmonious society. This process is reflected in a high level of urbanization and structural changes in the rural sector. "This also means greater demands on the government to provide social services to this mass population and to ensure that rapid economic growth proceeds rapidly enough to prevent the revolution of rising expectations from undermining the traditional foundation of Thai society. This is the *raison d'être* of all these five-year plans. The sixth of these plans ... calls for restructuring the Thai economy toward more industrialization led by exports. This is the traditional route of past success by those four Asian 'tigers' – Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong – all of which emulate Japan, the greatest economic trailblazer of Asia. In pursuing a similar strategy, Thailand now find herself flying after these countries in a 'flying geese formation' right into the walls of US protectionism."⁷

These denote the importance of the concept of 'the capitalist developmental state' developed by Chalmers Johnson in his study of Japan as a model for South Korea and Taiwan. The study raises the questions of whether elements of the Japanese Model in state policy-making have also

⁵Chris Dixon, *South East Asia in the World-Economy*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge New York, 1991) p.14.

⁶*Ibid.* p.181.

⁷M.R. Kasem S. Kasemsi, "Thai-U.S. Relations at a Critical Juncture," in Ansil Ramsay and Wiwat Mungkandi (eds.), *Thailand-U.S. Relations - Changing Political Strategic, and Economic Factors*, (Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988) pp.8-9.

been part of the state policies found in the Thai context,⁸ of whether it is characterized by a specific industrialization-strategy as the Japanese Model.⁹

In the Japanese variation of capitalism: "Markets are emphasized as a source of growth rather than of short-run efficiency, and a primary role of government is to supply incentives to promote growth through markets. The perspective motivating Japanese policy is explicitly dynamic and developmental. From this perspective, the competitive advantage of a nation's producers in world markets is created by policy rather than given by immutable resource and technological endowments."¹⁰

The Japanese Model, which has the capitalist developmental state as *primus motor per se*, has its origin in the German Historical School - some times termed as 'Economic Nationalism,' 'Handelspolitik,' or Neo-Mercantilism.¹¹ The central element in this theory, is not that the state intervenes, because all states do that, but *how* the state intervenes! This type of state has the following four main characteristics that are tied up to various kinds of interventionist policies. The conditions for the implementation of this particular policy framework are 'soft authoritarianism and capitalism.'

(1.) A stable political regime based upon a bureaucratic elite. "A developmental elite creates political stability over the long term, maintains sufficient equality in distribution to prevent class or sectoral exploitation [land reform is critical], sets national goals and standards that are internationally oriented and based on non-ideological external referents, creates [or at least recognizes] a bureaucratic elite capable of administering the system, and insulates its bureaucrats from direct political influence so that they can function technocratically. It does *not* monopolize economic management or decision making, guarantee full employment, allow ideology to confuse its thinking, permit the development of political pluralism that might challenge its goals, or waste valuable resources by suppressing non-

⁸Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, (Stanford, California, 1982), and Chalmers Johnson, "The Non-socialist NICs: East Asia," *International Organization*, vol.40, no.2, (Spring 1986.)

⁹The conceptual definition of the 'Japanese Model' was first introduced in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, *op cit.* pp.3-35;305-324.

¹⁰Chalmers Johnson, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, and John Zysman (eds.), *Politics and Productivity - How Japan's Development Strategy Works*, A Research Project of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE) (Ballinger Publishing Company, Berkeley, 1989) p. xvi.

¹¹See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, *op cit.* p.17., and Adian Foster Carter's brief but precise definition: "For any late developer, it is a *sine qua non* to first; insulate yourself against the powerful gales blowing from those already advanced; a task almost inevitably entailing pervasive state economic intervention, at least in the early stages" in Adian Foster Carter, "Friederich List Lives!," in *Economy and Development*, Sept.-Oct.1985, p.34. See also Friederich List's, *The National System of Political Economy*, 1st. ed., (Longmans, Green, London, 1841.)

critical sectors [it discriminates against them with disincentives and then ignores them]."¹²

Bureaucratic autonomy from various fluctuations in the political system is important: "Reigning involves creating genuine political stability, correcting excesses committed by the bureaucracy, promoting entrepreneurship, and avoiding the usual consequences of state intervention in economic affairs – namely, bureaucratism, corruption, and a misallocation of resources."¹³ The legitimacy of the state and the political elite is based on economic growth. The administrative guidance of the bureaucracy is based on concrete plans of intervention. This guidance is implemented by a powerful and prestigious economic bureaucracy with "an inherent meritocracy of talent."¹⁴

(2.) The guidance of the market by a centralized agency for planning that tries to establish cooperation between the private and public sectors. However, this agency is characterized by a very high degree of autonomy in the decision-making process.

(3.) The prioritization of an egalitarian distribution of wealth (along with education and land reform).¹⁵

(4.) The use of several methods of intervention that are all based on the price mechanism or what Chalmers Johnson calls "a market-conforming method of intervention."¹⁶

There is no doubt that Thailand is among the fastest growing industrializing economies that is characterized by soft or quasi-authoritarian political structures. Taking a combined look at the developmental state approach and Robert Wade's notion of "a guided market economy"¹⁷ (which, in fact, criticizes Chalmers Johnson for putting too much emphasis on institutions and bypassing the role of the state), important questions emerge. Does the state in Thailand have the same kind of economic policy-making autonomy as found in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan? Or are the societal and market forces melted up with the state as in Indonesia? What are the obstacles to a democratic regime form and democratization from below? These are some of the questions this paper will try to answer.

¹²Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan," in Frederic C. Deyo, *The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1988) p.142. The four points are found in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, *op. cit.* pp.315-321.

¹³ _____, "The Non-Socialist NICs: East Asia," *op. cit.*, p.563.

¹⁴ _____, *Politics and Productivity*, *op. cit.*, p.182.

¹⁵ _____, "The Non-Socialist NICs: East Asia," *op. cit.*, p.564.

¹⁶ _____, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, *op. cit.*, pp.318.

The first part of this paper offers a theoretical and conceptual discussion on what kind of framework is most convenient to use in the debate on the role of the state in a developmental perspective and how to fit this debate within the 'functionalist terms' of democracy and democratization.¹⁸ An alternative approach is suggested with emphasis on political factors and a non-functional approach. The second part is a preliminary empirical analysis concerning the role of the state in Thailand and its relationship with the question of democracy and democratization at the regime and the civil society levels, as well as its linkage with the external context. It suggests that a historical perspective is necessary in understanding how Thailand has been able to sustain high economic growth and simultaneously be labeled as Asia's Bolivia, because of the frequency of military coups d'etat on the one hand, and the stable political environment on the other.¹⁹ The third part provides a brief comparative perspective on the events that transpired between 1973-1976 - the period when popular forces toppled an authoritarian regime - and the latest events in 1992 where the Suchinda junta was forced to resign. Finally, some tentative perspectives on state and democracy in the Thai context is given.

Theories of State and Democracy

It has not been possible to have an adequate theory on which economic, political, social, or cultural conditions are prerequisites for democratic development.²⁰

Nevertheless, one of the most distinctive political phenomena at the global scale in the last twenty years has been the movement from authoritarian to more democratic regime forms. This has been observable not only in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, but also in Third World societies such as

¹⁷See Gordon White, *Developmental States in East Asia*, (Macmillan Press in association with The Institute of Development Studies of Sussex, Houndsmills, Basingstoke and Hampshire, 1988), and Robert Wade, *Governing the Market. Economic Theory and The Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1990.)

¹⁸Democracy and democratization as functionalist terms will be discussed later.

¹⁹Since the 1932 coup which formally ended the absolute monarchy, Thailand has had 19 coups and 14 different constitutions.

²⁰This is also the argument in Georg Sorenson, *Democracy, Dictatorship and Development - Economic Development in Selected Regimes in the Third World*(Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke & London, 1991.) Refer to the introduction in pp.1-34 and the chapter on theoretical implications in pp.164-190. Here he argues "(t)o attempt an examination of the ways in which democracy and authoritarianism respectively affect the factors decisive for the developmental strength of the state... would mean analysis of the effects of regime form on (the) three factors...: the social nature of the state; its politico-administrative capacity and its specific mode of involvement in attempts to further economic development."

Taiwan, Brazil, the Philippines, and a number of African states.²¹ Accordingly, the 'transition to democracy' debate has attracted attention among political scientists as well as policy makers.

In this paper, it is claimed that *the transition to democracy, at least in the case of Thailand, is determined by control of the state rather than by the forces of civil society or the business sector.*

During the 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theories in general focused on economic development,²² social structure,²³ and political culture²⁴ as bases for the development of democracy. These theories tended to produce a linear model of democratic development, which induced an optimistic view of the prospects for democracy in developing countries.²⁵

In the following decade, such optimism was replaced by pessimism, especially because of the emergence of authoritarianism in many developing countries. Correspondingly, studies on the breakdown of democratic regimes²⁶ and the nature of authoritarian regime forms²⁷ became salient. O'Donnell showed, in his study of Latin America, that when the military steps in to impose a technocratically legitimated order, bureaucratic authoritarianism takes over, allegedly representing the nation as a whole. This occurs in reaction to a political crisis and may be exacerbated by a downturn in the world economy requiring fiscal austerity measures.²⁸

²¹ See Alfred Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil. Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.) For a more critical approach to this empirical trend, see James Petras, "State, Regime and the Democratization Muddle," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.19, no.1 (Manila, 1989) pp.26-33.

²² Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1959.)

²³ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy - Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1981.) He mentions very categorically: "We may simply register strong agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No Bourgeoisie, no democracy." See p.418.

²⁴ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1965.)

²⁵ Note that I use the terms 'developing countries,' 'Third World,' and 'periphery' interchangeably, even if I am aware of the different and often contradictory connotations of each term. It is also worth mentioning that the linear approach of modernization, nation-building, and democracy influenced, on a large degree, American foreign policy as it was developed after World War II. See also Sung M. Pae, *Testing Democratic Theories in South Korea* (Lanham, New York, 1986.) Here Sung M. Pae remarks: "It is precisely for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of individual citizens (John Locke) that the promotion of democracy has been the major foreign policy guide line for the U.S. ... (It) is witnessed in the Marshall plan for sixteen European countries, Truman doctrine for Greece and Turkey, Point Four for some fifteen developing countries, and individual based country-based assistance for the Third World." Lastly, the same pattern can be found in Japan where the US actually forced the parliamentary democracy from the outside as one of several important measures to destroy Japanese fascism and militarism.

²⁶ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978.)

²⁷ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973) and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1979.)

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Cf. Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation - Structures of the World Economy* (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990.) pp.210-214.

Clive Thomas found the reverse trend in a number of decolonized states in Africa and the Caribbean: "The general underdevelopment of capitalist production relations in these societies has restricted the practice of 'bourgeois' ideas and legality and equality - classified under the rubric 'Westminster-style parliamentary democracy' - among the population at large, particularly since these are founded on the 'equality' of all individuals in the marketplace. Because of this, political and legal relations in these societies have not been democratically transformed along bourgeois lines."²⁹ Thomas argues very much in the same vein as O'Donnell, that it is the absence of possibilities in the local (national) economy that determines the consequent authoritarian regime. The state apparatus evolves different modes of political exploitation, hence, it is the control over the state apparatus that determines the outcome of the regime form, which at the same time means that this fight over control undermines the appearance of and/or the maintenance of democratic institutions.³⁰

Political marginalization or even exclusion and repression of popular mobilization and participation should be seen as an attendant phenomenon of or derived from *dependent economic development* or from a peripheral status in the international division of labor. Consequently, there are discrepancies between the way dependency theories conclude from mainly economic based theories. But the most serious problem is probably the reductionist treatment of the political field of study as an independent analytical field, both theoretically and empirically.

It is clear from this brief introduction that the statement of the problem is wrong. Following Cammack, "there are no necessary relationships between any generally fixed determinants as pre-conditions for a democratic or authoritarian development, and the same determinants' location as part of a theoretical explanation."³¹ Therefore, functionalism as such must be abolished. Democracy and democratization are not linear concepts which can be measured on a scale, but processes with ups and downs, victories and defeats. The explanation on why democracy and democratization develops in certain periods and are destroyed in others demands a more open-ended debate and framework.

However, in the discussion below, this theme is further developed in order to accomplish a non-functionalist but dialectic approach to the debate. Hence, the framework provided in this paper also disagrees with the

²⁹Clive Thomas, "The Rise of the Authoritarian State," *Monthly Review Press*(New York,1984) pp.84-85.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp.84-85.

³¹P. Cammack, *The Political Economy of Contemporary Military Regimes in Latin America*, cf. Georg Sorensen, *op. cit.* p.188.

Tocqueville and Barrington Moore modernization and dependency tautology on the relationship between economics and democracy.³² Chalmers Johnson has shown that throughout the last 120 years, Japan has continued to experience significant economic progress, "but capitalism in the Japanese form does not produce or even seem to need political democracy in order to function."³³ In other words, the periods of greatest economic growth in Japan coincide with periods of authoritarianism, not with periods of democracy as western theory suggests.³⁴ Is this the case in Thailand or is it just another causality with the opposite question mark? If the (western) tautology is wrong, how then is it possible to develop a theoretical framework in the Thai context?

Towards an Integrated Approach to Democracy and Democratization

There seems to be a general understanding that the universalization of democratic ideas contains at least three different elements. First is human rights which includes the right to choose a government representative of the people; second, the freedom of speech and expression; and third, the freedom to organize around political manifestations and ideologies. The growth of democratic norms throughout the world is strikingly evident in the degree authoritarian regimes find it convenient to wrap themselves in the rhetoric and constitutional trappings of parliamentarism, or at least to state as their goal the eventual establishment of democracy.³⁵

This trend could also be termed as 'a globalization of democratic discourses.' Despite a lot of confusion in the Thai context with regard to semantics and etymology,³⁶ it is important to note that there are no general

³²For example, Arthur Schlesinger, reflecting on Tocqueville, came to this generalization: "Democracy is unlikely to last without economic progress, but economic progress does not guarantee democracy". Cf. Chalmers Johnson, "The Democratization of South Korea: What Role Does Economic Development Play?" Copenhagen Papers in East and Southeast Asian Studies. in *The Modernization Process in East Asia: Economic, Political, and Cultural Perspectives*, no. 4 (Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Museum Tusulanum Press - University of Copenhagen, 1989.)

³³Chalmers Johnson, *ibid.*, p.65.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p.66.

³⁵Larry Diamond, Juan Linz & Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*, vol.3, (Lynne Rienner, Boulder Colorado, 1989.) See introduction.

³⁶According to Morell and Chai-Anan, democracy for the Thai means one of the following: Sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation. This confusion could, according to the authors, be one of the reasons why democracy failed in Thailand. "To Thais, *prachathipatai* (democracy) definitely does not mean popular sovereignty, control by elected representatives over the executive branch, power to the people. Political legitimacy here emanates down from the monarchy and bureaucracy to the common citizen, not up from the masses to form a government responsive to the popular will". See David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *Political Conflict in Thailand - Reform, Reaction, Revolution*(Oelschlagel, Gunn & Hain Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981) pp.24-25. Popular participation (people power) development means, according to Turton, Kan Mii (having), suan (part), ruam (common, mutual), khong (of), *prachaon* (the people). In short, the concept becomes meaningless because of the wealth of connotations. See Andrew Turton, *Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand. Experiences of Poor Farmers Groups*(UNRISD Participation Programme, Geneva, 1987.) p.10.

agreements on the political and ideological content of the term 'democracy,' and especially not on the relationship between the role of the state at the national, regional, and the global levels, and the globalization of popular democratic discourses. In other words, the demand for human rights goes hand in hand with the new popular discourses formulated as political, economic, social, and environmental rights.

Petras' statement helps clarify some of the pitfalls and mistakes which seem to be implied in this contradictory debate: "The state refers to the *permanent* institution of *government* and the concomitant *ensemble of class relations* which have been embedded in these institutions. The permanent institutions include those which exercise a *monopoly over the means of coercion* (army, police, judiciary), as well as those that control the *economic levers of the accumulation process*."³⁷ The point to be made is, simply, that all this muddling about democracy and democratization in the Third World is the preferred label for the long series of ostensible *political changes* which "(h)ave not at least changed the nature of the *state* but have rather led to changes at the level of *government or regime*."³⁸ Similarly, Galeano, in a poetic metaphor, has capsulated this ostensible trend: "Censorship has stopped, the curtain goes up, the audience applauds, but attention: the beautiful woman, who calls herself democracy is a transvestite - suddenly she takes off her things and what appears? A colonel!"³⁹

There exist several scenarios of democratic transition: (1.) transition driven by external forces (conquest, putsch masterminded from abroad, foreign intervention, wars); (2.) transitions resulting from the violent intervention by certain internal socio-political forces (revolutions, civil wars, coup d'etat); and, (3.) evolutionary transitions initiated by an internal crisis of the political regime.⁴⁰

Still, if a state-led and state-initiated growth strategy is not dependent upon a democratization at the political, cultural, and economic levels and on the fulfillment of a democratic consensus at the national strategic level, one point remains and this has been formulated very precisely by Bello and Rosenfeld in their study of the NIC's in the Northeast Asian political economy: "Economic policies that are not supported by a rough consensus forged by democratic means are likely to flounder over the long run. Democracy, one might say, has become a factor of production."⁴¹ In

³⁷James Petras, *op cit.*, p.26.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p.26.

³⁹Eduardo Galeano, "Demokratiet er en transvestit," *Information*, 31 July, 1987. Translation mine.

⁴⁰Diane Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators," in Diane Ethier (ed.), *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia* (The Macmillan Press, Hampshire & London, 1990) p.5.

⁴¹Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, "Dragons in Distress: The Crisis of the NICs," *World Policy Journal*, vol.VII, no.3 (New York, Summer 1990) p.460.

this definition, democracy becomes a matter of equal (human) right to resources, or as Cardoso states it from the Brazilian experience, "[r]eal democratization will arrive as it is crystallized in the spontaneous solidarity of the disinherited. It lives in the *comunitas*, in the experiences of common hardship, which form a collective we based on same life experience that is transformed only when, through molecular changes, the simultaneous isolation of the state and the exploiters - which will perish at the same time - comes about."⁴² One could even say that the 'global demand of democracy' is an inescapable part of popular discourses and thus it is not *a specific European phenomenon*.⁴³ This popular demand is not only related to the state and its institutions, nor is it simply a demand for the rights to organize in trade unions and strike, nor is it only a matter of gender equality. It should be seen as part of a global discursive process directed towards a more egalitarian distribution of resources - "[t]he organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control."⁴⁴ Further, as Held nicely puts it, this is "[a] belief that democratic ideas and practices can only in the long run be protected if their hold on our political, social, and economic life is deepened."⁴⁵

What is argued here is contrary to the general approach taken by Diamond et. al., and their theoretical originator Robert A. Dahl who sees "the term democracy... to signify a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system to which it is joined."⁴⁶ He implies that "[a] distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called economic and social democracy be separated from the question of governmental structure."⁴⁷ In my view, an integrated approach is necessary if the objective of the debate is to seek explanations and answers to the relationship between the contradictory processes of the state and democracy. Because, as earlier mentioned, external factors can definitely play a crucial role in inducing democracy at the regime level, democratization is also a never-ending

⁴²Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development and Democratic Theory," in Alfred Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil*, op cit., p.313.

⁴³As stated in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, (Verso, London, 1985.) But they are right when they argue that the trend towards "radical and plural democracy" (p.167), can be traced back to Europe and "[w]hat has been exploded is the idea and the reality itself of a unique space of constitution of the political. What we are witnessing is a politicization far more radical than we have known in the past" (p.181.)

⁴⁴Marshall Wolfe UNRISD-PPP. Quoted from *Assignment Children*, No. 59160, 1982(UNICEF, Geneva.)

⁴⁵David Held *Models of Democracy* (Polity Press, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, UK, 1987) p.4.

⁴⁶Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition*(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971) cf. Diamond et. al., op cit., p.xvi. Note that Robert Dahl has actually changed his former view in a more sophisticated direction. See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985)

⁴⁷This is based on Dahl's old approach.

process with victories and defeats for all parties involved.⁴⁸ Hence, the term democracy signifies that all levels of society are involved in the political system and cannot be artificially separated from the economic and social systems.

Therefore, this article seeks to promote a dichotomous concept of democracy which is directed at different levels of analysis. Democracy is directed at the internal and external levels of the state, which is seen as fundamentally janus-faced with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states.⁴⁹ The state is seen as a mediator of internal and external force which determines the overall policy-making process, as well as the influence on the actors and on societal development in general. The definition of democracy is, however, taken from Dahl:

(1.) *Equal votes*: The rule for determining outcomes at the decisive stage must take into account, and take equally into account, the expressed preferences of each citizen as to the outcome; that is, votes must be allocated equally among citizens. (2.) *Effective participation*: Throughout the process of making binding collective decisions, each citizen must have an adequate and equal opportunity for expressing preference as to the final outcome. (3.) *Enlightened understanding*: In order to express preferences accurately, each citizen must have adequate and equal opportunities, within the time permitted by the need for decision, for discovering and validating his or her preferences on the matter to be decided. (4.) *Final control of the agenda by the demos*: The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are not to be decided by processes that satisfy the first criteria. (5.) *Inclusiveness*: The demos must include all adult members ...⁵⁰

Hence, this definition of democracy is an ideal which all states and nations strive for. Democratization is a never ending process emanating from below, and can be defined as a concept involving power relations and constellations in society and the state. Democratization is concerned with human rights, the right to speech, organizational freedom, and other popular demands directed at the state.

⁴⁸This notion is similar to Karl Popper's distillation of the essence of democracy (which I want to mention here but hopefully without coopting into his general framework): "(1) it is parsimonious; (2) it does not depend on a particular culture or religious heritage (e.g. a Periclean Age, Judeo-Christian ethics, or the Natural Law); ...". Cf. Chalmers Johnson, *The Democratization of South Korea*, *op cit.*, p.66.

⁴⁹This formulation owes much to Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1979) pp.30; 32.

⁵⁰This definition of democracy expresses the content of an ideal regime form (*Demos* is a Greek term and refers to the people.) See Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Economic Theory*, *op cit.*, pp.59-60

Democracy and democratization are suggested in this article to be related with the state level in four ways:⁵¹ first, it is related to the regime form; second, to the relations of the state to the mode of production and macro-economy in general, both at the national and international level; third, to state power as the ruling classes' dominance of the political, ideological, and cultural levels; and fourth, to the state form as the hegemonic relationship inside the dominant bloc or class which possesses state power. At the same time, the capacity of the state means the extractive capacity, coercive capacity, incorporative capacity, and the capacity to manipulate the operative elements in the (macro) economic system which have a great influence on the determination of how political power is distributed.

However, the question of capacity versus autonomy of the state is an empirical question and is hypothesized to be one of the most important determinants with regard to the regime form and, as such, it is linked up with the question of democracy versus authoritarianism.

A framework for the empirical study of state and democracy must include a historical analysis of international developments, the capacity of the state, and a description of the emerging classes in the state.⁵²

Interpreting the Formation of Class and State in Siam - Differing Agendas

Let me start with a brief critique of three dominant approaches to the interpretations of historical developments, processes, and contradictions in Thailand by Thai social and political scientists because they give a clear-cut picture of the theoretical problems raised by this article.

The first approach advocates two lines of political thought: one has its origins in modernization research agenda with elements of eclecticism in a pluralist framework, and the other refers to the so-called 'strong government school' or the 'nation-building perspective.' They share the Weberian heritage and their main conclusions and interpretations of Thai history can be summarized as follows: (1.) the non-colonial relationship between the former Siam and the imperialist powers in the nineteenth century; (2.) the

⁵¹Johannes Schmidt, "Stat og Demokrati i Thailand. Vindere og Tabere i den Paternalistiske Udviklingsstrat," M.A. thesis (unpublished, in Danish), AUC, Aalborg, 1991. See also Donald Crone, "State and Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia," *World Politics* vol.1, no.2 (January, 1988.), Sue-Hoon Lee, "State-Building in the Contemporary World," *IFES Third World Series*, no.2 (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1988.), and Grit Permtanjit, *Political Economy of Dependent Capitalist Development: Study on the Limits of the State to Rationalize in Thailand* (Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, Bangkok, 1982)

⁵²For a comprehensive discussion on the need of a general framework based in a dialectic historical approach (but without economic reductionism) see Johannes Schmidt, *op cit.*, pp.29-39.

consequently slow development of capitalist classes, but a dependent evolution of a capitalist Chinese entrepreneurial group or sub-group; (3.) the successful dominance over and neutralization of critical and/or left-leaning viewpoints since the last century; and, (4.) the non-revolutionary content of the 1932 transition to a politically weak-based autocracy and the persistence of a substantially reconstructed bureaucracy.⁵³

The second approach owes much to Gramsci and Foucault. Like the Weberian school, this school of thought stresses the importance of internal factors, e.g. the hybrid rise of the Chinese entrepreneurs in the beginning of the twentieth century, and the substantial break with the past which began during the reign of Rama IV and was sped up by the reforms (under Chakkri) adopted in the end of the nineteenth century. According to this approach, the autocracy has changed together with important changes in the regime form. The state was strengthened through intensive centralization and through a new hegemonic project. The objective of the Chakkri reforms was to create a new legitimacy based on a massive consolidation of the King's power implying the creation of a *new absolutism*. "In order to establish this new hegemonic project the newly created bureaucratic structures in the state spread the new state ideology which sank down to the roots of society. After this important *modus vivendi*, the all-pervading strength of the state apparatus and its related ideologies resulted in the co-option, bypassing, or the 'decapitation' of potential intellectual opposition."⁵⁴

The third school of thought is merely an eclectic approach with an emphasis on external determinants such as the changes in the world economy and inter-imperialist rivalry. It emphasizes the following points: (1.) the *Sakdina* element⁵⁵ and the follow up *Sakdina* system which, came out of the need to control manpower, cultivate the abundant land, and to fight wars, persists in Thai culture and ideology today inspite of the

⁵³The Weberian school is not established as such, but two important representatives are David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, *op cit*. A couple of references from this milestone in Thai political research shows its preferences: "To comprehend modern Thai political tensions, it is essential to explore the legacy of the past. Thais are conscious of their heritage, openly proud of it. This nation's continuity with the past is evident in the attitudes, the behavior, even the terminology used by Thais today" (p.7); "The subsequent (post 1932) military-dominated regimes have expressed such basic values as social orderliness, abhorrence of bloodshed and political violence, and adherence to the dictates of elders and betters." (p.41); and "Thailand has undergone no traumatic break with its traditional political culture, no large-scale abandonment of its earlier behavioral patterns, and no forceful change in its political culture from without. Consequently, Thai political culture is relatively stable and homogeneous". (p.8)

⁵⁴Andrew Turton, "Limits of Ideological Domination and the Formation of Social Consciousness" in Shingeharu Tanabe & Andrew Turton (eds.), *History and Peasant Consciousness in Southeast Asia* (National Museum of Ethnology, Senri Ethnological Studies, Osaka, Japan, 1984.) See also Chathip Narsupha, *The Political Economy of Siam, 1851-1910* (The Social Science Association of Thailand, Bangkok, 1971) and Chathip Narsupha, *The Political Economy of Siam, 1910-1932* (The Social Science Association of Thailand, Bangkok, 1981)

⁵⁵*Sakdina* literally means power (rank and honor) over land (especially irrigated rice fields). The term *Sakdina* refers to a hierarchical system which was developed in the Ayuthaya period (1350-1770) and the early Bangkok periods (1782 to around 1900). Some scholars, Marxist and otherwise, use the term interchangeably with Thai feudalism, although one could argue that the early *Sakdina* had more in common with "the Asiatic Mode of Production" developed by Marx and later revised by Wittvogel. See Chathip Narsupha, "The Ideology of Holy Mens Revolts," in S. Tanabe & A. Turton, *op cit*, pp.128-129.

tremendous penetration of capitalist relations of production in rural and urban areas. The *Sakdina* ideology has, of course, been reconstructed a number of times, but it still persists in its original substance; (2.) that "Free trade is Jesus Christ and Jesus Christ is Free Trade."⁵⁶ With this immortal axiom in his luggage, Sir John Bowring, representative of her Majesty the Queen Victoria, forced the Thai king to sign a treaty which meant that the Thai state should remove all protectionist trade barriers immediately,⁵⁷ and, (3.) the state in Siam is a colonial, centralized, functional bureaucracy with Englishmen, Frenchmen, Belgians, and Danes as advisers and high level bureaucrats. This means that the then power bloc in Siam adopted certain practices of colonialism in order to escape colonialism.⁵⁸

Despite the vehement debate over the exact nature of Thai society and state and how it has influenced research agendas in different directions, there is a common agreement that we need to know more about the pre-conditions of Thailand's post-war integration into the orbit of the capitalist world economy. However, none of the three approaches gives a full picture of the formation of Thai state and society. But, a few tentative comments will be added to contribute to the knowledge of the evolution and the formation of three significant social forces in the Thai society: (1.) the Chinese capitalist class, (2.) the civil-military bureaucrats, and (3.) the authoritarian state. Because, as Turton and Taylor note: "Whatever the form taken by the state [in Southeast Asia - J.S.], politics plays a crucial role in economic development - in creating conditions for industrialization, initiating land reform, and setting up external trading and investment links."⁵⁹ I will add that the authoritarian, military dominated state and bureaucracy has been the single and foremost obstacle to a democratic regime form and, more importantly, the greatest obstacle to democratization from below.

⁵⁶Benedict Anderson, "Murder and Progress in Modern Siam," *New Left Review*, no. 181 (London, 1990) p. 34.

⁵⁷Bowring came to Bangkok with both impressive pomp and the threat of force behind him. See David K. Wyatt, *Thailand A Short History* (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1984) p.183.

⁵⁸John Gitling, *Thailand Society and Politics* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1981). Other representatives of this school are David K. Wyatt, *op cit.*, and Norman Jakobs, *Modernization without Development* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971)

⁵⁹John L. Taylor and Andrew Turton, "Southeast Asia" in *Sociology of Developing Societies* (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1988) p.16.

The Historical State and Political Processes in Siam

The questions to be answered are thus: Why did Siam develop mainly along anti-democratic lines? Why is it so despite the fact that Thailand never experienced the imposition and transfer of institutions from the West unlike in other developing countries?⁶⁰ Lastly, what are the explanations for the non-participatory population in the societal and production context? Allegories like "Land of smile" and the anthropological term of "Loosely structured social system"⁶¹ have been used as explanations for the specific political culture in Thailand. To find an answer to these questions, we must turn to history.

In 1971, Norman Jakobs made a comparison between Japan and Thailand. Like Thailand, Japan escaped colonialism. Both countries share a high degree of cultural homogeneity and a strong national identity.⁶² The way both countries prevented a direct colonization are identical: "Japan's system of ministries and agencies came into being well before its political parties, Constitution, or parliament. Differing from the United States, these ministries were not created to be 'civil servants,' or to provide regulation of private concerns, or to supply jobs for party loyalists, but rather to guide Japan's forced development in order to forestall incipient colonization by Western imperialists."⁶³ The administrative and bureaucratic praxis were characterized by 'vertical administration.'⁶⁴ Interestingly, many observers at that time were sure "Siam would develop while Japan would not."⁶⁵

It is well documented that capitalist economic and social development in Siam started with its opening to international trade in 1850 which resulted in the formation of important production factors such as financial capital, labor, and management. There was an expansion of agricultural output that was mainly due to an increase in planted area. Revenue derived from domestic production and exports were, however, *mostly remitted out of the country, thus implying that the Thai economy at that time was an economic*

⁶⁰Chai-ana Samudavanija, *Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

⁶¹See John F. Embree, "Thailand-A Loosely Structured Social System," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 50 no.2 (April/June 1950), pp.181-193, and Frank Golay *et al.*, *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1969). Golay found "Buddhism...serving as the major integrative force for the Thai culture, it prevented the encroachment of christianity. Insofar as the adoption of christianity might have been a major vehicle for Europeanization and modernization, Buddhism served as a barrier to development," pp.269-270.

⁶²Norman Jakobs, *op. cit.*, pp.3-4.

⁶³Chalmers Johnson, *Politics and Productivity*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p.187.

⁶⁵Norman Jakobs, *op. cit.*, p.4.

*colony of European and Western countries.*⁶⁶ The most important institutional transfer in the realm of colonialism, however, is indicated by Hanks: "The formation of the Thai state had to await the nineteenth century when both the idea and reality of a nation-state was introduced from abroad."⁶⁷

In another comparison between the Meiji reconstruction in Japan and the Chakkri reforms in Siam, Benedict Anderson pointed out that the response of Siam to the colonial threat was quite different from that of the Japanese: "Squeezed between British Burma and Malaya, and French Indochina, he [King Chulalongkorn - J.S.] devoted himself to a shrewd manipulative diplomacy rather than attempted to build a serious war machine (A Ministry of War was not established until 1894.) Chulalongkorn tried to emulate the state and development model along the lines of the colonial 'beamtenstaaten' in Dutch East India, British Malaya, and Raj."⁶⁸ Furthermore, the Chakkri reforms meant the official abolition of the *Sakdina* system. "Following these models meant rationalizing and centralizing royal government, eliminating traditional semi-autonomous tributary statelets, and promoting economic development along the colonial lines."⁶⁹ Together with the centralization of the state apparatus, a strong army was developed with the primarily function of maintaining internal stability and controlling revolts against internal colonialism and centralizing reforms. "This original function of the military can be said to have endured to the present."⁷⁰ The dominant position which the military has played in Thai politics since the 1932 coup can be traced back to these Chakkri reforms.⁷¹

The most important example of how the colonial administration functioned in Bangkok was Chulalongkorn's decree to import a massive number of single, young, male Chinese. "This import of *gastarbeiters* paralleled, indeed was modelled on, the politics of the authorities in Batavia

⁶⁶Wirat Wattanasiritham, *et. al.*, "Thailand Socio-Economic Development Planning," in Warin Wonghanchao & Yukio Ikemoto, *Economic Development Policy in Thailand* (Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1988) p.38. For a detailed discussion on the consequences see, James C. Ingram, *Economic Change in Thailand Since 1850-1970* (Stanford University Press, California, 1971.), and Akira Suehiro, *Capital Accumulation and Industrial Development in Thailand*, (Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, Bangkok, 1985)

⁶⁷Lucien M. Hanks, "The Yuan or Northern Thai" in John McKinnon & Wanar Bhruksasi (eds.), *Highlanders of Thailand* (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983) p.101, nt.1.

⁶⁸Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, London, 1983) pp.94-95 and fn.33. See also Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand-The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966) p.12.

⁶⁹In particular, the two-class system are Nai (Master) and Phrai (Subject). For a comprehensive discussion see, Chairat Charoensin o-larn, *Understanding Postwar Reformism in Thailand* (Duang Kramol, Bangkok, 1988) pp.132-135.

⁷⁰Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotism Paternalism* (Social Science Association of Thailand/Thai Khadi Institute, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 1979) pp.xvi-xvii.

⁷¹Prudisan Jumbala, *Political System and Nation-Building in Thailand*, research paper presented at the workshop on "Political System and Nation-Building in ASEAN" organized by the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 23-25 January, 1986

and Singapore."⁷² The Chinese would act as a sort of buffer between the King and the nobles on one side and the rest of the population on the other. As Wyatt notes: "In 1910 there was not one, but two Siams"⁷³ and the Chinese became the 'pariah entrepreneurship'.⁷⁴

The main target of the 1932 coup in Siam was the old ruling monarchy and the internal private sector groups, mostly of Chinese or Sino-Thai origin which generally lacked a basic relationship with the Thai. The soldiers and civilians behind the coup saw it as the first real break with colonialism. "In one stroke, the economy was to be disengaged from the Western-dominated colonial world, and a welfare-state directing the economy towards meeting national needs was to be erected."⁷⁵

Today, most of the 'Thai' banks are owned by the descendants of immigrant Chinese. The Chinese are also the means of entry into the Thai market for Japanese firms.⁷⁶ Indeed, the dominant position the Chinese have played in the Thai economy may, along with the military's dominant position in the state apparatus, be traced back to the reforms initiated by the Thai King. This had grave consequences on the development of political culture in Thailand.

That Thailand is a country with a peaceful political culture – a justification for not breaking away from autocratic rule – is a notion well known to be wrong. Various sources point out the occasional outbursts of violence from the state and the army throughout Thai history. Turton, Tanabe, Hewison, and Tambiah provides a picture of history with peasant and worker rebellions, strikes, ethnic and tribal upheavals on the fringes and in the periphery that have all been brutally neutralized.⁷⁷

The Black May (1992) incident in Bangkok was not the first time that state created repression and intra-rivalry violence (among the bourgeoisie, politicians, and the military in Thailand) crushed a popular movement for democracy. Struggles among farmers in the rural areas and oppression from the state since the period of democracy from 1973 to 1976 are also well

⁷²Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, *op cit.*, p.94.

⁷³David K. Wyatt, *op cit.*, p.219.

⁷⁴See Fred Riggs, *Thailand: the Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*, *op cit.*, and William Skinner, *Chinese in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & New York, 1957)

⁷⁵Mike Douglass, *Regional Integration on the Capitalist Periphery: The Central Plains of Thailand* (Institute of Social Studies, Hague, Netherlands, 1984) p.177.

⁷⁶James Clad, *Behind the Myth. Business, Money and Power in Southeast Asia* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989) pp.110-111.

⁷⁷See Kewin Hewison, *Bankers and Bureaucrats: Capital and the Role of the State in Thailand*, Monograph Series 34 (Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, Connecticut, 1989), Tanabe, *op cit.*, Turton, *op cit.*, and S.J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Denouncer - a study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976)

documented. But because of the difficulty of monitoring the specific incidents and of finding witnesses and the right sources, it remains to be shown exactly who was behind each specific incident.⁷⁸

Because of the lack of a total break from absolutism, civil society is still very weak. Consequently, Thai political culture is characterized by a population with a strong degree of identification with the bureaucracy, the military, the state (which is actually part of the military and vice versa), the nation, the King and the monarchy, and religion. It provides the state and associated institutions with a monopoly of legitimacy the degree of which is rarely found elsewhere. Moreover, perceived problems of 'insurgency' and threats to 'national security' have strengthened military and para-military social forces and strongly influenced public policy and forms of social control.⁷⁹

The model of 'internal colonialism' (or center-periphery relations) in the late nineteenth century has been rejuvenated since the early 1960s under the name of 'national security and development'.⁸⁰ The weak development of civil society, combined with the center-periphery relation has meant that long-term projects of constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy have been largely rhetorical, or have been initiated only to be undone and then restarted after periods of more intense authoritarian rule. The extreme polarization between center and periphery has resulted in a social transformation. For example, per capita household earnings in Northeast Thailand is around one fifth of that of Bangkok.⁸¹ It is not by coincidence that several scholars have coined the phrase 'Parasitic City.' As Suchart describes it: "Bangkok and the Central Region earned more than half the country's GDP throughout the 1961-1984 period. Bangkok alone increased its share of GDP from 22.7 percent in 1961 to 36.3 percent in 1984, *at the expense of other regions*."⁸² Over 75 percent of corporate tax revenues come from the metropolitan region. Almost every per capita index of progress - telephones,

⁷⁸See Andrew Turton, *Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand - Experiences of Poor Farmers Groups*, *op. cit.*, Victor P. Karunan, *If the Land Could Speak For Us... A History of Peasant Movements in Thailand and the Philippines*, vol.1, (Plough Publications, Hong Kong, 1984), and Benedict Anderson *Murder and Progress* (1990) *op. cit.* See also Peter Vanderveest, *Siam into Thailand: Constituting Progress, Resistance, and Citizenship*, Ph.D dissertation (Cornell University, 1990) pp.435-444, and Kewin Hewison, "Culturalism and the Analysis of Politics" in *Power and Politics in Thailand* (Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Manila, Philippines & Wollongong, Australia, 1989) pp.25 [originally published as "A Review Essay" in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 15(4), 1983.]

⁷⁹Andrew Turton, *Limits of Ideological Power*, *op. cit.*, p.21.

⁸⁰Charoensin o-larn, *op. cit.*, pp.142-143.

⁸¹Thailand is divided into five regions: Bangkok, Central, North, Northeast, and South. The Northeastern region is by far the most populous. See the discussion and figures in Wittayakorn Chiengkul *et. al.*, (Researchers team), *Report on Employment Problems in Thailand*, (Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, Bangkok, 1984) p.67.

⁸²Suchart Prasith-rathsint (ed.), *Thailand's National Development: Policy Issues and Challenges*, (Thai University Research Association [TURA], Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA], August, 1987, Bangkok) p.7.

light bulbs, doctors, hospital beds, motor cars, and the like – show a Bangkok bias that literally puts the rest of the country to shame.⁸³

Because of its primacy, Bangkok has a more complex social structure in the country. It retains remnants of the old hereditary royalty and nobility, some members of which are extremely wealthy as a result of ownership of large tracts of real estate in the greater Bangkok metropolitan area. Today, however, two elites – the bureaucratic-military elite that controls the government and the capitalist elite that controls the major industries, trading firms, and financial institutions – run the country. Although the vast majority of the capitalist elite are of Chinese descent, because of assimilation and personal identification as Thais, they no longer possess the ethnic distinctiveness of their forebears. Similarly, while most in the bureaucratic-military elite are of Thai descent, an increasing number today are Sino-Thai. These people also no longer define their interests in the same ethnic terms as did their predecessors in the pre- World War II period. But even with the decline of ethnic tension and considerable intermarriage between members of the bureaucratic-military and capitalist elites, and although many members of the former sit on boards of corporations owned or managed by members of the latter, these two elites still have distinctive interests that lead to periodic conflicts. Debates over the devaluation of the baht in the 1980s is one such example.

Deyo's study helps explain the underlying mechanism used to exclude the farmers and workers from political power relations. This mechanism, which he terms 'developmental paternalism,' serves as the structural foundation for East Asia's industrialization: "The political and economic strategies of East Asian elites draw moral strength from two closely related sets of values. The first of these centered on paternalism, invokes the moral authority of leadership that both defines and pursues national (vs. sectoral) interests through bureaucracy and public pronouncement. The second asserts the efficiency of such leadership through its proven material consequences for the public wealth. Economic development is the chosen measure of national welfare and thus a crucial basis for political legitimacy. *Development paternalism*, the composite of these two legitimating principles, justifies political exclusion and authoritarian rule as necessary for continuing high levels of growth. Alternative legitimating principles are effectively excluded from the moral domain of public discourse."⁸⁴

⁸³See James Clad, *op. cit.* p.116.

⁸⁴Frederic C. Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle - Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989) p.189.

Even though Deyo's analysis is concentrated on Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the two main elements in his concept 'developmental paternalism' has explanatory power in the case of Thailand. A number of studies done by Thai scholars confirms this point.⁸⁵ It is the persistence of 'developmental paternalism' which provides the legitimizing basis and justification for the exclusion of civil society. On the other hand, it justified the massive repression until the new people's power movement ousted the military regime in May 1992.

With the lack of legitimate space for democratization, alternative or participatory approaches to development have been impossible. Fundamentally oppositional ideas and forms of organization have been severely restricted, and more so for the poor and disadvantaged rural producers who form the majority of the population.

The rise of the ethnic Chinese (first as agents for royal capital accumulation and later as pariah entrepreneurs in Thai society), the emergence of a group of civil-military bureaucrats (resulting from the creation of the absolutist state formed the layers for the later evolution of a tripod structural collaboration between the Chinese business class), the Thai civil-military bureaucrats (as a substitute for the missing Thai bourgeoisie), and foreign capital eruption are all part and consequences of the Chakkri reforms.

The Long Wave of Paternalism and Developmentalism

The first military coup in 1932, which changed the name of the country to Thailand and initiated a flag and a national anthem, is an event that would be normally considered a revolution. But the coup only ushered in an era of rule by bureaucrats immune to the checks and control of the traditional monarch as well as of formal institutions legitimized by the idea of 'popular sovereignty.' This problem of legitimacy has plagued Thai political leaders and has been the main characteristic of Thai political culture ever since.

⁸⁵See Chairat Chaoenoin-o-larn, *op. cit.* pp.177- 183, and Thak Chaloeontarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism* (Social Science Association of Thailand, Bangkok, 1979). The following quotation is a statement from Field Marshal Sarit (1957-1969): "No matter how advanced modern political science is, there exists one crucial principle in traditional Thai government and administration that can never be overlooked. This very principle, which is still impeccable and should be utilized, is that of paternalism (Phoo Ban, Phoo Muang). A Nation is like a large family. The governor, the provincial secretary, and the district officer are family heads within the administrative hierarchy. Administrators must always keep in mind that people under their jurisdiction are not outsiders but members of the same family; they are siblings and relatives. Their well-being, happiness, and grievances are family matters and must be taken care of attentively..." (see pp.216-217.)

Thus 'Nation, Religion, Monarchy' on the one hand and 'Constitution' and 'Democracy' on the other compete as legitimizing symbols and have been used, as circumstances dictate, by leaders to justify bureaucratic and military dominance of the polity.⁸⁶ But the most important result of the 1932 coup was the entry of Thailand into profit producing activities.⁸⁷ After the 1932 revolution, the state began to promote an industrial sector, the goal of which was to establish a self-sufficient economic system. However, in reality the industrial sector was formed by an alliance between influential Chinese businessmen and the political leaders of the coups that followed after 1958.

The original target of the 1932 coup was the monarchy and the internal private sector groups, mostly of Chinese origin who generally lacked a basic relationship with the Thais.⁸⁸ Thailand got a constitution and a parliamentary system of government. However, this constitutional idealism gradually eroded into formalistic constitutionalism and it was more accurately a shift in the regime form from absolutism to 'Thai-style democracy.'⁸⁹ Hence, the 1932 revolution – and this was to be the pattern of subsequent coups as well – far from being a democratic or a mass movement "...was the replacement of one oligarchy by another."⁹⁰ It was a change in the formal government structure, a revolution within the ruling elite. As a consequence, the monarchy was not abolished. Its powers were, however, subjected to constitutional limitations and representative institutions were established to provide the needed checks. But since the King continued to 'reign,' this most important symbol of legitimacy was retained. "Those who exercised power after the coup did not have to face the problem that most leaders of coups d'etat have: that of establishing their legitimacy in the minds of that portion of the population that is politically conscious."⁹¹

The next important coup is 'the Sarit revolution' of 1958 which tried to overthrow the traditional political system inherited from the 1932 revolution, and sought modernization and economic progress on the basis of Thai values and culture.⁹² This 'Thaification' of the political system meant the

⁸⁶Prudhisan Jumbala, *op. cit.*, pp.12-13.

⁸⁷Akira Suehiro, *op. cit.*, pp.2-37.

⁸⁸Anuj Arbhahitrama, *Observations on Bureaucratic Democracy in Thailand*, *op. cit.*, p.47.

⁸⁹Those who were impatient were the Western-educated military and civilian bureaucrats. In the absence of a sizable middle class, a large and strong bureaucracy became the locus of power in the new constitutional arrangements. see Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy," in Larry Diamond *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp.306-307. For a discussion on the factors which caused the coup see J.Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp.94-95.

⁹⁰John Gieling, *op. cit.*, p.60. For a similar account (theoretical and empirical) see Peter Vandergeest, *op. cit.*, pp.50-51, and Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above - Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru*, (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1978)

⁹¹Thainan Nakata, *The Problems of Democracy in Thailand. A Study of Political Culture and Socialization of College Students* (PRAEPITTAYA Int., Bangkok, 1975) p.55.

⁹²Thak Chaloeitirana, *op. cit.*, pp.140-141.

promotion of the symbolic triangle based on the three ideals – King, Religion and Nation, that is to say a re-mobilization of the power of the King. As Thak notes, "In his concept of the modern Thai state, the King was to be recovered as symbolizing the spirit of the people, and their past, and their tradition; Buddhism was to be embraced by all as the source of social morality and ethics."⁹³ The objective of the regime was to pursue a coherent national development strategy through various reformist policies and programs involving an enormously increased role of the Thai state.⁹⁴ In this development context, "Sarit claimed that the Western style of constitutional democracy was not appropriate for Thailand because it was an obstacle to economic development."⁹⁵ Hence, development was there to enhance the regime's ability to function as a paternalistic system. The final goal of development and modernization was essentially to facilitate administration.⁹⁶

The goals of the new coherent development policy and the new role of the state could only be accomplished through an intensive repression of the population.⁹⁷ This was very much in line with the interests of the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie. As a representative of the Bangkok Bank said in a press release: "We have found from past experience that whenever trade unions are allowed ... they fall into the hands of undesirable elements who use the trade unions as a tool to subvert the democratic working of the government. Therefore, for security reasons, it has been found necessary to prevent the functioning of trade unions."⁹⁸

Interestingly, the new role of the 'assimilated' Chinese bourgeoisie was a revision of its former role as a buffer group between the Royal house and the people. Its new function was a sort of go-between between the bureaucracy and foreign capital.⁹⁹ As in 1932, the Sino-Thais played a dominant role in

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp.167-168.

⁹⁴Charoensin-o-larn, *op cit.*, p.131.

⁹⁵Damrong Thandee, *Politics of Policy Implementation: A Case Study of Rural Development*, (Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, Bangkok, 1985) p.62.

⁹⁶Thak Chaloemtiarana, *op cit.*, p.222.

⁹⁷On the arrests, the abolition of labor acts, and so on, see Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Political Institutions and Processes," in Somsakdi Xuto, *Government and Politics in Thailand* (Southeast Asian Studies Program, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987.) See also Kevin Hewison, *op. cit.*, p.121.

⁹⁸Kevin Hewison, *op. cit.*, p.122.

⁹⁹Akira Suehiro, *op. cit.*, pp.3-25. Note that the assimilation of the Chinese was part of Sarit's Thaification programme. However, even up to today, it is difficult to measure the success of this programme. This article argues that the Thaification programme was a forced integration and not an assimilation. Therefore the term Sino-Thai bourgeoisie is used synonymously or refers to the Chinese. This confusion is also reflected in various scholars' usage of the terms. As an additional information, Thailand is a homogenous country in religious terms with Theravada buddhism playing an absolutely dominant role as an integrative force. However, the ethno-linguistic composition is more complex with around 60 % Thai, 25 % Lao, 10 % Chinese (Sino-Thai), 3 % Malay, and Meo, Khmer. See Hans H. Indorf and Patrick M Mayerchak, "Linkage or Bondage U.S. Economic Relations with the ASEAN Region" in *Contributions in Economics and Economic History*, no. 91 (Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 1989) p.21. See also Barbara Leitch LePoer, *Thailand. A Country Study*, Area Handbook Study, (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1987) pp.xiv,96, and 107.

business activities and was the link to the world market with their connections in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan Republic of China, and China, not to mention to the Chinese communities in the US and Europe.¹⁰⁰

Consequently, the underlying reason for the nationalist economic policy, which began in 1932, was not determined by internal factional rivalry,¹⁰¹ but was, on the contrary, the result of a class struggle with ethnic and nationalist undertones between the Thai civil-military bureaucracy and the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie.

Historically, this rivalry had created momentums of Thaification versus alliances between the two groups. The anti-Chinese Thaification policies created a triple alliance. It can be defined as a symbiotic, but asymmetric, relationship between the two internal compradors and their alliance partners abroad. As Mike Douglass notes: "With a benevolent external economy, the dominant and almost exclusive Chinese merchant class was able to undermine the posture of economic nationalism by assenting to the inclusion of Thai military and bureaucratic elites on the boards of their trading companies. Instead of accumulating wealth through the construction of state-run enterprises, the Thai political elites could claim handsome incomes as 'directors' of Chinese-run businesses which prospered in an open economy."¹⁰²

It is the class, ethnic, and nationalist rivalry which has been the underlying reason for the subsequent military coups and authoritarian rule. It is a situation where government officials sit on the boards of private enterprises and Chinese serve as managers in state enterprises and government monopolies originally established to keep economic activity out of Chinese hands.¹⁰³

Thus, what is argued here is that one of the most important reasons for the anti-democratic development of Thai society is the missing indigenous Thai business sector. The military has been the vanguard of Thai nationalist values, not only to fight the internal and external communist threat but also to act as a substitute for non-Thai bourgeoisie. The two principal contending forces of post-1932 Thai society have been the military-dominated state bureaucracy and the Chinese business sector.

¹⁰⁰Akira Suehiro, Fred Riggs, and William Skinner, *op. cit.*

¹⁰¹This is the argument in a number of studies done by Riggs, *op. cit.*, Morell and Chai-Anan, *op. cit.*, David Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1962), Clark D. Neher, "The Foreign Policy of Thailand" in C.D. Neher et al., *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia* (Macmillan International Political Economy Series, London, 1990). Also see Joseph J. Wright Jr., *The Balancing Act: A History of Modern Thailand* (Asia Books & Pacific Rim Press, Oakland, California, 1991.)

¹⁰²Mike Douglass, *op. cit.*, p.171.

¹⁰³Brewster Grace, "A Note on Thailand," in *American University Field Staff Reports, Southeast Asia Series*, vol.22, no.4(1974) p.5.

External Pressures on the Regime Form, State Capacities and Policies

Among the international determinants, "US influence is the single factor which gives coherence to the social, economic, and political history of Thailand since World War Two."¹⁰⁴ The Thai military regimes became one of the significant factors in the US strategy against the communists in Northeast and Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁵

As mentioned earlier, the Thai Kingdom and the state have historically relied on the big powers to maintain formal independence. Sukhumband, referring to Girling's precise observation,¹⁰⁶ quoted that "the patron-client structure of internal Thai politics is paralleled by a preference for a patron-client relationship in foreign affairs, first with the British against the French, next with Japan during the World War II, and finally, with the United States."¹⁰⁷

However, the Japanese state and *zaibatzus* have, in the 1980s, replaced the Americans in terms of economic influence. Especially in the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990, Japanese economic strength grew and subsequently its political and cultural influence has grown tremendously not only in Thailand but also in the whole of Northeast and Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴Peter F. Bell, "Cycles of Class Struggles in Thailand," in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.8, no.1 (Stockholm, 1978) p.51. See also Robert J. Muscat, *Thailand and the United States, Development, Security and Foreign Aid*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1990) p.262.

¹⁰⁵See Surachart Bamrungasuk, *United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule 1947-1977* (Duang Kamol, Bangkok, 1988) pp.44., and David Elliott, *Origins of Military Rule* (Zed Press, London, 1978.) Robert J. Muscat, however, notes that in some respects the aid programs in Taiwan and Thailand were similar, *op. cit.*, pp.8;18.

¹⁰⁶John Girling, *op. cit.*, p.92.

¹⁰⁷Sukhumband Paribatra, "Thailand and Its Indochinese Neighbors: The Enduring Logic," in Lau Teik Soon & Leo Suryadinata, *op. cit.*, pp.142-143. See also Elliott for the historical rivalry between France and England in Southeast Asia where he quotes an interesting anecdote. King Mongkut wrote in 1867 in a letter to Siam's ambassador to France: "Since we are now being constantly abused by the French because we will not allow ourselves to be placed under their domination like the Cambodians, it is for us to decide what we are going to do; whether swim up-river to make friends with the crocodile or to swim out to the sea and hang on the whale." pp. 63-65.

¹⁰⁸There is a growing literature on Japan's ascendancy over East Asia. See for example "Sayonara, America Japan is building an Asian Yen Bloc - and the United States is the Big Loser," in *Newsweek*, August 5, 1991, pp.22-29, and "Building Roads for Japanese Investment and The Thailand Cultural Center: Better to Call It Japanese?," in *AMPO: Japan ASIA Quarterly Review*, vol.21, no.4, series No.82 (Pacific-Asia Resource Center, Tokyo, 1990) pp.38-42. Nester recently quoted IHT's example of Japan's neo-mercantilist-tied aid policies in a 1985 grant to Bangkok's Thammasat University establishing a center for Japanese studies. The grant was not only with the condition that only Japanese firms build the new center, but that the 200,000 library books come from Japan. The Thais protested that English, rather than Japanese, books were urgently needed since so few Thais could speak Japanese. After long negotiations, the Japanese agreed to the purchase of English books, but stipulated that they be bought through Japanese distributors who would ship them first through Japan. See IHT, 27 June 1988. Cf. William R. Nester, *The Foundation of Japanese Power: Continuities, Changes, Challenges* (Macmillan, London, 1990) pp.376-377. See also William R. Nester, *Japan's Growing Power over East Asia and the World Economy: Ends and Means* (Macmillan, London, 1990) pp.112-124.

The Japanese neo-mercantilist policy is also reflected in Chatichai's plan to convert resource-rich Indochina from a "battlefield into a trading market" and to continue using Japanese pressure to settle the Cambodian conflict.¹⁰⁹ The Thai aspiration for regional leadership is reflected in the Prime Minister's 'New Look Diplomacy' which has drawn some degree of concern in other ASEAN capitals. As Um notes, "[m]uch of the concern, however, is rooted in Chatichai's own penchant for sweeping and controversial rhetoric. One example was his proposal for a joint Thai-Japanese naval exercise in the South China Sea."¹¹⁰ In 1989, the major antagonism between Chatichai's 'no problem' attitude of promoting Sino-Thai big business interests at the expense of the military and the technocrats was highlighted by the press.¹¹¹

As part and parcel of the long-term strategy of American foreign policy in East Asia, Thailand became a cornerstone, acting as a buffer state between the Free World and the communist forces. The hegemonic role of the military-dominated state created and expanded coherent developmental policies in the post-World War II period. In fact, the military was institutionalized by American aid and the subsequent capacities of the state agencies were designed in the shadow of American Cold War foreign policies.¹¹²

The main content of these policies are briefly summarized in the following:

(1.) The 1940s saw an American initiative in Southeast Asia in response to anti-colonial struggles and to the Chinese revolution. This took the form of

¹⁰⁹Or turning "Indochina from a war zone into a trade zone". In Chatichai's vision of the future there should not be two Southeast Asias but "Thailand and ASEAN together with Burma, Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam becoming closely linked to one another through ties of trade, investment, communications and telecommunications." These was expressed in the address by Thai Minister Chatichai Choonhavan at the Conference on Indochina in Bangkok, 28 April 1989; FBIS-EAS 2 (May 1989). Cf. Eero Palmujoki, "Diplomacy over the Kampuchean Question" in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1990* (ISEAS Singapore, 1991) p.140. [But as the *Economist* briefs the reality, "A senior aid donor in Bangkok, the capital, describes this relationship as 'colonization with none of the benefits or, put more crudely, economic rape'. *Foreign Report*, (Economist Newspaper Limited, London) June 18th 1992]

¹¹⁰Khatharya Um, "Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 13, no. 3(December 1991) p.248.

¹¹¹Examples of clashes are mentioned by Neher: "Chatichai's selection of private business and industrial leaders to direct the National Economic and Social Development Board (the principal policy-making body for economic development) was cited as an example of a shift from trained technocrats to self-interested financiers." See Clark D. Neher, "Change in Thailand," in *Current History* (March 1990) p. 102. See also Scott R. Christensen, "Thailand in 1989-Consensus at Bay," in *Asian Survey* vol.XXX, no.2 (UCP, Berkeley) pp.184-185.

¹¹²Robert J. Muscat, notes "...it is clear that the US Programs have been present at the birth and have provided important assistance in the growth of Thailand's institutionalized capacities for modern economic development", *op. cit.*, p.262;268-271. Wurfel states that "[t]he impact of foreign aid on the military as an institution undoubtedly gave it a stronger role in Thailand,...." See David Wurfel & Bruce Burton (eds.), *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia*, *op. cit.*, p.302.

a long-range plan and, in Thailand, diplomatic initiatives to establish a basis for future influence.

(2.) The 1950s was a period in which Chinese capital regained the initiative. But as Hewison underlines: "The importance of state investment and political intervention cannot be underestimated. State policy continued to emphasize the importance of industrial development during the early 1950s."¹¹³ The state, with American aid, began the process of nation-building including 'development' in all its dimensions, and the building of repressive military regimes which sought to eliminate all opposition. The number one goal of American aid was to build Thailand into a policeman in the domestic and regional contexts.¹¹⁴ Clearly, US aid had tipped still further the political balance in Thailand in favor of the military, strengthening its ability to coerce the civilian population.¹¹⁵ As a reference book by the United States Government presented by the Secretary of the Army states: "Largely because of the advice and military aid received from the US in the decades since World War II, Thailand's military establishment reflected to some degree the influence of American defence practices."¹¹⁶ Indeed, aid was seen by many American business people and officials as a means to encourage 'healthy' attitudes towards private enterprise. Thai officials who exhibited such attitudes were encouraged.¹¹⁷

(3.) The 1960s saw a new cycle of class struggle based on a political recomposition of the working class and the initiation of social control through counter-insurgency. Capitalist development, led by foreign investment, was adopted as recommended by the World Bank Survey Mission Group to Thailand during its visit from June to July 1958.¹¹⁸ There emerged an artificial alliance between bureaucratic capital and Sino-Thai capital linked up with international (mainly American) capital. Furthermore, the American intention was to use Thai territory as a new strategic area to blockade Communist expansion in the region. As Arbhahirama notes: "The vulgar concept of 'democracy' (or the free world) as any system opposite to communism had now overstretched to the point of dissolving parliament and changing military democracy into military dictatorship."¹¹⁹

¹¹³Kewin Hewison, "The Development of Industrial Capital and its Contemporary Problems in Thailand" in Peter Limqueco (ed.), *Partisan Scholarship. Essays in Honor of Renato Constantino* (Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Manila, Philippines & Wollongong, Australia, 1989) p.259.

¹¹⁴ See Peter F. Bell, *op. cit.*, p.55, Grit Permeanjit, *op. cit.*, and Johannes Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp.155-164.

¹¹⁵ Prudisan Jumbala, *Political System and Nation-building in Thailand*, *op. cit.*, p.25.

¹¹⁶ Barbara Leitch LePoer (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.254.

¹¹⁷ Kewin Hewison, *Power and Politics: Essays in Political Economy in Thailand* (Journal of Contemporary Publishers, Manila & Wollongong, 1989), p.39.

¹¹⁸ Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, *op. cit.*, p.152.

¹¹⁹ Anuj Arbhahirama, *op. cit.*, p.53.

(4.) The 1970s saw an attempt by the state to break working-class power. The global economic crisis and austerity had profound effects on Thai society. The historic break from years of authoritarianism became evident in 1973. However, in 1976 an even more violent military regime ousted the short-lived democratic government and renewed violent forms of repression as the threats to the capitalist social order became salient. The 1976 coup resulted in a familiar political pattern with even more extremist overtones¹²⁰ and quasi-fascist rule. The United States had been the chief source of armaments and training assistance since 1950. From 1950 to 1976, the substantial majority of US aid was in the form of grants under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Additional aid was offered in the form of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, part of which carried United States guarantees of payment to American commercial suppliers.¹²¹

(5.) After 1976, MAP aid to Thailand declined and FMS credits increased. By 1979, Thailand had been dropped from the United States' list of grant aid recipients. But later that year, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, President Carter expedited delivery of approximately US\$400 million in arms and military supplies to Thailand.¹²² In the words of Benedict Anderson: "Never in its history had Siam been so deluged with external economic resources - the result not merely of American capital investment in military bases and strategic infrastructure development, but also of direct American aid to the Thai regime, and substantial Japanese and American private investment in a low-wage, union-free society."¹²³ The 1980s was a period of economic stagnation after the American defeats in Korea and Vietnam. This general withdrawal symptom and the international recession created new pressures on the state and the ruling military junta. In 1980, the military successfully brought down the existing government and installed their own man, General Prem, in the Prime Minister's office.¹²⁴ Morell and Chai-anan concluded in their 1981 book: "We assume that the military with its commercial associates and royal ties will remain the controlling force in Thailand in the immediate future."¹²⁵ However, in 1988, after eight years of waning military influence, a

¹²⁰The 1974 constitution, parliament, and all the political parties were abolished; martial law was proclaimed. The coup group appointed Thanin Kraivichien, a staunchly anti-communist judge, as the new prime minister. Over the months that followed, Thailand was immersed in intense reactionary rule. See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy*, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

¹²¹Barbara Leitch LePoer, op. cit., p.251.

¹²²The presence of roughly 45,000 US servicemen had a pronounced socioeconomic consequence - it increased by the large number of American personnel who came to Bangkok on rest and recreation leaves. The absence of this American capital injection just before the military coup in July 1976, combined with the global oil crisis, led to considerable controversy between Thai military and government officials. See *ibid.*, pp.252-253.

¹²³Benedict Anderson, *Murder and Progress in Modern Siam*, op. cit., pp.38-39.

¹²⁴Pasuk Pongchaipit, "Technocrats, Businessmen, and Generals: Democracy and Economic Policy-making in Thailand," in Andrew J. MacIntyre and Kanishka Jayasuriya (eds.), *The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992), p.27.

¹²⁵David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, op. cit., p.314.

former General Chatichai was elected. This reflected the growing political power of the Sino-Thai business community.

From the mid-1980s to the 1990s, Japan took over the role of the United States.¹²⁶ ASEAN as a whole is now Japan's third largest trading partner after the United States and the European Community (EC). Today, Japan ranks as the first or second trading partner of all six ASEAN members. To complement its direct investment and trade, Japan has consistently injected nearly two-thirds of its global aid budget into the region." The Japanese government recognizes their (ASEAN elites) importance and is now making intense efforts to cultivate a new generation of ASEAN power elites with no bitter memories of Japan."¹²⁷

In 1990, the problems of the new ultra liberal economic policy of Prime Minister Chatichai's Cabinet led to growing tensions between the Sino-Thai business sector and the military bureaucratic capital. These tensions created the basis for a new military take-over on 23 February 1991. The junta – the National Peacekeeping Council – justified its overthrow of Thailand's elected civilian government on the grounds of alleged corruption and allegations that Chatichai's senior aide had been involved in an assassination plot against previous Minister Prem Tinasulanonda. These, however, obscured the underlying cause of the coup – the conflict between the entrenched military bureaucratic establishment and the emerging business sector.¹²⁸

As it has been argued, the above described developments have their roots in history. Part of this explanation is the influence and the key role foreign factors have had on the military in Thailand. What is not usually understood is that even if *Pax Americana* had been broken in the region after the humiliating defeat in Vietnam, the United States still plays a crucial role and, perhaps arguably, even a central one. As Sukhumband points out, at least in a geo-strategic perspective that, "[p]erhaps, the client has to stand more on its own feet but the patron remains patron and fundamental continuity of means still endure."¹²⁹

Apart from the direct influence of the United States, the World Bank and other multilateral agencies have played their part too. Grit described the

¹²⁶To realize its goals of economic prosperity and to raise its international status to a level commensurate with its strength, Japan is re-orienting its economy and is pursuing its political objectives under a policy umbrella called the Comprehensive National Security Strategy (CNNS). See Anny Wong and Kuang-sheng Liao, *Japan's Cultural Diplomacy and Cultivation of ASEAN Elites*, (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, 1991), pp. 24:23. See also ft 4.

¹²⁷*Ibid.* p.2.

¹²⁸For a view supporting the explanation and the specific circumstances leading to the military coup in 1991, see Surin Maisrikrod and Suparra Limsong, "Thailand Deconstructing The Coup," *Pacific Research* (August, 1991) pp.1-4:8.

¹²⁹Sukhumband Paribatra, *Thailand and Its Indochinese Neighbours*, op. cit., p.143.

influence of the World Bank on both the regime form, the state, and the subsequent development policies as comparable with the consequences of the Bowring treaty in the middle of the 19th century.¹³⁰ The World Bank and US foreign policy were "indeed inseparable."¹³¹

Aid, loans, and 'policy recommendations' forced the Thai state to integrate into the world market.¹³² And what is more important, "[a]id in the form of advice, became the mechanism of the World Bank to create technical dependency. This technical dependency created a decision-making process external to the peripheral state."¹³³ Conditionalities implied a shift in overall development strategy from pre-dominantly Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies to Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI).¹³⁴ Paradoxically, "Thailand still lacks an effective system of screening, negotiating, registering, and monitoring US and any foreign direct investment activities."¹³⁵ In the early 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were instrumental in pushing Thailand to restructure its economy through the Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), reduce its budget deficit, and the terminate subsidies to public utilities and oil prices.¹³⁶

This dependency is crucial and explains the lack of land reform. Because of the World Bank's orthodox dogma of privatizing at all costs, the Thai state and government are not able to extend the needed government intervention "[t]o permit and facilitate changes in agricultural production, changes in the social structure and tenure patterns... Most of Thailand's farmers do not own their land and therefore, do not qualify for the bank loans necessary to stimulate these developments."¹³⁷ Will the Thai government

¹³⁰Grit Permtanjit, *op. cit.*, p.108.

¹³¹*Ibid.* p.64, See also Robert J. Muscat, *op. cit.*, pp.268-269.

¹³²James Ingram, *Op. cit.*, p.231. See also Rober J. Muscat, who notes that the amount of American aid in the 40 year period from 1946-1986 have accumulated to larger amounts compared to that of any African recipient (Egypt aside), *op.cit.* p.30.

¹³³Grit Permtanjit, *op. cit.*, p.109 and Rober J. Muscat, *op. cit.*, pp.268-269.

¹³⁴However, it is not being suggested that the history of industrialization can be neatly divided into ISI and EOI periods. Export of industrial products in certain sectors (particularly textiles and processed foodstuffs) was common in Thailand during the 1970s. Nor does a shift towards priority for EOI imply that ISI becomes inconsequential, as evidenced by the still flourishing import-substitution sectors in South-Korea and Taiwan. Nevertheless, crisis points can be identified which can be considered to be crucial watersheds in the consideration of policy. See Richard Robison, Richard Higgott, and Kevin Hewison, "Crisis in Economic Strategy in the 1980s: The Factors at Work," in R. Robison et al., *Southeast Asia in the 1980s - The Politics of Economic Crisis* (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Australia, 1985), p.7.

¹³⁵Warin Wonghanchao and Jeerasak Pongpissanupichit, "Contribution of Direct Foreign Investment to the Thai Economy," *Asia Pacific Economies: Promises and Challenges*, Research in International Business and Management, vol.6, Part B (JAI Press Inc.), p.250.

¹³⁶Pasuk Pongchait, *op. cit.*, pp.16;30. See also *ft.* 4

¹³⁷*Ibid.* p.7.

give priority to finding these funds? And probably more important, will it be courageous enough to do this in opposition to the World Bank's orthodox dogma of 'privatizing at all costs.'¹³⁸ The essential problem, at least compared with the Japanese Model, is the 'missing land reform.'

Until the beginning of the 1980s, the bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan and the United States went to import-substituted industries and any substantial increase of net FDI inflows went mostly to the export-oriented sector. In Thailand, it is found that companies with foreign capital involvement are among the largest in the country. In the case of Japanese FDI, Thai investors often have to rely on its technological know-how and sometimes on financial resources. The Japanese shareholders form a powerful group and maintain control of the companies despite their minority shareholdings.¹³⁹

The result of Thailand's integration into the world capitalist orbit has been a limited, externally determined political and economic capability which, as a consequence, legitimized authoritarian development policies. As Hewison noted, the supply of large loans and credits from international agencies and private transnational banks gives them a considerable stake in the direction of national development and provides international finance capital with a strong reason to influence development policies.¹⁴⁰

To promote economic growth a strong coercive state is a necessity, and the incorporative mechanism at the ideological, political, and cultural level has so far functioned very well. From 1973 to 1976, just one interruption occurred when the state and the military loosened their grip and thus created the necessary political space for mobilization of popular organizations hitherto excluded from control over resources and regulative institutions.¹⁴¹ The 1976 massacre recreated the developmental paternalism of the state – what Turton terms "the genealogies of violence based on 'a climate of fear,' in which violent attacks or death by assassination, rather than mere official rebuke or arrest, is a possible, ultimate sanction."¹⁴²

¹³⁸Warin Wonghanchao, *Thailand in the 21st Century: Economic Prospects*, (Socio-Economic Policy and Forecasting Unit, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1988), p.7.

¹³⁹Somsak Tambunlerschai and Umphon Panachet, "Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN" in Soon Lee Ying (ed.), *Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN*, (Malaysian Economic Association, Kuala Lumpur, 1990), p.65.

¹⁴⁰Kewin Hewison, *The State and Capitalist Development in Thailand*, in R. Robison et al.(eds.), *op. cit.*, p.60.

¹⁴¹ It must be emphasized, however, that the organization was indeed explosive. For accounts on workers organization see Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, *op. cit.*, p.164; on farmers and students organization see Suchit Bunbongkarn, "The Student Uprising in October 1973 and 1976," in *Dynamics of Nation-Building, Communication in Crisis*, RUSHASP Series on Occasional Monographs and Papers 13 - Vol.II, UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok, 1985) p.297; and on the Thai petty bourgeois organization see Prudhisan Jumbala, *Interests and Pressure Groups*, in S. Xuto, *op. cit.*, pp.113-125. On the parliamentary and constitutional developments see Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy*, *op. cit.*, pp.313-315, and finally for political party organization see Kramol Tongdhamachart, *Toward a Political Party Theory in Thai Perspective*, ISEAS, Occasional Paper No.68 (Maruzen distr. Hong Kong), pp.19-40.

However, it is not argued here that there is a one-to-one relationship. Nevertheless, it seems to be certain that the dominant political and cultural matrix of 'King, Religion and Nation' is the hegemonic ideological legitimizing factor of the growth strategy and this determines the necessity of authoritarian state policies to promote economic growth.

State Capacity versus Autonomy

The Thai state has played a major role in the domestic development of capitalist production. But the problem in Thailand, as compared to Japan where MITI has focused on the so-called 'Sun Rise industries' through the implementation of coherent rationalized industrial policies, the state has not had the same capacity to rationalize its economic policies and implement the stated goals in any of the Five-Year Plans.¹⁴³

The relative weakness of the indigenous classes is reflected in the extent to which the military and the bureaucracy have come to exert decisive control over the state apparatus. In general, the policies of repression of labor organizations, subsidies on food and fuel, protectionism of small sectors of the economy, and investment in infrastructure and production have fostered the growth of the previously weakly developed indigenous capitalist class. The changes in the Thai economy over the last thirty years have been spectacular, but in terms of economic policy it was not until 1985 that Thailand shifted away from the protected, import-substitution strategy it had adopted since the 1950s and moved decisively towards export orientation.¹⁴⁴ Substantial industrial sectors have been established and export volumes have constantly been increasing. However, it is questionable whether these changes can be attributed to the development strategies *per se*. "Rather the policies have to be seen in terms of *facilitating* changes made possible by the development of the international economy."¹⁴⁵ It is in this context that the role of the military dominated state bureaucracy has been crucial as a mediator between international and Sino-Thai capital interests linked up in the triple alliance of state, Sino-Thai capital, and foreign multinational capital.

¹⁴³Andrew Turton, *Limits of Ideological...*, *op. cit.*, p.99. For an opposite view, see Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, ISEAS (Singapore, 1987.)

¹⁴⁴Mingsarn Sannakorn Kaosard & Ams Israngkura, "Industrial Policies in Thailand," in Warin Wonghanchao & Yukio Ikemoto, *Economic Development Policy in Thailand*, ASEDP, No.1, Institute of Developing Economies(Tokyo, 1988)p.157.

¹⁴⁵Pasuk Pongchaipit, *op. cit.*, p.26.

¹⁴⁶C. Dixon, *op. cit.*, p.206.

Generally speaking,¹⁴⁶ the basic credo underlying the Thai state's reformist policy for the past two decades was, and still is, the promotion of private industries and enterprises through the facility of public expenditure (including international 'development' aid and loans.) The idea is to transform Thailand's 'traditional' society into a 'modern industrialized society' modeled after the advanced capitalist societies of the West. Hence, the accumulation strategies (ISI and EOI) have been markedly achieved through the following state sponsored measures: (1.) the squeezing of Thai agriculture under the names of 'agricultural development' and 'rural development'; (2.) the disciplining of the Thai laborers under the justification of economic doctrines such as 'comparative advantage' and 'favorable climate' for foreign investment; and (3.) the opening of Thai economy and society to foreign capital penetration and exploitation under the banner of 'industrialization' and 'economic development.' Thus, planning in a Thai context facilitates and legitimizes the development of dependent capitalism.

The neo-classical economic development model and Keynesian economic theories emphasize macro-economic growth and industrialization with the support of the agricultural/rural sector. Growth here is measured in terms of per capita income. "This development framework is urban-biased, imposes an economic versus non-economic dichotomy, and de-emphasizes income distribution."¹⁴⁷

Authoritarian states may maximize their independence from society, but they lose capacity due to their inability to mobilize public support through over-reliance on coercive means of control. Such is the case in Thailand. The Thai state is ruled by narrowly-based shifting regimes with substantial degrees of control. The result is that the state is dominated by powerful groups which limit state capacity.¹⁴⁸ In Thailand, governments come and go, but it does not seem to matter all that much,¹⁴⁹ because "the military and administrative structure remained intact."¹⁵⁰ Therefore, over the past four decades, the bureaucracy has been controlled through the assignment of military officers to crucial positions of authority and by the continuous process of co-opting bureaucrats to work amiably and effectively

¹⁴⁶The following paragraphs relies heavily on Permtanjit, *op. cit.*, and Charoensin-o-larn, *op. cit.*, pp.156-201.

¹⁴⁷Suntaree Komin, "Social Dimensions of Industrialization in Thailand" in *Regional Development Dialogue*, vol. 12 no.1 (Spring 1991), (United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan) pp.116-117. On the crucial problem of government de-emphasizing of income distribution, see Yukio Ikemoto, *Income Distribution in Thailand Its Changes, Causes, and Structure*, (Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1991)pp. 150-154.

¹⁴⁸Donald K. Crone, "States, Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia," *World Politics*, vol. L, no. 2 (January 1988).

¹⁴⁹Derek Tonkin, "The Art of Politics in Thailand," *Asian Affairs, Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs* vol.XXI, part III, (October, 1990), p.291.

¹⁵⁰John Girling, "Thailand in Gramscian Perspective," *Pacific Affairs*, vol.57, no.3(1984) p.395.

for the military regime. In Thailand, the military has continually administered governmental affairs.¹⁵¹ What this means is that "[i]n a sense the army can be considered to be the nearest equivalent of the Weberian 'ideal typical' bureaucratic organization, thus ... officers as the 'armed bureaucrats'."¹⁵²

The point to be made is clearly stated by Gramsci: "Instead of solving its historic tasks of *leadership by developing* the democratic initiatives of the masses, a class relied primarily on the state, on domination. In this case of 'dictatorship without hegemony' the state is (stage by stage) substituted for the class. It creates its own administrative and bureaucratic, even police, apparatus: Leadership becomes an aspect of domination."¹⁵³

Similarly, authoritarian policies are determined by the common interests of the triple alliance: the Sino-Thai local big capital, the military and the bureaucrats in the state apparatus, and foreign Transnational Corporations (TNCs), multilateral organizations, core states like Japan, and to a lesser degree, the US.

Consequently, democracy in Dahl's definition has evolved neither at the regime level nor at the actor level because of the contradicting interests embedded in the state apparatus. The reason for authoritarian rule is simply put: weak state capacities at the overall macro-economic planning and implementation level. The high economic growth, on the other hand, creates enough room for state maneuver and legitimizes coercive and incorporative capacities. In short, the high economic growth has, as a determining condition, weak state intervention in economic affairs but a strong capacity to manipulate and incorporate the hitherto excluded, or the overwhelming majority.¹⁵⁴

Partly concluding, the state in Thailand is a cultural ethnic state, a nation state, based on the ideological triangle of 'King, Nation and Religion' and consequently the politico-economic development model (what Thak Chaloemtiarana terms 'paternalism') is conditioned by high growth created

¹⁵¹Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Bureaucracy*, in S.Xuto, *op. cit.*, p.95.

¹⁵²Gergely Egedy, *Thailand Stability and Change in a Bureaucratic Polity* (Institute of Development Studies, Political Economy, University of Sussex, 1988)p.1.

¹⁵³Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1982), pp.104-106.

¹⁵⁴This is encapsulated in Sukhumband's explanation on the coup d'états: "Security came to be defined in terms of regime maintenance, and any type of dissent was seen to be a security threat. The military's professional role was given a wide interpretation, and officers believed strongly that their supreme duty was to maintain order, safeguard the key national institutions, and administer the nation's progress; that politics was a "game" played only by politicians and could bring instability, disorder, obstructions to the path of progress, and consequently dangers society at large; and that their interventions in politics, be it in the form of the use of force or otherwise, were not political actions *per se*, but pre-emptive, manipulative, corrective, supportive, or administrative mechanisms to protect the nation from those who were "playing" at politics or harbored ill intentions towards it and to steer it along the path of progress once more." See Sukhumband Paribatra, *Thailand: Defence Spending in Southeast Asia*, (ISEAS, Singapore, 1987) p.82.

by dependency relations at internal and external levels of the state. Thus, the triple alliance leaves the state with only a relative autonomy because of the interests determined by international factors.

Democratization from Below Against 'Thai-Style Democracy' from Above

From October 1973 to October 1976, a period known as the 'Democratic Spring of Thailand,' legitimizing institutions of the state were eroded and challenged by national popular movements. These are illustrated in the following events.

First, state 'squeezing' of the majority of the population, i.e., the farmers, led to the imposition of the unpopular rice premium which became one of the cornerstones of state capacity to extract resources from agricultural to industrial development. This policy instrument was "geared toward nourishing the accumulation strategies of ISI and EOI, and is quite obviously working against the interests of the rice farmers, who account for almost eighty percent of the entire population."¹⁵⁵ The capacity of the state to implement the rice premium has undoubtedly been very effective. Though it can be seen as a means to create peace in the urban areas, it is also one of the underlying reasons for the widespread poverty in rural areas.¹⁵⁶ The rice premium has become the single most controversial policy issue in post-war Thai society.¹⁵⁷ The attempt to diversify Thai agriculture through the rice premium policy right after a bad harvesting season, by and large led to a rice shortage. From June 12 to July 30, 1973, rice exports were completely prohibited. "This 1973 rice crisis, in which the city people had to stand in long lines in order to buy rice, became one of the key factors that contributed to the fall of the military regime in October 1973."¹⁵⁸ In short, because the price of rice was determined by the fall in world market prices it further pushed the social rebellion which, in the end, toppled the authoritarian regime.

As Apichai and Montri note, "[t]he degree of democracy in Thailand can simply be measured by the welfare of the rice farmers. So long as the Thai rice farmers are still in constant difficulties, there will be no hope for

¹⁵⁵Charoensin-o-larn, *op. cit.*, p.161.

¹⁵⁶David Feeny, *The Political Economy of Productivity, Thai Agricultural Development, 1880-1975* (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver and London, 1982) pp.113-125.

¹⁵⁷There are two related consequences of the rice premium policy: 1) the stabilization of the domestic price on rice and 2) the diversification of Thai agriculture. Simply speaking, the rice premium is an export tax on rice. Rice exporters are required to pay a certain amount of tax to the government for each ton of rice exported. Charoensin-o-larn, *op. cit.*, pp.159-160.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.* p.162

true democracy in Thailand."¹⁵⁹ According to the adjusted poverty line, about 48.8 percent of the people were living in poverty in 1988. The poverty incidence of 55.7 percent in rural areas represented 22 million people and the poverty incidence in urban areas (both municipal and sanitary districts) represented about 4.8 million people. The Northeast had the highest poverty incidence at 67 percent, compared with 14.7 percent in Bangkok and the three surrounding provinces.¹⁶⁰

The same thing could be said of the labor sector: "It is clear that the condition of the labor movement is closely related with the mechanism of the state. When the state mechanism shows the tendency to suppress, labor movements come to a halt. On the contrary, there is progress in the movement of labor when the state's controlling processes are eased."¹⁶¹

Secondly, the external dominance of growing Japanese influence extended not only in economic terms but also culturally and politically in the form of conditions implied in Official Development Assistance (ODAs) and other kinds of aid-related measures.¹⁶² After the American defeat in Vietnam, the withdrawal of troops from Thai territory left an exhausted home market, disabling the ISI Sino-Thai bourgeoisie and the increasingly corrupt bureaucratic-military regime to sell their goods and commodities. When the Americans moved out, the Japanese moved in to gradually dominate the economy with the military regime. The total organizational nodal point of the popular forces, thus, was an anti-imperialist demand directed at both representatives of foreign domination and hegemony. These developments led to demands for a democratic constitution.

Finally, it can be argued that the legitimacy of the politico-cultural matrix came to a crisis after two decades of martial law and dictatorial rule. The popular organizations, with the student movement in the forefront, rejected deep-rooted *Sakdina* values and ideologies, the on-going parliamentary 'Thai-style democracy' inertia, as well as the inefficiency of the

¹⁵⁹Apichai Puntasen & Montri Chenvidayakarn, *Policy of Rice in Thailand. Politics, Issues and Conflicts*, (Ms Thammasat University, Bangkok.) Cf. Mikael Gravers, "The Debate on 'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance': A Critique," in M.Gravers, P.Wad, V.Brun & A. Kalland (eds.) *Southeast Asia Between Autocracy and Democracy. Identity and Political Processes*, (Nordic Association of Southeast Asian Studies Aarhus University Press, 1989), p.29.

¹⁶⁰Medhi Krongkaew, Prapanee Tinakorn and Suphar Suphachalasai, "Rural Poverty in Thailand: Policy Issues and Responses," *Asian Development Review*, vol. 10, no.1 (ADB, Manila, 1992) p.206.

¹⁶¹Phichit Chongsathitwatana, "The Thai Labour Movement from 1945 to October 14, 1973," in Arnold Weinhörner & Subsaeng Promboon, *The Movement of Labourers in Thailand* (Bangkok, 1978.)

¹⁶²A striking example is the fact that Thailand is the site of the world's third largest Japanese embassy and Thailand was the seventh largest recipient of Japanese ODA from 1969-79, but became the second largest recipient of Japanese ODA, in cumulative terms, between 1979 and 1986. See Chaiwat Khamchoo, "Japan's role in Southeast Asian Security in the 1990s," *Asian Review*, vol.4(1990), *op. cit.*, pp.60-61.

bureaucracy.¹⁶³ The crisis of legitimacy became manifest in the breakdown of the dominant national politico-cultural discourse – paternalism.

All three examples of attempts at democratization from below shows that the key element remains to be the power over the various state capacities. The overthrow of the military regime should be seen as a move and a process of democratization from below, notwithstanding Thailand's experiences where similar overthrow of the military did not effect any changes in the power relations.

The 'Period of Democratic Spring' resulted in a bloody and violent massacre in down-town Bangkok and the sunsequent assumption of a new military regime.

In the early 1980s, the military introduced a new strategy of basing its legitimacy on 'Thai Style Democracy,' an old concept but this time with a new content.

'Thai Style democracy' must be seen in relation to the introduction of the export oriented industrialization strategy and a growing state interventionism in all spheres of society and production. The new activities in the rural areas were tagged 'development programs' but in reality were counter insurgency programs against the armed Communist Party and "include[d] a proliferation of forms of social surveillance and control. While 'democracy' and 'participation' are policy catchwords, government strategy seems, in effect, to resemble the Indonesian New-Order State's '*flooding*' mass strategy of preventing rural population from engaging in organized political activity".¹⁶⁴ As Chai-Anan notes, "[t]he military and bureaucratic groups may 'lose' the first battle. However, as they had more and more experiences with new environments and situations, their advantage in controlling political resources, especially the use of legitimate violence, made it possible for them to gradually gain control over extra-bureaucratic forces."¹⁶⁵

The Thai military's longstanding role in state enterprises is unlikely to diminish much in the near future. The military regard their influence on the boards of state firms as important for national security. It also provides them with access to benefits that would otherwise be unavailable to badly paid soldiers. Their boardroom presence is established both by tradition and legal right. Board seats enable the military to find state-enterprise sinecures for

¹⁶³See Pornpirom Jamtham, "The Student-Led Democratic Movement after the 14 October 1973 Incident and Its Relations with the Communist Party of Thailand," *Asian Review* (Journal of Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Vol.1, 1987) pp.9-11.

¹⁶⁴Turton, 1987, *op. cit.*, pp.31. See also Shane P. Tarr, "The Nature of Military Intervention in the Countryside of Surat Thani," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol.23, no. 3(1991) pp.46-50

¹⁶⁵Chai-Anan, *Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy*, *op. cit.*, p.331.

retiring military personnel, to direct purchase contracts to military-linked suppliers, and to award service contracts to friendly companies.

The military has institutionalized the means of mobilizing the masses to support the government (where appropriate), individual leaders, the military's national security program, and the monarchy itself. Some of these institutions are the Capital Peace Keeping Force, the Civil Affairs Centre, the Directorate of Civil Affairs of the Royal Thai Army, etc. These, together with other institutions and agencies are directly controlled by or closely related to the military. The Senate, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the National Defence Volunteers, and the Village Scouts give the Thai armed forces the capability to conduct mass psychological operations, to instill what is euphemistically referred to as "a sense of responsibility" in the public consciousness, and indeed, to gain crucial or perhaps decisive support for the military. For the latter, such involvements are 'legitimate' for there is no dividing line between national security, politics, government services, and military affairs. To illustrate these institutional developments, figures of state expenses shows that over one-fifth goes to the military.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, because of the strength of Thai majesty laws, often enforced by military rather than civilian courts, any public discussion of a redefinition of the political role of the monarchy is at present impossible in Thailand.¹⁶⁷

In short, the military and the state have been incorporating the population efficiently to strengthen the new politico-cultural hegemony and social order. This is a paradox, a fulfillment of Wilson's old thesis that the development problem in 1962 in Thailand was a matter of bringing the state machinery under some disciplining power.¹⁶⁸

Crisis and Control: A Comparative Perspective on October 1973 and May 1992

On October 5, 1973, several confrontations between the military and the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) culminated after a NSCT leader made a speech in front of the Democracy monument in Bangkok. This was also the time when more than 100 prominent representatives from the public signed a statement demanding a new democratic constitution.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶Sukhumbhand Paribatra, *Thailand: Defence Spending in Southeast Asia*, *op. cit.*, pp.84-90-102.

¹⁶⁷Peter A. Jackson, *Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict: The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism*, (ISEAS, Singapore, 1989) p.54.

¹⁶⁸David Wilson, *op. cit.*, p.280.

¹⁶⁹Asia Yearbook, *FEER* 1974, p.309.

Prior to this event, a number of demonstrators were arrested for inciting the public to rise against the government. NSCT had organized boycott campaigns against Japanese products and the control of the military.¹⁷⁰ Later, NSCT even decided to draft the constitution themselves.¹⁷¹ On the 14th of October, later known as the 'Day of Tragedy' or 'Bloody Sunday,' "riot police and the students clashed in violent fighting and later on the army moved in. A lot of people were killed."¹⁷² Amidst the turmoil, the King stepped in to control the situation by asking Thanom, Prapas, and Narong to leave the country. With the refusal of General Srivara, the Army Chief, to stand on their side there was no alternative left for the students except to comply.¹⁷³

The October revolution, as Girling defines it, was indeed revolutionary in the sense that it started as an intellectual movement, and dealt with concrete problems and conditions of the masses. It was aimed directly at attacking the power structure of the privileged groups. These efforts resulted in the release of economic and social forces which had been taking shape during the past two decades.¹⁷⁴

At the same time, it was a complete break from the ruling political culture - paternalist developmentalism - and the deeply-rooted *Sakdina* values and ideologies, i.e., the patron-client relationship in politics, economics, and even in foreign policies. On that ground, it is possible to see the movement, the NSCT, and others as "a democratic force opposing elitist dictatorial rule and aspiring to develop a new democratic and creative political culture."¹⁷⁵

The 1973 event could also be seen as a triumph of those elements in the Sino-Thai business sector who, in fact, used the student movement and popular resentment for their plans. A couple of years after the 1973 revolution, there was a wave of liberal optimism. Interestingly, the amount of foreign investment declined considerably during the 1973-1976 period.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the three year period of 'open politics' made the unhampered growth of trade unions and spread of trade union activities possible. The number of strikes increased rapidly with 34 in 1972, 501 in 1973, 357 in 1974,

¹⁷⁰Prudhisan Jumbala, *Political System and Nation-building*, *op. cit.*, p.38.

¹⁷¹Suchit Bunbongkarn, "The Student Uprising in October 1973 and 1976," in Yogesh Atal, *Dynamics of Nation-building. Communication in Crisis Situations*, RUSHSAP Series on Occasional Monographs and Papers 13 - Vol.II (UNESCO - ROEAP, Bangkok, 1985), p.297.

¹⁷²*Asia Yearbook (1974)* estimated that 350 were killed and more than 1000 wounded, of which 90 per cent were students. *op. cit.*, p.304.

¹⁷³Suchit Bungbornkarn, *The Student Uprising*, *op. cit.*, p.302.

¹⁷⁴John Girling, *Thailand. Society and Politics*, *op. cit.*, p.188.

¹⁷⁵Pornpirom Iamtham, *op. cit.*, p.7;11.

¹⁷⁶Grit Peemtanjit, *op. cit.*, p.170.

and 241 in 1975.¹⁷⁷ Also, the number of political parties virtually exploded at the first democratic national election in 1975. Of the 44 parties contesting the 269-seat House of Representatives, 22 parties were elected in.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the press became more vocal; the other media became increasingly political. The democratic mood seemed ubiquitous.

After the 1975 elections, a major problem arose as none of the 22 political parties were able to form a government on their own. This led to a coalition between 17 parties which lasted for only a year when a new election was announced. This came about as a result of heavy pressure from the military to prevent a pro-socialist government from coming into power. The election held in 1976 was marred with violence and claimed many lives.¹⁷⁹ The socialist-oriented candidates of the New Force, Socialist, and United Socialist Front parties, together with student activists became the prime targets of harassment, intimidation, and violence by military-sponsored rightists. The heightened political tensions led to the electoral rejection of the socialist-oriented parties, the Thammasat massacre, and the military coup of October 6, 1976. Democracy was again laid to rest when the 1974 Constitution was revoked and the parliament dissolved for the reason that that the enemies of the nation were allegedly attempting to sabotage the stability of the Kingdom, the Throne, and the national economy.

The same pattern of events can be observed up to the Black May massacre in 1992. After Suchinda took over Chatichai in a bloodless coup in February 1992, his first move was to ban state-enterprise unions among the 200,000 workers.

Suchinda, who was initially said to have had no ambition of becoming prime minister and was content on returning the country to civilian-led democracy within a year, was less adamant about this question towards the end of 1991 and later became widely regarded as the figure most likely to become Thailand's next premier.

The issue came to a head on November 19, 1991 when a coalition of the majority of the political parties, as well as academic and student groups staged a 50,000-strong protest in Bangkok against the proposed constitution and the junta's alleged intention of retaining political power after the elections slated for March 1992. As before, the oppositions had their focus on a new democratic constitution.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷Arnold Wernhötner in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, No.4 (1983), p.483.

¹⁷⁸Kramol Tongdhamachart, *op. cit.*, pp.19-40.

¹⁷⁹David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, *op. cit.*, 262. See also Benedict Anderson, *Murder and Progress in Modern Siam*, *op. cit.*, p.43.

¹⁸⁰Asia Yearbook, *FEER*, (Hong Kong), p.206.

As reported in the local media, about 50,000 people demonstrated on May 4, 1992 against the appointment of Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon as prime minister. The general, who overthrew the last elected prime minister Chatchai in a 1991 coup, took over the post on April 7. This demonstration came after a rally on April 20 which drew more than 50,000 people.¹⁸¹ *Financial Times* described the May 8 situation: "Students, workers, young professionals, and old people joined the protest as more than 100,000 people defied military orders to end protests, the largest since a student uprising toppled a military dictatorship in 1973."¹⁸² The rallies culminated on May 17 in a huge mobilization of more than 200,000 people demanding a revision of the constitution.¹⁸³

American newspapers made sacrosanct remarks after the massacre in Bangkok. More recently, Washington has sought to display in Thailand some of the same devotion to democratic values that it had asserted in less strategic places. For instance, it suspended aid due to last year's coup. Still, the latest events caught the American government under embarrassing circumstances of conducting joint military exercises with the Thai army. From the view of *Washington Post*: "Too many Americans have seen economics-oriented authoritarian rule in such places as Thailand as an accepted and acceptable state of affairs. There never should have been any doubt, in the armed forces or among the Thai public, about whose side Washington was on."¹⁸⁴

An editorial in *International Herald Tribune* stated that it was up to the Thai leaders, especially King Bhumipol Adulyadej, to resolve the crisis by re-establishing democratic rule. It asserted that the US can also play a vital role in this process by denouncing Gen. Suchinda in the strongest terms. Words matter in Thailand, "especially when Washington is their source. Bangkok will go to considerable lengths to avoid jeopardizing its military and economic links to the United States. Several weeks ago, for example, the Bush administration eliminated a proposed prime minister from further consideration when it denounced him as a suspected drug figure and therefore ineligible to travel to the United States."¹⁸⁵ However, Japan, the largest aid donor accounting for over three-quarters of Thailand's aid, did not consider suspending aid. "We regard the Suchinda government as a legitimate, constitutional government," a senior official of Japan's foreign ministry said.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ *IHT*, May 5, 1992.

¹⁸² *Financial Times*, May 8, 1992.

¹⁸³ *The Guardian*, May 18, 1992.

¹⁸⁴ *Washington Post*, May 18, 1992.

¹⁸⁵ *IHT*, May 18, 1992.

¹⁸⁶ _____, May 21, 1992.

On May 21, the King emerged to mediate over the crisis which had already cost at least 100 lives. "The monarch said nobody had won and everybody had lost in the confrontation."¹⁸⁷

But as the *Bangkok Post* noted "Gen. Suchinda may be out, but the military that supported him remains one of the key institutions of power in the country. It is most unlikely that the men in uniform will go back to the barracks permanently."¹⁸⁸ During the bloody crackdown, there was widespread dissatisfaction among army officers of other classes of the military academy. These included officers of classes 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and down the line. However, most of them remained silent. Criticism by several members of Class 5, Suchinda's clique, was centered mainly on the fact that the image of the military as an institution had been tarnished, but not because the military engages in politics. This is an important point. It means that the military will most likely retain an active political role. And most important, if the military takes over in a new coup in the near future, it would also probably want to rely on state-owned companies to shore up its own position, in which case the government's privatization program could be stalled or even reversed.¹⁸⁹

Morell and Chai-anan asked in 1981: "Is Thailand ready for democracy as part of an institutional and attitudinal response to its identity crisis? In terms of alien western structures and procedures alone, the answer remains firmly negative, even after nearly five decades that such forms were first introduced. Another set of superficial, irrelevant constitutions and formalistic elections of politicians to a remote, impotent but interventionist parliament in Bangkok surely cannot contribute very much to resolving Thailand's political crisis."¹⁹⁰

As has been seen from this brief comparison, both the 1973 and 1992 events showed that the middle and working class, mostly composed of students and academics, were at the forefront of the movement for a new democratic constitution. What this article has tried to suggest is that any genuine move towards democracy at the regime level must either be nurtured by a democratization from below, through demands for 'rights' - labors rights, women's rights, children's rights - and a democratic constitution to support these rights. But, ultimately, it will be the state, and those who are firmly in control of the various key agencies of the state, who will determine whether or not democracy will take root.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Bangkok Post*, May 26, 1992.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Tentative Perspectives on State and Democracy in a Developmental Context

The overall conclusion is that any transition to democracy is controlled by the state rather than by the forces of civil society.¹⁹¹ The degree to which we are able to measure democracy and democratization with Robert A. Dahl's outcome factors, is determined by control 'from above.'¹⁹²

Since 1932, Thailand has had 3 constitutions which are democratic in Dahl's definition, 6 constitutions which are 'semi-democratic,' and finally 4 'un-democratic' constitutions which do not fulfill Dahl's criteria. Chai-anan's government in this definition would then be 'semi-democratic'.¹⁹³ The problem with these institutions are very simple – that regardless of where the constitution stands, its average life span has been less than four years, and over the last four decades, the bureaucracy and crucial positions of authority have been under the control of military officers who coopt them to work amiably and effectively for the military regime and not for the civilians. "In Thailand, [the] military has continually administered governmental affairs."¹⁹⁴

As a matter of fact, "authoritarian state structures are not only typical throughout the Third World but have been typical throughout human history, or at least since the neolithic revolution made state formation possible. We cannot even assume that liberal democracies will remain the characteristic political form of the industrialized world."¹⁹⁵ The recent so-called 'backlash' to authoritarian regimes in Haiti and Algeria are illuminating instances of the counter argument developed in this article – that the transition debate is too simple-minded, functionalist, and Eurocentric.

¹⁹⁰David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, *op. cit.*, p.313.

¹⁹¹The conclusion is contrary to Benedict Anderson's, *Murder and Progress in Modern Siam*, *op. cit.*

¹⁹²This type of conclusion resembles the arguments of the 'strong government school' and its later ramifications, the statist's approach. See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, CT, Yale Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1968), Ellen Kay Trimberger, *op. cit.*, and Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (ed.), *Bringing the State Back In*, (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1985).

¹⁹³Chai-anan Samudavanija, *Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy*, *op. cit.*, pp.320-323.

¹⁹⁴Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "The Bureaucracy," in Somsakdi Xuto, *op. cit.*, p.95.

¹⁹⁵Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics*, (Macmillan Ed., Hampshire & London, 1985), p.199.

Consequently, there is no true evolutionary path to Western style liberal democracy.¹⁹⁶

The functionalist approach provides us with the wrong questions and the wrong answers, leading us to a teleological causality that capitalism and the evolution of the bourgeoisie are automatically prerequisites for democracy.

The approach suggested in this article follows a state-centered line of argument with a dialectic focus on processes of democracy and democratization combined with an eclectic view of internal and external determinants. The case of Thailand, at least, confirms the initial theoretical consideration – there are no simple correlations between development and democracy.¹⁹⁷

Turning finally to Thailand, it does not require clairvoyance to imagine the events that, in retrospect, will be seen as knocking reality back into Bangkok's boom – a sharp deterioration of the domestic and external accounts, a resumption of foreign indebtedness, higher inflation, and a move to 'distort' domestic economic policy by adopting 'nationalist' (i.e. anti-Chinese/Sino-Thai) policies.¹⁹⁸ Sporadic nationalist reactions during the past Thai regimes made little impact on communal feelings, and today the only restrictive entry practice seems to persist at the Chulachomklao military academy, which insists on excluding cadets born of first or second generation immigrants. This largely amicable coexistence, enhanced by frequent intermarriage, may not endure indefinitely however. The rapacity that led to the wrecking of Thailand's forests and coastal resources usually carries a Chinese face, say Thai critics – an allusion to the overwhelmingly Sino-Thai interests in the companies that have almost denuded Thailand's vast forests. Other local chauvinists see a Chinese hand behind the biggest banks and finance companies, prompting occasional muttering from younger

¹⁹⁶This ought to be taken into consideration in the EC's insistence that human rights and environmental issues be written into the new economic agreements with ASEAN counterparts. These are seen ASEAN officials as a "tendentious application of Western norms and values in inter-state relations". This is an illustration of the amazing attempts to push and penetrate the Third World with forms of domination in regime forms and policy questions made possible by an uneven global economic and political structures. See the ongoing debate in *FEER*, Michael Varikitis, "Dollar Democracy," *FEER*, 26 September, 1991, p.35.

¹⁹⁷*Cf.* Stephen Haggard, *Pathways From the Periphery. The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1990), p.257.

¹⁹⁸James Clad, *op. cit.*, pp.123-124. In addition, Clad refers to *FEER* correspondent Paisal Sricharatchanya in Bangkok who mentions that "[t]he Sino-Thais have emerged as the dominant economic group, controlling almost all key business sectors and are the predominant student group in the elite Thai universities; Chulalongkorn and Thammasat. Up to 50 per cent of Bangkok's population is estimated to be ethnically Chinese nowadays", *FEER*, February 18, 1988.

military officers. Gen. Chaovalit, before he became leader of the New Aspiration Party, occasionally made veiled appeals to indigenous feelings *vis-a-vis* the Chinese. Up to the end of the 1980s, however, these undercurrents were normally silenced once the aspiring soldiers reached positions of power.¹⁹⁹

These events can also be caused by external fluctuations in global economic and political structures such as the growing tendency towards protectionist mercantilism in the core states of Japan, the US, and the European Community. This can lead to growing authoritarianism and less space for democratization from below. The Thai state is likely to increase its capacity by manipulating and mobilizing the Thai people for its own sake, as its elites (the triple alliance) will run the country autonomously under the principle of 'the state shall lead, not serve, the people.'

Still up to 80% of the 55 million population reside in the rural areas, which is a witness to Thailand's extreme case of dualism.²⁰⁰ Therefore, support from the non-urban populace is the heart of the struggle for political control. Whoever controls the rural vote has political leverage over all other groups. At present, the bureaucrats within the Interior Ministry and the military have that control.²⁰¹ It also means that whoever controls the state apparatus has the power to exclude rural forces. As Maisrikrod and Limsong conclude, "the dominance of the military-bureaucratic alliance over the businessmen-politicians is, unlike democracy, deeply rooted in Thailand's political culture."²⁰² This conclusion is confirmed by Turton's extensive studies of power relationships between the state and the rural population – that even if there are certain personal syncretism[s] between military and other bureaucrats, and the Sino-Thai business sector, "the military possess[es] its own relative autonomy... a momentum of its own somewhat hybrid, parasitic, 'secondary complex of predatory interests.'"²⁰³

It is precisely this symbiotic relationship between the relatively autonomous military, civil bureaucrats in uniform, the state, and the Sino-Thai business sector that has to be broken down before paternalist developmentalism can be removed as the fundamental basis of the political

¹⁹⁹James Clad, *op. cit.*, pp.150-151.

²⁰⁰There are still some dispute about the exact figure. However, Lewis and Kapur notes that "despite net migration to Bangkok and other towns, the Thai population remains more than 80% rural". See John P. Lewis and Devesh Kapur, "An Updating Country Study: Thailand's Needs and Prospects in the 1990s," *World Development*, vol.18, no.10, pp.1364;1373.

²⁰¹Sutin Maisrikrod and Suparra Limsong, *op. cit.*, p.8.

²⁰²*Ibid.* p.8.

²⁰³Andrew Turton, *Local Powers and Rural Differentiation*, in Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton & Benjamin White, *Agrarian Transformation, Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia*, (University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1989), p.73.

system in Thailand. Furthermore, external pressure must be taken into consideration to fully understand the triple alliance and its capacity of facilitating an authoritarian developmental policy necessary to enhance the export-driven growth strategy.

This is also the theme in the 'late-comer' and 'catch up' debate about developmental (soft) authoritarianism as a prerequisite for industrialization, economic growth, and 'modernization.' As Roman Szporluk concludes in his interesting contribution to the Marx versus List debate: "...it is indeed true that the Third World today is Listian in its outlook...."²⁰⁴ The 'young' Chalmers Johnson claimed in his *Revolutionary Change* (which came in the same period as Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*) that "[t]he process of social and economic change in the Third World was considered to produce a disintegrative interregnum which required a strong authoritarian rule to achieve political reintegration and economic development."²⁰⁵ Johnson's and Huntington's 'advice' not only became reality in Thailand as emphasized in this article, but was in fact institutionalized to cement paternalist developmentalism, and to cope with the so-called 'demand overload' problem. It is precisely because of this built-in heritage that the spontaneous popular movement were toppled in May 1992.

The regime form in Thailand cannot be defined as a democracy or autocracy, not even in functionalist terms or in Dahl's idealist form not only because of the role of the military but also because of the rules and regulations as stated in the law such as that implemented by the Sarit regime in the 1950s. Rather, the regime form has been characterized by an authoritarian developmental state determined by the internal cleavage in the authoritarian triple alliance between the predominantly Chinese bourgeoisie, the civil and military bureaucracy, and the impact of external (primarily American) forces on these two groups.

It is this specific relationship between the state and the macro-economy at the national and international levels, as reflected in the shifting balance of power in the triple alliance, that determined how state power and state form

²⁰⁴Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List*, (Oxford Univ. Press, New York & Oxford, 1988), p.237. The most striking example is, of course, Japan's ODA policy which is motivated by what has been called "comprehensive security." It consists of three main points: 1.) to secure the supply of natural resources, 2.) to keep the external environment stable and peaceful, and 3.) to provide profitable means for domestic private sector. See Motoko Shuto, "ODA in Japan's Foreign Policy: Changes, Characteristics and Prospects," *Asian Review*, vol.4 1990, (Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1990), p.43.

²⁰⁵Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, (Little Brown, Boston, 1966), quoted from R. Higgott, R. Robison & K. Hewison, *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment: Implications for the Study of Southeast Asia*, (Routledge & Keegan, London, 1985), pp.21; 54 (see also ft. 24.) Refer also to Samuel Huntington, *op. cit.*, p.23, which clearly states that the central conflict in the Third world is between modernization and political development.

has been created in Thailand. It does not, on the other hand, connote any causal relationship between the regime form, type of state, state power, and the question of democratization from below. In Thailand, as in many other near-NICs, it means subordination and exclusion of any move from below towards the process of democratization which includes not only political rights, but also economic and social rights. It means that the four structural capacities of the state in Thailand have a great impact on the relative autonomy of the state, which is the most important prerequisite for developmentalism and authoritarian policies. As long as the military controls these capacities of the state, the stability of economic policy and the non-democratic developmental practice is secured for years to come. Constitutions come and go, but in the end, the military and the bureaucracy have the final say. Therefore, as we have seen in the months after the military regime was toppled in May 1992, the new 'caretaker' Anand and his democratically elected followers have tried to get the Army not only back to the barracks, but also out of the bureaucracy, lucrative government monopolies [parastats], and business. It remains to be seen if the newly elected democratic government will be able to change the structures of the state bureaucracy. But most important, at least as a first step, "the next government needs to ponder the relocation of major military units out of Bangkok, and launch a two-pronged effort to divide and co-opt the military. This could be done by actively soliciting the loyalty and respect of officers who command key regiments."²⁰⁶ It remains to be seen how much truth there is in the old Thai saying that 'ten merchants are not equivalent to one aristocrat.' "The dominance of the military-bureaucratic alliance is, unlike democracy, deeply rooted in Thailand's political culture."²⁰⁷

The final question is not, as mistaken by some scholars, who will carry out the 'historical mission' (i.e., the development of democracy) in Thailand. Since democracy is such a relative concept, the most crucial question is: whose democracy and under whose hegemony? Despite of the events in the infamous Black May incident, it should not be mistaken that the role of the military in Thai politics and state affairs is over. In fact, as has been the argument of this paper, history has shown that a strong governmental role in guiding the economy and sustaining high economic growth is necessary with or without the military.

²⁰⁶Thicinan Pongsudhirak, "Avoid the 18th coup," *FEER*, April 4, 1991.

²⁰⁷Surin Maisrikrod and Suparra Limsong, *op. cit.*, p.8.