DECOLONIZATION AND FILIPINO MUSLIM IDENTITY

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INTRODUCTION

Four unpublished essays are woven into this publication on the Muslim South. Each one deals with a topic that generally marks the character of Muslim societies and thus provides a basis for the understanding of attitudes, values and developments in the region, historically or otherwise.

The first essay touches on the development of folk islam which represents a dynamic blend of socio-cultural elements from Islamic civilization and native tradition. The analysis takes note of antecedents in the larger world of Islam, known in Islamic literature as darul islam, in which the interactions between original Arabic features and non-Arabic ingredients produced a kind of synthesis that enabled Islam to develop as a universal faith.

The second essay discusses in more detail the “sultanate,” which is one of the contributions of Islam to Philippine political history despite its eventual decline in power during and after the American colonial regime. The consolidation of the independent datuships in the Muslim South into a structure that paralleled the evolution of folk islam provided a kind of Muslim consciousness that confronted the challenge of colonial conquest and pacification with a consistency and persistence quite distinctive in Philippine history.

This heroic struggle of the Muslim South against colonial threat is elaborated in the third essay which deals with the struggle for supremacy of various Muslim naval forces throughout the duration of Spanish rule in the Philippines. In reality, the Filipino naval foundation goes back to this ancient prototype which dared challenge the more technologically advanced navies of the West, and, in the process, losing ultimately its mastery of the Philippine seas.
Finally, the fourth essay takes the Muslim struggle briefly into the American colonial era and the subsequent period to underline the continuous resistance and eventual submission of the Muslims to American and Filipino sovereignty. This integration of the Muslim South into the colonial and post-colonial system brought Muslim societies into a most difficult and crucial experience, one which was much more fundamental than the centuries of bloody confrontations. This experience, which is part of the democratization of the Filipino, has brought the Muslim to a crossroads — a dilemma that sets his own socio-cultural institutions against modern ones which American colonialism and neo-colonialism have brought upon the Philippines. Thus, the struggle for a Muslim identity has become more complex, requiring a serious evaluation of historical imperatives, colonial experiences, and radical alternatives.

In effect, this monograph brings to public attention certain fundamental features of the Muslim South that offer a wide range of possibilities for understanding some of the contemporary issues of the Muslim struggle. But more significantly, it presents to the Muslim people the problems and prospects of their struggle in the context of rapid changes in the world within and without, affecting interests, aspirations, loyalties and values of traditional societies.

I. THE FOLK ISLAMIC TRADITION

A. The Muslim World

As used here, “folk islam” refers to that synthesis of Islamic concepts and practices and indigenous cultures. By “cultures” is meant those beliefs, customs, practices and institutions which have been acquired and adopted as traditions. Historically, the rise of folk islam in the Philippines antedated that of the sultanae by about two centuries.

However, the understanding of folk islam requires, to a certain extent, a study of developments in the Muslim world which occurred long before the rise of settlements in the Muslim South. This helps in delineating what is “Islamic” from what is not and,
in effect, in understanding what is “folk.” From standard sources of Islamic history, certain patterns marked the development of Islam from its earliest beginnings in the Arabian Peninsula up to the end of the Abbassid caliphate in mid-13th century, the time about which the penetration of Islam into Southeast Asia was said to have occurred.

Politically, the pre-Islamic tribal structure, whether represented by the majlis or mala, continued to serve as the basic unit of Islamic political organization even after the death of the Prophet. The attempt to change this at the time of the Umayyad caliphate was caused by the incorporation of non-Arab populations into the Islamic polity, which until then was still Arab in character and leadership. The new political and administrative features, which introduced for the first time the office of the gadi, encouraged a kind of negative response which stressed the return to earlier tribal arrangements. This was, undoubtedly, in consonance with the zeal to keep the Arab character of the Islamic community. It was not until the later Abbassid period that the non-Arab nature of Islamic development emerged as a more desirable basis of society, government and culture. In fact, the rise of Persian, Turkish, Indian, African and Spanish patterns determined the specific lines of Islamic evolution and expansion. Thus, earlier Arab dominance and significance were only preserved in the body of Arabic literature which served as a vehicle of Islamic culture, especially the Koran whose spiritual refinement is preserved best in the original Arabic. Social development in the Islamic world proceeded not from the abolition of tribal social organization and consciousness. Rather, it proceeded from its augmentation by a much larger social structure and consciousness represented by the ummah which underlined faith, not blood, as the basis of social relations. Eventually, however, as the non-Arab areas became Islamized, the social basis became more and more spiritual and social organization reverted back to the tribal social order in line with the effort of the dominant Arab aristocracy to keep its status in an ever-expanding empire. But the result of this strong Arab backlash was to create the trend towards pluralistic tribal or ethnic patterns, with a general adherence to the ummah as an evidence of loyalty to the Faith. We see, therefore, the Islamic world being pluralized internally by various ethno-linguistic societies seeking to preserve their own local iden-
titities while at the same time clinging to the new socio-political form.

Economically, the rise of Islam in Arabia also enlarged the commercial and trading activities of Arabian communities. It also integrated, through political and administrative networks, the profitable avenues of western and oriental trade reaching as far west as the Scandinavian countries and as far east as China and Southeast Asia. Thus, as a consequence of the enlargement of the Islamic ecumene and the eventual incorporation of states, societies, communities and empires which varied greatly in historical and cultural experiences, the Islamic world manifested a kind of accommodation which meant diversification and differentiation in Islamic cultural thrusts. The exception lies in the general adherence to the supreme message of Islam which is known as the *shahada*.

In effect, the development processes and patterns in the Islamic world, from its inception onward, left as the only acceptable basis of agreement the *shahada* and the four pillars. No Muslim would deny the unity of Allah and the singular position of Prophet Muhammad as the last of the prophets. Hence, just as the political, social, economic and cultural directions of Islamic progress were prominently marked by accommodation and pluralization, so was the religious development of Islam. By the very nature of its origin, it had to be affected substantially by non-religious developments. Consequently, what emerged were not only two broad approaches to Islam — namely, Sunnism and Shi'ism — but also several differentiating groups within the two systems generally associated with political succession and/or interpretation of the Koran and *Hadith*.

In a sense, what have been regarded as Islamic institutions, political or otherwise, by contemporary Muslim societies of Southeast Asia were actually creations of certain periods of Islamic history to meet specific social needs. For instance, the *majlis*, which has been mentioned in the proposed Muslim Code of the Philippines as a possible basis of local government, was a political unit which was distinct to Meccan society. It was essentially connected with the nomadic instinct of pre-Islamic Arabia. It served
adequately as a sort of popular council guided by the decisions of the tribal sheik. In the same manner, the *mala*, which was composed of several majlis, was developed in Mecca to provide a more appropriate mechanism for the needs of mercantile interests. Even the *gadi*, a judicial institution, also referred to in the proposed Muslim Code, was an administrative innovation of the Umayyad dynasty to meet the growing problem of administration in a set-up where the interpretation of the *sharia*, in relation to the Koran and the *Hadith*, could no longer be anchored on pre-Umayyad Arab criteria because of the peculiar character of Muslim populations under Umayyad rule. Likewise, the sultanate system, which was designed, in a sense, to develop a secular foundation for the Islamic community, had emerged by the 12th century in Turkish Indian and Southeast Asian areas, just as the office of *wazir* arose in the Abbassid period to systematize the administrative functions of the caliphate.

In this regard, it may be necessary to mention that the rise of the Abbassid caliphate was, perhaps, attributable to the movement of those who considered the Alid line as the legitimate successor to the Prophet. This would usher in the Shiite phenomenon as a dominant institution in the Eastern part of the Islamic world with Persia as the locus of its power. Shi'ism would generate a persisting opposition to Sunni orthodoxy, the ideology of the larger part of *darul 'islam*. It was not until Islamic expansion had reached India that it began to acquire a more emotional, meditative and mystical character resulting in the emergence of Sufism in the sub-continent, and later, in Southeast Asia.

In effect, Islam underwent a series of transformations from its strictly Arab structure and character into a system marked by a variety of experiences, cultures and values. In fact, its survival as a system was precisely due to its assimilation of indigenous traditions.

B. The Philippines and Islam

By the time Islam was introduced into the Philippines, it had already gone through various phases of development and had already been liberated from the narrow, aristocratic and rigid
character of Arabian societies. Moreover, it had assumed the more accommodative and mystical nature of Indian sufism. In short, the kind of Islam which came to the Philippines from India and/or Southeast Asia was, by the very nature of its historical and culture experiences, *folk islamic*.

But to what extent was the *folk islamic* character of Islam developed in Muslim societies of the Philippines? This may be seen in the political, social and cultural aspects.

Generally, the political set-up of pre-Islamic Philippines was based on the baranganie system or the datuship. The datuship was a somewhat feudal type of social organization. It did not, however, develop the features of either European or Japanese feudalism because the members were related to one another by kinship rather than political and/or economic ties. The different datuships, therefore, maintained political independence although interdependence existed between them because of the need for internal trade and alliance against common enemies. The coming of Islam brought a new political institution, the sultanate, which was either Turkish, Indian or Southeast Asian in origin. The coexistent relation between the datuship and the new institution helped towards the consolidation of pre-Islamic political units and enclaves. In other words, the introduction of the sultanate hastened the state process in the southern islands by providing a superstructure over the otherwise scattered datuships. A religious system was also developed which emphasized greater loyalty to the *ummah* rather than to the local leadership. But the dichotomous and parallel development of the sultanate and the datuship was often marked by conflict, with the former ultimately becoming dominant and paramount. Of course, the latter remained active in decision-making through the *ruma bichara*, which was composed of representative datus under the sultanate and served as an advisory council to the sultan.

The *ruma bichara* was similar in role and function to the baranganie council of elders, except for the fact that the latter was smaller in context than the former, which was "supra-baranganie" since it involved datus from different areas within the sultanate. Strictly speaking, the *ruma bichara* applies only to the Sulu and
Maguindanao societies and seemed to have been Samalan in origin. It might have evolved from “luma bissalaa” which means in Siamal the “house of speech.” There is no indication that this was of Islamic influence.

Likewise, the local political structure showed very little Islamic influence as the local terms which have survived would tend to show. In Sulu, for instance, the titles of authority which appeared in the 19th century were rajah muda (heir-apparent), datu maharajah (supreme judge), muluk bandarasa (lord of the treasury), tumanggong (assistant treasurer), maharajah Lailah (war minister), amilbahai (assistant to the datu), rajah kahar (protector of the Chinese), rajah laut (admiral), bandahara (assistant to the muluk), sawajaan (vice-admiral), mamandra (lord chamberlain), panglima (general), panglima daiva (secretary of War), panglima pahalawan (lesser than panglima), panglima manganan (lesser than panglima), panglima palbasa (petty chief), panchula (herald), munari (herald) and mukahil (herald). It is, however, in the titles without political or military authority that some Islamic strains could be seen, as, for instance, salip or sherif (descendant of the Prophet), hadji (pilgrim) and imam (priest). The local titles habib (salip who is a haji), tuan (sir) inchy (lady), hatib (religious assistant) and bilal (religious leader) are indigenous to Southeast Asia.

In Lanao, the same pattern existed. The local political structure had remained substantially non-Islamic. This can be seen in such terms as solotan (judge), paninin diungan (past sultan), datu (chief), rajah muda (sultan’s adjutant), sultan cabugatan (superior judge), sancupan (attorney), cabugatan (justice of the peace), casanguan (counselor) and modim. The only evidences of Islamic influence appear in such local terms of authority as sarip (keeper of traditions), alim (sublime porter), sherif, shayuk, hadji, imam and calip or halip.

In Maguindanao, the terms ruma bichara, sultan, rajah, datu, rajah muda and rajah laut were also used in the same manner as in Sulu, but watamama (of royal line) and ambra rajah (defender of the people) are distinct to Maguindanao. This would indicate the inter-penetration of the two sultanates or their probable origins in Southeast Asian indigenous structures.
In the cultural aspect, which involved principally literature, art, music and customs, Islamic penetration was evident only in a few cultural areas. In language, Tausug (or Sinug), Siamal, Magindanao, Maranao, Yakan, etc. have remained the main vehicles of communication in the Muslim south. Arabic, which represents one of the several cultural vehicles of the Muslim world, has found a place in Philippine culture in the jawi or Malay script which is of Arabic derivation but confined to the scribes or members of the native ruling class. It has never been popularized except in passages and/or surahs of the Koran which are committed to memory for religious rituals as well as for other purposes including anting-anting and spells.

Similarly, the oral literary forms, which vary from one ethnic group to another, do not appear to have dominant influences from Islamic literary traditions and themes. The narrative traditions, which consist of epic poetry, legends, myths and stories and which also vary from one Muslim group to another, appear to be indigenous. They maintained some connections with Southeast Asian societies like Indonesia and Malaysia which had also been subjected to the same Islamic process as the Philippines. The parang-sabil of the Tausugs, which glorifies the sabil or “juramentado,” seemed to be native to Sulu although a similar phenomenon was also found in Indonesia and Malaysia. Perhaps, the only Islamic influence, if any, that is very evident in the institution is the sabilallah, which means “one who dies for the faith.” The sabilallah emerged in great numbers in the Muslim south in the late 19th century.

Other cultural aspects have also shown folk islamic elements. In written literature, the literary energies which revolved around the controversy over Koranic and Hadithic interpretations were not found in the Philippines; thus, Philippine Muslim literature has remained largely oral. The musical traditions, which in the Sulu Archipelago are represented by the suwa-suwa, dal-ling-dal-ling, tuguh, dulang-dulang, ligaya, tenes-tenes and leng-leng do not show Islamic features. In fact, the musical tradition called kalan-angan shows a mixture of native elements and modern influences. Perhaps, one reason for the failure to develop an Islamic musical tradition is the fact that in the Muslim world this type of tradition
was associated mainly or largely with religious activities and Koranic recitations. Creativity along secular lines did not receive encouragement from the ruling social class who determined, in a way, the patterns of cultural development in the Muslim world.

Looking at the other Muslim groups in the Philippines, the same phenomena exists in Maranao and Maguindanao societies where the musical traditions consist of similar forms. Likewise, the artistic creations of the Muslim south show bold and dominant non-Islamic features. The *ukkil* of Sulu, which is similar to the *okir* of Lanao and Cotabato, is a fern-like design which is found in almost all the cultural communities although motifs in Lanao have more variety and innovation. In fact, the same pattern is also found in the rest of Southeast Asia. The *sarimanok*, found in both Lanao and Sulu art, although varying in the way the fish motif is used, is indigenous. It can hardly be attributed to Islamic influence. But the “sarimosque” introduced by Tausug artist Abdulmari Imao indicates a definite synthesis of Islamic and indigenous elements. The architectural designs of houses are not Islamic and do not approximate any of the designs in the Middle East, Africa, Iran, Turkey or India. Instead, they take after the Southeast Asian type peculiar and suited to the ecological character of the region. The *gulis* of the Sulu archipelago, which is commonly seen in the designs of utensils, instruments and tools, is a line pattern produced by one upward, downward or sideward stroke of the hand. It is native to and common throughout the archipelago.

But where does one find the Islamic influences in culture? Understandably, the religious aspect of culture would show this. The *masjid* (mosque) is an Islamic creation which suits the taste of the ruling class since it is usually located in population centers or capitals. But the house of worship of the Muslim masses, usually found in the rural or remote areas, is the *langgal* (in the case of Sulu and Basilan). The latter’s design is entirely different from the mosque. It resembles the Southeast Asian house of prayer.

The religious rituals represent another cultural institution where Islamic influence is evident. It can be seen in such rituals as *ramadan*, *maulud* and *haj*. But religious beliefs are similar to the rest of the Philippine communities, except such beliefs as *jinn* and
shaytan, which were actually pre-Islamic and similar to Arabian "polydoemonism." The geometric designs of fabrics, perhaps, are of arabesque influence. The jihad and sabilallah are institutions which are traceable to the Muslim world just as the observance of the Five Pillars—shahada, salat, puasa, haj and saraka—is Islamic. Finally, the veneration for the Koran as a holy scripture represents the greatest impact of Islam in the Muslim south.

In the economic aspect, one certainly cannot see that the concepts or practices in the Muslim World, which also differ from environment to environment, have been reflected in the Muslim communities in the Philippines. Economic activities and features were evolved in response to the rhythms of social life in the different geographic areas. Even the conduct of internal and external trade was determined by the immediate needs of the Muslim societies themselves. Slave trade, which earlier developed as a principal feature of Muslim trade, was a part of the Southeast Asian economy not certainly attributable to Islamic influence unless some kind of correlation is established with the razzia. The land system manifested no influence from either the Arabian agrarian concept, which was interwoven into nomadic, desert and pastoral life or even the later land-grant concept called ierta, which was practiced generally from Egypt to India until the 19th century when Western influences brought drastic changes.

The social organization of Muslim communities did not follow the Islamic pattern which, strictly speaking, was based on the ummah, unless the pre-Islamic tribal organization based on the ahl al-bait whose head, the sheikh, is to be taken as part of the Islamic concept. Ever the majlis, a council of elders which advised the sheikh, was a pre-Islamic social structure. So was the larger mala, which was composed of the various majlises. Likewise, the sunna, which means practice of the ancestors, refers to the pre-Islamic basis of social organization subsequently adopted by Islam. The Islamic structure, which the Prophet introduced and which was premised on the ummah, involved the division of people into the ansar (helpers), nuhajiran (Meccan supporters), munafugun (hypocrites or unbelievers), the dhimmis (tolerated ones) and the mawali (clients). The classification distinguished not only the Muslim from the non-Muslim but also the Arab from the non-Arab Muslim.
In effect, the social organization of Filipino Muslim societies, which was based on kinship and expressed politically in the datu-ship, was non-Islamic. It followed the matrix of social organization throughout the archipelago. In fact, the datu-ship was as much an institution in non-Muslim areas as it was in the Muslim communities. It was also established in insular Southeast Asia but not in the rest of the Islamic world.

Thus, Islamic development was marked by incorporations/ accommodations of local practices in all aspects. Each Muslim society was distinct from the others.

It appears quite clearly from a survey of developments in the Muslim world that the survival and spread of Islam as an institution and as an ideological force, from its inception in Arabia on to its farthest limits, depended on two inter-related factors: its complementary relations with pre-Islamic Arabian cultural traditions and its assimilation of the various ethnic traditions of the non-Arab world which had become the greater world of Islam. It is precisely this folk Islamic nature of Islamic revolution that was threatened by the zeal of the Arabophile of the empire to bring Islam back to its purely Arabian context. The conflicts, which arose from this tension, plagued the Islamic world in its post-Arabian period until the Abbassid caliphate, which was Persian in orientation, developed a more universal character for Islamic goals. Had Arab ethnicism and nomadism been allowed to dominate Islamic concepts, the phenomenal success of Islam in enlarging its ecumene would not have been achieved.

To demonstrate this remarkable ability of Islam to accommodate, assimilate and innovate, one may look, for instance, at the evolution of distinct political and administrative institutions which have found their way to Southeast Asian patterns. The tribal majlis, who were suited to Arabian conditions, were augmented by the gadi in the Umayyad period, followed by the introduction of the sultanate under the Turks to meet social needs. Then, the office of the wazir, similar to the present-day office of prime minister, was created underAbbassid rule to allow for the integration of Persian interests. Subsequently, as Islam spread to Persia and India, such titles as “Amir,” “Shah,”
and "Nizam" emerged as proofs of the indigenization of Islam and the minimization of the caliphal office.

The religious development involving both the Koran and the Hadith, by the very nature of the latter, had to move from its purely pre-Islamic Arabian base to a more nondescript pattern. The Arabian belief in shaytan, jin, and angels was carried in various ways to as far as Southeast Asia. But it had to develop, as it moved across Asia, such variations as Sunnism, Shiism and Sufism. In particular, the khaliqa, gadi, imam and awiliya are titles which were more or less associated with development from Sunnism to Shiism and then Sufism. In effect, they were efforts to respond to certain local or ethnic realities entirely different from the Arab world.

Literary patterns also showed the evolution from the pre-Islamic Arabian gasidah (code) and ghazal (love poetry), to the literary prose of the 8th and 9th century A.D. and to the period of Western penetration which brought the drama, the novel, and the short story as new forms for Islamic expression. This is not to mention the diversification from unilingual (Arabic) to multi-lingual communication based on Turkish, Persian, Urdu and Southeast Asian languages. The other socio-cultural processes also showed the same evolution from rigidity to liberalism and then pluralism in social organization, customs and practices.

Thus, it is logical to conclude that it is only possible to conceive of Islam or Islamic civilization as a "folk Islamic tradition." From both historical and cultural criteria, Islam had to assume this character if it was to survive in the human community. And equally significant is the fact that the diversity of Islamic civilization found a common, albeit loose, tie in the general observance of certain institutional practices such as the celebration of special days and adherence to the Five Pillars. The Muslims in the Philippines are composed of several ethno-linguistic groups or societies which greatly differ from each other in history, culture and language. In effect, it is more meaningful to deal with the various societies in their own unique context.
II. THE SULTANATE SYSTEM

A. Before Islam

Subsequent to the emergence of *folk islam* in the Muslim South, the next important development was the establishment of the sultanate in Mindanao and Sulu, and, perhaps, even Manila, had not the latter yielded to Spanish conquest. The rise of the sultanates was in itself an indication that the *ummah* as a social concept had been adopted by the Muslim South and was responsive to local traditions. In fact, political developments followed clearly dichotomous lines in which the sultanate and the local systems were structurally and functionally integrated.

In the pre-Islamic era, the Muslim South shared the same political patterns as the rest of the communities in the archipelago. The head of the social organization, which was similar to the barangay, although called locally in different terms, was the datu who belonged to the nobility or ruling class. He was assisted by a group of elders, composed usually of the heads of families. He ruled the village whose population consisted of both freemen and dependents.

For instance, from oral literature, the pre-Islamic set-up of Sulu society consisted of four institutional developments. The first was the *kamaasmaasan*, a term that refers to the earliest stage of socio-political organization when the men of influence were determined generally by age or by patriarchal position in the family. The institution was, therefore, the recognized governing entity of the village which was generally composed of kinship-related individuals. Later, men who were known not only for their age but also for their wisdom and wealth gradually assumed a more dominant role. They became constituted into the *banua*, which refers to the elders of the village, who were separated from the rest of the *maas (old men)* for specialized functions. In effect, the *banua* was equivalent to the baranganie" council of elders" found in other parts of the archipelago, and would, later, evolve into the *ruma bichara*, the "advisory council" of the sultanate. Through prowess, wealth and charisma, the datu emerged from the *banua* and began a new political process.
A series of subordinate officials called maharajahs, rajahs, and orangkayas, whose roles or functions were shaped by external influences, arose in response to the growing need of a growing community for effective coordination and consolidation of control in the various units of the datuship. Sulu’s contact with Hindu or Hinduized states such as those established in Java led to the adoption of the rajahship just as the continuous economic relations with other parts of Southeast Asia resulted in the introduction of the orangkaya in Sulu society. The latter was associated generally with those who exercised influence because of wealth which usually came from trade and commerce. In fact, the term orangkaya actually means “men of wealth” in both Sulu and Indo-Malay terminologies.

Likewise, from oral literature such as the darangan, pre-Islamic Cotabato and Lanao had already developed their own distinct patterns. In what is now Cotabato, before the Saraya-Sailud dichotomy emerged, local societies were functioning in accordance with a political arrangement in which the datus governed, assisted presumably by elders, and, later, by local officials including the ambarajahs. The datus, who descended from Tabunaway, functioned subsequently as the dumatus of the villages under the sultanate similar in a way to the Sulu set-up.

In the same manner, Lanao showed equally distinguishable institutions. From the epic Maharadia Lawana as well as from the Maranao version of the darangan, references to the datus heroes suggest the existence of the institution in the lake region, although there are no references to definite local officials, as in Sulu and Maguindanao. Understandably, the seemingly obscure picture of Lanao’s pre-Islamic institutional development could be attributed to its submergence in the Maguindanao process which was in part by royal linkage or by political expediency. It would not be until the 18th century, as will be shown later, that Lanao’s reassertion of the “old liberties” would take shape and definite institutional forms would emerge to which the beginnings of present-day institutions can be traced.

B. Impact of Islam

The introduction of Islam affected profoundly the areas now
represented by the Muslim South. Three effects were evident on the local societies: First, the sultanate as a political institution was established in Sulu and Cotabato and led to the centralization of power in the sultan, thus bringing the datu into a unitary, albeit loose, structure. Second, the sultanate introduced a series of new local officials essential to the centralization of authority. Third, the sultanate, being a distinctly Islamic creation, brought about a new socio-cultural process that would have significant impact on the nature and structure of the local villages.

As a centralizing political institution, the sultanate at once created a new social structure and consciousness corresponding to the new paramount person of authority. Consequently, the line of succession had to be delineated along definite limits within the social structure. The datu class, being the ruling class, initiated this profound social change. Since only one of the datus can be successor, the convenient criterion for succession, based upon Islamic concepts, would be legitimacy thru lineage from the Prophet or his representative. In Sulu, Sherif Makdum Ibrahim Al Akbar or the Malay warrior Rajah Bagindia could have been the beginning of the line but there was no political authority established by the first and nothing followed the reported subjugation of the local societies and the assumption of paramount authority by the latter over the various datuships. It was not until Abu Bakr came, possibly in 1450 A.D., that the sultanate in the Islamic sense was established, thus making Abu Bakr the first Sultan of Sulu. The ruling class, therefore, was bifurcated into those who descended from Abu Bakr and those who did not. Consequently, the structure of the nobility showed the distinction between the royal datu who could and would succeed to the sultanate and the ordinary datu who represented the implementing arm of the new institution.

The same was true of Cotabato where Sherif kabungsuan succeeded in 1511 in introducing Islam except that, unlike Sherif Makdum Ibrahim, Kabungsuan succeeded in definitely establishing himself as paramount lord creating a line of succession thru marriage into the local royalties. It was, therefore, thru the Kabungsuan connection that the line of the sultanate was established. Consequently, the ruling class of Cotabato was divided into the herbangsa descended from Kabungsuan and the dumatus
traceable to the indigenous nobility. Like Sulu, therefore, it was the ruling datu class that was substantially affected by the Islamic advent.

But the other areas of the Muslim South showed no similar pattern. The lake region of Lanao, where today about 17 royal houses have emerged, did not develop the sultanate as in Sulu or Cotabato despite the tradition that Sherif Alawi had actually reached the region contemporaneously with Kabungsuan. It would not be until the 19th century that Lanao would begin to show a clear independent development from the Maguindanao sultanate to which its datus pledged allegiance.

The same may be said of Maynila under Rajah Sulayman, where the sultanate was not established despite the introduction of Islam into the area. Consequently, only two sultanate systems were developed in the Philippines, which were distinct, although at some points in history, inter-related or inter-connected.

Although the most significant impact of the sultanate on the social structure involved to a large degree the kadatuan or dumatus level of the ruling class, the influence of such a change or impact on the lower levels of the ruling class was also apparent. For instance, the establishment of the panglimas in Sulu as the sultan’s representatives at the district level necessarily set them apart from or dichotomous to the local datus and, in many respects, overshadowed the power and functions of the latter. They, in a sense, constituted a political class of their own with district social status. Then, the introduction of other local functionaries with clear Islamic foundations reinforced the sultan’s spiritual and social status in the whole realm. These local functionaries included the iman, hatib, bilal, salip, alim, gadi, nakib, etc., who served in the local level as moral leaders but without the political authority which was exercised by either the panglima, datu or maharajah. While, however, this political arrangement or pattern emerged in the Sulu archipelago, it was not so in Maguindanao or Lanao where the indigenous local leaders such as the datus and rajahs each served as the Sultan’s representative, assisted by other minor officials called ambarajahs, imatampyn, kasteri and endatuan. Only perhaps the religious functionaries such as the gadi, the
cabugatan, and the sangkapan assumed roles similar to that of the Sulu local leaders.

But the social levels below the ruling class, whether free, slave or serf, underwent no significant structural changes vis-à-vis the new political arrangement. Only their political consciousness and their locus of political loyalties were redirected from the local datus or rajah to that of the sultan as the “shadow of God” on earth, subsequent to the development of the ummah, a sense of community that Islam introduced into indigenous societies, which evolved about two centuries before the sultanate.

The kind of social structure which evolved as a consequence of Islam required to a certain extent some changes in the economic activities of the communities. This would be quite obvious not so much in the methods of production, but in the distribution of goods, resources, and benefits.

C. The Economic Base

At this point, it may be recalled that by the time of the Islamic advent, Mindanao and Sulu, and for that matter, the rest of the archipelago, had already developed a lucrative external trade with neighboring states of Asia and the Pacific; a vibrant internal exchange of goods between lowland and upland communities as well as between islands or regions; and, consequently, a working system of agriculture, fishing and livestock raising, albeit primitive they might have seemed to the Westerners. In a sense, the motivation for innovative or technological changes to increase production of goods and services or to improve local industries was inadequate or absent since the support requirements of the political and social systems were more than met by the vast amounts of rich lands, marine resources, and forest products which could be had by as simple a technology as they had including the simple methods of a collecting economy. Economic viability was enhanced by the absence of demographic problems arising from an increase in population pressures. There were not too many people at that point in time, the population estimated to be only about one million throughout the archipelago, and more likely concentrated in the Visayas and Central Luzon.
However, the establishment of the sultanate system affected the distribution of resources. Whereas in the pre-Islamic period the ruling datu class exclusively enjoyed substantial access to economic resources and benefits, the sultanate had cut substantially into the distributive pattern. According to tradition, the sultan had acquired the right and privilege of getting a portion of all incomes from trade, the best fruits from agriculture, and the biggest pearl fished out of the domain. The absence, however, of a common medium of exchange placed the collection of revenues for the sultanate almost exclusively in the hands of his representatives, the panglimas in the case of Sulu, and the datus and rajahs in the case of Maguindanao and Lanao.

The means of economic exchange varied from place to place and from one historical period to another. In the earliest stage, even prior to the time of the sultanate, barter was the most popular means of exchange. This assumed either of two forms: the placement of goods on a prominent or usual place of exchange for anyone to match them with products of their own or through direct negotiations between parties in the exchange. The first was noted by Spanish chroniclers in many instances in Luzon and Maguindanao as did the Chinese in the Visayas. The second form was practiced in all areas where a common language was used and, therefore, was more ethnic rather than trans-ethnic, as in the case of the first. It was not until there was a significant flow of valuable items for external trade and the growth of the slave class that the means of exchange were augmented by the use of imported Indian, Chinese and European items and domestic slaves. Even up to the turn of the 20th century, slaves were still regarded in practice as “properties,” as shown in the provisions of either the Sulu Code or the Maguindanao paluwaran. But the most extensively used currencies, for instance, in the Sulu sultanate were the pousin, the kompow, the konfongs and the petis, in addition to local cowries and the gadjahilaw. The establishment of Spanish rule in the Philippines and consequent trade relations with the sultanates brought the use of Spanish currencies in the Muslim South. The most valued foreign currencies were the American silver and gold dollars, particularly the latter, which were also used as jewels and were popularly referred to as dulsan.

While these various means of exchange were used during the period of the sultanate, the recodification of local laws of Sulu in
1902 and that of Maguindanao in late 19th century, preserved in Saleeby’s *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, only referred to certain means. The old Sulu code mentioned *gadja-hilaw* and slaves as the means for compensatory obligation. The New Code (1902) referred only to “pesos” and “slaves.” This suggests attempts to simplify the confusing currency system of the sultanate, but even this simplification was not sufficient to maintain economic viability in the system and to strengthen the economic theory or principle and, therefore, did not differ from the pre-Islamic system in which the use of valuable items or goods was prominent in exchange. This was, in fact, evident in other ethnic societies where Chinese porcelain, textiles, and rice were used.  

Hence, the traditional market system, which was based on the *tabu* and the *pasar* concepts and around which socio-cultural activities revolved to a large extent, had not been affected by the introduction of the sultanate. The *tabu* represents a most effective means of distributing goods. Under this system weekly meetings of people and their goods were customarily held at different places and different days of the week. This was particularly used in the outlying areas usually far from the more developed villages where the *pasar* served similar purposes. Thus, the *tabu* could be the oldest pattern of marketing goods in areas like Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and, perhaps, in other Muslim communities. The *pasar*, which is somewhat related to the Indo-Malay set-up, represents a more sedentary marketing system associated with developed centers of trade and population, although in contemporary usage, both *pasar* and *tabu* have been interchanged for the permanent market system. This was and is equivalent to the *tulipapa* in the Christian areas.

But in the territory of the Sulu sultanate another marketing institution had been developed with the advent of foreign traders, largely Chinese and Europeans. The *tiangue*, the term given to this system, seemed to have been confined strictly to Jolo, the political and economic center of the sultanate and resembled functionally and structurally the Christian *palengke*. In fact, popular references to the *tiangue* are usually associated with Jolo, which is sometimes called in the language of travel as *tiangue* or *sug*. This confirms the view that, indeed, Jolo was the only significant
entrepot of trade in Sulu upon which the sultanate depended for its economic status vis-a-vis the outside world.

The economic stability of the sultanate was greatly dependent on its political authority. Any disruption of power by external threats or internal conflicts also affected the rise and fall of the sultanate’s income. This was best illustrated by the situation in Maguindanao in the 17th century after the death in 1671 of Sultan Kudarat whose reign marked the peak and “golden age” of Maguindanao. Rajah Laut, who was supposed to occupy a position equivalent to an admiral and was below the sultan, was described as a person of authority with a lot of people at his command and about 30 wives attending to his insatiable needs. The Englishmen who conducted trade in the area had only to deal with him as shown in the experiences of those who were with the Cygnet expedition to Mindanao. This profile of the secondary official official of the sultanate serves as an index of the extent to which the sultanate had declined, a victim of an economic system that was, at best, shaky, and at worst, chaotic.

Only the Sulu sultanate seemed to have succeeded in maintaining its economic viability and, therefore, its political authority and social status until the middle of American colonial rule. Its relative success vis-a-vis its Maguindanao counterpart was due to a number of factors.

First, the Sulu sultanate was more or less “open” in attitude compared to other traditional Muslim societies, and, consequently, relations with the external world, including Western countries, were more vibrant, productive and rewarding. In fact, the benefits derived by the Sulu Sultan were achieved thru strengthened trade and commerce with the Western world.

Second, the Sulu sultanate successfully and effectively made use of the most important economic brokers of the period and area – the Chinese -- who had already established themselves in Southeast Asian trade, and, in fact, in local politics through inter-marriages with the native women.

Third, the European powers, by virtue of their interests in Sulu as a strategic point in Southeast Asian trade, did not allow the weakening of the Sulu sultanate, unlike in Maguindanao.
where Spanish thrusts ruined the power base of the sultanate. In Sulu, the European powers kept a balance of interests and pressures, changing positions as the circumstances warranted. This fluidity in the power rivalries in the area allowed the Sulu sultanate to be revived as a viable political entity capable of maintaining and increasing its economic control over local resources.25

Fourth, the Sulu sultan and his immediate officials and kinsmen were actively engaged in trade, thus insuring economic stability thru the substantial control of local and foreign trade. European economic concessions in the area were to be obtained through the sultanate and guaranteed by mutually beneficial treaties which further strengthened the economic position of the sultanate.26

Another economic institution that provided a stable source of income for the sultanate was land. However, this was, more evident in the Sulu sultanate than in Maguindanao where the weakened sultanate brought about a significant revival of the various datuhips not only in the Maguindanao ethnic domain but also in the non-Maguindanao cultural communities which subscribed allegiance to the Maguindanao sultanate in the days of Sultan Kudarat. These areas included the Maranao lake communities, which, by the 19th century, had already established their own separate sultanates, more or less related to the four traditional pangampongs, however smaller in territorial extent they might have been. The subsequent rise of 17 royal houses of Lanao would find rationale in this historical antecedent.27

In Sulu, the sultanate, by virtue of its paramount authority, had acquired a kind of proscriptive right over lands in the political domain not specifically owned or occupied by the datuhips. This right was, in a sense, similar to the Spanish royal ownership of all lands not given as encomiendas to specific individuals or corporate entities in the Philippines. Consequently, all incomes derived from such resources were effectively controlled by the use of the panglimas who were the sultan’s representatives in what is believed to be the original five districts into which the Sulu archipelago was divided by the sultan.28 The increase of slaves acquired by the sultanate and the datu from the numerous raids provided not only ready revenues from the lucrative slave markets of Southeast Asia
but also an excellent source of work hands to cultivate the sultan's lands and those of the slave-owners, and to supply the sultan and datu's harems. At this point, it must be mentioned that the Sultan was substantially involved in the organization of slave raids, and, therefore, received corresponding benefits from such activities.

Not the least important, the Sulu sultan derived regular economic benefits from his North Borneo property after relinquishing management and control to British interests, governmental or private, in a lease agreement signed between the sultanate and the other parties. The annual rental of $5,000 enabled the sultan to maintain his royal status and diplomatic influence especially after the disastrous consequences of Spanish attacks on Sulu resulting in the destruction of trading vessels, farms and villages in the 19th century.

It was the kind of political advantage and fluidity Sulu enjoyed that was no longer present in the Maguindanao sultanate which, by the 20th century, had virtually been reduced to a nominal symbol of a once glorious age. It was not until the signing of the Kiram-Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915 that the economic foundation of the Sulu sultanate was shaken and eventually altered. The sultan's landholdings were limited and his taxing powers and prerogatives were drastically cut and absorbed by the new colonial system. Only the sultan's spiritual leadership was recognized and retained. In 1920, Dayang Dayang Piandao, the last of the House of Kiram, signed a document relinquishing all political rights under the sultanate and accepted employment in the colonial bureaucracy. Since then, individuals with claims, legitimate or otherwise, to the old sultanate merely kept institutional continuity and occasional pageantry more as a psychological feature in Philippine politics than as a political reality or force as it was in yesteryears.

D. The Cultural Image

The understanding of the political, social and economic realities of the sultanate would be difficult without reference to the
kind of cultural world or life that accompanied the introduction and growth of the institution in which Islam played a significant role, and against which colonialism was unsuccessful in its attempts to destroy the foundations of indigenous cultures. Although Islamic development in the Philippines displayed no outright establishment of orthodox Islamic culture, it, nevertheless, provided a strong influence in the development of what may be conveniently labelled a 'folk islamic tradition' in the same way that the introduction of Catholicism in several parts of the archipelago led to the emergence of 'folk catholic' or 'folk christian' cultural patterns. This phenomenon refers to the mixture, integrated or dichotomous, of native and Christian or Islamic elements in response to the practical needs of the traditional societies. In the Muslim South, under either the Maguindanao or Sulu sultanate, local societies evolved distinct folk islamic traditions.

In the domain of the Sulu sultanate, which included at least four major ethno-linguistic traditions—the Tausug-Samal, Subanun, and Yakan—language and literature displayed a unique synthesis of Islamic and native elements. The sinug, sinama or siomal, subano and yakan, although generally native in structure and functions, have assimilated a lot of Arabic terms and nuances. The Arabic language, however, had not been adopted as lingua franca although a limited use of Arabic had been evident in the ruling class of society. The elitist nature of its assimilation allowed the indigenous languages to remain as common media in the area and limited Arabic influence to the language of religious rituals.

The absence of a native script for each linguistic tradition allowed the jawi, which was derived from the old Malay script, to develop as part of Sulu cultural traditions, and, thus, essentially linked Sulu to Indo-Malay cultural developments.

All literary creations in the sultanate had generally remained oral until more recent times when English emerged as a convenient vehicle of expression among the educated class. Arabic, which the madrassahs introduced in recent years, has only began to draw attention to the importance of Islam in Filipino Muslim relations with the Muslim world.
The failure of the sultanate to develop strong Islamic institutions was due to the fact that Sulu and Mindanao were not directly affected by world Islamic processes but were indirectly influenced by filtered Islamic traditions from either South Asia or Southeast Asia or by Muslim leaders who had gone to Islamic countries. No significant mention or references to Arab missionaries, teachers or personalities are found in oral literature but references to awliya or Southeast Asian mystics or sufis are numerous, particularly in the Sulu traditions.

The establishment of Islam and the sultanate encouraged the development of a kind of literature characteristic of the new ambience. The tarsilas, which were written genealogies, were inspired by the question of succession to the sultanate. Datus who desired some justification for their claims to the sultanate endeavored to produce tarsilas tracing their origins to either the Prophet or his representative. Najeeb Saleeby has preserved a copy of a Sulu tarsila.36

Equally true is the tarsila tradition in Cotabato where succession to the Maguindanao sultanate was contingent on the royal line able to prove the legitimacy and strength of claim by means of tarsilas. The 17 royal houses of Lanao, which claim that their own tarsilas, which are inaccessible to outsiders, confirm the legitimacy of their lines, are unique features in Muslim political history.37

Two other written sources emerged in Sulu: the kitab and the luntar, which were also creations of the sultanate. The latter was a written observation of members of the ruling class concerning affairs in the sultanate, but no known copy exists except a brief reference to it in Rony Bautista’s write-ups on the sultanate.38 The only known kitab, referred to by Cesar Majul in The Muslims in the Philippines, was that whose authorship was attributed to Hadji Butu Abdul Baqua, the Wazir of Sultan Jamalul Kiram.39 But the material no longer exists.

In the area of oral literature, which abounds in the Muslim South, mention should be made of three narrative forms in Sulu, in addition to such other forms as the damnan (wits), tigum-tigum or tukud-tukud (riddle).40 The parangsabil, which is regarded by
Nora M. Mercado as ballad, is actually an ethno-epic as Arsenio Manuel contends, except that the hero, usually from the non-ruling class, dies triumphantly in the end, killing his enemies or a lot of them. It was evidently inspired by the sabilallah, the Arabic for one who dies in the cause of God. The kissah, which is a short narrative similar to the short story, has for its theme the exploits of the hero, usually of the datu class, who lives and triumphs in the end in his various adventures. The glorification of a pre-sultanate political institution was precisely needed to counteract the eroding effect of the sultanate on the datuship. In the same view, the third narrative form called the katakata is a popular, humorous portrayal of the sultan similar to the trickster stories in Western literature, or the Abu nawa narratives in the Indo-Malay region or the pilanduk pusung stories in Sulu, Lanao and Cotabato, or the “Juan Tamad” and “Pusong” tales in other Philippine ethnic societies. In the katakata, the sultan is tricked or outwitted by the joker-hero, who usually comes from the lower class of society. The narrative is, therefore, a satire on the sultanate system.

Likewise, in art, the impact of the Islamic advent on the sultanate can be readily seen in the ukil or okir designs, the saramok and sarmosque motifs, and the geometric patterns in fabrics, utensils and other things. The ukil, which is found in the Sulu archipelago (including Tawi-Tawi), incorporates the Arabic script amidst fern-like designs. The same is true of the Lanao or Cotabato okir except that the latter has a wide variety of indigenous designs, from ferns to rope, woven into the Arabic script motif. The saramok, which is believed to be Maranao in origin, portrays the rooster and fish motifs in geometric framework. But it differs from the Sulu variation as depicted in the Imao creations where the bird (manok-manok). not the rooster, is the principal focus and where the fish design is absent except in the brasswork. The sarmosque is a distinctly Tausug art form introduced by Abdulmari Imao of Jolo. The motif is centered on the mosque with the manok-manok design integrated to create an artistic harmony of both Islamic and indigenous elements. Geometric designs, which are characteristic of Islamic art and, therefore, of the sultanate, abound in weaponry, royal costumes, ceremonial vessels and various objects from headgear (pis, turban, etc.) to charms (anting-anting, hadjimat, buliga, etc.).
But it was in the area of music and dances where the contribution or impact of Islam on the sultanate had been less or, in fact, non-existent. The music traditions in the various Muslim societies had remained indigenous; that is, the forms and themes had been kept Southeast Asian as suggested in the study of Southeast Asian music by Jose Maceda, foremost Filipino musicologist. The musical instruments known in the localities as agung, kulintangan, gabbang, pulau, biyula, etc. are not traceable to Islamic origin.

In the Sulu archipelago, the musical tradition has revolved around certain patterns which are locally called luguh, lolo, suwah-suwh, dulldang-dulldang, ligaya, tenes-tenes and lelleng. The luguh, possibly the oldest form, is sung in religious and social festivities and follows a crooning, slow tempo. The lolo, which is a Samal musical pattern, follows a slow, then fast, tempo. It captures the movement of the paddle as it touches the water. The suwah-suwh, which is based on a sprouting citrus seed, is a fast and merry tune usually accompanying the pangalay, the only native dance that evolved among the Tausugs, Samals and Yakans. The dulldang-dulldang, which is a pre-war creation, is a musical dialogue sung like the Tagalog balagtasan. The ligaya, tenes-tenes and lelleng are postwar and contemporary cultural phenomena in Sulu with evident modern influences. The first was a creation of Tausug artists during the height of the KamLun Uprising in Jolo and follows more or less a modern rhythm, somewhat reflective of the modern kund'man. The second and third, which are Samal in origin, are contemporary, with the lelleng portraying more closely the Pacific nature of Samal society.

E. The Contemporary Profile

Today, despite the revival of Islam in the Philippines, the sultanate has remained a shadow of the past since the emasculation of the last bulwark of its political authority represented by Sulu in the 1915 Kiram-Carpenter Agreement. In fact, the remaining spiritual and moral authority it was allowed to exercise has been gradually eroded to what it is today, a historic-political artifact. The recent effort to re-establish the Agama and to introduce the Shariah court system does not mean the resuscitation of the sultanate as it was in the beginning because the Shariah-Agama features as stipulated in legal instruments operate within the judicial framework of the Philippines and in pursuance of national,
not regional, political interests. For the revival of the sultanate, as it was, would run counter to national sovereignty.

Consequently, the socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics of the sultanate have been submerged in the modern process with the Sultan assuming the garb and aura of just the ordinary leader vis-a-vis the national leadership, subject to the laws of the land, and earning his livelihood like any landowner (if he had land), entrepreneur, politician, or office-holder except, perhaps, once or twice a year when he puts on the old traditional trimmings and cloak of royalty in a local ceremony, more as a nostalgic rehearsal or recollection of an era long dead.

But unlike the human body which cannot be resurrected except by Divine miracle, a dead institution can be brought again to life. The sultanate is one institution that can be retrieved from the artifacts of history and infused with life. But such a process is contingent upon a lot of factors which are *sine qua non* to a revived sultanate system.

First, contemporary traditional leaders in the Muslim South must be revitalized and convinced that their political future lies precisely in a renewed sultanate. Otherwise, the political base of any process of revival will not be adequate to counter the growing radicalization of some segments of the Muslim leadership.

Second, the revived sultanate must be able to bring the various Muslim groups into a new unified structure for the Muslim South. In effect, the old historical pattern involving three sultanates will not be able to meet contemporary trends in political leadership.

Third, the sultanate has to operate within a modern context equipped with structural and conceptual capacities to respond to modern processes which affect all aspects of community life. Undoubtedly, the old values of the sultanate hinder its ability to react to new challenges and problems associated with modernization, especially the emerging orientation of the Muslim youth.

Lastly, all possibilities of conflict with the Philippine State which assumes sovereignty over the Muslim South have to be explored by in-depth inquiry and realistic assessment; otherwise the prospects of revival are dim.
NOTES

1 For an elaboration of the institutional development from the kamaasmaasan to the sultanate, see Samuel K. Tan's "Unity and Disunity in the Filipino Struggle," Asian Studies (December 1973) pp. 110-132 hereafter "Unity and Disunity."

2 In a series of lectures before the Faculty of History, University of the Philippines, December 1980, John D. Villiers, Director of the British Institute in South East Asia, elaborated on both the origin and development of the "orangkaya" (Ulangkaya in Tausug) in Indonesia and the Malay world, including the Philippines. Naeeb N. Saleeby also referred to the "orangkaya" as one of the important and established local officials in Sulu society in his History of Sulu (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1969).

3 The term "Ulangkaya" in Tausug and Samal, the two principal linguistic traditions in Sulu, means a "man of wealth" as it is in the Indo-Malay world.


6 The native assertion of the "old liberties" in general terms is found in Casimiro Diaz's Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas (Valladolid: Imprenta, Liberia, Heliografia y taller de grabados de Luis N. de Gavia, 1890) as translated in B & R, Vol. XXXVIII. He observed that the natives "could not unite with the others, and although all desired liberty, they did not work together to secure the means for attaining it." (p. 212).

7 The loose confederation of datus was as evident in Sulu as it was in Maguindanao where the sultanate, after Kudarat, began to see the falling away of the datus into traditional patterns especially in the late 19th century. See Cesar A. Majul, The Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973). pp. 317-337 for a discussion of political institutions.

8 Consciousness is particularly given impetus by the growing role and importance of the sultan in the settlement of disputes and conflicts between subjects as well as between datus who until then settled their differences in open hostilities, there being no recognized paramount authority over them.

9 Najeeb M. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905), hereafter referred to as Studies. For a secondary source which

10 Rajah Soliman’s (or Sulayman) role in pre-colonial state construction is briefly discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ Tadhana: The History of the Filipino People (Manila: National Media Production Center, 1976), Vol. II, part I, pp. 41-115; hereafter referred to simply as Tadhana.

11 Mastura elaborates in more detail the roles and functions of the various local officials and institutions of Maguindanao in “Rulers of Maguindanao,” a manuscript submitted to the Philippine Social Science Council, Purok Aguinaldo, Diliman, Quezon City; also Darangen, p. 47.

12 The coronation in 1974 of Sultan Mahakuta Kiram of Sulu in Jolo as successor to Sultan Ismail was accompanied by a display of traditional color and amenities but hardly registering the usual political significance that it once was to the local society. In fact, the subsequent self-proclamation of other claimants to the Kiram throne soliciting government recognition, which is considered ‘vital politically or otherwise, had only hastened the demise of the institution. “Shadow of God” is no longer used today in referring to the sultan as it was in the age of the sultane.


16 Local tradition in Sulu still talks of the once privileged status of the sultan in terms of priority over the best in the land.


18 Salesby, Studies, pp. 70-89.
19 Serafin D. Quiason, “The Tiangue: A Preliminary View,” a paper submitted to the First Symposium of the British Institute in South East Asia, January 27-30, 1981, Singapore. The pouin was a Chinese coin with a hole; the kongan was a coarse woven cloth; the kompon was a linen cloth; the konfong was a black nankeen; the petis was a copper coin.

20 Emerson Christie noted in The Subanum of Sindangan Bay (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1909), that the Subanos used Chinese porcelain as preserved wealth and as index of social status.


22 Ibid. pp. 379-388 also, B& R, 33; Tadhana.

23 Ibid.

24 There is a concentration of Chinese-Tausug, Chinese-Samal mestizos in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, larger than elsewhere in Muslimland.

25 Nicholas Tarling, Sabah and Sulu (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978). The data on trade are integrated in all the chapters, but those in “The Dalympyle Cessions,” pages 1-10, provide a good summary of the beginnings of economic relations involving the Sulu sultanate.

26 Ibid. also, Salesby, The History of Sulu, pp. 219-256.


28 Majul, p. 331.

29 Philippine Claim to North Borneo (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1963), Vol. I.


32 The coronation of Sultans in Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu has been accompanied by traditional pomp and color.

34. Samuel K. Tan, “Folk Islam in the Philippines,” an unpublished manuscript, 45 pages; also, Abdulmari Imao’s “Sarimanok” and “Sarinaghe” motifs in art are clear illustrations of the extent of folk Islamic development in Filipino Muslim cultures.


36. The tarsila text is English translation is found in Saleeby, Studies, pp. 12-66.

37. In Lanao, the numerous sultanates, with no comparable territorial magnitude as Maguindanao or Sulu, are supposedly represented by 17 royal houses located at various points around the lake region where historically the four ancient pangarappons (Maciu, Onagan, Bayabao, and Baloi) were established.

38. Rony Bautista’s manuscript, “Vignettes . . . ,” nostalgically referring to the heyday of the sultanate, was circulated during the coronation of Sultan Mahakutta Kiram in Jolo.

39. Majul, pp. 11-12; also, Saleeby, Studies, p. 12.


41. Tan, Armed Struggle, pp. 140-142.

42. The “Pilanduk” and “Pusong” stories which are common in the Muslim South are similar in a way to the “Pusong” and “Juan Taman” narratives in the Christian areas. But the “Abunnawas” type, which is similar to the Malay “Abu Nawas” stories, are found only among the Tausugs and Samals.

43. Mamitua Saber and D.G. Orellana, Maranao Folk Art: Survey of Forms, Designs, and Meanings (Marawi City: Mindanao State University, 1973). The book is a full treatment of the various types of “okir” and other artistic motifs.

44. Ibid.


46. Ibid.

47. See Jose Maceda’s A Manual of Field Music Research with Special Reference for Southeast Asia (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1981) for a comprehensive view of music in Southeast Asia.

III. THE NAVAL STRUGGLE

The entry of Western civilization into the archipelago brought a kind of relation characterized more by conflicts rather than integration or assimilation. This was best portrayed in the Muslim struggle to preserve their dominance of the seas and waters of the archipelago where their ancient watercraft provided the lifeline of domestic and international trade.

A. The Muslim Fleet

As seafarers and riverine or lake dwellers, the ancient Filipinos (including the Muslims) had to develop watercraft that suited their character and environment. Their communities or settlements were greatly dependent on watercraft for survival. The early vessels were of various types or designs. This was best shown in the canoes which the Spanish expeditions encountered in the Philippines. Pigafetta noted in his account the arrival in Limasawa of a chief from another island on a boat that resembled the typical canoe of the Pacific.

The use of outriggers was a significant change in both concept and function. The small canoes, which were made of carved-out logs, were perfectly suited for short trips across rivers or through treacherous rapids and mangrove swamps, but were not practical for long and oceanic voyages. The larger boats without outriggers, like the kumpits and sapits or lepa, could serve better purposes although they were not as useful as the outrigger ones. Comparatively, they could carry more persons and cargoes than the canoe and could be used for long travel, being designed with big rudders and equipped with sails when necessary. Their wide, rounded bottoms enabled them to stay afloat and withstand rough seas without capsizing. They could be readily converted into comfortable houseboats by just putting over them the kaodjang, which was a wide roof made of nipa palm and easily rolled and tied to the side of the boat. The hull was wide enough for persons to hide or stay under cover. The same was true of the sapit or lepa which was smaller than the kumpit. Eventually, this type of vessel would become the motorized vessels of contemporary times.

In contrast, the Sulu sakayan or pelang was designed with outriggers which were necessary for balance. Its slim and low body
was compensated by its length, enabling it to accommodate more persons than the canoe. The vessel, while providing balance, also kept off contact with strangers within a safe distance. Although it had less docking facility compared with the other type, it was an excellent craft at sea, being very light and not dependent on a permanent rudder but on the navigator who could easily paddle it in any direction. The caracoa, which represented a bigger version of this type of craft, differed only in that it was designed for combat purposes. Its wider body and flat bottom were balanced by bigger outriggers which offered convenience for a greater number of persons who could stand or sit on platforms on both sides of the vessel. It could accommodate 90 barrigas (rowers), as Father Marcelo Francisco Mastrilli so described in his account of the 1637 expedition to Mindanao under Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera. Later, in 1687, the English traveller, William Dampier, would note the same type of vessel but add that it even had rooms constructed for use of the Rajah Laut and his retinue of wives and attendants when he went to an island to hunt. One, therefore, can easily visualize that a fleet of these large vessels could look formidable and impressive in those days. But, by its very design, which underlined lightness and speed, the caracoa could not be fitted conveniently with lantakas or canons and their accessories, a disadvantage that would make it inferior to the slower but more powerful Spanish galleon, galley, or champan, a Chinese vessel which formed part of the colonial fleet. The canoes were suited to the coastal waters and rivers of the archipelago. They were light and could be brought ashore after use.

Later on, larger vessels and bigger canoes were developed, more suited for external trading. The early seacraft were trading vessels used extensively by the coastal communities, with bigger types, including caracoas, probably used in inter-island trade. References to the caracaos were made by early Spanish conquistadores and chroniclers who actually were with the expeditions that went as far as north Borneo. Therefore, as the coastal and the riverine trade increased, the role of the sea regional trade in ancient Southeast Asia stimulated the native manufacture of hundreds of caracoas which could be used for an expanding trade system as well as for defense purposes.

It was from these water-associated activities that the ancient
Filipinos would develop a value system in which the attachment to sea life became an important element in community life. The love of the sea consequently developed well-defined cultural values which have been preserved in the folklore of the various ethno-linguistic groups. But it was, perhaps, best exemplified in the lifestyle of the Muslim communities in the archipelago to whom the roots of our naval tradition can be traced.

Until the advent of the Spanish galleys and galleons, inter-island trade, between Manila and as far as Borneo and the Moluccas, was carried out in ships that were called caracoas, praus, kumpits and sapits which were designed or built like the Chinese sampans with wide rounded bottoms and body made of light wood. They were big enough to carry from twenty to thirty people and their cargoes. A fleet of these ships could easily transport three to five hundred men comfortably.

By its very structure and design, the caracoa or prau (prahu), was suited to the open sea and was not as effective as the kumpit, sapit or canoe in mangrove areas or swamps because of its outrigger. Thus, it was more fitted to serve as a sort of navy for both defensive and offensive activities in contrast to the kumpit or sapit which was very useful for trading purposes. Therefore, the prominent mention of the caracoa or praus being used in the encounters between Muslims and the Spaniards is common in Spanish sources. It was, therefore, from this Muslim seacraft that the early beginnings of the Filipino navy must be viewed.

For both the trading ships and the caracoas, the forces of nature were crucial because it was on them that they depended entirely for effectiveness and usefulness, modern technology being entirely absent in the native concept. Three forces were, therefore, carefully used by the ancient Filipinos, particularly the Muslims, whose knowledge of these forces had been preserved in both their folkloric traditions and their historical experience.

First was the wind whose potentials the natives tried to develop and maximize. With the use of good sails, the different kinds of winds, which appeared during certain periods of the year, could be harnessed for voyages to different areas of the archipelago and even to other parts of Southeast Asia. Spanish sources
and travelers' accounts refer to the northeast and southwest monsoons as well as to the westerly and easterly winds which locally are called `timur' or `timog,' `utara' (north), `satan' (north), `habagat' (east), and `amihan.' From about mid-March until the end of May or the middle of June, gentle winds, called "bonanzas" by Spanish sources, provided leisurely travel in the archipelago when the sea was generally calm. Then in the period following up to about the end of August, the `vendavales' or the southwesterly winds carried Muslim raids from Mindanao and Sulu to the Visayas and Luzon. These were actually part of the larger wind pattern which blew from northwest to southeast starting from the west in all the southwestern seas. These southwesterly winds, which are called `habagat' locally, were followed by some gentle winds from September to October before the `brias' blew, first from the southeast to the north and then from the north to the south.

As in all the galleon travels through the Pacific and Atlantic, wind power was crucial to the activities of the ancient Filipino navy as well as to that of the Spanish. It was, therefore, necessary for the Muslim seafarers to know the time and the direction of the winds in the archipelago. Since reckoning was based on lunar calculations, the Muslims determined the time by observing the behavior of Nature around them by day and the skies at night for navigational direction. But usually more vital was the long experience through numerous voyages of the veteran seamen. It was here that the complementary role of Samal seafarers could best be seen and appreciated.

By their very nature, the currents in the archipelago provided a natural force for mobility. As in the case of the winds in the archipelago, the currents followed certain patterns which did not change. To maximize their utility for travel or naval purposes, the seafarers had only to know the exact time the currents reversed or changed direction and the geographic route through which they passed or the points at which they converged with other currents. Thus, the long experience through years, decades, and centuries of travel were as vital in naval operations as the winds. It was seldom that the ancient Filipinos, including the Muslims, would defy this natural force which had been a source of constant fear and awe since time immemorial.
In fact, the Sulu archipelago is particularly noted for some of the swiftest currents known to men. The name “Sulu” actually has its roots in this creation of nature which had distinguished its inhabitants, the Tausugs (people of the current) since the dawn of history. The term, Sug, which is the local name of Jolo, means current and is the common root of both people and land.

Thus, travel between islands and regions was dependent, to a great extent, on an accurate knowledge of this natural phenomenon. For illustration, take the travel from the island of Manubul to Siasi where the center of municipal government is located. The trip is made by vinta or kumpit early in the morning or before noon when the current called son flows swiftly during high tide towards Siasi. Then, in the afternoon during low tide, the trip back can be made conveniently with the laang, the return current. Otherwise, trips not in conformity with the current flow usually take hours through the coastlines. It was not until the advent of motorized vessels that the lordship of Nature was somewhat neutralized.

The two forces of nature which represented the power sources of the ancient navy were, however, dependent for their maximum benefit on the capacity of man to understand their behavior. There was no quick and easy way to learn their secrets but the perilous path of experience which had claimed the lives of many a seafarer. The risks and difficulties were only minimized by a system of informal education or apprenticeship in which the experienced navigator passed on his knowledge to his son or kinsmen by actual participation in the observation and utilization of the two natural forces. This process of transmission enabled the ancient Filipinos to survive the centuries of travels in search of trade and the struggle against foreign domination.

But in the case of the Filipinos, ethnic interdependence provided the most meaningful support for naval activities or seafaring ventures. Except for the Samals, Ilanuns and Lutaos, the Muslim groups in Mindanao and Sulu were generally land dwellers or land cultivators. Their use of watercraft was rather limited to riverine or lacustrine ventures. The Maranao’s naval orientation was confined to the lake region, a rather limited area to develop a highly responsive type of watercraft. The Maguindanao’s know-
ledge was more or less related to the numerous river networks characteristic of their habitat. Likewise, the Tausugs, who were land dwellers, had very limited exposure to seacraft. This ethnic limitation in experience and orientation due to environmental factors would create a serious problem for sea trade upon which Muslim economies substantially depended. This was the specific area where the Samals, Lutaos, and Ilanuns would contribute almost dominantly because of their seafaring lifestyles.

This sea-oriented sector of the Muslim ecumene played a significant role in the development of the ancient navy. The Ilanuns, sometimes called Iranuns or “Hilanones,” lived along the coasts of Illana Bay, particularly in what is now Malabang. Even before the rise of the Maguindanao Sultanate in the 16th century to which their seafaring activities were integrated, they were known to have sailed from their bases to the coasts of western and northern Mindanao and to as far as Visayas and Luzon in the north and the Malay peninsula in the south, frequently stopping in several islands and points in the Sulu archipelago, including Basilan, Balanggingi, Jolo, and North Borneo. In fact, the term lanun, which is Malay for pirate, was generally used with reference to the Ilanun activities in Southeast Asia. Their expert use of the prau, a light and fast sailing vessel, was effectively harnessed by the Maguindanao sultanate in many of the raids and attacks against Spanish strongholds. They, therefore, provided the Maguindanaos with the seafaring expertise necessary in naval operations as well as with combat power, being themselves warriors, skillful in the use of the kris and the kampilan.

The same was true of the Lutaos, who were seafarers from Ternate, a long-time partner of Maguindanao in the ancient trade. They provided the Maguindanao sultanate with experienced navigators and additional warriors in many of the raids during the early centuries of Spanish rule. Unlike the Maranaos, they were the political executors of Maguindanao's sovereignty over the Sibuguey peninsula where the ancient Subanuns had established their settlements. They resembled the Samals in their seafaring lifestyles and were believed to be actually a part of this ethnic group which was found throughout insular Southeast Asia.

But in no other Muslim society was, perhaps, the role of the seafaring people more crucial than in Sulu. Here, the dichotomy
was quite defined because the Tausugs, who were earlier known as *gimbahanuns*, meaning “people of the forest,” were dependent on the Samals. Not only were they dependent on the Samals for the sea products which they bartered with cassava, fruits, and forest products, but they also were dependent on them for the sea vessels they used in trade and naval activities. Unlike the Yakans whom Francisco Combes called the “Sameacas” and who were the boat-builders in Basilan, the *gimbahanuns*, later the Tausugs, did not develop this industry owing, perhaps, to the highly complementary nature of Samal society which could readily supply what the former lacked. Thus, in the coastal communities or villages from the Siasi island group to Sibutu in Tawi-Tawi, boat-building was a well-developed industry. Of course, the wood, the rattan, the glues, and the bambooes which were needed for the construction of vintas, (*sakayans* or *pelang*), canoes, *praus* (*parau*) *kumpits*, *sapits*, *biggung* (small bancas), and *caracoas* were supplied from the forests of the land dwellers.

The sultan’s navy, which consisted mainly of locally made vessels, integrated both the Tausugs and Samals in its operations with functions or roles which were complementary. The fighting force was provided by the Tausugs who developed a warrior tradition with distinct types of weaponry known locally as *barung*, *kalis* (*kris*) and *budjak* (spear), which are highly offensive and effective from the standpoint of destructive quality and maneuverability. On the other hand, the Samal weapons, except for the harpoon called *sangki* which could be used for combat, were designed for fishing purposes. In fact, the offensive weapons of the Tausugs were generally used. Thus, the Samals provided the navigational expertise for the Sultan’s navy. This interdependent relationship between the two ethnic groups has preserved the unique unity of Sulu society, with ethnicity as well defined as religious orientation.³

In effect, therefore, Nature and man were carefully harmonized in the early concept of the Muslim navy. The mastery of Nature had to be recognized if man was to succeed in his trading ventures or if he was to defend his homeland from foreign intrusion. This concept of harmony with nature, which was also the underlying principle of naval development in the West before the advent of steam, had to be complemented by Man’s dependence
on his fellow beings. This was particularly true of the ancient Filipinos whose communities were both inland and coastal, although the latter characteristic was more dominant, thus necessitating the earliest development of seacraft as the mainstay of the security needs and economies of the communities. In fact, even the inland societies, in a sense, assumed almost a similar pattern because of their riverine or lacustrine locations, whether upriver or downriver. In other words, the development of naval power in ancient times preceded the need for land forces which fore-shadowed the emergence of the modern army.

Then as now, Nature was as unpredictable as man himself. This element of uncertainty in the behavior of the wind and the current had constantly perplexed the ancient seafarers. How to calm a brewing storm or how to tame an unruly current and the surging waves was a puzzle for which the early Filipinos had never ceased seeking the ultimate but elusive solution. The absence or lack of science, in the modern sense, naturally brought the ancient minds to the logical, although non-empirical, end of their search for the supernatural world. The folklores of long ago still reflect the ancient beliefs in the supernatural speaking through the thunder, the lightning, the storms, the typhoons, the waves, or through the sounds of birds, insects and animals in the forest. Any unusual or unanticipated change in the pattern of Nature’s behavior was seen as God and the spirits trying to communicate with men, seeking to demonstrate their wrath or anger for some wrongs committed or some good omitted. This belief was present in the cultures of the early Filipino and their activities, whether on land or sea, were affected by this factor.

Even the Spaniards often sought refuge from broken sails and rudder in Heaven’s hand. This was so reported, for instance, by Juan de Medina in his *Historia*, written probably in 1630. Referring to the “San Nicolás,” a *champan* which sailed from Manila on August 29, 1628 to Panay and which broke its rudder because of strong winds and waves. He said: “It was God’s mercy which was extended to that religious” and “the boat was without help other than that of heaven.”

Thus, the voyages of the ancient seafarers, whether for trading purposes or for naval operations, were incomplete without
certain rituals that sought the help of the Supernatural against unforeseen dangers of the sea or that sought to mollify the angry spirits of the sky and sea. Among the Tausugs and Samals, three ritual formulas were used. The *putika* consisted of the manipulation of sticks, bones, stones or any object by the *imam* or the diviner, using in the performance burnt incense whose scent was sweet-smelling to the spirits. The objects, by their positions, were supposed to indicate the best time for the voyage or to forewarn the planners of any dangers ahead. The *tawal* was often resorted to when actually faced by an impending peril from storms or perilous currents. The navigator or person who possessed this type of power uttered the proper formula, which may be passages from the Koran or some unintelligible words believed to be potent to calm or appease the spirits which guarded the sea or the sky. The diviner stretched his hand towards the sources of danger and commanded the Supernatural to remove the peril. Whether the formula was potent or not was not as important as the psychological impact that such fatalistic belief in the spirits had on the sense of security of the voyagers. Another ritual was the *duwaa* which was performed before the trip was made. It was a ceremony which invoked the spirits for guidance and sustenance throughout the trip. It consisted of the appropriate food offerings such as yellow rice (*kuning*), chicken, fish, vegetables, and fruits which were presented by the *imam*, with burnt incense and specific formulas, including passages from the Koran. A similar ceremony was performed after the return of the voyagers to thank the spirits or God for the safety and success of the trip. The fourth way was a visit to the *tampat* which was usually established on huge rocks on the shores or under the sea or sometimes erected inland beside an ancient well. Spirits, who had control over the forces of nature, were believed to be living in these places. Failure to visit or perform the required offerings could make the trip hazardous, so they said. This was best portrayed by the Maguindanaos under Tagal in 1637 after months of depredations in the north. Before proceeding to Cotabato, their home base, they stopped at Punta Flechas to perform the usual ritual of arrow-throwing and the offering of food items and human blood.

Among the Samals, another ritual called the *omboh* was sometimes performed before the trip. Although it was usually observed for all cases of sickness, it was a rite that venerated the ancestral
spirit – the omboh – which locally meant “one’s maternal or paternal ancestor.” The ancestral spirit was believed to be capable of inflicting injury on the family or person and the ritual was believed to be capable of protecting and freeing the persons from dangers. The performance of this ritual, which was exemplified by the practice of the sama laut of Central Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, consisted of reserving one corner of the house for the omboh. The house had no partitions or rooms because the obstructions could offend the ancestral spirit. A specially-designed trunk for rice, fruits and white cloth was placed at the corner, together with a mat and a pillow. After three days, the foodstuffs were cooked and offered with the appropriate formula from a mixture of Koranic passages and local formulas. There was also another special ritual which was strictly observed by the Tausugs of Tapul island and which resembled the omboh in some ways. It was locally called kaja.8

The power source of the Filipino Muslim navy, which came from Nature, man and spirits, determined not only the types of seacraft to be used and the extent of trading activities in the archipelago and outside but also the course of naval history for the Filipino Muslims of long ago. As noted earlier, the vessels were light, swift, practical and very easy to maneuver. With the use of large sails wind power could drive the prau, caracoa, kumpit, or sapit with incredible speed just as it could readily maneuver swiftly through the current with the rudder or the paddle. By its very structure, it could be driven by several rowers when wind or current power was not available. At the same time, it could also provide space for shelter or sleeping and storage for provisions. The interdependent and complementary character of relations among the ethno-linguistic groups in the Muslim south and the decisive role of spirits in naval concepts brought the unity of nature, man and the supernatural against the new challenge from the West.

B. The Colonial Challenge

The last four decades of the 16th century would witness the Muslim trading vessels being confronted for the first time by the naval power of Spain. By their very design and rationale, the vessels were as much a naval fleet as they were trading seacrafts.
They were not only carrying merchandise and goods in the Manila-Visayan-Mindanao-Borneo trade but also ready warriors who could be summoned to meet an external threat to trade and security. This versatility of the fleet, which was based on the integration of economic profits and defense, was a practical response to primitive simplicity and economy, more effective than the specialization of defense functions in a warrior class and trading work in the merchant-trader class. Even the weaponry of the fleet, which usually consisted of *kris*, *kampilan*, *barang*, and spears, was not only very effective for hand-to-hand combat but was also useful for other cutting purposes.

In 1569, the Muslim fleet of twenty vessels which came from Sulu with the first southwest monsoon saw the first encounter with a Spanish fleet under master-of-carp Martín de Goiti off the coast of Cebu. In this engagement the Muslim traders were divested of their merchandise and four of their vessels were seized and the crew enslaved. This was an indication of the first successful interdiction of the profitable trade between Manila and the southern islands which had been developed for a long time by the Muslims. In fact, the trade relations had even established strong political ties between the sultans of the two geographic poles, to the extent that Governor Francisco Sar delarte had to conduct the expeditions to the south as far as the Moluccas and Borneo to destroy the political links and in its place establish the sovereignty of Spain. The Muslims saw in the encounter that the Spanish ships were better equipped with culverins and the soldiers with muskets and arquebuses. The Spanish attitude towards the Muslims and the Visayans must have been so vile that Father Diego de Henero, Provincial of the Augustinians, would refer to the situation in 1570 as “inhuman acts” of the soldiers in the Visayas.

This historic naval encounter between East and West off the coast of Cebu would later be followed by the sack of the Muslim stronghold of Manila in 1570 by Martín de Goiti even after partaking of the ancient ritual of friendship, the *sandugo*, with Rajah Sulayman, the youthful chieftain of Manila. Sulayman’s fleet of innumerable *praus* was seized, his one thousand five hundred houses were burned, several of his cannons were taken, and five hundred Muslims were killed. After this clever occupation of the capital port of the archipelago, Sulayman’s navy became a
mere part of history. The Muslim era in Luzon had ended and Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago was proclaimed by Legazpi in the presence of "All the Captains with their companies." From this point on, the Spanish fleet would begin its spoiling missions in Luzon and in the southern seas to destroy Muslim control of commerce in the archipelago by destroying their naval supremacy. This was done by establishing Spanish or Christian strongholds in Manila and Cebu, and by initiating the reduccion in the coastal communities. In this, the Spaniards were aided by Visayans in their praus.

One compelling factor in the southern thrust of Spain was the Portuguese ties with Ternate, an ally of Maguindanao against Spain, which seriously undermined Spanish interests and ambition in the south. It was not until 1580, when Portugal and Spain were united under one crown, that the Portuguese problem was solved. But this political expediency was too late to undo the harm that the Portuguese had done on Muslim-Spanish relations just as it was difficult for the Muslim South to forget the appearance in Brunei of a Spanish armada of forty ships with four hundred Spaniards, one thousand five hundred Filipinos and three hundred Borneans under Sande in 1575; or the punitive expedition to Jolo under Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa in 1578; or the two expeditions in 1579 against Mindanao, Sulu and Brunei under Captain Gabriel de Rivera and Juan de Arce Sardonil.

It was from the aftermath of the Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in Southeast Asia and from the deliberate Spanish seizures of Muslim trading vessels that a change from trading to defense and offense developed in the Muslim concept. While the Sultan’s fleet, usually led by one of his datus or kinsmen, was not altogether devoid of its commercial mission, it had, however, acquired the more important task of initiating retaliatory attacks against Spanish interests for the injury that the latter had inflicted on Muslim commerce and polity. The shift from a trading fleet to a raiding and retaliatory navy marked the dramatic evolution of the Filipino Muslim navy from the beginning of the 17th century until about the middle of the 19th when another fundamental change in concept emerged. This pattern was only temporarily disrupted by an interregnum of relative peace and quiet from 1663 to 1719.
The retaliatory offensives of the Muslim fleet were not always conducted from the mainland of Mindanao or from Sulu although they originated from these points. Strategic bases had been used by Muslim seafarers since the trading days of the pre-Spanish era. These were located at the coastal villages of Bojelbeng and Maluso in Basilan island; at the Pilas group of islets northwest of Basilan, a favorite pirate’s lair; at the Samal and Iranum island of Balanggingi; at Cuyo island off Palawan; at Burias island west of Masbate; and at Mindoro, especially Naujan and Calapan. It is quite apparent that these bases were established on the western side of the archipelago, which was the sea lane that was regularly used in the Manila-Borneo trade along which the port communities, and, later, cities, developed. No similar pattern emerged in the eastern side of the archipelago which faces the Pacific and through which the lonely galleon plied its way from Acapulco to Manila. Perhaps, one reason for this lopsided geographic development of the archipelago in ancient times, which has remained unaltered, was the fact that ancient Filipino trade had long been linked with China, India, and Southeast Asia and the impact of the galleon trade on the pattern was almost nil. In fact, the colonial trade was merely an addition to the pattern, being dependent on the Asian trade for its rationale.

From the bases, depending on the places to be raided, the Muslim fleet could readily launch operations which would have taken weeks from the home bases in Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu, and, which had to be done in consonance with the definite patterns of the winds and the currents. But from nearby bases, the raids could be conducted at will with the light *caracoas* which were designed to accommodate several rows of oarsmen and warriors.

Although anti-Spanish sentiment was already evident within the Maguindanao leadership, particularly in the attitude of Kapitan Laut Buisan, son of Datu Bangkaya from a “woman of Slangan” named Umbum, and father of the famous Sultan Kudarat, the beginning of a concerted attack on Spanish rule came with Adasaolan's fleet of eight *joangas*, a swift boat of Sulu manufacture. But he was killed in this encounter. It was from this point that Adasaolan sought alliance with both Maguindanao and Borneo against the sword of Castille.
But even before the combined effort materialized, the Maguindanaos attacked the Visayas in 1595 in the first blow of the vendavales, assisted by their Ternatan allies. The coastal villages of Panay were raided and captives taken, followed by an attack on the coast of Cebu where many captives and loot were taken and several were killed. Only one Muslim vessel was seized by the Spaniards and the crew captured or killed. The subsequent dispatch on April 1, 1596, at the time of the bonanzas, of Esteban Rodríguez de Figueroa to Mindanao was the Spanish answer to the attack as Spain had been nurturing the hope of destroying the "heir of Mahoma" and to stop gold tributes from going to the Maguindanao Sultan. Figueroa never had the premonition that he would fall from a kampilan in what would be his last battle. The Spanish force of fifty vessels, consisting of two hundred sixty four Spaniards and one thousand and five hundred native contingents assisted by several "Tingues" and hundreds of Tampakan Muslims, was opposed to Datu Sirongan of Buayan. The Spanish Fort of Murcia was re-established at Tampakan by Juan de Lara, Rodríguez’s master-of-camp, but was later abandoned by the Spanish forces which retired to Kawit, Zamboanga, renamed Fort "La Caldera." The subsequent return, on February 6, 1597, of the forces to Pulangi under Captain Toribio de Miranda was resisted by Sirongan who succeeded in seizing Tampakan, killing seventy of its residents. It was at this time that a naval fight occurred on the Pulangi where several vessels were sent through the Spanish blockade by Sirongan to seek aid from Ternate. Some of the vessels were captured by Sargento Mayor Diego de Chaves but the others succeeded in getting through.

Meanwhile, Juan Ronquillo del Castillo, “General of the Galleys and encomendero of Candaba and Laguna,” sailed on February 8 to take charge of the Mindanao campaign. Ronquillo’s campaign up the Pulangi towards Buayan was fiercely resisted by thousands of Maguindanaos with the assistance of Ternatans who manned the artillery and instructed the warriors in the use of the arquebuses they had supplied to Sirongan. The tactical surrender of the scheming Sirongan resulted in an agreement on April 29, 1597 in which the only demands Ronquillo made were the return of Visayan captives, the payment of tributes, and the political break with Ternate. But the peace was precarious and Ronquillo’s fleet terrorized the Muslim villages along the Rician river and
planned an attack on the Ternatan fleet that had just arrived in November to give support to Maguindanao and Buayan. Ronquillo took the whole Ternatan fleet, together with ten pieces of artillery, fifty arquebuses, an assortment of valuable items, and killed several chiefs and kachils, including Kachil Baba, uncle of the Sultan of Ternate. But Sirongan remained as yet to be conquered. This did not materialize as Ronquillo broke camp and moved to La Caldera where he established his fort in accordance with Governor Juan Tello's order.

In June 1599, a Maguindanao fleet of fifty caracoas under Salikula and Sirongan, with about three thousand men armed with arquebuses, kampilans, and culverins, attacked Panay, burning crops and taking booty and captives. The same pattern of raid was made on other Visayan areas. In 1600, about the time of the vendavales, seventy caracoas of eight thousand men under Salikula attacked Bankayan island off Cebu, destroyed the Church, took eight hundred captives, sailed away as fast as they came, and raided Arevalo while the Spanish fleet under Captain Coleto was feverishly searching for them. The Arevalo Church was burned and six hundred captives were taken. This was followed by a raid on Baclayon where the burning, looting and killing were surprisingly omitted, giving the impression that the targets of the Muslim fleet were areas or communities from where Spanish expeditions came or were supported.

But a brilliant naval strategy was effected in 1602 by the Maguindanaos to maneuver Spanish presence away from Jolo to Panay and Cebu. With excellent use of Maguindanao, Subanun, Samal, and Lutao informers, Buisan and Sirongan, the two heads of the planned attack, succeeded in making Captain Juan Juarez Gallinato leave Jolo, thus freeing the route from the Sulu Sea through Palawan, Mindoro and then to Manila. The attack was two-pronged: one fleet was placed under Sirongan to raid Cuyo, Calamianes and Palawan and the other fleet was led by Buisan to harass the Tagalog coasts. The force under Sirongan was not as successful as that of Buisan because the Spanish garrison at Cuyo had been alerted by the presence of Camucones in the area who, in the past, usually followed in the wake of Maguindanao raids. But Buisan captured a ship bound for Manila from Cebu including ten Spaniards, repeating the same pattern in Mindoro and Batangas
and taking a lot of booty and captives. The Spanish fleet sent from Manila to destroy Buisan’s squadron failed to catch up with him as he resorted to throwing some of his captives overboard, forcing the Spanish vessels to pick them up and thus allowing Buisan to escape just before the monsoons changed. Although Spanish efforts were intensified by Governor Acuña, the Maguindanaos in their swift caragoas continued their raids. In October, when the new wind pattern, the brisas, had just begun and the Spaniards ordinarily did not expect raids on the Visayas, Buisan had already positioned himself for an attack on Leyte with a fleet of fifty vessels and a thousand men. The town of Dulag was surprised on the dawn of October 29 when Buisan’s fleet attacked, taking several captives, including Father Melchor Hurtado, and destroying the church and the village. He promised to release the captives for ransom on his return from the north. From here the fleet raided Polo, and, on his return, he dropped by at Dulag where he took the ransoms and released the captives as he promised but not before he invited the chiefs and people to join the Maguindanaos in a holy crusade against the Spaniards. It was at this point that the chiefs understood Buisan’s mission and they all partook of the ancient sandugo before Buisan sailed away via Surigao and along the eastern coast of Davao to Cape San Agustin and then to Cotabato thru the Moro Gulf. In 1604, Buisan again descended on Calamianes with his fleet, taking fifteen Spaniards and booty. In 1605, he was preparing another fleet for attack on the Visayas despite peace between Sirongan and the Spaniards but his plan had to be deferred because a Spanish armada, which could be used against him, was being readied in Iloilo for the Moluccas campaign which had taken priority in Spanish interest. About the same time, on September 8, 1605, the peace treaty between Spain and Ma-
guindanao was signed in Buayan with Buisan’s implicit approval after getting the promise of a “swivel gun” from the Sirongan and the Spaniards. Subsequently, on his way to the Moluccas, Galli-
nato delivered the promised gun.

It was not until 1608 that Buisan’s fleet was again poised for a renewed incursion into the Visayas. This was prompted by Dutch attacks on the Spanish-Portuguese base in the Moluccas, which resuscitated Ternatan political initiatives against Spanish interests. With 67 caragoas, Buisan attacked and burned the coasts of Samar and Leyte but was engaged by a Spanish fleet under
Alcalde Mayor Salgado of Cebu, causing the Maguindanao fleet to disperse. In 1609, the combined fleets of Sigrongan, Buisan and the Rajah Mura were surprised by a Spanish fleet under Gallinato in Pangil Bay where a ferocious naval fight occurred. Before the Maguindanaos yielded, thirteen of their biggest caracos were destroyed, being unable, as in the open sea, to maneuver as fast as they should. However, about sixty caracos managed to evade Gallinato’s blockade. Meanwhile, the Caragans had joined the Maguindanao raids but it was not until 1613 that Datu Qagdalanun of Pulangi, with three squadrons, including Caragans, sacked Samar and Leyte, and carried away a total of 1,000 captives. But the subsequent Spanish conquest of the Caragans of Bislig put a temporary stop to Maguindanao depredations. Until 1634 the raids were not resumed except, perhaps, an incident involving a Maguindanao chief named Salin who refused to yield an artillery piece secured from the Spanish authorities in Cebu on Sultan Kudarat’s request. He consequently died from an arquebus shot but not before hacking to death a Spaniard who had fallen overboard and was clinging to a rope for his life. Salin split his skull with a kampilan blow.  

During this interregnum in Maguindanao’s raids, Dutch control of Ternate had caused the movement of peoples, like the Lutaos, to Maguindanao where they added substantially to Maguindanao’s naval build-up. This naval development plan had to be supported by the revival of trade between Maguindanao and Southeast Asian centers, where Indian-Chinese commerce had its base. Consequently, peace with the Spaniards was a precondition to Maguindanao’s naval progress. It was at this point, when Maguindanao was going into hibernation, that the Sulu Muslims would begin another process of struggle in which the ancient navy would play a vital role as if Providence had prepared them for this transition. But this new role would require more resources than what the Sulu sultanate had then. This would naturally be found in some kind of “foreign aid.”

In 1614 Sultan Rajah Bongsu sought Dutch alliance against Spanish pressure in Mindanao. A Sulu fleet of 80 caracos attacked the Visayas before Captain Lazaro Flores dispersed them at Punta Potal where six of the piraguas were destroyed and forty of
the crew were killed and some taken captives. Then, between Cebu and Negros, eight caracoas were taken by a Spanish fleet and several were likewise captured off Cavite, but not before the Muslims destroyed the shipyard and took several Spaniards for ransom. The Sulu fleet also attacked Pantao in Camarines Sur where the raiders burned a galleon and two pataches, captured 400 persons in the shipyard, and killed about 200. No Spanish retaliation was made but the construction of joangas, similar to the Sulu caracoas used in the raids, was undertaken and they were stationed in Iloilo. By their lightness and maneuverability, the light vessels deterred the Sulu raids which Spanish sources described as minor problems. Like Maguindanao, Sulu lapsed briefly into a precarious calm, joining in the renewal of trade ties between Manila and the Muslim south, thus reliving the ancient trading rationale of the Muslim fleet before the Spanish advent.11

By 1625 both Maguindanao and Sulu had become flourishing centers of trade in the region. As such, they were also able to consolidate politically and to improve their military capacities with support from the Dutch. But the Spaniards still had to deal with the Camuones who owed no allegiance to anyone but themselves and who attacked a village where the Archbishop of Manila visited, killing and plundering the villages, and carting away all the clothes and pontifical wardrobe of the archbishop who fled deshabille.

The peace between the Spaniards and the Muslims could have lasted longer. The Muslims had just begun to enjoy the revival of economic activities in the south. But Spanish miscalculation and error based on a colonial mistrust for anything native brought Sulu to another confrontation with the Colonial State. The incident of 1625 which triggered this situation was the harsh way in which the Spanish authorities dealt with Datu Ache and his trading fleet which left Jolo as part of the renewed trade relations between Sulu and Manila. Datu Ache was arrested and humiliated despite protests that he and his men were on an official trip to trade with Manila. Sulu’s answer to this humiliation was Raja Bongsu’s naval attack on the Visayas, with a fleet of thirty joangas or large caracoas and about 2,000 men, capturing two Spanish ships, two Spaniards, 60 natives and a lot of iron. The latter was an article that was highly prized by the Muslims, showing that in their naval
development the use of iron as well as knowledge of the ship’s artillery and weaponry was beginning to get attention. From Oton, a Spanish fleet with native contingents met a Camuneses fleet of seven caracoas capturing three of them and killing the crew. A large carcoa was caught off Cebu, its crew killed except six who were taken alive on their vessel to Cebu. The natives, who wore no clothes, fought the Spanish fleet with stones, slings and spears, showing their primitive character. They had no firearms or iron weapons, and their vessel had no nails. A stone chisel was found among the things they had and they ate lice, similar to a tribe in Borneo. The establishment of a shipyard in Camarines was partly due to the need to construct galleons, galleys and brиган- 
tines for use against predatory fleet (which harassed the coastal communities for sheer material profit) as well as for regular camp-
aigns against the Muslim south.

Soon Bongsu obtained information on the location of the Camarines shipyard which became the principal target of his mission. Just before dawn, seven hundred of his men pounced on the unsuspecting inhabitants, killing both natives and Spaniards. Twelve Spaniards and some residents led upriver, leaving “the King of Jolo and his men” for some days “eating and drinking as if in their own homes.” Bongsu took with him “four pieces of artillery, collected all the iron that he could load into the ships, and scatterd into the sea one thousand fanegas of rice.” This indicated that Bongsu was not mainly interested in plunder. The only benefits or rewards he wanted were the iron weapons, the destruction of the Spanish shipyard, and “a Spanish woman” he took to add to his harem. But as revealed in a letter he left for the Governor before leaving for home, his reason for the naval attack was the imprisonment of his envoy, Datu Ache, and the seizure of three “beautiful pearls of extraordinary size” from him.

From the shipyard, Bongsu’s fleet attacked Bantayan which was defended with arquebuses by three Spaniards and one secular priest and which was protected by large thorns found in the island. The raiders used wooden-abaca shoes and succeeded in sacking Ogomu village, taking loot and three hundred natives. Cristobal de Lugo, with a fleet of caracoas, gave chase. The Muslims abandoned eight small boats and outdistanced the Spanish fleet.
with their swift *joangas* whose prows were such that they could be rowed without turning them around. The injury done to Spanish pride by the Jolo fleet was sufficient reason for a Spanish punitive expedition to Jolo on April 22, 1626 under Cristobal de Lugo. The two squadrons of forty vessels, including *caracoas* provided by the natives of Oton and Cebu, involved two hundred three Spaniards and one thousand five hundred Filipinos. They attacked Jolo settlements, including the Sultan’s palace on top of the hill; carted away gold, silver, cloth, one hundred fifty muskets, arquebuses, two falcons, three versos, a Spanish flag; and burned the settlements, including a huge supply of rice, sixty *joangas*, and about a hundred vessels “so that not a single ship was left to them.” No casualties were sustained by the Spanish troops as the Sultan and villagers fled to the hills. The spoilers did not even spare the three “highly esteemed” tombs of the sultanate. As instructed by the Governor General, Cristobal sent the Governor’s letter to the Sultan in answer to the latter’s note during the sacking of Camarines. The Sultan sent a reply, written by Doña Lucia, the Spanish woman he had captured, expressing in courteous language that he could not return the Spanish woman even for the six hundred pesos offered. She had become the Sultan’s favorite and an influential person in his realm, but the Sultan would accept the amount offered in exchange for the falcons, versos, and a slave woman seized by the Spaniards. The demands could be met except for the three artillery pieces which the Spaniards refused to return, not even for Doña Lucia. Consequently, the Sultan and Joloanos lost all their valuable possessions, including the fleet of one hundred forty vessels on which depended Sulu’s power.

From Jolo, Cristobal proceeded to Basilan where the troops burned houses, crops and palm trees. But no injury was done on the inhabitants who were forewarned of the Spanish plan and who fled to the hills leaving behind “nothing but common things.” By 1628, the Spaniards had definitely pursued the building of at least three galleys, four brigantines and forty *caracoas* “to take vengeance on the Moros of Borneo, the Camucones, and the Joloans.” The report of Fr. Hernando Estrada in 1629 confirmed the Spanish sack of Jolo from which Sulu would not be able to recover for a long time. However, what remained a problem, as Pedro de Pardo reported in 1629, were the Camucones fleet which had no base of their own but which preyed on any oppor-
tunity for plunder, usually taking part in Muslim raids whenever they were within the vicinity. Their fleets, therefore, were equivalent to the remontados or vagamundos in the hinterlands who escaped from the reduccion and who also attacked Christian villages. Thus the Spanish fleet, while concerned with the Muslim attacks, was also seeking to punish or destroy these marauders of the sea whom Fernando de Silva described as “a people who were accustomed to rob these coasts in vessels so light that they rely upon these alone.”

In 1629, Datu Ache’s fleet of thirty six caracoas attacked Camarines, Samar, Leyte and Bohol. It was this occasion that prompted Governor Niño de Tabora to destroy the enemy in their own homeland as a matter of strategy. So that on March 17, 1630, a punitive expedition of twelve champans and fifty caracoas with four hundred Spaniards and two thousand five hundred natives left under Mariscal de Campo Lorenzo de Olaso to attack Jolo. The expedition was a disaster and induced another raid by a Sulu fleet in 1632 on Leyte and Calamianes, taking captives for the slave market of Batavia and holding Spaniards for ransom. In 1634, Maguindanao finally joined Sulu in a concerted armada of twenty-two caracoas and one thousand five hundred men to attack the Visayas and went as far as Tayabas. This merging of naval power involving the strongest Muslim sultanates in the south was actually an indication of a Muslim strategy to pressure the Spaniards out of the region. The sending in March 1635 of Juan de Chavez with three hundred Spanish and one thousand Visayan troops to establish a garrison in Zamboanga was answered the following year with the first blow of the “vendavales” with Tagal’s eight caracoas conducting depredations in the Visayas, Palawan and Mindoro. They were aided as usual by the Camucones. The months of depredations loaded Tagal’s fleet with several captives and booty, but he was finally overtaken by an angry Spanish fleet which destroyed them at Punta Flechas, the place where they stopped to offer the usual homage and rituals to their guardian spirits. The subsequent campaigns of Governor Sebastian Hurtado de Cormeira, with two hundred fifty Spaniards and one hundred Pampangos in eleven champans, led to the capitulation of Maguindanao, followed by the humbling of Basilan, and the fall of Jolo. The later Spanish expeditions even reached Borneo to destroy the Camucones.
What the resounding Spanish success meant to the Muslims was the need to acquire a working knowledge of Western weaponry. This would explain the feverish effort of the Sulu Muslims to seize Spanish or foreign vessels and their hardware whenever and wherever possible. But the artillery pieces and guns, which were carted away in the raids, had remained decorative fixtures in the Sultan’s arsenal, the knowledge of their use being almost non-existent. This handicap plagued the Muslim fleet for the duration of its struggle against the colonial navy.

Thus the destiny of the Muslim south as a part of the Colonial State was only pre-empted by the Spanish withdrawal from Mindanao in 1663 owing to the rumored Chinese threat on Manila. This withdrawal gave respite to Maguindanao and Sulu which had been increasingly subjected to military pressures from the Spanish navy. Consequently, the Muslim South turned its attention internally to examine its own weaknesses while at the same time seeking opportunities from the outside to improve its resources, especially its naval capabilities.

The interregnum saw the Muslim fleet recreating its trading functions of yesteryears, while at the same time also the Muslims sought what the European ships coming to Mindanao had to offer for their traditional seacraft which had not been effective against the colonial navy. In 1689, the Maguindanao tried to detain the English Cygnet and its crew in the Pulangi delta for several months through various means, from promises of rich economic returns to offers of liberal hospitality to the weary crew, including a local form of feminine attraction called the pugally and a site for a factory. The Englishmen never knew that the impoverished sultanate was trying to ground the English ship by a natural tear done by a kind of worm which could eat up a ship’s bottom in weeks as had happened to some unsuspecting vessels in the past. However, the Cygnet was made of different materials invulnerable to the worms’ attacks.

Thus, by the 18th century, Maguindanao’s navy virtually passed out into impotence which had marked its development since Kudarat’s death in 1671. What remained was a sultanate torn by internal conflicts with one claimant to the throne, Kahar-ud Din, seeking Sulu’s naval aid against his rival, Bayan ul
Answar, who was also asking the Dutch for help. Apparently, Sulu still had a sizeable navy because Sultan Shaoud Din responded to Kahar ud Din’s importunings with an expedition of seventy-five vessels to Sabanilla, but only to end up fighting a dramatic duel with his beneficiary and killing him. Thus the Muslim navy from this time on was mainly represented by the Sulu fleet.

It would not be until 1719, when Fort Pilar was reestablished in Zamboanga, that Sulu’s fleet would begin its critical struggle for survival. In 1730, a fleet of thirty-one vessels with three thousand men under Datu Sabdula attacked Dumaran Island and Taytay in Palawan, but a Spanish expedition of all sorts of vessels put Jolo island to the torch in retaliation. Then Sulu attempted to attack Zamboanga with four hundred fifty men and later, with two thousand warriors including Maguindanaos. But the ambitious venture reduced Spanish pressure. This was aggravated by an internal conflict in the Sultanate which drove Sultan Azim ud Din (Alim ud Din) to Spanish arms. Sultan Azim ud Din’s long sojourn in Manila, from 1742 to 1746, marked the political decline of Sulu, with Bantilan merely trying to hold the break-up for as long as possible by renewing raids and seeking support from the Ottoman Sultan. The raids by sixty-eight vessels of Kalibo (Panay) and Ilog (Negros), by fifty-seven of Banton, and twenty-five of Palompon became the “bloodiest” in the history of Muslim attacks, prompting the Spaniards to believe that the Muslim resistance was an evil which could be eradicated by a policy of “annihilation.” The hundreds of captives taken for the slave trade drained Spanish resources and drastically cut the number of tributes in affected areas. The British occupation from 1762-1764 aggravated the Spanish plight and provided Sulu with a new opportunity to strengthen her naval capacity by the procurement of guns, artillery and weapons from English traders. All these preparations were aimed at consolidating the Muslim South with the hope that the Sulu fleet would become the master of the sea. The increase in trade with English ships offered hopes for Sulu’s aspirations and subsequent attacks on the Visayas and Luzon reached as far as Manila Bay, Paranaque and Pasay in 1769 with a fleet of caracoas and a fighting force composed of Maguindanao, Maranaos and Tirones. Thus, the late 18th century presented a good prospect for Sulu’s economy, and, consequently, her naval capability. But despite this, one fundamental weakness in Sulu’s naval devel-
opment was the almost total dependence on the personal qualities of the warriors and her traditional weaponry. The effort to secure Western hardware, including the best artillery pieces and guns which were paid for in slaves, was not complemented with the actual training of men in the proper use of the weapons that would bring Sulu eventually to the same fate as Maguindanao. Apparently, the lessons of history were not as quickly or readily learned.

For a while the early decades of the 19th century appeared to confirm Sulu’s political ambition as her defiance against Spain continued even with English reluctance to revive trading activities after the tragic massacre of the English trading port at Balambangan in 1775. Meanwhile, the Sulu leadership was not aware that in Spanish circles, the problem of Sulu’s naval raids was now getting more attention than it used to and would usher in the Spanish ultimate answer to the sea raiders—the steam gunboat. But this could not be implemented immediately because of the more serious political problem in Europe brought about by the Napoleonic wars. It was not until 1815 that Spanish attention could be focused on the colonies, including the Philippines. Thus, the full responsibility for the security of the Philippine colony was given to the colonial administration, and particularly, to Admiral Ignacio Maria de Alava to strengthen the colonial navy in accordance with a royal decree of September 27, 1800. This decree gave him authority over Philippine naval affairs and the Cavite shipyard. As conceived by Alava, the new naval thrust included the creation of a Naval Bureau in Manila and a new shipyard in Binondo under Jose Blanchi, a shipbuilder, with particular emphasis on the building of boats equipped with many guns not found in the old vessels. This pseudo-modernization of the Spanish navy through technology, which was actually embodied in the 1870 “Plan of Reforms” of Governor Marquina, was the long awaited solution to the poor defense system of the archipelago and would mark the process towards the ultimate destruction of Muslim naval power.

Meanwhile, the Sulu Muslims had been impressed by the quality of ships the Europeans, especially the English, had brought to Jolo. The display of British firepower was made by the English East India Company in Fort Pilar. Unfortunately, by 1810, Sulu had been plagued by an internal conflict involving a challenger to
Sultan Ali ud Din -- Datu Bantilan. The conflict revealed the underlying problem of Muslim societies in which internal political interests tended to outweigh external concerns. It was here where the colonial forces succeeded in creating a breach from which Muslim societies became increasingly vulnerable to Western intrigues and pressures. This was first demonstrated in the way the Spaniards used to advantage the internal break-up of Maguindanao and the Spanish navy became the undisputed master of Ilana Bay and the Pulangi after their gunboats destroyed the resisting costazas. With the establishment of a Spanish base in Pollok in 1851, the Maguindanao fleet became just a part of history and resistance shifted to land confrontations until the end of Spanish rule.

In effect, by the middle of the 19th century, the Maranao, Ilanun and Maguindanao fleets had ceased to be significant in armed conflict. This became more and more apparent with the successful conquest of Davao by Jose Oyanguren in 1849 in which the role of the steamboat Elcano was decisive. Named “Nueva Guiszpuzcoa,” Davao became another point in the encircling movement of Spanish arms and ships to contain and dismantle Muslim control in the area. In this, a flotilla of the corvettes Narvaez, Constancia and Valiente, the schooner Animosa, four large rowboats, the transport ships San Vicente, Soledad and Scipion and other vessels were used in 1861. Consequently, Tamontaka was established as a Jesuit base in 1861 and converts were reported in 1863. The only consolation the Maguindanao Sultan got was a “volley of seven cannonades” from Pollok base as befitted his new title of “Teniente General,” a designation given to him by the Royal Decree of 1860 together with the title of “Caballero Grand Cruz” (Knight of the Great Cross).

In the same manner, while Maguindanao was being emasculated of its naval power, Sulu was still flexing her muscles and slave-raiding continued with the participation of roving Ilanuns and Balanggingi Samals. Spanish retaliation could have been immediate but the strategic place of Sulu in the trade pattern, which also benefited the Spanish Colonial State, was a factor which could not be ignored. The Treaty of 1836 with Sulu was meant precisely to secure what a punitive expedition was expected to accomplish. But the entry of the United States through the Wilkes expedition in 1844 and the French adventure off Basilan in 1843—with the
corvette Favorite, the warship Sabine, later, the 50-gun frigate Cleopatra, and the war steamers Victoriouse and Archimede--aggravated the colonial problem. It also finally destroyed Sulu’s naval threat in the southern seas, and opened Sulu’s coastal settlements to vulnerable artillery attacks from the gunboats. The 1848 pounding of the Sipak fort in Balanggingi by the Spanish navy was a good example.

The attack by Tongkil Muslims in 1850 on Samar and Camiguin and the cannon shots from the shore batteries of Sultan Pulalun no longer bothered the Spaniards as the steamboats were eliminating one by one the raiding fleet from the sea. Thus, Sulu’s hope for survival depended on land defenses and assistance from the European rivals of Spain. The attack by Governor Urbiztondo on Jolo and Tongkil, which involved a fleet of one corvette, one brigantine, six steamboats, two gunboats, nine tenders, nine transports and twenty-one balangays, with various vintas, lankas and rafts, inflicted serious damage on Sulu’s cottsas, villages and fleet from which recovery was very difficult. But in 1860, a daring raid by a fleet of four hundred Muslims slipped through San Bernardino straits and attacked Visayan villages. This appeared to be the last of the great Muslim raids because eighteen steamships were brought from England in 1861 to put an end to the activities of the Sulu fleet. In fact, Jolo was subjected to bombardment in 1872 by the Spanish navy, followed in 1876 by the Malcampo expedition of nine thousand troops in a fleet of ten steamboats, eleven transport boats and twelve gunboats. From this date, Sulu resistance to colonialism was strictly confined to the defense of her homeland and the southern seas became the playing ground of ships and gunboats of the Western powers.

C. The End of the Line

While the period after 1876 saw the Muslim fleet finding their place only in oral literature and history, the period for the Filipinos as a people actually represented a sort of transition to a new stage in the development of the Filipino navy. It was a time when the Christian Filipinos, who had been a part of the colonial navy since its beginnings in the archipelago, began to witness the crucial shift in naval technology from nature to steam.
They saw in the various expeditions in which they participated as rowers, and then, eventually as soldiers, the effective capacities of steamships in destroying the ancient Muslim fleet which depended solely on Nature’s power. It was this eye-opening experience for the Filipinos, whose consciousness had transcended the ethnic barriers by the middle of the 19th century, that would soon enable the revolutionary government to take over the colonial navy and briefly use it before it was seized by the Americans at the outbreak of the Filipino-American War in 1899.

In assessing the development of the early Filipino navy, represented by the Muslim fleet, it seems that three patterns were clear. First, the navy actually consisted of four components which were separate but mutually interdependent. The Maguindanao navy, which was one of the earliest to develop a concept of strategy and defense, was dominant during the 15th and early decades of the 17th Century. The Sulu fleet, which was contemporaneous with Maguindanao, was really a part of the Brunei or Borneo naval pattern, the sultanate of Sulu and its people being culturally and historically related to the Brunei sultanate. It was not until the effective isolation of Sulu from the Brunei political process by the Colonial State that Sulu evolved its own distinct navy. The Ilanun naval component was a semi-autonomous fleet, which was attached to the Maguindanao fleet, and then, later to the Sulu fleet, before it emerged as a small independent fleet in the 19th century and literally confined to Ilana Bay. The Maranao fleet of small vessels in the Lake region could hardly be regarded as a naval threat since its activities were mainly confined to the Lake region. On the other hand, the Camucones fleet was not politically integrated into either the Maguindanao, Sulu or Ilanun naval systems.

But by virtue of their operations in the archipelago, the various native fleets actually constituted a unit from the standpoint of naval concept, design and operations. As stated earlier, they were all dependent on the effective use of wind, current and human power, strengthened by an ancient belief in the role of spiritual or supernatural forces as expressed through appropriate symbols, ceremonies and rituals. Their vessels, except perhaps for the artistic designs which followed the ethnic motifs, were mostly of the curacao type in both small and large categories. However, the small boats or vessels were distinct to the ethnic
groups. The weapon complement of the fleet was generally traditional. The fighting caracoas, including the Sulu joangas, which were so designed that they could be rowed without turning around, were not armed with cannons or culverins, or their warriors with muskets and arquebuses. The weapons consisted of kampilans, kris, barungs (for Sulu), and spears. Thus, they were only effective in the open sea where they could disperse and maneuver conveniently and elude the Spanish fleet. Their lightness gave the advantage of outdistancing the slower Spanish vessels which were usually loaded with cannonballs and bulk cargo until the Spaniards included caracoas in the Spanish fleet. In effect, the Muslim fleets could only inflict damage in a hand-to-hand encounter, an advantage which was neutralized by Spanish cannons, muskets and arquebuses.

It was, perhaps, this clear Spanish edge that prompted the Muslims to acquire and seize wherever and whenever possible the weaponry and even the vessels of the Spanish navy. But the seizures of Spanish ships, cannons, guns and ammunition merely deprived the Colonial State of the use of the ships and weapons. The Muslims never had developed a training system to enable them to use the weapons and thus become a real threat to the Colonial navy. The cannons were generally used as shore batteries rather than offensive weapons in the caracoas. This serious lack in Muslim naval development was best seen in the Spanish attack on Jolo in 1626 in which guns and artillery pieces were seized. The Sulu Muslims could have inflicted heavy losses on the Spanish force had they learned how to use the weapons. This handicap continued to plague the Muslim navy until the end of Spanish rule.

Thus, it was the basic strategy of the Muslim fleets to avoid encounters with the Spanish navy. Consequently, the Muslim plan of retaliation or attack was always to hit unsuspecting villages, and the naval fights between the Muslim South and the Spanish State resulted from Spanish initiatives. In effect, the Muslim naval encounters were defensive rather than offensive in character.

This became more apparent with the introduction of the steam gunboats which ushered in a new era in naval warfare in the Philippines. It definitely tipped the balance against the Muslim fleet which was easily destroyed at sea. Thus, by 1876, after the
Malcampo expedition, they had virtually disappeared as a force in the southern seas. The obliteration of the Muslim fleet as lords of the sea was accompanied by the transformation of the Muslim struggle into a purely defensive resistance in their own home grounds, being literally pushed back by the Colonial State to the territorial limits of their homelands.

But the passing away of the Muslim navy into its place in history did not mean the end of Filipino naval development. The Christianized Filipinos had a part in the process. As early as the first century of the Spanish era, Visayans, Pampangans, Ilocanos, Tagalogs, etc., who had as much of the sea as the Muslims of the south, were actually participants in the operations and activities of the Spanish navy. They either served as helps, rowers, or fighters. Through the centuries, they had acquired valuable experience and knowledge of the Spanish navy. Their contacts with the Muslim fleet in the various expeditions must have given them insights into the Muslim fleet, its inadequacy and future and the comparative advantage of technology over nature as displayed in Spanish naval successes in late 19th century.

For just as the Muslim fleet faded as a naval power, the Christian Filipinos were plotting the takeover of the entire Colonial State in the 19th century through the Revolution of 1896. This dramatic action was the culmination of the years of preparation in the revolutionary, political, social, economic, military and cultural aspects of national struggle. The various sectors or classes in society participated in their distinct ways in the process towards the formation of a national community, and the seizure of the Spanish naval fleet by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo’s revolutionary government was a part of this national takeover, the beginning of a destiny to be nurtured along with a Filipino concept embodied in the creation of a National Navy in Aguinaldo’s plan of government.

This new Filipino concept, as will be shown in the subsequent period, involved the integration of the naval heritage laid down by the Muslims of long ago and the technology and science brought by the Colonial power. It was the blending of a traditionalism anchored in Nature’s power over man and a modernism founded on the conquest of nature by man’s scientific creativity that would mark the path of naval evolution towards a truly
Filipino navy. In this, the Christian Filipinos would set the tempo of development. Thus it was understandable that upon the return of Aguinaldo from exile in 1898, he ordered the seizure of the Spanish fleet. His decree of June 21, 1898 duly institutionalized the Filipino navy in the scheme of national development.
NOTES


2 Fray Juan de Medina, Historia de la Orden de S. Agustin de estas Islas Filipinas (Manila, 1893), an English translation in B & R Vol. XXIV, pp. 27-179.

3 Sulu folklore. whether Tausug or Samal, has references to the putika which is still practiced by the imams or religious men of today when people who travel seek their services.

4 The tawal is a Tausug or Samal practice associated with healing or neutralization of impending danger. Anyone who has this gift, which he has acquired by practice or training, applies it on the area where the ailment is found. It consists of reciting a formula and blowing the affected part of the body from left to right or right to left to drive the alleged evil from the body. When applied to impending dangers such as storms, typhoons, whirlpools, etc. the diviner declares the appropriate formula and commands nature to behave in quietude.

5 The tampat is usually a place near the swáhnp, a huge rock, a well, a tree, or a huge coral formation at sea where small flags or banners of different colors and designs are planted.

6 Letter of Father Marcelo Francisco Mastrilli (S.J.) to Father Juan de Zalazar, Provincial of the Society of Jesus in the Philippines, Taytay, June 2, 1637, in B & R, Vol. XXVII, p. 282. The letter gives an account of the conquest of Mindanao which includes the unique custom of offering thanksgiving rituals to the Prophet at Punta Flechas. Mastrilli records: "We learned from some of the captives that they really intended to attack us; but that, thinking the governor (for whom they mistook Captain Martin Monte, on account of his distinguished presence) had fallen on that day, they felt it necessary to give thanks first to Mahoma for so great a victory, with many ceremonies and rituals which they held that night, with the heads of our dead - as we ourselves guessed from the great number of lights we saw at the same time on the hill." See also pages 260-61 for more details.

7 The kafa, as a ritual, is briefly described by Abuji Aradji in an article, "Tampat and Pagkaja: Two Tausug Folk Beliefs Concerning Life and Death," Mindanao Journal, University Research Center, Mindanao State University, Marawi City, Vol V, No. 2 (October-December 1978), pp. 125-134. In this article Abuji limits the kafa strictly to personal matters.
A lengthy description of various types of watercraft in the Philippines, with illustrations, is given by Ricardo E. Galang in “Types of Watercraft in the Philippines,” *Philippine Journal of Science*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1941), pp. 291-306; a great deal of the description is taken from the B & R which includes several Spanish primary sources.


The *reduction* was the Spanish process of converting the Filipino natives and organizing them into communities under effective control by the Colonial State and the religious. It is often referred to as putting the natives “bajo de la campana” (under the bell).

It appears from general Spanish sources that Konings or Chen Ch’eng Kung’s (“known in Spanish source as Cotser”) threat was a strong factor in the Spanish withdrawal from Zamboanga in 1663, although playing a role, too, in this move were the numerous revolts and outbreaks of unrest in Luzon and the Visayas such as the Ilocos revolt under Andres Malong and Almaza in 1662, the Pampanga revolt under Maniago, the Bankaw uprising in Leyte, the Tambob revolt in Bohol, and the Tapar rebellion in Panay in 1663. The *Tadhana* (Vol. 2, Part I), pp. 238-237 and 391 attributes the withdrawal to the revolts.

The establishment of alternate or secondary raiding bases is treated in Samuel K. Tan’s *Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1897-1913* (Quezon City: PSSH, March 1967) in “Prelude To American Rule.”

See *Tadhana*, Vol. 2, Part I, p. 94 for a brief analysis of the trade centers on the Western side of the Philippine Archipelago. *Tadhana* explains this phenomenon: “In part, this was because most major Philippine rivers drain into the Western seas; with this flow of the streams moved goods from the Eastern hinterlands to the coastal entrepots in the West.”

Michael O. Mastura in *Rulers of Maguindanao*, (C.C.: Philippine Social Science Council, 1979) reconstructs from the Maguindanao tarsila (Saleeby text) the core lineage of Maguindanao-Sulu relations.

*Tadhana* establishes Pangiran Tindig as the Batara Shah Tengah of the Sulu Tarsila who was in conflict with Adasaolan (Marcos, p. 263).

Marcos, pp. 262-263.

19. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

20. Although somewhat biased, the Spanish sources which provide interesting data on the rise and fall of Maguindanao include such sources as Juan de la Conception, Historia General de Filipinas (Sampaio: 1788-1972), 14 volumes, which has numerous references to the Muslims up to about the third decade of the 18th century; Vicente Barrantes, Guerras Piratas de la Piratería Malayo-Mahometana en Mindanao, Jolo, y Borneo (Madrid: 1888), 2 volumes; Francisco Colin, Labor Evangelica (Pastell's edition, Barcelona: 1904) which is abstracted as "Native Races and their Customs" in B & R, Vol. XL and Francisco Combes, Historia de Mindanao y Jolo. (Retana's edition, Madrid, 1897) also abstracted as "The Natives of the Southern Islands" in B & R, vol. XL. The secondary sources which have tried to reconstruct and analyze in different perspectives the Muslim reaction to Spanish colonialism include Najeeb Saleeby whose History of Sulu (1913) and The Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (1915) have remained authoritative. Also, Cesar Majul's The Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1977) provides insight on the sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu. Saleeby attaches as appendices I and II in History of Sulu, pp. 171-176 the accounts of Ronquillo's campaigns, obviously taken from Antonio Morga's Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas.


22. The entire theme of Ferdinand E. Marcos' Tadhana: History of the Filipino People, Volume II, which is in five parts, is the struggle of the Filipino people regardless of ethnic origins and differences, to evolve their national community. The encounters with colonialism (1565-1765), the indigenous reaction to colonial institutions (1661-1765), the consequent ferment and transition through which the Filipinos went (1765-1815) and their gradual transformation (1872-1896) are all briefly, but clearly, rationalized in Tadhana: Outline of the History of the Filipino People (Manila: National Media Production Center. 1967) in which is established theoretically the Filipino effort to take over the Colonial State by the late 19th century. And the brief seizure of the colonial navy by the revolutionists was part of this general pattern.
IV. THE GREAT DILEMMA

A. The Colonial Continuum

The destruction of Muslim naval supremacy towards the close of Spanish rule shifted Muslim attention to the defense of their homeland which was under great pressure from Spanish operations. The campaigns underlined the vital importance Spain gave to the ultimate subjugation of the Filipino Muslims. The desolation of coastal communities in the Sulu Archipelago by Jose Malcampo was followed by the appointment of military governors to maintain Spanish presence and power in the area. The persistent Muslim resistance, with minimal effects on Spanish lives, only brought more spoiling expeditions in 1886 under Governor Jose Arolas, continued up to about 1888 and resulting in the destruction of more Sulu villages. This forced the sultanate and the local datus to come to terms with the Spanish authorities.

The same was true of the situation in the mainland of Mindanao. The heroic defiance of Datu Utu of Buayan from 1880 to 1888 was gradually neutralized by internal rivalries and conflicts, thus giving the Spaniards a breakthrough in Gen. Emilio Terrero’s campaigns to crush Maguindanao resistance. The surrender of Datu Utu shifted political leadership to datus who were more open to colonial aims although, from their own long-range objectives, the collaboration with Spanish authorities was the better part of Muslim strategy and struggle.

Meanwhile, Governor Oyanguren’s early successes in Davao and thereabouts resulted in bringing the tribal leaders and their people to accept Spanish presence and efforts, and, in fact, to bring them into some sort of loose alliance against the Muslims with whom historical relations had not been altogether smooth. After Oyanguren the Spanish gain was augmented more fundamentally by the town-making process spearheaded by the Jesuit missions from 1860 to the end of Spanish rule in 1898. By the last decade of Spanish rule, Spanish operations had affected Iranun and Maranao movements with the establishment of forts along the waterways leading to Pangil Bay, one of the outlets of Muslim raiders in the past. The Spaniards also used to great advantage the political contests for the sultanates in Sulu and Maguindanao. In the
former, the Spanish authorities recognized Datu Harun Ar-Rashid of Palawan against the better claimant, Datu Amirul of Patikul. In the latter, the Spaniards tried to blunt the momentum of the Amai Pakpak resistance by intrigues and arms.

But just as Spanish efforts were beginning to show optimism and were inflicting serious blows to the Muslim struggle, new developments in the colony and abroad thwarted Spanish plans to conquer the Muslim South. The revolutionary ferment in Luzon had taken a serious turn in 1896 as the Katipunan prepared to dislodge Spanish sovereignty by force of arms. The consequent outbreak in August 1896 under Andres Bonifacio plunged Central Luzon into bloody confrontation forcing Spanish military forces to concentrate on the defense of Manila and the suppression of rebellion in the surrounding provinces, especially Cavite, where friar estates were concentrated and the heat of the Revolution was the most intense. The flame of conflict spread steadily to the rest of Luzon and the Visayas. By 1898, the repercussions in Mindanao were felt in Zamboanga where Vicente Alvarez led his supporters against the remaining Spanish contingents who took a stand in Tetoan, and in Misamis where Jose Capistrano and some ilustrados of Cagayan de Oro led the revolutionary elements.

The upheaval in the archipelago eased the pressures against the Muslim South as Spain tried to quell the rebellion by her remaining forces which were not adequate and prepared for such a general outbreak. Unfortunately for the Christian Filipinos, the Muslims did not join the revolution. They were more concerned with the urgent need to consolidate their own areas and to remove the last vestige of Spanish presence in their midst. In effect the Muslim struggle contributed to the weakening of Spanish power.

For Spain, the trouble in the colony was already a serious crack in her imperial profile in Asia and another challenge in the Caribbean was aggravating her problems and dilemmas. Cuba was determined to get her independence by revolution with encouragement and help from the United States whose taste for world power status had already been induced by Alfred Mahan’s naval theories. The subsequent defeat of Spanish forces and the destruction of her navy in Manila dealt the blow to Spanish impe-
rial hopes, and, consequently, doomed her plan to conquer the Muslim South. Only the diplomatic negotiations in Paris, which resulted in a treaty on December 10, 1898, had given a semblance of an honorable exit for Spain from her last Asiatic outpost.

But for the Muslim South, the respite from Spanish arms was shortlived. The United States entered the scene with a clear intention to claim the fruits of her diplomatic and military victories. The Filipino determination to prevent the Americans from carrying out their intention erupted into a war that lasted up to 1902 and beyond. The hostilities which began in 1899 delayed American pacification of the Muslim South but American presence in the area had to be made obvious by diplomacy. The conclusion of the Bates Treaty on August 20, 1899, under peculiar circumstances, neutralized, at least, a potential trouble spot in the Muslim South. The initial movements of American troops around Lake Lanao, with offers of peace and friendship, brought Lanao leaders to cooperate with American efforts. At least this peaceful pursuit of American aims kept the Mindanao Muslims at bay while the war in Luzon and the Visayas was raging. When Emilio Aguinaldo finally yielded in 1901 and civil government was proclaimed, American attention was turned towards the south where American sovereignty had to be enforced and prospects of Muslims resisting American rule were unmistakably clear.

The organization of the Moro Province in 1903 was the first step to show that the United States meant to see her sovereignty recognized. The Muslim refusal to give this recognition led to armed confrontations in Lanao where American campaigns lasted up to 1906, involving sustained as well as protracted struggle with the towns of Bayan, Maciu, Ditsaan, Tugaya, Ganassi, Marawi and others. In Cotabato, Datu Ali took to the field in 1899 and rejected American overtures until 1905 when he was cornered and killed at Simpetan. His death, however, did not end the resistance. Datu Alamada continued the struggle until he was convinced to yield in 1914 by the prominent datus of Cotabato, including Datu Piang, Datu Inuk and Datu Mopuk.

In Sulu, the Bates Treaty had not worked well. Shortly after
its conclusion tension arose as American occupation of Jolo and other points in Sulu infringed on the prerogatives and powers of the Sultan and the local datu. Encounters in Taglibi, Patikul, Luuk, etc. brought to popular attention such personalities as Paruka Utik, Maharajah Untong, Maharajah Andung, Panglima Hassan, Pala and Sahipa. The bloody confrontations came to an end only in 1913 when the Sulu Muslims were decisively defeated at Bud Bagsak, paving the way for the abolition of the Moro Province and the inauguration of the civil government in 1914 under Frank W. Carpenter. In fact, earlier, in 1904, the Bates Treaty was already unilaterally abrogated by the United States, thus putting the sultanate back to where it was at the end of Spanish rule—an institution torn apart by internal conflicts and confronted by the superior forces of the United States. Whatever reluctance the latter had in divesting the Sultan of all his powers was obliterated by the abrogation of the agreement. The lonely walk of the Sultan to an ominous end in the American political scheme came finally in the signing of the Kiram-Carpenter Agreement in 1915 when only his spiritual prerogatives were conceded to him. This unfortunate emasculation of the sultanate was further aggravated by the renunciation of political rights by the heirs of the House of Kiram in documents signed in 1920.

What followed in Muslimland after the establishment of a civil government was the weaning of the Muslim mind and sentiment away from tradition and their redirection towards assimilation of modern values which, in reality, were the ideals and principles of the American democratic and liberal tradition. This process of reorientation was effectively accomplished through the educational system with its emphasis on free primary education, the missionary work of Protestant and Catholic missions, socio-economic programs and projects, and Muslim participation in local and national affairs. The result of this process was acceptance of the American system by the Muslim leadership and constituencies to such an extent that by the 1920s the Muslims had publicly expressed preference for American to Filipino rule. The documented declarations of Muslim leaders during the height of the independence campaigns between 1920 and 1930 clearly revealed their opposition to the Filipino government and in the event of eventual independence, their desire to see Muslimland as a separate state under American sovereignty.
But the problem that arose from the re-orientation of Muslim leadership towards a pro-American posture was not only the redefinition and strengthening of the Muslim-Christian conflict but also the eventual clash between Muslim traditional and modern values as the process of Americanization seeped deeper into local cultures. The quest for identity was confounded and the Muslim heart was ripped apart by forces from within and without which could not be ignored.

The outbreak of war in 1941 and years of guerrilla resistance to which the Muslims contributed significantly in Mindanao and Sulu temporarily brought together all sectors under American leadership in a common cause against Japanese imperialism. But the end of the war and the grant of independence to the Philippines in 1946 revived Muslim anxieties, fears and dilemmas as they ruminated over their status and place in the new republic.

B. The Radical Turn

The continuation of a neo-colonial orientation and set-up in postwar developments, politically or otherwise, led to a renewal of Muslim struggle through peaceful means to seek definite reforms and to achieve recognition of their equal status. The period from 1946 to 1968 was marked by a kind of protracted struggle in the halls of Congress. Only the Kamlon Uprising in the early 1950s punctured the peaceful and bureaucratic movement for reforms.

But the negligible benefits and inadequate response of the government to Muslim demands started to create a dent in Muslim optimistic perceptions of what they would be as envisioned by an almost flawless articulation of government policies and programs and national goals. The inability of the government to implement to logical ends worthwhile reforms and programs was due to corruption in the bureaucracy as well as to instability in Muslim leadership. Thus, the great dilemma that confronted the Muslim people was how to react to the growing dissatisfaction over existing conditions and the spreading influence of radicalism which was dramatically expressed by Governor Udtog Matalam in 1968 when the Mindanao Independence Movement was launched at Pagalungan. The emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front, with a more defined blueprint for the Muslim struggle gave the
Muslim South an alternative that crystallized the search for Muslim identity — within the framework of Muslim historical and contemporary aspirations.

The government responded quite decisively to the critical situation in the Muslim South, viewing it as a part of the larger national crisis that had placed the entire nation on the edge of disorder. Martial law was declared in 1972, giving complete power to the government to deal with any problem, but the effect on the Muslim front was to accentuate the radicalization of the Muslim struggle and to fan the religious character of the conflict which gave justification for the entry of darul islam in the Mindanao conflict. The government was quick to sense the implication of the Muslim world’s involvement in the struggle. Diplomatic offensives into the heart of Islam were initiated to neutralize the powerful petro-dollar countries. The resulting Tripoli Agreement provided a breathing spell for the parties in the conflict. The subsequent grant of political concessions to the Muslims in terms of high positions in the government, both local and national, culminating in the formation of two autonomous regions in 1979, soothed the feelings of a segment of the Muslim leadership and, at least, gave some psychological satisfaction to the Muslim population.

But political positions, by their own nature, had their own limits. Those who have not been favored by such benefits were disillusioned and the struggle continued. Meanwhile, the economic thrusts of development in the Muslim South, including barter trade opportunities, started to shape along the old lines of past eras when the elites gradually took over the profitable economic ventures, leaving the small Muslim traders with the residual benefits of trade. The capitalists from Manila, including aliens, and the military had become the economic czars in the region. Increased military presence in the South, although premised on limited commitment and humanistic goals, further eroded Muslim trust in the role of government in Muslim affairs. Military clashes revived ancient fears and Muslims looked back in nostalgia to the pre-military era when peace and order literally reigned in their region.

What, perhaps, confounded political, economic, and military approaches to the Muslim struggle was the apparent lack of a "cultural dimension" which could have provided the proper
context for government efforts. The lack of sustained programs to understand Muslim attitudes, values and institutions as they relate to conflict and struggle has clouded one fundamental area that can ultimately offer a more meaningful approach to Muslim radicalism. Included in this cultural aspect are the multi-faceted traditions in the Muslim South that are not as simple to deal with as generally assumed. The roots of Muslim behavior, sentiments, thoughts and actions are found in their literature, music, arts and social activities which have survived through time, crises and conflict. Even the more important religious institutions are not readily susceptible to the simplistic methodology of the educational system inherited from a colonial past. Thus the search for a Muslim identity poses a problem to a nation in crisis initially handicapped by the thought processes that have crisscrossed the minds of people wherever the Muslim South is discussed or considered.

But there is optimism in the fact that the historical process, by its very nature, is governed by the irresistible law of change and time and what was and is held to be the approach to Filipino Muslim history will undergo the same transformation or evolution that has governed the development of human societies. Thus, to put in perspective the Muslim search for identity, it is necessary to deal with the usage of “Moro,” the sources and interpretations of “Moro History,” and certain patterns in the Muslim struggle which best categorize their search for identity.

The term “Moro” goes back to Spanish sources or historiography in which the prejudices of Spanish civilization towards the Muslims, whom they called “Moors,” were preserved. Eventually, the same biases and attitudes were acquired by the Christianized Filipinos, including those who belonged to the “enlightened class” or ilustrados. The literary form “moro-moro” has served to strengthen cultural prejudice as well as encourage conflict on the basis of religion.

Unfortunately, the coming of the Americans with a tradition described by American historians as “democratic” did not result in the eradication of colonial prejudice. Rather it resulted in the further institutionalization of the term and its historic-cultural implications. In fact, even the ethnic groups which were not
Christianized or Islamized and which are known today as the "cultural" or "national" minorities have been consistently referred to as the "pagans." This was the direct translation of the Spanish "infieles" used throughout the Spanish period with reference to the non-Christian tribes, except for the "Moros," who were treated as a different class or race of men.

In brief, it was not a term that originated from the people referred to—people who, before the colonial advent, had already identified themselves strictly in ethnic or geographic terms. The term "samal" (sama), "malana" (macanao), "maguindanao" (maguindanaon), "tausug", etc. were and are preferred terms. Unlike the term "Moros," the aforementioned are based on the very character of culture, society and geography. Also, historically, the terms "Joloanos" or "Sulus" were used in colonial times for people of the Sulu archipelago and were based on geographic criteria, not cultural bias.

There are two terms which are negative in implications: "Moros" and "Ilanun" or "Iranun." The latter refers to pirates who were generally known in Southeast Asia as lanuns. The former, however, is the only one that has been definitely associated with the Muslims in the Philippines regardless of their ethnic origins. It is pregnant with contempt, hate, ridicule and prejudice. It is anchored on two great colonial prejudices: first, that those who were given the name "Moros" were savages and uncivilized and, second, that their religion, called "Mohammedanism" by the colonial sector, was largely responsible for their primitive values and behavior. The term, therefore, is culturally and religiously condescending. Unfortunately, even those who have been radicalized and are assumed to have developed an anti-colonial ideology have ironically adopted the term for a movement seeking to liberate the Muslims from something that has yet to be defined in concrete and specific terms.

Thus, throughout colonial history, terminologies have constantly reminded us of our indignity, not dignity, as a people. Foreign scholarship has contributed to the belief that the Filipino Muslims can put dignity to a term that has nothing but negative implications. But some people might raise the issue: is not the term "Filipino" equally pregnant with colonial influences? True
but unlike the word “Moro,” “Filipino” is derived from the positive aspect of Spanish concept, from no less than the highest embodiment of their ideals and aspirations—the King of Spain. In fact, for sometime, the term was only restricted to the Spaniards in the Philippines until, perhaps, the 19th century when the Indios applied the term to themselves as a way of raising their sense of dignity to that of their colonizer.

From the standpoint of historiography, as it is understood in the Western world, the sources of Moro history are the historical writings of Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, Chinese, Malays and others. But of these sources a large portion is Spanish. From the account of Pigafetta to the works of Jose Montero y Vidal in the late 19th century, and from the travel accounts of Charles Wilkes in 1842 to the contemporary works of American journalists, writers and tourists, there is a consistent articulation of the same old theme with the only difference being evident between Spanish and American historiography—that the Filipino Muslims, while contemptuous of Spanish colonial rule, were receptive of American rule. The latter is what marked the thrust of American historical account and analysis of Filipino Muslim society and culture. Thus, the ones who became the villains in the centuries of conflict between Muslims and Christians were the Christian Filippines, with the Americans emerging as arbiters, pacifiers and liberators. Whatever atrocities were committed by the colonial power, including massacres of Muslims in numerous encounters, were simply treated as the inevitable consequence of a mandate of American rule.

Of course, the Christian Filipino response to this kind of historical source has been to create a new approach based on the elaboration of the rich heritage of culture and struggle which the Filipino Muslims contributed to the national process. From the reference of Rizal in his writings to “Moro” friends in Dapitan to the more recent works of Filipino historians, there is a conscious effort to reconstruct history as an answer to the divisive or disruptive approaches of foreign historiography.

Out of this historical reconstruction, three patterns mark the centuries of the Filipino Muslim struggle against the outside world and their own. The first is a struggle for ethnic identity. This is
the earliest of the three patterns. It goes back to the remote era long before the coming of Islam. It is also part of the baranganic or suprabaranganic activities which revolved around the need for security as well as survival. The struggle required unity on the basis of kinship, language and geography. For instance, the communities that shared the same linguistic and cultural tradition established close settlements along the shores of Lake Lanao. They have been known as the Maranaos or “people of the lake (ranao).” The same is true of the communities which occupied the fertile lands of the Pulangi and which have been known in historical works as the “Maguindanaos,” the “Midanayans,” and, in local references, the Maguindanaos. Likewise, communities which emerged in the Jolo island group and which are called in the taraslas as the Buranuns, the Baklaya and the Tagimaha shared, at least, the same linguistic and cultural tradition.

Consequently, the ethnic nature of the Muslim struggle has been preserved through the years and has, undoubtedly, been a major factor in the ultimate direction of Muslim movements in history, including those in contemporary times. What this means is that the persistence of the ethnic factor indicates not so much the anti-modern or anti-progressive nature of Muslim aspirations as it is a means of survival in a society where nationalism has remained parochial and prejudiced. It cannot be denied that until lately the nationalist concept still sported the Christian form which it acquired at the close of the last century.

As a result of the advent of colonialism, which had as its principal handmaiden the Christian dogma, the second pattern of struggle emerged along religious lines. That is the ethnic character of the Muslim struggle has not been eradicated but has been augmented, if not complicated, by the advent of Islam in the 13th century. The new religious element which became an important part of local traditions was accompanied by a new political process which led to the establishment of the sultanate system in the Sulu archipelago and Cotabato, and later, in Lanao. The increasing influence and dominance of the sultanate in local affairs also increased the influence of Islam in native religious activities. The mutual and interdependent relationship between political and religious institutions resulted in the strengthening of both institutions and in the development of Muslim consciousness. This
consciousness was quite developed in Sulu and Maguindanao where the two sultanates were firmly established. But in the other areas, including the Lake Lanao region, where the pre-Islamic datu ship was dominant, the ethnic character of the struggle remained as the main motive force.

Eventually, ethnic and religious factors were brought to a synthetic or dichotomous relationship. It was, therefore, this type of situation that has made the search for identity by Muslim societies somewhat a problem. For one thing the Islamic concepts and practices could not be assimilated wholly without minimizing the importance of native traditions. What happened, therefore, was the emergence of a “folk-Islamic” type of cultural development until events in the Spanish-dominated parts of the Philippine archipelago moved towards religious consolidation. The *reduccion* was definitely and uncompromisingly premised on the Christianization of the natives, including the Muslims and non-Christian cultures, that reinforced the local resistance along Islamic lines in the case of the former and along the “old indigenous religion” in the case of the latter. In effect, the call for *jihad* by Rajah Buisan, and later, by Sultan Kudarat against the Spanish communities was not so much dictated by the need to spread Islam but rather by the urgency of preventing a new religion from interfering with local traditions. The Muslim struggle for religious identity was thus essential to their survival.

However, the political nature of Christianization provided the Muslim struggle with a basis for enlarging its dimension beyond ethnic and religious lines. Thus, the third pattern was a struggle for national identity. What this meant was that the Muslims saw the Spanish effort as a move to put the entire Philippine archipelago under Spanish rule. The invitation of Rajah Buisan for the Leyte inhabitants to join Maguindanao in a common front against Spanish rule served to illustrate the Muslim concern that the growing influence of Spanish power in the archipelago was hurting their interests. The raids on various points in the Visayas and Luzon by Muslims from Maguindanao, Sulu and Ilanun bases indicated a significant change in Muslim responses to colonialism. In fact, attempts were made in the 18th and 19th centuries to bring the Muslim depredations under a unified thrust through political marriages or through the revival of Islamic fervor.
Undoubtedly, this national character of the Muslim struggle, which even altered the diplomatic techniques of the sultanate, represented a major factor in Muslim relations with the American regime and the Christian Filipinos. Although the use of violent means to realize Muslim aims for national recognition was drastically neutralized by American military power and strategies, the struggle persisted in the political area where the instruments of political change became the object of Muslim participation. For instance, the Muslim took advantage of the electoral process to seek a place in the new colonial order although their educational preparation was not as adequate as that of their Christian counterparts.

Thus, today, the Muslim struggle for national identity affects not only themselves but also the entire nation. When Muslim writers and leaders join in the demand for “national recognition,” what do they mean? For instance, what did Judge Jainal Rasul mean when he chose for his book title “The Muslim Struggle For National Identity?” Or, Alunan Glang when he presented the option between “Secession or Integration?” Or Cesar Majul when he declared that it is only by making the Filipino Muslims “real Muslims” that they can be “true Filipinos”? Frankly, the answers to these questions are not simple and easy because the Filipino Muslims do not all come from the same political and cultural traditions.

Now to restate the question: What is the Muslim struggle for national identity? It is actually a dilemma created by two forces between which the Muslims find themselves. On one hand, there is the open declaration that the Muslim struggle is an effort to bring about a recognition of their history as an important part of Philippine history; that their cultures, however different they may be from the others, are integral parts of the Filipino heritage; and that the national resources are as much their own as they are of the dominant Christian sector. And yet, on the other hand, there is also the equally evident but unspoken conviction that their historical experience is only a part of the greater Islamic process, that their cultural traditions, however dominated they may be by indigenous elements, are actually part of Islamic culture or civilization; and that the problems and the prosperity of the world of Islam are their problems and their prosperity. Thus, they are torn between their desire for autonomy and their commitment to the Islamic world.
Islam are as much their own as they are of the numerous societies which follow Islam.

It was and is this dilemma in Muslim orientation that has created the basic problem in both the government response to the Muslim problem and the Muslim attitude to such a response. In a sense, ethnicity, religion and nationalism, which marked the stages and character of the Muslim struggle, have created in Muslim consciousness the dilemma and confusion which have set him against the world without and within. He is fighting against a world he understands so little and against the fears, anxieties and insecurities he knows so well. Thus, he searches desperately for the means to cope with the demanding struggle of the man within himself and the overwhelming realities which surround his little world outside. He finds the crimson road an easy path to follow because he had travelled that way through centuries of relations with forces, peoples and powers driving him deeper and deeper into frustrations. He realizes that time and history are against him unless he seeks the changes within himself and his own world, unless he wakes up to the unreason and futility of the method of struggle that has only brought the depletion of his resources, the emasculation of his powers, and the reversal of his destiny. He knows that every period of the history of his struggle is marked by the unmistakable march of modern progress which has slowly miniaturized the value and sufficiency of his traditions.

In effect, the Muslim today has come to a crossroad — a critical point — where his aspirations, goals, and purposes must change, where his strategies for survival must somehow part from his historical patterns. This is a direction that is demanded by two realities. First, the outside world which represents the larger society has definitely and irreversibly followed the path of modernization, sacrificing some, if not many, of its traditional ways and features. As such, it has increased its resources, powers, and knowledge. The Muslim cannot expect to reverse this trend. He can only hope to change the attitude of those outside his own. Second, history as a teacher of men points not only to the desirable examples of the past but also to its weaknesses, and the lessons of history must lead to better understanding of present problems and more effective ways to cope with anxieties, fears and frustrations.
It is in relation to these two realities that the Muslims must shape their struggle for identity, must search for the fundamental solutions to problems that confront them, and must find the basis for mutual cooperation with the outside world. For ultimately, the barriers of ethnicity, religion, and biased nationalism must give away to the struggle of people as human beings against a human nature that is corrupt, against an environment that is slowly becoming unfit for human habitation, against a social system that has wasted man’s energies and resources, and against a world order that has accentuated the sufferings of the Third World.

The need for change, for a re-evaluation of attitudes and directions, is an imperative for the Christians as it is for the Muslims. The “Moro image” which has been nurtured in historical accounts, literature and arts should give way to a renewed image of the Filipino as a modern man not oblivious of the country’s religious and traditional heritage but more concerned with its humanist development. In effect, both the Muslim and the Christian can share the same struggle for national identity by liberating themselves from the persisting phenomenon of neo-colonialism for it is in this task of decolonizing the country’s orientation that the basic answers to national problems might yet be found.
CONCLUSION

From the centuries of struggle and change marked clearly by two great colonial regimes, the Muslim South had not as yet been substantially re-oriented to accept and recognize the Filipinization of political leadership which under colonial policies included the non-Christian communities. This situation which had become quite apparent after independence in 1946 has brought problems of integration to the national leadership as well as a dilemma to the Muslim people.

Unless this dilemma between painful alternatives, which have expressed themselves in integration and secessionist movements, leads quickly to a definite end, the injury to development and progress will be incalculable. This is particularly true in the development of a kind of mind, and therefore, a consciousness that determines the kind of personality a Muslim assumes in a fluid situation in which his basic values are mixed up in processes from which he cannot extricate himself because his survival is partly linked to these processes.

Thus, the instability has led to fears, anxieties and misconceptions which are the ingredients that fuel tensions and conflicts. The violent responses, which undoubtedly are premised on either the attainment of peace and order or on the necessity of self-preservation, are to be expected from an unresolved problem. In either case, the loss of resources, energies and cohesion can only result in the ultimate ruin of the only valid rationale of Filipino struggle—national unity.

The way out of the dilemma is not new because historical experience and common sense have shown such a way. It is recognizing the distinctiveness or differences of all the ethnic groups that constitute the Filipino national community. This recognition of divergencies or cultures necessarily eliminates the undesirable effects of the "superior-inferior" or "civilized-primitive" dichotomies which have marked the relationships between the Christians and non-Christians in the Philippines. The elimination of this psychological barrier leads to mutual, cooperative and complementary efforts seeking to improve social
well-being and to achieve national goals for the benefit of all. Perhaps this old idea of pluralism sounds divisive, redundant and idealistic, but it might yet be the only light out of the tunnel where the national communities have languished since colonial times.