Closing the Representation Gap in Micro and Small Enterprises: Some Critical Factors

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Abstract

Using data gathered through a survey, this paper identifies critical factors and variables that may positively affect or influence collective representation of workers employed in micro and small enterprises (MSEs). These factors include: legislations on enforcement of formal employment contract, protection of job security, protection of the right to organize, and social security coverage; inclusion of skills training and upgrading among union services; using safety at work, grievances or problems at work, and income security or stability (e.g. minimum wage campaigns) as organizing themes; and establishment and/or strengthening of other forms or structures of organization to represent MSE workers. These factors will require creative and innovative union strategies, increased union visibility in the MSE sector, and a stronger role of unions in addressing issues and concerns of MSE workers.

Keywords: micro and small enterprises, representation, MSE sector

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Introduction

How micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are defined varies across countries depending on the criteria used, such as the number of workers employed, the value of capital assets of enterprises, the size of the sales turnover, and the value added of the enterprises. Countries may decide to apply a definition based on any of these criteria or use a combination of them. The lack of a universally accepted definition results in very high differences among countries.

In the Philippines, micro enterprises are business activities or enterprises with total assets of not more than Php3 million and employing one to nine workers. Small enterprises meanwhile are those that have assets of over Php3 million up to Php15 million and employing 10 to 99 workers. In China, enterprises employing up to 2,000 workers are considered small and medium enterprises. In Thailand, micro enterprises employ one to four people, whereas small enterprises employ five to 19 (Allal, 1999). Kenya's definition of small and micro enterprises varies depending on whether the enterprise operates in the formal or informal sector: an enterprise operating in the formal sector falls under the MSE definition if it employs up to 50 persons, whereas an enterprise is considered operating in the informal sector if it employs up to 10 persons (Bekko & Muchai, 2002, p.8). The ILO Consultants' Manual defines micro enterprises as non-agricultural enterprises with one to nine workers (including self-employed workers), and small enterprises as non-agricultural enterprises employing 10 to 49 workers (Mollentz, 2002, p. 77-78).

Various studies point to a decent work deficit in MSEs (ILO, 1999; Reinecke & White, 2004; Fenwick et al, 2006). In general, wages, job security, health and safety, opportunities for skills training, and union action in micro and small enterprises compare less favourably with those offered by larger enterprises (Bennett, 2002, p.1). Similarly, ILO research has shown that MSEs account for over 90 percent of enterprises where working conditions are very poor, and where workers are excluded from labor protection (ILO, 2004).

Studies analysing improvements in labor-standards compliance point to the indispensability of representation and participation of both the employer and the organization of workers in enforcement mechanisms. However, representation and organization of workers employed in MSEs remain a formidable challenge for trade unions in many countries. In trying to organize MSE workers, unions

are faced simultaneously with many challenges. Clearly, the dispersion of the sector puts more pressure on the trade union as the smaller the enterprise is, the greater the challenge for unionization (Bennett, 2002, p. 29). Other important barriers include: the limitations posed by the legal regime and poor law enforcement; lack of job security of MSE workers; the hostility of employers to unions; inadequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination; limited workers' knowledge and expectations about unions; negative attitude of workers toward unions; and the nature of work relations within MSEs (Xhafa, 2007, p. 75). The limited spaces for representation and protection in the legal framework has created a sort of vicious circle, in which the lack of protection and representation and the 'limited' exercise of the right to organize build on and reinforce each other, resulting in lower job quality and higher precariousness among the MSE workers.

In light of the above, the International Labour Organization (ILO) initiated in 2007 a series of research projects on Closing the Representation Gap in Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). The findings of the first phase of the project pointed to a complexity of factors that influence the representation of workers in MSEs in various countries. These factors were clustered under the categories of: (i) legal framework; (ii) issues of implementation; (iii) employers' approach to unionization; (iv) trade union strategies; and (v) workers' willingness to join the union (Xhafa, 2007).

The second phase of the project, which was done in 2008 in collaboration with alumni of the Global Labour University (GLU), involved 11 country case studies and a survey among select MSE workers. This second phase covered major trends in the regulatory framework for MSEs, and employers and trade unions' compliance with the same. The study highlighted that organizing MSE workers is particularly challenging for trade unions. Also, the survey results revealed that unionization has a direct impact on the level of security in the workplace in the MSE sector.

Using data gathered in the 2008 survey, this paper aims to identify critical factors and variables that may affect or influence collective representation of MSE workers. It engages with the research question: What organizing themes and strategies would encourage MSE workers to organize? In this regard, the survey findings pertaining to the non-unionized respondents are highlighted in this paper.

Research Design and Methods

A semi-structured questionnaire targeted for MSE workers was prepared in the second phase of the ILO-GLU project mentioned above. A total of 191 workers were interviewed in 11 countries: Albania, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, India, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, the Philippines, Turkey and the Ukraine. Respondents were purposively sampled from select sectors (unionized and non-unionized). Although the number of respondents per country was small, the survey proved very informative given random sampling and a relatively large number of variables studied. The respondents were also drawn from specific sectors per country.

The dataset yielded 73 variables. In this paper, we explore and analyze some of these variables—some treated as independent variables and others as dependent variables. The independent variables are grouped into demographic and employment-related variables. The demographic-related variables include gender, educational level and age, whereas the employment-related variables include job length categories, existence of employment contract, formal job training, applicability of skills in other jobs, opportunity to increase skills, safety at work, existence of occupational health and safety regulations, negative health effects of work, night work, stability of monthly income, existence of minimum wage, existence of benefits, social security coverage, employer contribution to social security, overall job satisfaction, and problems encountered at work. The dependent variables, which may be grouped as representation variables, include willingness to join a union, having heard of a union in the sector, unionized or non-unionized, existence of previous attempts to organize, and opportunity for collective action.

In processing and analyzing data, we used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Bivariate analyses were undertaken to explore the relationship between variables studied. An independent T-test was used to test differences in means to determine the statistical relationship between a nominal/categorical variable and a continuous variable. Cross-tabulations were used to explore the significance of relationships between categorical variables.

As statistical measures were mainly used to analyze survey results, the results presented here may not be generalized. To the extent that the 191 respondents come from 11 countries, the sample is rather limited. Moreover, country-specific nuances due to historical,

economic, political and social contexts have not been considered. Instead, as an initial exploratory paper, what are presented here are trends, tendencies and insights that require further study and exploration through additional literature review, a bigger sample per country, case studies (country-specific), and other relevant methods. Nevertheless, the drawing of sample from various countries and industries adds up to the 'representativeness' of the sample. Also, country of origin of respondent was not a variable considered in the analysis. Where possible, analyses of results are complemented by literature review done in the first phase of the MSE Representation Gap project (Xhafa, 2007) as well as other literature.

Demographic and Employment-related Factors and Unionization

Unionization is associated with several of the independent variables, such as age, job length categories, job security, existence of employment contract, formal job training, opportunity to increase skills, safety at work, social security coverage, and employer contribution to social security. (See Table 1, Appendix.)

With the exception of the age cohort younger than 19, survey results indicate that unionization increases with workers' age (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Age Cohorts and Status of Unionization



Likewise, unionization is more likely as workers' length of employment goes up. As indicated in Figure 2, the proportion of unionized respondents increased from 18.2 percent for those working for less than a year to 75 percent for those working for more than 20 years. This finding implies that as an MSE worker stays longer in the job, the chances for unionization tend to increase.

Figure 2. Job Length Categories and Status of Unionization



Figure 3 shows a higher unionization rate among respondents who claimed that it is not easy to lose their job. As job security implies staying longer in the job, this finding in a way complements the findings in Figure 2.

Figure 3. Job Security and Status of Unionization



Figure 4 confirms a positive association between the existence of a written contract and unionization. Data indicate higher unionization rates among those who reported the existence of a written employment contract. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude from this finding that unionization causes the existence of written employment contracts and vice versa. For one thing the legal framework covering employment relationships varies across countries. For example, the law stipulates that a written employment contract is compulsory after 30 days of employment in Albania, whereas in the Philippines, flexible employment contracting (written, verbal or none at all) is widely practiced in the MSE sector.

Figure 4. Types of Employment Contract and Status of Unionization



Having formal job training tends to be positively associated with unionization. Survey results show that among those who had formal job training, nearly 60 percent were unionized as opposed to about 32 percent who reported no formal job training (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Formal Job Training and Status of Unionization



Again, Figure 6 further reinforces the previous finding of a positive association between the existence of opportunities to increase skills and unionization. Among the respondents who claimed the existence of opportunities to increase skills, nearly 65 percent were unionized as compared to nearly 27 percent who said they didn't have any opportunity to increase skills. We could infer from this finding that increasing one's skills may increase the chances for unionization as the more skilled workers tend to be less fearful of losing their job if they organize. In this regard, we surmise that offering formal job training and skills upgrading may be a good strategy for organizing in the MSE sector.

Figure 6. Opportunities to Increase Skills and Status of Unionization



Figure 7 reveals higher unionization rates among respondents who claimed there is lack of safety at work (49.3%) compared to those who said otherwise (29.7%). Offhand, one would tend to hastily conclude that leaving the workplace unsafe may increase the level of unionization. However, what seems to be a negative association between safety at work and unionization status may be an indicator of a more complex picture. Considering the literature review (Xhafa, 2007), the level of awareness on health and safety hazards at work is higher among unionized workers. In contrast, there is a generally low level of concern on health and safety among the MSE workers, particularly in the developing and transition countries. Nonetheless, to the extent that health and safety is a less controversial (less political) cost to both employers and employees also in the MSE sector, a health and safety agenda could constitute a good entry point for organizing and representation of MSE workers.

Figure 7. Safety at Work and Status of Unionisation



Figure 8 shows a clear positive association between workers contributing to social security and unionization. Majority (nearly 62%) of respondents that contributed to social security were unionized as against merely 11 percent among those that were not contributing to social security. To the extent that higher unionization rate is observed among those who contribute to social security, we could infer that campaigning for social security contribution for MSE workers is likewise an entry point for organizing in the sector. Here, pushing for national legislation for a subsidized or more affordable social security

scheme for MSE workers would be a better alternative than compelling individual employees and employers to contribute to social security.

Figure 8. Contribution of Worker to Social Security and Status of Unionisation



Figure 9 shows the same pattern of association between employer social security contribution and the unionization rate, although we see a higher proportion of unionized respondents who claimed that their employer does not shoulder their social security contribution counterpart. Unionization rate is three times higher (60.9%) among respondents whose employers pay their counterpart social security contribution than those whose employers did not pay their counterpart (19.8%). If unionization increases the probability of

Figure 9. Employer SS Contribution and Status of Unionisation



employers paying their social security counterpart contribution, we could surmise that social security is likewise a good organizing theme in the MSE sector.

Opportunity for Collective Representation and Willingness to Join a Union

In the questionnaire used in the survey, the variable "opportunity for collective representation" corresponds to the question: "Do you see any opportunity for collective representation and action in your enterprise?" This is an important variable to the extent that it surfaces employment-related factors that could be used by unions for organizing MSE workers.

Survey findings reveal the variable "opportunity for collective representation" as associated with several independent variables, such as existence of an employment contract, job satisfaction, and problems encountered at work (Table 2, Appendix).

Meanwhile, the dependent variable "willingness to join a union" corresponds to the question: "Would you welcome a union in your enterprise?" When total sample is considered, the cross-tabulation finds association of this variable with several independent variables, such as job security, job length, applicability of skills in other jobs, and existence of opportunity for collective representation (Table 3, Appendix).

Opportunity for collective representation and action. The notion of collective representation and action is quite ambiguous when considered in the MSE sector. Firstly, the very term 'collective' connotes a relatively big group of people. Secondly, collectivity and representation implies some level of power and influence. This is clearly not the situation for workers in MSEs whose number in an enterprise is generally low (less than 20 on the average) and who moreover are mostly unorganized.

It is hence expected that a larger proportion of non-unionized respondents in the survey saw no opportunity for collective representation and action. Nevertheless, results pertaining to those who saw opportunity for collective representation may provide useful insights critical to organizing in the MSE sector.

Among non-unionized respondents, opportunity for collective representation is highest (35.3%) among those who had no employment contract at all (Figure 10). Those that claimed having written contracts saw the lowest opportunity for collective representation (11.4%). This finding implies that as the employment contract either becomes more informal or non-existent, the opportunity for collective representation increases. To the extent that verbal employment contracting and absence of employment contract is pervasive in the MSE sector, we could infer that there are opportunities for collective representation in the sector.

Figure 10. Opportunity for Collective Action and Contract of Employment



Figure 11 meanwhile shows a negative association between existence of opportunities for representation and job satisfaction, as one would expect that those who are dissatisfied with their job see more opportunities for collective representation. Here, there were more respondents satisfied with their job (33.3%) that saw opportunities for collective representation than those who were dissatisfied with their job (13%). With many MSE workers feeling disgruntled about their miserable employment conditions, and with employment in MSE seen as a last resort, a sense of hopelessness prevails. Hence, collective representation becomes the least concern among MSE workers. On the other hand, those that are satisfied with their job and thus would want to continue working may find opportunities for collective representation to improve their working conditions. These findings imply that unions may need to play a more

visible and stronger role in improving working conditions of MSE workers to increase opportunities for collective representation.

Figure 11. Opportunity for Collective Representation and Job Satisfaction



Figure 12 clearly puts forward the argument of organizing around grievances and problems at work experienced by MSE workers. Survey results indicate that there were more respondents who encountered problems at work (42.9%) who saw opportunities for collective representation than those who did not encounter any problem (16.9%) and saw opportunities for collective action.

Figure 12. Opportunity for Collective Representation and Problems at Work



As the proportion of respondents that saw no opportunity for collective representation is high regardless of whether workers encounter work problems (57.1%) or not (83.1%), again this finding points to the need for unions to increase their visibility and role in addressing problems and interests of MSE workers and to all categories of workers in general.

Willingness to join a union. In this paper, the variable 'welcoming a union' is considered an indicator of a worker's willingness or preparedness to join a union. It is the most important variable in addressing the representation issue among MSE workers. This variable points a more specific form of organization—the union—in contrast to the more ambiguous variable 'collective representation and action.'

From the survey findings, it is interesting to note a high proportion of respondents who expressed that they welcome a union in their enterprise. This finding in a way puts into question the common perception that MSE workers are hostile to unions.

Figure 13 shows that there are more respondents who claimed to have job security who expressed that they welcome a union (84.2%) compared to those who reported that their job is insecure (62.7%). This reinforces previous findings that job security enhances a worker's willingness to welcome a union. This suggests that initiatives that strengthen job security through legislation and union action may prove critical to organizing in the MSE sector.

Figure 13. Welcoming a Union and Job Security



Figure 14 shows that the number of workers who indicated that they would welcome a union in their enterprise is particularly higher among those who have worked for less than a year (88.9%) and one to five years (76.8%). However, as the job length increases, workers' inclination to welcome a union decreases to 50 percent for those who have been working for six to ten years and 40 percent for those working 11 to 20 years. It may be argued that working in an MSE for a period longer than six years without being organized may decrease the likelihood of organization and rather reinforce individual solutions to any problem encountered at work. Although this finding may seem to contradict the need to strengthen job security, we argue the need to combine both strategies to organize MSE workers.

Figure 14. Welcoming a Union and Job Length



Figure 15 shows a substantially higher number of workers who welcome a union among those who could apply their skills in another job (68.4%) as compared to those who welcome a union and who could not apply their skills to another job (33.3%). This finding only goes to reinforce the argument about strengthening job security, where skills upgrading could be one of the ways. This finding suggests that unions may want to consider including skills upgrading among their services and, at the same time, as an organizing strategy.

Figure 15. Welcoming a Union and Applicability of Skills in other Jobs



Figure 16 shows the relationship between income security and workers' willingness to welcome a union. Income stability tends to increase the number of those who welcome a union (77.9%) as compared to workers whose monthly earnings vary (56.8%). Although not a subsantial difference, it can be argued that having a more stable income raises the chances of unionization among MSE workers. This suggests that increasing income security of MSE workers may be another important strategy for unions to organize. Strategies such

Figure 16. Welcoming a Union and Stability of Monthly Earnings



as campaigning for minimum wage or regular pay could be used by union to achieve higher income security for MSE workers. Clearly, such strategies would contribute directly to increasing the role and visibility of unions among the MSE workers.

Figure 17. Welcoming a Union and Opportunity for Collective Representation



Figure 17 underscores what was mentioned earlier in this section on the lack of hostility of MSE workers towards unions. Almost all (96.2%) of those who saw opportunity for collective representation welcome a union. Even more interesting is the finding that among those who saw no opportunity for collective representation, the majority still welcome a union (61.5%).

Critical Factors in Workers' Representation in MSEs

What organizing themes and strategies would encourage MSE workers to organize? Which factors are critical to addressing representation and organization among workers in the MSE sector? The major findings of our survey among non-unionized respondents suggest the following:

1. Willingness to join a union tends to be higher among MSE workers who have been working for less than five years.

2. Job security tends to enhance an MSE worker's willingness to join a union.
3. As the employment contract either becomes more informal or non-existent, the opportunity for collective representation among MSE workers increases.
4. Willingness to join a union tends to be higher among MSE workers who can apply or use their skills in another job.
5. MSE workers whose incomes are more secure or stable are more likely to join a union.
6. Workers who encounter problems at work tend to see more opportunities for collective representation than those who have not experienced problems at work.
7. Workers who are satisfied with their job tend to see more opportunities for collective representation.

The above findings provide empirical bases to the literature review on MSE representation by Xhafa (2007). She highlights two main approaches in addressing the twin issues of representation and protection of MSE workers: (i) a state-led approach, with the State enacting the laws and regulatory framework and enforcing them, sometimes with the involvement of trade unions; and (ii) a bottom-up approach, which basically comprises actions from the unions and non-government organizations or other community groups. According to Xhafa:

> Protection, organization and representation of workers in MSEs may be attributed to four core variables, namely: the legal framework, enforcement mechanisms, employers' attitude towards unions and other workers' organizations, and the union's organizing drive as shaped by its structure, processes and political action. (2007, p. 22).

Xhafa further adds (2007, p. 108) that of these four variables, the legal framework has a particular impact as an instrumental mechanism for setting and enforcing behavioral norms, enacted to protect workers' rights and the working environment.

Our survey results indeed highlight the importance of national legislation to establish, implement and enforce the critical factors addressing representation and organization of MSE workers identified in this paper. These critical factors that require legislative intervention

may include the following: (1) establishment and/or implementation of formal employment contracts; (2) enhancement of job security and protection of union rights, especially the right to organize; (3) provision of subsidized and/or affordable social security for MSE workers, and provision of support and incentives to MSEs to encourage employee and employer participation in social security programs; and (4) establishment of facilities for skills training and upgrading for MSE workers.

Xhafa (2007) argues that limitations on representation-protection of MSE workers in labor laws may be attributed to the limited trade union action or initiative or engagement with the state. Accordingly, "unions' purposive action on extending the coverage of labor law where successful expands the sphere of coverage of labor law potentially to include workers in the MSE sector" (ibid, page 108).

But why are many unions reluctant to organize in the MSE sector? Regalia (2008) offers insights on the issue. She argues that:

> …as the social weight and the visibility of irregular, or migrant, or nonstandard workers increase, the problem of representing their interests increasingly influences the debate and the organizational choices of trade unions. But the positions taken up and the solutions sought are by no means homogeneous. They vary according to the interest and willingness of the unions to revise and innovate their representation strategies, which is perhaps obvious; but they also vary according to the attention that unions are prepared to pay to the specific interests of workers different from their constituency, which is perhaps less obvious. (p. 68)

According to Regalia, there are two dimensions influencing unions' attitude towards representation of workers different from their traditional membership. These are: (1) awareness of the specific nature of diverse workers' interests; and (2) willingness of unions to innovate representation models. She further identifies four situations corresponding to an equal number of attitudes by unions towards these different workers (Figure 18). These attitudes are defined as: (1) indifference; (2) opposition or resistance; (3) a commitment to extending the protections of other workers to these ones by imitation; and (4) a willingness to explore new forms of representation, or to imagine a more general reconfiguration of labor representation.

Figure 18. Union Attitudes to and Representation of Workers Different from their Traditional Membership

		Willingness to innovate representation model	
		Low	High
Awareness of the specific nature of diverse workers' interests	Low	Indifference	Imitative extension of protection
	High	Resistance/ Opposition	- Specialization of protection - Reconfiguration of representation

Source: Adaptation of Regalia, I. (ed). 2006. Regulating New Forms of Employment: Local experiments and social innovation in Europe. London: Routledge, 248.

The first attitude—indifference—is exhibited by unions that ignore or underestimate the difference between the interests of many workers and those of traditional core workers. The union's awareness of the specific nature of diverse workers' interests, and its willingness to innovate representation models, are both low. Regalia (2008) argues that this attitude was long dominant in the past, but it is still widespread in the choices actually implemented by large part of the unions.

The second attitude—opposition and resistance—is exhibited by unions that are well aware of the different interests of numerous workers but do not intend to represent them. This may be due to the unions' fear that these informal and atypical workers constitute a threat because they may compete unfairly against their traditional members. Thus, they are reluctant to represent these workers, but instead seek to persuade the government to intervene with new laws and measures in favor of such workers. This attitude exhibits high awareness of the specific nature of diverse workers' interests but low willingness to innovate representation models.

The third attitude—imitative extension of protection—prevails where the union intends that these workers be covered as much as possible by the standards and protections enjoyed by core workers. In this case, the labor unions endeavor to expand their capacity for representation though underestimating the diversity of the interests at stake. Here, the union's awareness of the specific nature of diverse

workers' interests is low, and its willingness to innovate representation models is high.

The fourth attitude—specialization of protection, reconfiguration of representation which to Regalia (2008) is the most interesting—seeks new solutions to the problems of representation through experimentation. However, she stresses that it is also the most difficult, and still largely in its beginnings in almost all the European labor unions. In this category, both a union's awareness of the specific nature of diverse workers' interests and its willingness to innovate representation models are high.

The above scheme or typology offered by Regalia (2008) effectively captures prevailing attitudes of unions towards organization and representation of MSE workers. We would like to add that a union's acceptance (or otherwise) of non-regular forms of employment is likewise an important dimension. While not specifically mentioned, we surmise that this dimension is implied in the willingness of unions to innovate representation models.

The evidence from the country case studies in Webster et al. (2008, p. 36) "suggests that a growing number of trade unions are beginning to see MSEs as a priority although majority still do not." Three main obstacles facing trade union organizers in MSEs were identified, namely: (1) trade union reluctance because organizing in the sector is time consuming with low returns; (2) the growing informalization of work; and (3) societal and employer hostility leading to low awareness of rights and reluctance amongst workers to join trade unions in MSEs (Webster et al., 2008, p. 38-39). These obstacles may explain why many trade unions seem to take either a resistance/opposition approach or imitative extension of protection.

Conclusion

In this paper, we highlighted some critical representation factors that could serve as entry points or spaces for collective representation and for enhancing MSE workers willingness to organize and/or join a union. These factors are: (1) union action (political, campaigns, legislative initiative, etc.) for the critical factors requiring legislative intervention identified above; (2) inclusion of skills training and upgrading among union services; (3) using safety at work, grievances or problems at work and income security or

stability (e.g. minimum wage campaigns) as organizing themes; and (4) establishment and/or strengthening of other forms or structures of organization to represent MSE workers (territorial structures, community-based organizing, workers' associations, cooperatives, etc.). These factors will indeed require creative and innovative union strategies, increased union visibility in the MSE sector, and stronger role of unions in addressing issues and concerns of MSE workers in particular and the working class and the poor in general.

By highlighting some critical representation factors that could serve as entry points or spaces for collective representation and for enhancing MSE workers willingness to organize and/or join a union, we also attempted to address the problematique of the fourth union attitude in the representation scheme presented by Regalia (2008). These critical factors offer possible strategies for unions to reconfigure representation and specialize some level of protection for MSE workers.

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Appendix: Tables of Statistical Test Results

Table 1. Variables Related to Being Unionized or Not

Variable	Test Results*	Degree of Association
Age	p = 0.000	Highly significant
Job length categories	p = 0.004	Highly significant
Job security	p = 0.027	Significant
Existence of employment contract	p = 0.004	Highly significant
Formal job training	p = 0.002	Highly significant
Opportunity to increase skills	p = 0.000	Highly significant
Safety at work	p = 0.007	Highly significant
Social security coverage	p = 0.000	Highly significant
Employer contribution to social security	p = 0.000	Highly significant

*Chi-square Test: p is probability value.

Table 2. Variables Related to Existence of Opportunity for Collective Representation and Action

Variable	Test Results* (Total Sample)	Test Results* (Non-unionised)
Existence of employment contract		p = 0.039, S
Job satisfaction	p = 0.047, S	p = 0.015, S
Problems encountered at work	p = 0.000, HS	

**Chi-square Test: p-value is probability value; HS = Highly Significant; S = Significant.

Table 3. Variables Related to Willingness to Join a Union

Variable	Test Results* (Total Sample)	Test Results* (Non-unionised)
Job length		p = 0.024, S
Job security	p = 0.044, S	p = 0.020, S
Applicability of skills in other jobs	p = 0.019, S	p = 0.023, S
Stability of monthly income	p = 0.006, HS	p = 0.023, S
Opportunity for collective representation and action	p = 0.000, HS	p = 0.001, HS

**Chi-square Tests: p-value is probability value; HS = Highly Significant; S = Significant.