This paper deals with portrayals of the "Moro" in contemporary folk dramatizations of medieval struggles between Moors and Christians, found in village or town fiestas in parts of Spain, Central America, and the Philippines. It is often believed that the standard theme of these performances is Christian superiority, and the "Moro" is always cast in the role of villain and vanquished. While this still holds true for most performances, in a number of places, fiesta committees have decided to break with tradition, and have introduced formats and content that depart significantly from the standard formula.

In this paper, I draw attention to a counter-intuitive notion: that a representation of war and conquest in folk dramatizations of battles between Christians and Muslims has the potential to convey messages of convivencia (peaceful co-existence) and nationalism. Through strategies such as deletion (offensive scenes such as baptism
are abandoned), inversion ("Moros" become heroes and victors), revision (alternative endings are shown, such as reconciliation, or a tie), and appropriation (characters are equated to indigenous gods and local heroes), performances are infused with radical new messages. In these modified performances, the "Moro" has acquired complex new meanings and is no longer confined to the role of villain and vanquished. In some contemporary performances, the "Moro" can even be portrayed and perceived as victor, co-equal, and even a national emblem, a representation not of the Muslim "other" but of the suppressed "self."

This study draws upon examples from a selected set of communities and the conclusions drawn here are limited only to the specific places cited. There are hundreds of towns worldwide where variants of the Moros y Cristianos are performed, and generalizing about patterns that encompass the whole tradition are beyond the scope of this study. What is hoped here is to suggest that within this family of performances a noteworthy counter-current exists. But why should we study these counter-currents? In line with the aims of peace research, this project is an attempt to identify and articulate capacities for peace between Christians and Muslims by positing alternative ways of looking at the Moros y Cristianos, which has long been seen as a symbol of Christian chauvinism. I hope to show, through the examples in this paper, that we can fruitfully re-read what has become a symbol of division and uncover/discover potentials for re-imagining the Christian-Muslim relationship beyond the all-too-familiar "clash of civilizations" framework prevalent today.

Let me briefly explain the terms used in the title of this paper, to clarify the parameters of this study. By "contemporary" I mean the post-Vatican II period to the present. Vatican II in the 1960s infused the Catholic Church with a spirit of ecumenism which allowed for the value of other religions, including Islam, to be acknowledged by the church. This spirit of ecumenism paved the way for folk dramatizations performed during Catholic festivities.
to gradually veer away from their traditional message of Christian superiority. I draw from my personal observations of performances in the 2000s, but also make use of examples taken from studies made in the last four decades since Vatican II.

Another key term is "Moro," which I enclose in quotation marks to delineate the fictive "Moro" in performances from actual Moros. When referring to historical Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula, I use the term Moor. And for the Muslims in the Philippines, I use the italicized Moro. The portrayed "Moro" is most commonly associated with Muslim groups. But for Anthony Shelton the "Moro" and the "Cristiano" are cultural imaginaries that hide and contain a multiplicity of possible ethnic and religious distinctions. The identity of the "Moro" is therefore not fixed, and could refer to Muslim groups like Berbers and Turks, and also to non-Muslims like Jews and Romans. The "Cristiano" meanwhile, can refer to the Spanish, but also to various native inhabitants of the Americas. For Shelton, these categories have an inexhaustive incorporative capacity, and the representation of these two factions differ from location to location (Shelton 2004, 268).

And finally, what do I mean by "folk dramatizations"? This family of performances commonly known as Moros y Cristianos originated in the Iberian Peninsula in the Middle Ages and was taken to colonies overseas. Variants of the Moros y Cristianos cut across different performance genres, such as dramas, dances, re-enactments, pageants, and masquerades. It is vibrant in former Spanish colonies, in dance-dramas called dansas de la conquista, historiantes, santiagos, matachines, tastuanes, or danza de la pluma, found in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico. In the Philippines, it comes in variants such as moro-moro theater (also called komedya, linambay, arakyo), or dance-dramas like palo-palo, and even the sinulog, among others. In this study, I use fiestas de Moros y Cristianos or fiestas, to refer to these folk dramatizations. These performances are local affairs, performed annually at fiestas honoring the local patron saint.
Participation in them is an act of devotion, in fulfillment of a vow called promesa in Spain, manda in Central America, and panata in the Philippines. Villagers volunteer resources to contribute to the performance, believing that doing so is an efficacious means of gaining divine favors or expressing gratitude. They are considered as family and community traditions, something handed down from one generation to the next, with a history that goes back decades, if not centuries, such that they tend to follow well-established conventions.

From Conflict to Convivencia

The post 9/11 era is an age where tensions between Christians and Muslims are high. In 2005, a Danish newspaper published a provocative series of cartoons with caricatures of the prophet Mohammad. By 2006, violent protests swept across the Muslim world in reaction to the cartoons. In the same year, another controversy erupted over statements made by the Pope regarding Islam, which again, evoked a series of protests. Amidst these tensions, the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (Federacion Espanola de Entidades Religiosas Islamicas) called for the prohibition of the fiestas de Moros y Cristianos on the grounds that they have no place in democratic Spain because they are demeaning to Muslims (La Federacion Islamica… 2006). The increased sensitivity surrounding Islam was not lost on fiesta committees all over Spain, and community leaders took steps to adjust to the situation.

In the towns of Bocairent in Valencia, and Beneixama in Alicante, for example, local leaders decided not to perform a particular tradition that may be seen as offensive to Muslims. This tradition has to do with the burning of “La Mahoma.” In many small towns in the southeastern region of Spain, the re-enactment of battles involves the procession of a statue of the Virgin Mary by the
"Cristiano" band, with a corresponding procession of the "Moro" band behind an effigy some three feet in height, curiously called La Mahoma. At the end of the fiesta, when "Cristianos" re-capture the castle from the "Moros," the effigy is traditionally burned. Following the Danish cartoon controversy, Bocairent and Beneixama's local leaders decided to forego the burning of La Mahoma. But they are not the only ones to have done so as many other towns in the region had already been abandoning the practice (Sierra 2006).

In the same year, 2006, festeros (or participants in the fiestas) from Alcoi were invited to participate in the annual Hispanic Parade held at New York’s famous 5th Avenue. More than a hundred festeros flew to the US, but without the traditional arrangement of having bands of "Moros" and "Cristianos." The "Moros" were left at home and two bands of "Cristianos" were sent instead. Local officials were quick to explain that their decision was made for purely logistic reasons. The tempo of music used by "Moros" and "Cristianos" differed, and this would have made coordinating the procession more challenging. The chief organizer of the fiesta commented that should they receive another invitation in the future, they would send two bands of "Moros" to New York next time. Despite these explanations given by local officials, speculation was high that the decision to send only "Cristianos" was influenced by the controversies surrounding the Danish caricatures and statements of the Pope (Pozzi 2006).

Whatever their reasons may be, practical or political, what is clear is that the local leaders in Alcoi have shown themselves to be in a reflexive mode. They, like their counterparts in many other towns in Spain, are aware of the politics surrounding their traditions, and are re-assessing their performances. In newspaper write-ups on the fiestas, and official websites put up by the organizing committees of different towns, festeros often explain that their traditions are not meant to be offensive. One word that gets thrown around a lot
is convivencia, or co-existence. Among the Spanish, the Moros y Cristianos is popularly perceived to be an event that commemorates historical events, and symbolizes convivencia.

One manifestation of convivencia can be seen in the town of Sax where locals traditionally dress up as Turks to represent the "Moro" faction in their fiestas. In February 2007, festeros from Sax deemed it appropriate to invite the Ambassador of Turkey to be the guest of honor at their Festival de Moros y Cristianos. The Turkish Ambassador Ender Arat graciously accepted the invite, and in his speech, he congenially addressed the "Turcos de Sax" as his "compatriotas" y amigos ("countrymen" and friends). He even invited some children from Sax to represent Spain at the International Children's Day celebrations held in Turkey. The openness of the Turkish Ambassador is not an isolated case. Positive responses from Muslims can also be seen in other towns in Spain.

In an investigative piece on the fiestas, Carlos Aiemeur draws attention to a number of exciting manifestations of convivencia between Christians and Muslims. One outstanding example is Kader Ibeid, a Palestinian immigrant who has been actively involved in the fiestas for a decade, even becoming a member of the Fiesta Central Committee, a position of prestige and distinction, in Javea town, in Alicante. But he is not the only Muslim to participate in the fiestas. In Villajoyosa, Muslim Saharawi children were invited to parade with the band of "Moros." While in Alcoi, folkloric groups were even brought in from Morocco and Turkey to participate in the fiestas in 1995, and again in 2005. There is also support for the fiesta from official voices within the Muslim sector. Majed Kadem, president of the Comunidad Islamica de Alicante, called the fiestas "very enjoyable and beautiful" and considered them "innocent." These sentiments are also shared by Malik Ruiz, president of the Comision Islamica de España. In the town of Crevillent, where six percent of the population is Muslim, the fiestas have the local imam's blessing.
Imam Mohammad Ben Hayouh was quoted as having said that "the fiesta demonstrates great respect for different cultures." He was able to say this, perhaps because in Crevillent the performance ends with a pact between "Cristianos" and "Moros." Similarly, performances in Alcoi end with "el abrazo de los capitanes" or the embracing of the warring captains (Aiemeur 2006).

Depictions of convivencia can also be seen outside Spain. In Zacualpan, Mexico, the Moros y Cristianos culminates in the "waltz of the hands," when both sides lay down their arms and dance in pairs (Shelton 2004, 286). In the moro-moro performance of Baler in the Philippines, the final section of the play is called the pagkakasunduan or reconciliation. Interestingly, in the neighboring province of Nueva Ecija in the village of Sinasajan, I watched a performance in 2005 that ended with no clear winners or losers. The local version of moro-moro is called arakyo, and it retells the story of Queen Helena and her search for the Holy Cross. The same story is re-told each year, using the same old script. Clearly, in the script, the play ends in "Cristiano" victory and conversion of "Moros." In actual practice, however, the play ends when the sun sets, regardless of what part of the script that leaves unperformed. An exciting battle scene closes the show, with no winners declared, in what could be interpreted as a tie, or a draw. But, when I interviewed one of the actors of the play, and I asked him who wins in the end, he answered: "Moro." His reply may be due to the fact that he was playing the role of a "Moro" general. Or maybe it is because the traditional "baptism scene" that used to be the finale of the play has been omitted for the last few years, so that in actual performance the "Moros" are shown neither as defeated nor as converted, the alternatives prescribed in the script.

As in Sinasajan, the performance I saw in San Dionisio in Metro Manila, in May 2006, entitled Prinsipe Reynaldo, also skipped the baptism scene. Unlike in Sinasajan, where one script
is used repeatedly, the locals of San Dionisio write new scripts and stage a different story each year. The director of the play informed me that it was a conscious decision not to include the baptism scene. He also proudly recounted to me how they’ve decided to insert into the performance a famous folk dance from the Muslim groups in the Philippine south called singkil. These decisions were the result of years of reflection and intense internal community debates on the content and format of their moro-moro plays. The revision of the moro-moro in San Dionisio started in 1962, when local civic leaders updated the scripts and came up with a new play called Prinsipe Rodante. In the play, the religious conflict was reworked to suit the ecumenical spirit of the times, and the main theme was not the usual triumph of Christians over Muslims, but the brotherhood of man.

That period in the 1960s was interesting for it was when Vatican II was underway, and the Catholic Church was doing some serious re-thinking. But while the spirit of ecumenism was spreading, so too were feelings of distrust between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines. In 1967, in response to a moro-moro festival sponsored by the Bureau of Tourism, the Muslim senator Mamintal Tamano, then head of the Commission on National Integration, called for the banning of the moro-moro because they created a negative image of Muslims, and were counter to the aims of national integration (Mendoza 1976, 152). An intense debate ensued, with defenders and attackers of the moro-moro coming to the surface. These debates in the late 1960s would have an impact on the thinking of scholars in the 1970s and 1980s. Filipino scholars who studied the moro-moro acknowledged the divisive theme and offensive portrayals of “Moros.” They made efforts to steer the moro-moro in a new direction. Most notable are the efforts of Nicanor Tiongson, who wrote extensively about the topic and later, when he became the Artistic Director of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), spearheaded efforts to revitalize and improve the moro-moro. It was under his leadership that the villagers of San Dionisio were invited to a writing and theater workshop at the CCP in 1990. One of the objectives of the workshop
was to "replace the threadbare and culturally offensive theme of
the conversion of Muslims to Christianity with themes dealing
with more significant and/or contemporary issues" (Fernandez
1996, 73). A newer version of Prinsipe Rodante was written at the
workshop, and in it, the villain is the "Cristiano" Prince Alvarro
who usurps power. "Moros" from another kingdom come to the
aid of peasants who revolt against their prince and their combined
force allows them to overthrow Alvarro and re-instate the rightful
rulers. The element of warring "Cristianos" and "Moros" is still
present, enough to allow for traditional fighting choreography to
be performed, but re-worked in such a way that it also suits the
theme of popular revolt. The new plot did not lead to the defeat and
conversion of "Moros," and thus required no baptism scene. It also
sent a message that "Moros" and "Christianos" can unite to achieve
a common goal. Tiongson's intervention has left its mark in San
Dionisio. The mission/vision and goals of the Komedya ng San
Dionisio (KSD), and the Komedya ng Filipinas Foundation (KPF),
two theater groups organized by the villagers of San Dionisio,
are influenced by his prescriptions. At the 2006 production of
Principe Reynaldo, the souvenir program quoted Tiongson's views
that "the komedya offers a lot of potential as a media for modern
messages" and that "given its colonial history and orientation
however, concerted effort...must be made to endow the komedya
with messages that are more harmonious with the country's thrust
toward national unity..." (Prinsipe Reynaldo 2006).

The examples given above show how performances have
altered their formats in Spain and the Philippines. We also see a
degree of reflexivity among the producers of the performances.
From the local fiesta committees in Spanish towns, to theater
scholars like Nicanor Tiongson, and civic leaders in San Dionisio,
we see a conscious effort to send a message of convivencia in Spain,
and national unity in the Philippines. Despite these developments
however, we must not lose sight of the fact that majority of
performances still retain the traditional theme of Christian superiority and many Muslims still find these spectacles to be offensive and demeaning. There is also a segment of the Muslim population in the Philippines that struggles for self determination and separation from the Philippine state, and they may not necessarily share the goal of national unity emanating from center.

It is however, worth noting that the selected instances in Spain highlighted in this paper, though they are the exceptions to the rule rather than the norm, point to the fact that better relations between Christians and Muslims is possible. The examples of the Turkish Ambassador in Sax, the Saharawi children in Villajoyosa, the Moroccans in Alcoi, and the Palestinian in Javea, hopefully show that Muslims and Christians can celebrate these fiestas together. There may still be a long way to go before convivencia can be achieved, but the changes introduced today, small as they may be, are hopefully steps in the right direction.

**From "Muslim Other" to "Suppressed Self"**

This section of the paper discusses how the portrayals and perceptions of the "Moro" are laced with nationalist imagery. In this argument, two important factors concerning the nature of portrayals and performances comes into play. The first factor is the categoric instability of the factions "Moro" and "Cristiano." For Shelton (2004), these categories have an "inexhaustive incorporative capacity," which means that they can acquire any identity the performers choose, and they often take the form of hybrid characters, composites of heroes and villains adapted from a vast range of sources such as folk legends, national history, comic books, and Hollywood hits. In some cases, subversive characters develop, including protagonists that allude to native gods or pagan deities, or even anti-colonial folk heroes. Another factor is the "malleability of performance," or their "capacity to encode distinct semantic meanings in a variety
of political, religious, and cultural contexts while still retaining its structural form”. For Shelton (ibid, 267), this malleability allowed for Iberian Christian meanings to be easily inverted through strategies of foreign appropriation and subversion. This ability to house radical meaning within a traditional structural form allowed these performances to be the tools not only of the state but also of subaltern and militant groups.

Take for instance the danza de las plumas of Oaxaca, Mexico. On the surface it is a dramatization of the defeat of Moctezuma by the Spanish forces led by Cortes. For Max Harris (1997), this is only the “official” story. Beneath this public narrative is what James Scott (1990) calls a “hidden transcript.” Harris contends that the popular understanding of Moctezuma is not only of a past ruler (defeated by Cortes), but also of a folk messianic figure believed by the natives to emerge one day to defeat the Spaniards and establish Indian hegemony. Legends of the return of Moctezuma to deliver the Indians from Spanish domination abound among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico. In these dances, Moctezuma and his followers are dressed in elaborate and colorful costumes, while Cortes and the Spanish are dressed in inferior attire. The Spanish also perform simpler dance steps, and occupy the stage for a shorter period. In contrast, Moctezuma and his men, perform elaborate dance steps, and dominate the stage. So even if the story technically ends in Cortes defeating Moctezuma, during the performance itself, it is clearly Moctezuma and his forces that reign supreme. And if we were to think in terms of the folk messianic Moctezuma, his defeat in the play is not really final but just the necessary pretext for his return. Cognizant of the popular understanding of Moctezuma, Harris (1997) suggests that the same performance could be read two ways, “as both a triumph of Spanish Catholicism and a future indigenous defeat of the conquistadors and their successors.” He further adds that these dances of conquests can be read as the “simultaneous performance of two conflicting narratives, one endorsing conquest and the other reversing it” (ibid, 107).
Could the same logic be applied fruitfully to the Philippine setting? One of the most popular moro-moro plays performed in various parts of the country is the Historia Famosa ni Bernardo Carpio. The story is based on the legends of the Spanish hero Bernardo Carpio. But just like Moctezuma in Mexico, Bernardo Carpio also had another identity. He too was portrayed as a folk messianic figure in the popular imagination of Tagalog peasants. Reynaldo Ileto (1998, 9-10) shows us how the local histories of central and southern Tagalog towns reveal a popular belief—that Bernardo Carpio was their indigenous king trapped inside a mountain, struggling to free himself and liberate his people from the Spanish.

In Central America, the most commonly appropriated Spanish hero is the national saint, Santiago Matamoros (St. James the Moor slayer), who is equated to a number of pre-Hispanic deities and indigenous heroes. For the Concheros (contemporary fraternities that seek to promote indigenous culture in Mexico, and also the name of a dance of conquest), Santiago is popularly associated with Ehecatl, a pre-Hispanic wind god. For the Cora Indians, Santiago is conflated with a nineteenth century indigenous agrarian leader and prophet, Manuel Lozada (Shelton 2004, 290). In the danza de los santiagos in Cuetzalan, Puebla, the victorious Christian soldiers called santiagos wear masks that identify them with indigenous warriors of the sun, while the defeated heathen soldiers called pilatos wear pale-faced masks that identify them with the Spanish conquistadores (Harris 1993, 107). Again, these instances show how the narrative of Christian superiority is accepted, but that of Spanish superiority is rejected. The appropriation of Spanish heroes like Bernardo Carpio and Santiago allow conquered natives to imagine themselves to be on the "Cristiano" side of the equation. But as was shown earlier, in the example of Moctezuma in the danza de las plumas, they can also embrace the "Moro" side as a representation of themselves.

In some other cases, it becomes increasingly difficult to think in terms of either "Moro" or "Cristiano." Take for example
the moro-moro play entitled *Princesa Perlita* which was written in 1970 and restaged most recently in 2006 in Metro Manila. In *Perlita* we find protagonists dressed in fabrics inspired by native Southeast Asian or Malay clothing. The protagonists are converted to Christianity early in the play. A cardinal from a foreign kingdom baptizes them and gives the queen, Reyna Malaya, a statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The image miraculously speaks to Malaya warning her of an impending attack. The invaders are led by Montenegro, a character who represents Spain. And the cardinal who initially baptized Malaya, and who is first portrayed as a benevolent character, becomes a traitor when he is manipulated by Montenegro later in the story. We see in this play an acceptance of Christianity signified by the appropriation of the Virgin Mary to the side of the protagonists and a rejection of Spanish authority and frailocracy (represented by the manipulated cardinal). Throughout the play, the protagonists continue to wear their Malay clothes. And the hero, who defeats Montenegro in a breathtaking fight scene at the end of the play, is dressed in a way that evokes images of Lapu-Lapu, a local datu warrior whose resistance to and defeat of Magellan made him the country’s first hero.

The example just given reminds us to pay close attention to the performative life of a text. Through the strategic choice of costumes, a story line’s main message may be subverted. The *Moros y Cristianos* is often seen as a colonial tool, but it can also be the vehicle for nationalist messages. In *Perlita*, even if the protagonists are supposed to have been converted to Christianity, their costumes clearly equate them with pre-Hispanic Filipinos, or with the Moro warriors who resisted Magellan. The converts, though they accept Christianity, are shown to be both anti-Spanish and anti-friar. In the same vein, in the Mexican santiagos, the strategic allocation of dark colored masks to the protagonists and pale-colored masks to the antagonists casts the indio as "Cristiano"/hero and re-casts the Spanish as "Moro"/villain without changing the plot. In the danzas de las plumas, the "Moros" represented by Moctezuma and his
men have far more elaborate costumes, more intricate dance steps, and longer stage exposure than the "Cristianos" such that among performers and audiences, it is more prestigious to play the role of the "Moro" even if they are defeated at the end of the story. This means that while "Cristianos" are superior in the text, the "Moro" is superior in the performance. This has been described by Toor in 1926 as the "aesthetic victory" of the "Moro" (Harris 1996,157).

The prestige of the "Moro" role and its "aesthetic victory" can similarly be seen in Baler in the Philippines, where the women who play "Cristiano" princesses are confined in their choice of costumes and stage action to long dresses and dainty movements. Their "Moro" counterparts wear short skirts, and perform challenging footwork, something which the Christians do not perform. The better dancers therefore get the coveted "Moro" roles. For special dance demonstrations, where only short excerpts of the moro-moro can be performed, it is the "Moro" princess who is showcased. In Sinasajan too, the "Moro" role bears a certain prestige for the menfolk. The entry-level role is that of a "Cristiano" soldier, and over time, an actor can work his way up the hierarchy and play the plum role of the "Moro" leading man who is assigned the most challenging choreography.

In Spain, there is clearly a strong desire among festeros to join the band of "Moros" rather than "Cristianos." In Villajoyosa, Alicante for example, there are forty-four bands of "Moros" and only nineteen "Cristianos." This is not unusual, for in many other towns all over Spain, the "Cristianos" are often the minority. Even the costume-makers in Alicante, the epicenter of the lucrative costume rental industry, take extra pride in being specialists in making "Moro" costumes. The desire to be "Moros" may stem from the visual superiority of "Moro" costumes, which are more colorful, elaborate, and have more variety. But another possible reason is that it is the "Moro" camp that gets to rule during the fiestas.
In dramatizing the reconquest, "Cristianos" are defeated at the start of the fiesta and will regain control only towards the end, allowing "Moros" to reign during the fiesta. They dominate the bulk of festivities, from fireworks, gunfire, and lavish parades, and get to have the sensuous clothing and choreography. For Harris (1994), this festive reign of the "Moro" at fiesta time represents the temporary resurgence of that which is suppressed but which cannot finally be suppressed by the church. He contends that the expulsion of the Moors in 1492, and the Moriscos (the Moors who converted to Christianity) in 1609, failed to rid Spain of Moorish influence not only in architecture but also in the blood. As one of Harris' interviewees states, "the Moors are not just a symbol, they are something in us. Look at our faces. Many are Moorish" (ibid, 47).

What Harris reports in his study made in the mid-1990s was also something I stumbled upon a decade later. My Spanish interviewee from Castellon, in the Valencia community, used nearly the same phrase: "the Moor is in our blood, look at our faces." It seems to me that this is a common expression, a popular perception among the people of Valencia. It may have something to do with the strength of regional identity in Spain. Many of those who resist Madrid as a center define themselves proudly as Catalans, as Valencians, as Basques, and so on. In those parts of Spain where Moorish influence was particular strong, this aspect of their history is now embraced and celebrated, for it differentiates them from the rest of Spain—it is their heritage and is central to their identity. This could probably explain why in the maritime district of Valencia, some localities perform "Moro" victory. Miguel Bustos, president of the local Agrupacion de Moros y Cristianos relates that they re-enact battles from a specific period in history, the late eleventh century, in the time of El Cid, when the area was under siege by the Almoravides, a Muslim dynasty of Berber warriors that once dominated Northwestern Africa and Spain (Aiemeur 2006).
The choice of this period in history is an interesting one, for it is characterized by alliances between Moors and Christians in Valencia as they attempted to fend off the advancing Almoravides. In history books, Moors are sometimes painted as men of valor, sometimes more courageous than Christians. Take for example this passage from an old account of the fall of Valencia: "The Christians, perceiving that it was impossible to maintain themselves in Valencia, retired from the city; but Alcadir, assisted by the brave general Aben Tahir, Lord of Tadmir, still continued to defend the walls, which he abandoned only with his life" (Conde 1854, 310). This chivalric imagery of Moors is a recurring phenomenon that surfaces every now and then in Spanish historiography, ballads, drama, and novels.

The river of Spanish literary images of the Moor are fed by two streams. One is a hostile current or a "vilifying tradition," while the other current is more benevolent, an "idealizing tradition" that paints Moorish men as loyal, heroic, and courtly people and the women as lovely and virtuous. Israel Burshatin (1985) identifies two points of view in explaining this phenomenon: the "aestheticist" view conceives the Spain as being "so generous to its enemies of eight centuries that it buries the hatchet and fashions them into models of the courtly and chivalric." The "social" view renders literary phenomena as pamphlets of "peaceful coexistence." Scholars who subscribe to the latter argue that chivalric or sentimental narrative in Orientalist garb hides a subversive message for the segment of the population (the New Christians, or converted Jews and Moors) who needed consoling or were intent on dismantling the dominant culture of the Old Christians. The Aragonese lords of Morisco vassals, who patronized Maurophilie Literaire, allowed the proliferation of Moorish "positive role models" to boost the morale of their faithful and hardworking New Christian subjects by generating nostalgic images of aristocratic Moors of the past (ibid., 99).
This reminds us that the trauma of conquest was not just confined to the natives who were subjected to Spanish colonial rule in the Americas and in the Philippines. As the colonial project was underway overseas, the process of establishing Christian and Castilian hegemony was also taking place within Spain. A massive campaign to expel Moors and Jews was undertaken to rid Spain of "tainted blood." There were Moriscos however, or Moors who converted to Christianity, who successfully learned to assimilate by abandoning their traditional dress and cultural identity and intermarried with Old Christian families to escape expulsion. They are an undeniable part of the Spanish body politic. And so when festeros in Spain speak of the Moros y Cristianos as a celebration of convivencia and point to their faces for traces of Moorish blood, could they perhaps be said to commemorate the incorporation of the Moors into the Spanish Christian fold, and to acknowledge the intermingling of Moorish and Christian blood as an integral part of their lineage? Maybe the "Moro" can refer not only to the Muslim "other" but also to the suppressed "self," the "Moro" within.

In the Philippines too, there are signs that producers and performers may be thinking of the "Moro" as the suppressed "self," rather than the Muslim "other." In her study of the sinulog in Cebu, Sally Ann Ness (1992, 139-145) shows how nationalist imagery has worked its way into the performance. The opening segment of the sinulog shows three principal characters: Magellan, King Humabon (Magellan's Visayan host), and Lapu-Lapu (Magellan's slayer). As the three approach the patron saint, they and all the corps of performers, kneel before the image of the Santo Niño, except for those in the "Moro" column. Lapu-Lapu's rise as a pivotal principal character in the dramatization is a recent development. In 1965, Spanish Kings marched down the center of a three column formation with "Cristiano" soldiers on one side and "Moros" on the other. By the 1980s, the procession of Spanish Kings was gone, and in its place
was a re-enactment of Magellan's defeat by Lapu-Lapu. Through the years, the sinulog came to represent a twofold narrative central to Filipino nationalism: the conversion to Christianity and the Muslim resistance. In the sinulog we see two portrayals of the "Moro," both in the role of convert (Humabon) and victor (Lapu-Lapu). The image of the two Moro chiefs, Humabon and Lapu-Lapu, marching side by side seems to remind Filipinos of an age of brotherhood disrupted by the arrival of the Spanish, sending the message that Christian and Muslim Filipinos share the same blood.

In 2006, while promoting the moro-moro entitled Perlita ng Silangan on a local television show, the play's director Soxy Topacio was quoted as having said that the conflict in the story is not about Muslims and Christians, "and the characters are all Muslims, which in truth, we all were, once upon a time" (Mustafa 2006, 13).

Conclusion

Most textbook definitions of the Moros y Cristianos and its variants the world over subscribe to the view that the characterization in the Moros y Cristianos is strictly black and white, with the "Moros" presented always in the role of villain and vanquished. It is time to reconsider these basic assumptions. We must fine tune our framework for studying the Moros y Cristianos so that they may also account for counter-currents in the conduct of performances. The categoric instability of the terms "Moro" and "Cristiano," coupled with the malleability of performances, shows how the ostensibly simple binary structure of these mock battles hides multiple layers of meaning. It is contingency rather than fixity that characterizes the Moros y Cristianos, and herein lies the potential for a theater premised on war and conquest, of being capable of delivering a message of convivencia and nationalism.
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