

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism to Democratic Governance: Philippine Bureaucracy's Governance Mechanisms for Engaging Civil Society in Urban Poor Social Housing

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ABSTRACT. The Philippine bureaucracy's encounter with authoritarianism from 1972 to1986 underscores its vital role as a political institution of the state and government and the imperative for its transformation for democracy following the critical juncture of the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This article examines the bureaucracy's institutionalization of democratic governance mechanisms engaging collaboration with civil society organizations, particularly in the case of urban poor social housing, since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and subsequent landmark legislation and policies. The paper argues that government bureaucracy in the Philippines is a crucial stakeholder either in authoritarianism or democracy in the use of its organizational resources. Given the background of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the paper analyzes the contextual factors of constitutional design, political leadership, civil society dynamism in policy processes, and bureaucratic arrangements for civil society participation that propelled government bureaucracy toward democratic governance, particularly in socialized housing for the urban poor.

KEYWORDS. bureaucracy · civil society · bureaucratic authoritarianism · democratic governance · urban poor housing · socialized housing program

INTRODUCTION

The Philippine bureaucracy encountered the authoritarian political leadership of Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. when he imposed martial law in 1972. Marcos held the country under his strongman rule and one-party government until he was toppled from power by the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. Corazon Aquino took over political leadership and paved the way for the drafting and ratification of the

1987 Philippine Constitution to restore the institutions and processes of democracy. The deployment of bureaucracy during the authoritarian interlude, and subsequently, in the restoration and institutionalization of democracy (Cariño 1992) provides a useful case for analysis of bureaucracy and its importance in Philippine politics and public management given the framing of democratic governance.

"Who controls bureaucracy" and "who are controlled by bureaucracy" are two-fold aspects of the power dynamics that may account for variations in how government bureaucracy actually works (Meier and O'Toole 2006). Bureaucracy's institutional arrangements observed in country cases demonstrate the shifts to and from authoritarianism and democracy, such as in Latin America and in Asia, particularly the Philippines (O'Donnell 1988; Cariño 1992; Falleti 2011). The bureaucracy has been entangled not only with the ruling political leadership and coalitions but also with contending forces, specifically civil society groups and social movements. Across countries, civil society activism has opposed authoritarian rule and supported democratization (Civicus 2012; Mercer 2002, 7–8; Kohli 2002, 57–84), which emphasize that civil society is a vital contending force. Currently, the character of political rule is difficult to classify due to varying cases that portray democratic types with institutions and processes led by a strongman or controlled by a group, or both, or authoritarian types that allow spaces and responses from citizens and nongovernment or regime groups (Truex 2018; Ortmann and Thomson 2014; Cassani 2012; Diamond 2002; Mufti 2018). Questions may be raised as to whether government institutions' policy responses and efficient and effective actions are attributable to authoritarian or democratic practices; and whether the government provides democratic spaces for engaging citizens and civil society groups.

In the Philippines, the struggle to control state-government institutions involved contestations between political leaders and civil society groups. Martial law and Marcos's one-party regime had engaged the bureaucracy since 1972 until Marcos was deposed in 1986. The political leadership that succeeded Marcos began efforts to include bureaucracy in democratization. This article examines the bureaucracy's shift from bureaucratic authoritarianism to democratic governance since the 1987 Philippine Constitution restored democratic institutions and processes. What bureaucratic arrangements are indicative of bureaucratic authoritarianism and democratic governance? The focus

is delimited to the government's handling of the urban poor housing issue that has been a continuing point of contention and interaction with civil society during and since post-authoritarian democratization. Specifically, how was the shift to democratic governance undertaken by the government bureaucracy designated for urban poor socialized housing since 1987, and eventually since the creation of the Socialized Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) in 2004? The paper analyzes the mechanisms and processes of the SHFC, the forces and interests involved as well as SHFC's engagement with civil society, government, and political stakeholders.

Related to the post-authoritarian democratic turn, democratic deficits, and civil society activism in countries, the framing of democratic governance offers a theoretical and operational approach for examining state-and-government and civil society interactions (Grindle 2010, 1–3, 6). Bureaucracy's power dynamics is challenged by how it actualizes democracy in its encounters with political and societal actors. Even in a so-called democracy, such as the United States, bureaucracy stands amid continually evolving perspectives and practices in politics, public administration, and management that have a reach of influence even upon the Philippines. Governance perspectives offer alternatives for institutional design and practice particularly in states challenged by democratic deficits. Governance by bureaucracy, and in terms of democratic governance and collaborative governance, may be examined in a historical institutionalist perspective by analyzing structures, processes and outcomes, critical junctures, and time sequence (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 693–721). Historical institutionalism focuses on rules, norms, and political actors, and how these use resources, strategies, and institutional arrangements (Thelen 1999). Stakeholders' engagement occurs in processes of policy and program formulation, adoption, and implementation, while bureaucracy plays a crucial part by hosting the administrative and operational policy processes (Sabatier 1991).

To provide empirical grounding, this article focuses on the SHFC being the bureaucracy created for socialized housing specifically for the urban poor through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). Complex development processes and urban poverty in the Philippines (Balisacan 1994) provide the contexts for the continuing dilemma on urban poor housing between government and civil society. Qualitative data collection methods derived evidence from both primary and

secondary evidence, including scholarly literature and secondary sources, legislation and policy documents, government reports and records, and key informant interviews.[1] An online web search was conducted, guided by the use of keywords, i.e., "bureaucracy," "bureaucratic authoritarianism," "democratic governance," and "collaborative governance"; and Philippine data specifically on urban poor housing and the CMP was collected from the website of SHFC and government agencies, and from civil society organizations (CSOs). For key informant interviews, the ethical norms of informed consent, voluntary participation, and confidentiality were observed. Qualitative analysis applied on the primary and secondary data was relied on to extract the contexts and indications of bureaucratic authoritarianism and democratic governance; to surface the interactions and power relations among the concerned housing bureaucracy, civil society organizations and political officials and to highlight the challenges confronting government bureaucracy and civil society in responding to the housing needs of the urban poor.

This article is divided into the following sections: 1) the conceptual and theoretical clarification of "bureaucracy" and "civil society" as autonomous yet interactive institutions in authoritarian and democratizing states, and the nuances of bureaucratic authoritarianism and democratic governance; 2) the critical historical and political junctures in the state-government, bureaucracy, and civil society interactions to track the threshold of democratic governance pertinent to the contentious issue of urban poor housing; 3) the bureaucratic arrangements for civil society engagement, how these were forged, and who were involved; and 4) the analysis of bureaucracy and democratic governance, arising from the case of the SHFC bureaucracy and its urban poor housing programs.

1. The key informants have been engaged for many years in urban poor housing programs and projects in either government or nongovernment organizations, or in both, at high level of management positions and/or in operations, during their respective terms of office. Two key informants were interviewed together by the author on November 29, 2018; three key informants in the group on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019. All the group and individual interviews were held in Quezon City. The key informants mutually agreed with the author to withhold their names to observe confidentiality.

Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Authoritarian and Democratizing States

Bureaucracy and Civil Society

An institution, according to March and Olsen (2005, 4; citing their own previous works), "is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances." The state, in turn, is a composite of institutions, which may be analyzed for changes over time, interactions, hierarchies, and effects (Kahler 2002, 65–66, 75–78). The institutionalist approach treats government as a political institution of the state, encompassing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government (March and Olsen 1984, 734; March and Olsen 2005, 7). Government has been regarded as a composite of rulers and personnel whose decisions configure the state (Levi 2002, 53–55). The ideal form of organization for government, according to Max Weber (1946, 77–128), is called "bureaucracy." In Weber's view (1978, 956–63), bureaucracy is a rational and legal form of organization, an administrative body of trained and qualified officials with tenure of office and career track, organized by official jurisdictional areas and duties, according to rules and hierarchy of offices. A "bureaucracy" may refer to a single agency or to a composite of agencies of government, and more specifically refers to the departments, bureaus, and offices in the executive branch of government. Meier and O'Toole (2006) raise the issue of power that controls bureaucracy and power that bureaucracy exercises. Given its locus in government, specifically as the executive's organization for public management to implement policies and render services, bureaucracy is engaged in active relations not only within its organization, but also with the other institutions of government and political actors, private business sectors, and active civil society groups.

Civil society's opposition to authoritarian power and advocacy for democratization has been explained as an expression in the public sphere of their "communitarian," "associational," or societal values and interest (Civicus 2012, 8; Laine 2014, 71–72; Mercer 2002, 7–8; Kohli 2002, 57–84). Civil society has been described as the "arena outside of the family, the state and the market," and it is "created by individual and collective actions, organizations and institutions to

advance shared interests" (Civicus 2012, 8). State and civil society are viewed as autonomous, but interact and create impact upon each other.

In the Philippines, "civil society" has referred to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) considered to be generally cause- and service-oriented, and facilitative of empowerment of people's organizations (POs), which are community-based organizations characterized by being disadvantaged, poor, and marginalized.[2] Government bureaucracy and these civil society organizations were adversarial during and until the end of the Marcos Sr. years, but transitioned into new dynamics of interaction when Corazon Aquino took over the presidential leadership and launched her democratization agenda, using rhetoric such as "bureaucracy for democracy" and "democratizing bureaucracy" (Cariño 2002, 6, 161). Bureaucracy plays an important part in the government's execution of functions and how this happens relates to factors such as the design and use of political power in the state.

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Democratic Governance

Bureaucracy's role in authoritarian states has been examined in the varied experiences of countries. Studying Argentina's case of bureaucratic authoritarianism, O'Donnell (1988, 31–33) highlights some indications, namely: 1) the state power wielders' coercive repression of political democracy by limiting citizen access to government; 2) closure of democratic channels for popular representation, particularly for the working class, while being open to the state civil bureaucracy, armed forces, and large enterprises; 3) depoliticization of social issues by

2. The literature distinguishes NGOs from nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and POs, particularly in the Philippine context (Constantino-David 1997). Among the characteristics of an NGO, it is a private, nonprofit, and voluntary organization; organized and mobilized for public welfare and development concerns; cause-oriented, issue-oriented, advocacy-oriented, and development-oriented; for collective goals of members, not for commercial purposes; and assists POs and mediates between the POs and other entities such as the state (See Clarke 2012, 3; ADB 2013, 3; Cariño 2002; Domingo 2013; Constantino-David 1997). The NPO is also a nuanced term, as to whether the organization is not profit-seeking, nonmonetary, and noncommercial; or shares profit collectively among its members; or obtains funds only by grants or donations (Laine 2014, 67). POs are distinguished by referring to them as "grassroots organizations," "community-based organizations"; being more locally grounded and whose members are disadvantaged (Clarke 2012, 3; ADB 2013, 3).

prohibiting a pertinent class from raising issues; 4) the organized specialists' use of coercive authority to "normalize the economy" and the upper bourgeoisie's domination by strict control over resources; and 5) promotion of capital accumulation, oligopoly of private capital, and economic exclusion of the popular sector. [3]

On the other hand, Falleti (2011, 139) clarifies the variations in authoritarianism exhibited in military regimes to be related to factors as access to power, decision-making, organization of government, conduct of elections, control of opposition, and relations with civil society, among others. These affect the arrangement of state power, bureaucracy, and other political institutions.[4] In cases of authoritarian successions in the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, the authoritarian variations were observed to be in the form of dominance, co-equality, or subordination of bureaucracy relative to executive power (Cariño 1992, 152–60). The Philippines offers a case of "bureaucratic sublation" or "bureaucratic subordination" under authoritarian leadership and executive power (Cariño 1992, 5, 140, 155) attributed to the compliance of government agencies to repressive policies.

Transitioning from authoritarianism, democratization begins by enabling rights and liberties, such as those in the "liberal tradition" for individuals and collectivities, and by initiating "minimum procedural"

3. To understand the bureaucratic authoritarian state, O'Donnell (1988, 6) distinguishes regime from government. Regime refers to the "set of effectively prevailing patterns," which for him need not be "legally formalized" but "establish the modalities of recruitment and access to government roles and the criteria for representation and the permissible resources that form the basis for expectations of access to such roles." Government refers to "a set of persons who (a) occupy top positions in the state apparatus"; (b) comply with the rules of the regime; (c) exercise formal entitlement to "[mobilize] resources controlled by the state apparatus" that supports their "directives and prohibitions" (O'Donnell 1988, 6). The bureaucratic authoritarian state, in O'Donnell's (1988, 2–4) study of Argentina from 1966 to 1973, demonstrates a distinct type of authoritarianism whereby the state is "an apparatus" and "a set of institutions" acting as "the guarantor and organizer of capitalist relations of production" observed to be a "part of society" but "seems to stand apart from society." O'Donnell further asserts that the state only "appears to be" but is not an "unbiased guardian and agent of general interest," considering the structure of social classes.
4. Democratic transition and democratization are affected by the type of strategies used by authoritarian military regimes, for example in Argentina and Brazil (Falleti 2011, 157–59).

aspects of democracy, such as the re-emergence of political parties and civil society groups, the holding of elections, and exercise of citizen rights and obligations (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6–8). The signals of liberal democracy during the post-authoritarian democratizing process are observed in the upholding or restoration of human rights and freedoms, civil and political rights, consent of the governed, and civil society engaging the state in mutually strong standing, or either one or the other being in strong or weak standing (Mercer 2002, 7). Democracy's vital sign is dispersion of power, in contrast to bureaucratic authoritarianism's concentration of state power and use of violence to repress dissent and exercise of rights (Cariño 1992, 163).

However, democracy appears to be difficult to actualize, making it a continuing problematique for substantive and procedural elements of democracy to be translated from theory to praxis. It has been argued that the approximation of democracy lies in the demonstration of minimal procedural and substantive elements, specifically the conduct of elections, citizen voting, political party competition, principles of consent, and representation (Schumpeter 2003, 290–96; Przeworski 1999, 23–35). Democratization is assumed to be a process to actualize a conception of democracy. As informed by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), re-democratization takes its course beginning with democratic transition, occurring upon dissolution of an authoritarian regime; then to democratic restoration, when democratic institutions are configured; and democratic consolidation, when institutions deemed to be democratic eventually become sustained in the long term. Some dilemmas are observed, such as when a so-called democracy exhibits some authoritarian strains (Cassani 2012; Diamond 2002; Mufti 2018). On the other hand, authoritarian types attempt to open up to citizens' voices and use democratic features (Truex 2018; Ortmann and Thomson 2014). Hybridity in democratic and authoritarian types of political regimes have been examined in 103 countries in 2001 (Diamond 2002, 26–33). These observations point to the need for examining the nuances of democracy relative to the confluence of authoritarianism.

Democratic Governance: An Alternative Framework

Recent discourses on governance provide another layer of theory and praxis for democracy. Scholars and academics in comparative politics, public administration, and international relations began conceptualizing

governance in the 1970s (Hydén and Samuel 2011, 8–9). But attention upscaled only in the 1990s related to the upsurge of citizen and civil society mobilization, poor performance of government institutions, and democratic deficits in many states (Grindle 2010, 1–3, 6). The World Bank (1991, 1) initially viewed governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country's economic and social resources." The updated definition identifies the role of the bureaucracy, the executive branch of government, and civil society as crucial stakeholders:

> Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law. (World Bank 1994, vii)

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2009) further underscored good governance as democratic governance, as indicated by: 1) self-government, transparency, accountability; 2) inclusive, people-centered, and participative decisionmaking; 3) rules, institutions, practices for social interactions; 4) and human rights and gender equality. This suggests that democratic governance embeds the indicators of democracy and good governance. The state-government institutions including bureaucracy and societal institutions are actors and participants in the democratic governance framework.

On the other hand, academics and scholars rendered more nuanced perspectives. In a general sense, governance refers to the social process whereby all social groups interact—public (state, government, bureaucracy), private (market business), and civil society (NGOs and POs). Respective spheres maintain "autonomous status," create rules, and manage their interactions (Tsujinaka, Ahmed, and Kobashi 2013, 413, citing Jan Kooiman's *Governing as Governance* [2003]). Typologies of governance indicate the different ways by which interactions may be designed. Government is a major stakeholder whose initiatives for participative, collaborative, and network arrangements with various stakeholders may improve performance (Ansell and Gash 2007).

AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC CONSTRUCTION OF BUREAUCRACY FOR URBAN POOR HOUSING

The narrative of bureaucratic construction in the Philippines depicts the forces that shape and control the bureaucracy's norms, form, functions, and responses. This is observable in the contentious case of urban poor housing, which ran its course from the beginning of authoritarian control and until after the restoration of democracy. This section highlights the critical historical and political junctures of authoritarian politics and the democratic turn, and in these contexts, the changes in political leadership, the upsurge of urban poor and civil society mobilization, and related dynamics of policy and bureaucratic change.

Authoritarian Imprints on Philippine Bureaucracy

To reiterate, the Philippine experience with authoritarianism under then President Marcos Sr. began with the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972. Though martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, Marcos persisted in the exercise of power justified by the consolidation of provisions in the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, and amendments in 1976 and 1981. Marcos laid down the rules by way of presidential proclamations, presidential decrees (PDs), letters of instruction (LOIs), executive orders (EOs) and administrative orders (AOs). Marcos's executive domination came by way of reorganizing the bureaucracy and appointing officials from his close circles and the military, and by directing the bureaucracy to implement development plans and programs, despite resistance from societal groups (Rocamora 1993, 3; Cariño 1992, 80–84; Rebullida 2006, 169; Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982). In "bureaucracy's subordination" to "executive dominance," Cariño (1992, 83–84) succinctly points out the ambiguity in the authoritarian directive for bureaucracy "to decentralize and seek out citizens" and "to promote people's participation," while suppressing dialogues and negotiations with citizen groups opposing Marcos's development policies and programs. The bureaucracy played a role in implementing Marcos's development plans under the charge of appointed heads of government agencies, some of whom had military backgrounds.

The Marcos regime's directions set the stage for repressive policies and programs that elicited adversarial relations with civil society organizations. This contentious condition is illustrated specifically in

the case of the Marcos Sr. government's interaction with urban poor organizations on the implementation of urban development goals and housing policies and programs. In this narrative, Marcos laid down policies and programs, and created the bureaucracy to undertake the housing component of urban development. A major part of the plan targeted areas for priority development involving urban poor settlements. Prior to Marcos Sr., the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, created in 1947, administered the government's housing programs involving the relocation of the "squatter" or informal settler settlements, which had grown since the 1940s in areas of Manila and Quezon City (Van Naerssen 1993, 5). Prior to declaring martial law, Marcos created the Central Institute for the Training and Relocation of Urban Squatters in 1967 (EO No. 79, s. 1967). He reorganized the Presidential Committee on Housing and Urban Development (EO No. 215, s. 1970) to pursue development goals, housing and resettlement. By a series of directives, Marcos ordered the removal of dwellings on public and private lands (LOI No. 19, s. 1972) and the removal of persons in "portions of rivers, creeks, esteros, drainage channels," and similar waters and the return to the state of the portions of public domain illegally acquired (PD No. 296, enacted in 1973). Significantly, PD No. 772, enacted in 1975, made squatting a crime, not merely a public nuisance. Section 1 of the law defined the "squatter" as

> [a]ny person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial, or any other purposes, [who] shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

It pointed out the unlawful occupation of public land and private land owned by the "affluent class" that merit "the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice." The Marcos Sr. government targeted the Tondo Foreshore, regarded as "the largest squatter and slum colony in the Greater Manila," and the areas of Vitas, Dagat-Dagatan and those adjacent as "planned areas for new development" (PD No. 814, s. 1975). This overturned the provisions of Republic Act

(RA) No. 1597, which offered dwellers the opportunity to purchase the land at affordable cost.

The bureaucracy to implement the Marcos Sr. plan was laid upon the National Housing Authority (NHA) (PD No. 757, enacted in 1975), to bring in the private sector for housing finance development and undertake resettlement. The Ministry of Human Settlements was created in 1978 via PD no. 1396. It supervised several other housing finance agencies created or reorganized. Eviction and relocation of squatters, arrests of "squatter" association leaders, and the eventual ideological politicization of the urban poor organizations draped the political landscape (Van Naerssen 1993; Karaos 1993, 1998; Honculada 1985). According to Cariño (1992, 83), "Marcos fielded the military even in agencies such as the National Housing Authority" to repress resistance from "ejected squatters" rather than engage in "dialogues and negotiations."

Urban poor associations, alliances, and federations swelled into what had been referred to as an urban poor/"squatter" social movement (Van Naerssen 1993; Karaos 1993). In 1970, urban poor organizations formed their first federation, the Zone One Tondo Organization to clamor for the implementation of RA No. 1597 (Karaos 1993, 72). Politicized and radical urban poor organizations confronted the implementation of policies and programs by government agencies. These civil society formations played well into the next historical moment of democratic restoration, which may help explain the changes in policies, programs, and the agencies of government comprising the housing bureaucracy.

Constitutional, Policy, and Bureaucratic Changes: Public Sphere for Civil Society

Two critical junctures ushered change in the Philippines: the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution deposing Marcos Sr. and catapulting Corazon Aquino to political leadership, and subsequently, the drafting of the 1987 Philippine Constitution restoring democratic institutions and processes. Since the repression of civil society organizations proved to be a major grievance against the state, the 1987 Constitution laid down critical breakthroughs that formalized their participation within the sphere of the state. Constitutional provisions acknowledge the rights of NGOs and community-based or sectoral organizations "to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful

means," while obligating the state to provide the consultative mechanisms (article XIII, sections 15–16). Another landmark legislation, RA No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, establishes devolution and mandates local government units (LGUs) to engage the NGOs and POs as active partners in various joint and cooperative arrangements, for various purposes of local development, even financially assisting and entering into partnerships and collaboration to pursue local development (sections 34–36).

While the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly use the term "governance" or "democratic governance," its pertinent provisions are in line with the attributes of this new framework. Government is no longer the sole actor in society, nor is it the sole provider of goods and services. It now interacts with and engages other stakeholders in the private sector, societal groups, and individual citizens. Inclusiveness, people-centeredness, and participation of stakeholders in government decision-making and processes became hallmarks for the Philippine government.

In this overall context of widened democratic space, state institutions and civil society organizations re-examined the past regime's contentious issue on urban poor housing. The legislature's enactment of pro-urban poor laws and the creation of programs and agencies by the executive had been attributed to the advocacy of civil society's urban poor organizations and coalitions claiming their housing rights and protesting their homelessness and lack of security in land tenure (Karaos 1998; Magadia 2003, 93–112). As a consequence of the increasing number and activism of urban poor settlements, urban poor organizations, and pro-urban poor NGOs, civil society gained "political leverage" to engage state institutions and officials (Rebullida 2003). State institutions and officials demonstrated their openness to public clamor, in contrast to the toppled Marcos-led government.

Immediately within the year of taking office, Corazon Aquino created the Presidential Committee for the Urban Poor (PCUP) via EO No. 82, s. 1986 to coordinate between government and the urban poor on matters such as planning, policy formulation and implementation, review, monitoring and evaluation of programs and projects relevant to the urban poor. The EO also mandated the accreditation of legitimate urban poor organizations. This initiative starkly contrasts with the repressive and antagonistic approach adopted by Marcos Sr. as president.

Also, as an immediate action, Corazon Aquino created the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) (EO No. 90, s. 1986), identifying government agencies to implement the National Shelter Program of her administration. Four key agencies and three support agencies comprised the HUDCC, mainly to bring together and coordinate the disparate government housing agencies under the president of the Philippines. Further changes made during the Corazon Aquino administration (EO No. 357, s. 1989) aimed to strengthen HUDCC's housing agencies. Aquino's AO No. 111 (1989) directed concerned government departments, agencies, and offices to coordinate with the PCUP and participate in trisectoral dialogues among government, NGOs, and urban poor POs. These presidential directives signaled the executive's openness to popular sectors.

Civil society dynamism and state responsiveness forged the groundbreaking pro-urban poor program, the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), launched in 1988 as an innovative socialized housing finance program for urban poor informal settlers. Subsequently enacted in 1992, the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA or RA No. 7279) sustained the CMP and provided fund sources for implementation (articles IV, V, VIII). The UDHA also ensured consultation and participation of the urban poor in decision-making and proper processes for demolition, eviction, and resettlement (article IV, section 23; article VII, section 28). The enactment of the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter and Urban Development Financing Act of 1994 (RA No. 7835) ensured fund support for CMP. A significant milestone, the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997 (RA No. 8368) overturned Marcos Sr.'s PD 772, which sought to erase the stigma of the urban poor as "squatters," and identifying them instead as informal settlers.

Under Marcos Sr., government housing policies and programs dealt with direct housing production, mortgage, development loans, and community programs (Angeles 1985; Llanto et al. 1998, 6–9; Ballesteros 2005). Post-Marcos, the Corazon Aquino administration launched new laws, policies, and programs that enabled civil society participation and security of land tenure for the urban poor.

Threshold for Democratic Governance

The institutionalization of the CMP by the 1992 UDHA provided the public space for civil society organizations, which actively worked for

its enactment (Magadia 2003, 93–112). The UDHA underscored socialized housing as the

> housing programs and projects covering houses and lots or homelots only undertaken by the Government or the private sector for the underprivileged and homeless citizens which shall include sites and services development, long term financing, liberalized terms on interest payments, and such other benefits in accordance with the [UDHA]. (article I, section 3, paragraph r)

Social housing is deemed appropriate to the urban poor informal settlers compared to economic housing, which is a "type of housing project with lower interest rates and longer amortization periods provided to moderately low-income families, as defined under existing laws, rules and regulations" (RA No. 9904, the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners Associations, chapter I, section 3, paragraph h).

The CMP's socialized housing was managed by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) since the term of President Corazon Aquino. The NHMFC was created by Marcos Sr.'s PD No. 1267. Bureaucratic changes occurred after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed EO No. 272 in January 2004, creating the SHFC. While the NHMFC shall continue to handle the "secondary market for home mortgages granted by public and/or private home financing institutions," the SHFC as a wholly owned subsidiary of the NHMFC shall distinctly undertake social housing for formal and informal sectors in low income brackets. The SHFC shall be the lead government agency to take charge of developing and administering social housing program schemes, particularly the AKPF Program (amortization support program and developmental financing program) and the CMP, which is differentiated from other housing programs by its financing scheme, governance arrangements, and specific clientele—the urban poor informal settlers.

Both agencies became members of the HUDCC, which was created in 1986 and dissolved on February 14, 2019 on account of RA No. 11201 creating the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD). In this new department, the NHMFC and the SHFC are attached agencies for policy and program coordination. The changes in legislation and policies that abolished,

TABLE 1. Housing-related laws and policies during martial law and authoritarian period (1972–86)

1972	Proclamation No. 1081	Declaration of martial law
1972	Letter of Instruction No. 19	Removal of dwellings on public and private land
1973	Presidential Decree (PD) No. 296	Removal of persons in portions of creeks, esteros, drainage; return of illegally acquired land to the state's public domain
1975	PD No. 772	Squatting as a crime not merely public nuisance; penalty for squatting; squatter defined as illegal occupant of land
1975	PD No. 814	Overturn of Republic Act No. 1597 by identifying Dagat-dagatan as Area for Priority Development
1975	PD No. 757	Creation of the National Housing Authority for housing finance, resettlement development, and private sector involvement
1977	PD No. 1267	Creation of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
1978	PD No. 1396	Creation of the Ministry of Human Settlements as an umbrella institution for all housing agencies

revamped, and created new programs and government agencies are shown in tables 1 and 2.

Given these changes since democratic restoration in 1986, the question turns to bureaucracy's shift to democratic governance with emphasis on civil society participation within the public space. How and in what ways has the housing bureaucracy practiced democratic governance?

Bureaucracy and Civil Society: Democratic Governance in Urban Poor Socialized Housing

As a major change in bureaucratic practice, CMP demonstrates the formal and institutionalized participation and collaboration of civil society in a government program mandated by the 1992 UDHA. This was perceived to be the state's responsiveness toward civil society's

TABLE 2. Housing-related laws and policies since re-democratization in 1986

1986	Executive Order (EO) No. 82	Creation of the Philippine Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) to accredit urban poor organizations
1986	EO No. 90	Creation of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
1987	Philippine Constitution	Recognition of civil society organizations and human rights
1988	National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)	Launch of the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) by NHMFC
1989	EO No. 357	Strengthening of the urban housing and development program
1989	Administrative Order No. 111	Government departments, agencies, offices to coordinate with PCUP for sectoral dialogues
1991	Republic Act (RA) No. 7160	The Local Government Code devolved housing concerns to local government units
1992	RA No. 7279	The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 provided for the adoption of the CMP as a socialized housing for the urban poor; processes for eviction and demolition; fund sources and agencies involved (article VIII, section 31)
1994	RA No. 7835	The Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Financing Act of 1994 gave funding support for the CMP
1997	RA No. 8368	Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act
2004	EO No. 272	Creation of the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) and transfer of the CMP and other social housing programs from NHMFC to SHFC
2012	EO No. 69	Transfer of PCUP to the Office of the President to effectively coordinate, formulate, and evaluate policies and programs concerning the urban poor
2018–19	RA No. 11201	The Philippine Congress enacted the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development Act in 2018; signed into law by President Rodrigo Duterte on February 14, 2019

activism on their claims to housing rights for the poor, including security of land tenure, as well as a way to lessen conflict (Karaos 1998, 146). Across the years, the power dynamics has engaged the political spheres of government at the national level, the network of civil society organizations, and the local government since the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code. This section highlights the ways by which the SHFC, as the bureaucracy for urban poor socialized housing, has provided the platform for engaging civil society in the democratic governance norms of participation, accountability, transparency, and rule of law. The discussion also points out the interplay of presidential politics in the bureaucracy for urban poor housing.

Structure and Dynamics: Participation, Collaboration, Networking, Accountability, and Leadership

The basic CMP structure, whereby the national government provides funding for land acquisition and serves as process manager for the urban poor informal settlers to avail of community mortgage until the completed transfer of individual land titles, has been sustained since 1988. SHFC renamed the CMP originators into the CMP mobilizers (CMP-M), the CSOs that assist in organizing the urban poor beneficiaries into POs, referred to as homeowners' associations (HOAs) or community housing associations (CHAs). The homeowners' association members initially pay the loan amortizations collectively, then payment becomes individualized after some years to reach full payment and permit the awarding of individual land titles. The POs/HOAs/CHAs may avail of the CMP for any of three purposes: 1) lot acquisition, either for relocation offsite or onsite for land occupied; 2) site development; and 3) housing materials at corresponding loan ceilings and monthly amortization.

The CMP mobilizer may be an accredited CSO, an NGO, a PO, or a non-government association (NGA) or LGU with capacity "to assist, organize and prepare communities for participation in CMP" (SHFC 2019a). From its beginnings, the CMP mainstreamed the self-help and mutual-help practices among NGOs and POs into formal contracts of collaboration to access public funds for land purchase and to mobilize loan repayment (Rebullida, Endriga, and Santos 1999). Over the years, the power dynamics have occurred in the interactive processes among the stakeholders: 1) between the CMP-M, the PO, and the landowner; 2) between the CMP-M and the PO applying for the CMP; 3) between the PO officials and their member-beneficiaries; and 4) between the NHMFC/SHFC and the NGOs. Cooperation and

conflict characterized the relationships between and among the stakeholders in different stages of the program. Surveys and case studies have depicted the conflict resolution and negotiation processes in the stages of land purchase between a landlord and the involved NGO or LGU mobilizer and PO beneficiaries; in loan processing relative to SHFC requirements; and in loan amortization collection among members of the PO/HOA/CHA (Rebullida 1999; Ballesteros, Ramos, and Magtibay 2015; Commission on Audit Management Services 2006; pers. comm.[5]).

The NGOs organized themselves into the National Congress of CMP Originators and Social Development Agencies for Low Income Housing, starting with eight NGOs in Luzon, twelve in Visayas, and eighteen in Mindanao. Under SHFC, this evolved into the National Network of CMP Originators and Social Development Organizations for Low Income Housing consisting of ten NGOs in the Luzon CMP Network,[6] seven in the Visayas CMP Network,[7] and five in the Mindanao CMP Network.[8] The Foundation for Development of the Urban Poor served as the longtime secretariat until it was taken over

5. Author's interviews with three key informants on December 6, 2018 and two key informants on December 6, 2019.
6. The Luzon CMP Network lists the following member NGOs: Center for Community Assistance and Development; Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor; Foundation for Development Alternatives; Foundation for the Empowerment, Economic Development, and Environmental Recovery; Muntinlupa Development Foundation; People's Alternative Study Center for Research and Education in Social Development; Tulong at Silungan ng Masa Foundation, Inc.; St. Hannibal Empowerment Center; Center for Housing Innovations and Component Services; and Partnership for Integrated Services and Social Development, Inc.
7. The Visayas CMP Network lists the following member NGOs: Iloilo People's Habitat Foundation, Inc. (IPHF); Roxas City Urban Poor Federation, Inc. (RCUPF); Sustained Actions for Community Upliftment, Land Tenure Towards Development, Inc. (SASCULDEF); Julio & Florentina Ledesma Foundation, Inc. (JFLFI); Social Action Center Tagbilaran (SAC Tag); Kaupon Han Paguswag Han Samar, Inc. (KAUSAMAR); and Pagtambayayong–A Foundation for Mutual Aid (PFI).
8. The Mindanao CMP Network lists the following member NGOs: Kahugpungan sa Mindanao, Inc; Hugpong Dabaw with nine member organizations in Davao City, namely Assumption Parish Socio-Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (APSED), CODE, Mindanao Land (MinLand), Gawasnong Pagbalay, Inc. (GPI), Grassroot Institute for Education and Development Foundation (SALROSED), Itinerant Mission for Grassroots Development, Inc. (IMGRADE); in Cagayan de Oro with GROUP Inc. and TOUCH; in Zamboanga City with Katilingban sa Kalambuan, Inc (KKI) and Zamboanga Human Resource Development Inc. (ZHRDI); in Iligan City with SSMI; and General Santos City with KPS Foundation Inc.

by the Pagtambayayong Foundation.[9] Since its inception in 2004 and operations taking-off in 2007, SHFC and the CMP Congress had conducted consultations (SHFC 2007a; 2008a, b; 2016a) and NGOs actively participated in CMP policymaking and implementation, but participation is perceived to have waned since 2016.[10]

Civil society representation in the SHFC Board of Directors enabled the sector to share their voice in policymaking, particularly when one of them was appointed SHFC President[11] from 2011 until 2016 during the term of President Benigno Aquino and until 2017 upon transition to the term of President Rodrigo Duterte. Key informants noted the relative facility by which civil society organizations conveyed their concerns to SHFC and the regularity of consultative processes during the presidency of Ma. Ana Oliveros from the civil society sector, though they also noted some resistance to change among others in the bureaucracy.[12] Some difficulties were encountered related to bureaucratic perspectives and practices that needed to be changed and past adversarial experiences between government and civil society that needed to be overcome to engage in the processes of the CMP.

President Corazon Aquino played a part in democratic restoration and responded to civil society by reframing housing agencies from the Marcos Sr. era and launching the CMP in 1988 managed by the NHMFC. President Macapagal Arroyo created the SHFC in 2004, for a bureaucracy dedicated to socialized housing, and transferred the CMP from the NHMFC. How SHFC practiced participation, transparency, and accountability are highlighted in its consultative processes applied in instituting policy and program changes, particularly in the period of the GO-NGO Budget Partnership Agreement.

9. Author's interview with two key informants on December 6, 2019.

10. Author's interviews with two key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

11. For example, Francisco "Bimbo" Fernandez and Ma. Ana Oliveros, from civil society organizations, joined the SHFC for a time as members of the Board of Directors. Subsequently, Ma. Ana Oliveros was appointed President of SHFC (SHFC 2013a, 7, 13–14).

12. Author's interview with two key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

Consultative Processes, GO-NGO Budget Partnership and Streamlining Innovation

The SHFC bureaucracy showed resilience in instituting reforms, beset by persistent clamor from the civil society NGO-PO housing network to address inefficiencies and lack of space for participation.[13] The SHFC upheld the governance concepts of "streamlining," "transparency," "accountability," "responsiveness," "participation," and "corporate governance," which was particularly reflected in SHFC annual reports, highlighted in the years 2010–16 related to the GO-NGO budget partnerships. Since the launch of the Localized CMP (L-CMP) in 2007, SHFC has regularly conducted consultations and forged partnerships, particularly "synergy with LGUs" highlighted in 2017 and 2018 (SHFC 2017, 2018a, b).

The 2010 Reform Agenda emerged from SHFC's strategic planning and consultative processes to speed up loan application and create the Community Support Unit for direct assistance to the POs; and in 2011, sustained the regional consultations with CMP partners and Balanced Scorecard for good governance (SHFC 2010, 2011). In 2012, the SHFC and CMP logos were changed to reflect the organization's change processes toward "participation in people's lives through housing" (SHFC 2012, 4). Related to innovative programs in 2015, SHFC emphasized "collaborating for sustainable communities" (SHFC 2015a). Since its twenty-fifth year in 2013, SHFC intensified policy-related and budget consultations with CMP-Ms and other stakeholders for CMP reform, in relation to SHFC's Budget Partnership Agreement with the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA), a civil society organization composed of several NGOs engaged in urban poor housing, and the CMP Congress, a network of NGO mobilizers for the CMP (SHFC 2013b; 2015b; PHILSSA 2013a, b). In 2016, SHFC dealt with the streamlining of its policies and procedures that were deemed obstructive based on the experiences with CMP and CMP-based housing innovations (SHFC 2016b).

The budget partnership between national government agencies and civil society organizations came about as the latter clamored for open spaces for participation and the former invited them to participate in the budget preparation process during the term of President

13. Author's interview of three key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

Benigno Aquino (DBM 2011, 2016). Upon assumption of office in 2010, President Aquino allocated PHP 10 billion yearly for housing informal settlers in Metro Manila's waterways and danger zones that are affected by typhoons, floods, disasters, and climate change, and the Deparment of Budget and Management prepared the guidelines for engaging civil society organizations (DBM 2012a, b; pers. comm.[14]). The PHILSSA-CMP Congress Budget Partnership Agreement was signed in 2013. The agreements were twice extended (2014–2015 and 2016) for the civil society organizations to participate in budget planning, utilization, monitoring, and evaluation (SHFC 2013b; SHFC 2015b; SHFC 2015c; pers. comm.[15]).

The CSOs welcomed the budget partnership as an opportunity to increase resources for housing the urban poor informal settler families (ISFs) in waterways and danger zones by creating a new program, the High Density Housing (HDH), inspired by the CMP model. SHFC's HDH adopted the CMP's community-driven approach but differed by engaging the ISF communities to prepare a people's plan for a multi-story vertical housing program rather than horizontal housing (SHFC 2013a, 9; SHFC 2014, 13). The CSOs faced some difficulties in engaging with the government agencies due to the bureaucracy's terminologies and procedures, which they had to learn in the process. The partnership between the CSOs and government bureaucracy posed challenges to their capacities in building trust as partners, no longer as adversaries; and for government to treat the CSOs no longer as loan applicants but as partners in the budget process (pers. comm.[16]; IBP 2018, 38).

SHFC upscaled its budget and policy consultations with CSO and LGU partners. The CSOs learned to prepare the People's Plan, design high density housing, and coordinate with other agencies—the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) since ISFs and sites were within their jurisdiction, the Department of Social Work

14. Author's interviews with two key informants on November 29, 2018; three key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

15. Author's interviews with two key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

16. Author's interviews with two key informants on November 29, 2018; three key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

and Development (DSWD) assisting the ISFs, and the PCUP for the people's plan (NHA 2012; pers. comm.[17]). The CSOs accomplished some targets with SHFC attributed to President Benigno Aquino's budget allocation; and improved their capacities in dealing with the bureaucracy that is not accustomed to dealing with CSOs.[18]

With new CMP variant housing programs, SHFC revised the CMP guidelines to streamline the processes and better serve NGOs, POs, and LGUs; and established inter-agency partnerships called "G2G" (government-to-government) for one-stop-shop offices, common databank, and priority project lists (SHFC 2011, 2013a, 2016a). From twenty-seven previously required documents, only eleven remained, nine of which were indispensable to the loan warranty issuance and two documents for off-site projects (pers. comm.[19]; SHFC 2016c). Streamlining intended to "unburden community associations with their application . . . and acquire security of tenure at the soonest possible time" (SHFC 2016a, 12). The G2G partnerships forged inter-agency facility for faster release of documents. SHFC's LGU partnerships helped speed up the release of documentary requirements sourced from LGUs (SHFC 2016a, 13).

SHFC's 2016 streamlining guidelines were attributed to the fast-tracking pace of Vice President Maria Leonor "Leni" Robredo who became chair of the HUDCC for a short duration. Appointed on July 7, 2016 by President Duterte, Robredo belonged to the opposition party of former President Aquino (HUDCC 2016). Robredo intended to address the housing backlog and streamline the process, but resigned on December 4, 2016 (SHFC 2016a, 12; Robredo 2016).

By June 2017, President Duterte appointed a new SHFC President, Arnolfo Ricardo Cabling, a former Davao LGU official. The SHFC's convergence, collaboration, and synergy noticeably inclined toward LGU partners and their communities' housing gaps (SHFC 2017, 2018a, b). Some observers noted the SHFC's waning consultations with civil society non-government organizations.[20]

17. Author's interviews with two key informants on November 29, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.
18. Author's interviews with two key informants on December 6, 2018 and one key informant on December 13, 2019.
19. Author's interviews with three key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.
20. Author's interviews with two key informants on December 6, 2018; two key informants on December 6, 2019; and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

TABLE 3. Number of accredited CMP mobilizers/NGO, PO and NGA partners, 2016–2021

Year	National Government Agency (NGA)	Civil Society: Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)	Local Government Units (LGUs)	Total
2016		45	22	67
2017	2	178	63	241
2018	1	62	27	90
2019		80	—[a]	80
2021				57

Sources: SHFC 2016c, 2017, 2018b, 2019a, 2021a.

[a] No LGU data.

SHFC's CMP Variations, Performance and Challenges

CMP assessments, prior to and since SHFC's creation, acknowledged the program's innovative and pioneering micro-finance social housing features and its benefits to the ISFs' shelter security, but also critiqued operational weaknesses and inadequacies in serving the bottom poorest (Rebullida 1999; Porio et al. 2004, 72–73; Commission on Audit Management Services 2006, 3–4; UN Habitat 2009; Ballesteros, Ramos, and Magtibay 2015, 32–36, 41–43). The CMP demonstrates program sustainability by running thirty years since 1988 to the present. It has inspired the creation of twelve program modalities, such as the L-CMP in 2007 for LGUs, the HDH in 2013, the CMP-Peace Process and Nation-Building for those that gave up their armed struggle, the Culturally Sensitive CMP for indigenous communities, the Post Disaster and Rehabilitation CMP for calamity-stricken communities, and CMP variants for agricultural and industrial workers (SHFC 2018a, 20–21).

In the L-CMP, the SHFC is engaged in consultative processes with partner NGOs and LGUs to reduce the housing backlog in respective areas (SHFC 2007a, b). The partner LGUs provide counterpart funds to at least 25 percent of the CMP project costs. With the national government, SHFC is engaged with the National Housing Authority, which refers their projects for the CMP while it handles other types of

programs for the informal settlers, such as housing production, relocation, and resettlement (NHA 2012).

With refined criteria drawn from the past years' experiences, the SHFC accredited NGO, PO, national and local government partners for participation and accountability as CMP-Mobilizers (table 3).

The Corporate Performance Scorecard sets the metrics for SHFC's social impact performance, internal processes, financial efficiency, and learning growth performance. The Revised Manual on Corporate Governance requires SHFC's compliance (SHFC 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015a, 2016b, 2017, 2018a) with governance indicators. Stakeholder engagement is measured by SHFC's number of partnerships, community associations and institutions capacitated. Social impact is measured by the ISFs receiving shelter security from loan assistance.

SHFC, as the bureaucracy dedicated to socialized housing, sustained its lifespan since its creation in 2004 to become an agency attached to the DHSUD, which was created by RA No. 11201 in 2019, during President Duterte's term. The law's enactment received "qualified support" from the CMP Congress of CMP Originators and Social Development Organizations for Low Income Housing (CMP Congress), which impressed 1) the need for the continued implementation of the Urban Development and Housing Act; 2) the efficiency and responsiveness of bureaucracy given the level of integration of housing agencies; and 3) the "explicit emphasis on the provision of housing for the poorest thirty percent of the population" (CMP Congress 2019). Civil society did not object to the use of "human settlements" in the law, despite its being reminiscent of the "Ministry of Human Settlements" during the Marcos Sr. years.[21] The NGO network argued that the term "human settlements" and "urban development" aptly refer to the broader contexts for socialized housing for urban poor informal settlers.

During President Duterte's term, with the legislation of the DHSUD in 2018, the leadership of SHFC has sustained the CMP as the government's flagship program for urban poor housing, describing this to be people-led, community-driven, for the low income families' security of tenure and for building resilient and sustainable communities, through the legally organized home owners-beneficiaries community

21. Author's interviews with two key informants on December 6, 2019 and one key informant on December 13, 2019.

associations as main civil society actors, and in partnership with national and local government (SHFC 2021b, 2; SHFC 2020, 5, 6, 11). Comparatively, during President Aquino's term, SHFC had more actively engaged civil society organizations such as PHILSSA and the CMP Congress. The HDH program—initiated during Aquino's presidency, and aimed at addressing the housing needs of informal settler families residing in Metro Manila's danger areas through the construction of medium rise buildings—continued toward completion and closure during President Duterte's term as fund allocation ended (SHFC 2021b, 6, 2). The SHFC moved on to the new CMP variant, the so-called Vertical CMP, a type of multi-level housing for informal settler communities; and created the CMP-Marawi for communities affected by the 2017 Marawi Siege (SHFC 2019b; SHFC 2020, 7). The institutional arrangements continue to formally enable civil society's participation and accountability as mobilizers for the informal settler families' housing loan availment, in accordance to legislation and operational policies.

Analysis and Conclusions

The paper finds salience in the current dilemma of sustaining democratic restoration against the inroads of authoritarianism in government bureaucracy. Passing through a long period of authoritarian period rule (1972–1986) and marching onward to democratic restoration since People Power in 1986 and the new constitution in 1987, the test of institutionalizing democratic governance confronts the considerably large Philippine bureaucracy. In the restoration of democratic institutions, the bureaucracy established for socialized urban poor housing programs offers an illustrative case.

Democratic governance, also referred to as good governance, emphasizes participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, inclusiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness. In contrast, the bureaucratic authoritarian model derived from Latin America restricts public participation while rendering power to a controlling politico-administrative machinery. For the Philippines, the data indicate bureaucratic authoritarian control during the Marcos Sr. years, specifically toward the urban poor on their housing needs. On the other hand, democratic governance practices evolved since 1988 with a bureaucracy designated for urban poor socialized housing. The two scenarios of bureaucratic authoritarianism and democratic governance

may be explained by the confluence of factors, namely: 1) presidential executive power; 2) civil society activism; and 3) constitutional and policy contexts.

Presidential executive dominance played a crucial role in the bureaucracy's direction and historical junctures. From 1972 to 1986, President Marcos used the powers of the state, changed the constitution, abolished democratic institutions and processes, promulgated policies, and implemented programs with negative impacts on the urban poor. Marcos engaged in an adversarial relationship with CSOs of the urban poor that contested his housing policies and the housing bureaucracy under his power. In contrast, President Corazon Aquino landmarked bureaucracy's openness to civil society organizations during her term from 1986 to 1992, including her executive order to implement the Community Mortgage Program. Legislature at this time enacted ground-breaking laws favorable to civil society's advocacy for urban poor housing. While the succeeding presidents, President Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, had fostered civil society participation and poverty alleviation, it was President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who accommodated civil society advocacy for creating the Socialized Housing Finance Corporation in 2004. In the subsequent term of President Benigno Aquino from 2010 to 2016, civil society boosted their participation and access to government funds by their covenant relationship with the president who rendered the funds for government-civil society budget partnership. The executive factor again shows up during the term of President Duterte in his relationship with the legislature for the passage of the law creating the new Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development, to which civil society gave "qualified support" for as long as it sustains SHFC's functionality. These patterns demonstrate the dominance of presidential politics and executive power upon the bureaucracy.

Civil society activism also accounts for the directions taken by the legislature and by the president exercising executive power. Moving beyond their adversarial relationship with government under Marcos Sr., civil society organizations gained capacities to engage the SHFC bureaucracy for participation by partnerships, collaboration, and consultations. One key observation: civil society's activism enabled their organizations' access to government funds leading to increased number of programs and projects, and to increased number of informal settler communities acquiring security of land tenure for housing. Another key observation: policy change (policy and decision

making as rule making) improved operations toward enhanced participation, accountability, transparency, efficiency, and innovations to address the specific conditions of the urban poor. In the last five years, SHFC focused on the housing programs' formalized grassroots community based associations, while previous years had seen the pioneering moves of NGOs for urban poor housing. Continuing the monitoring and evaluation of SHFC to cover the period 2016 to 2022 will likely reveal the gains and gaps in the current dynamics of civil society-bureaucracy collaboration.

The confluence of civil society participation and bureaucratic leadership can facilitate the development of democratic governance practices in government institutions. The appointment of top leadership with expertise in civil society dynamics, even for a term of office and in accord with legal and administrative processes for appointment in government positions, can comparatively respond to democratic governance. While not entirely responsive nor resistant, the SHFC bureaucracy accommodated civil society's advocacies that challenged the government's administrative processes to be responsive to urban poor housing needs.

In a broader context, civil society participation can be enhanced by an enabling policy framework. The Philippines is anchored on the 1987 Philippine Constitution and legislative mandates—the Local Government Code, the UDHA, and the Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations Governance Act (RA No. 10149). The elements of constitutional design, legislative mandates, and executive directives enabled the governance rhetoric on civil society participation, accountability, and transparency. The experience with civil society-government budget partnership agreements, though only spanning from 2010 to 2016, markedly operationalized governance features.

As depicted in historical institutional narratives, a confluence of forces relates to "democratic governance values put to practice." What forces create impact on the bureaucracy's turn to democratic governance? The Philippine experience points at 1) the president's exercise of executive power; 2) civil society organizations' persistent activism; 3) bureaucratic leadership (civil society leaders appointed for a term of office); and 4) the enabling legal and policy contexts which are also sites of state-civil society dynamics.

There are challenges to operationalizing democratic governance emerging from years of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the Philippine case examined here, executive and administrative interventions are short-lived, whether beneficial or not to stakeholders. Continuous

advocacy from civil society presents itself as part of a long-term political and bureaucratic process. Civil society can control bureaucracy and executive power by watchfulness over inclusion/exclusion of people participation and other deficits in democratic governance. Contemporary cases in China, Singapore, and Malaysia call attention to newer ways of intertwining strong political control with selective liberality toward social sectors using the bureaucracy, while democratic states can embed nuances of strong political control. In the Philippine case, state and urban poor civil society have a long history of struggle, constructive engagement, and collaborative governance. This can stand further scrutiny on the extent and limits of democratic governance.❁

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