

JAPAN'S NEW ORDER IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1942-1945: A BLUEPRINT FOR ASIA UNDER JAPAN

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Japanese involvement in the Philippines has been going on even before the Spaniards conquered the country.¹ Such involvement continued through the centuries, eventually culminating in what one historian called the "Japanese adventure in the Philippines" in 1942-45.² There were Japanese designs on the Philippines during the last decades of the 19th century but American conquest of the country at the turn of the century preempted them.³ American desire to protect her interests in the Philippines led her to forge some agreements with Japan, such as the Taft-Katsura and Root-Takahira Agreements. In these agreements, Japan promised to leave the Philippines as an American sphere of influence.⁴ It appeared, though, that these agreements were done for expediency. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905-1906, American and Japanese policymakers appeared to entertain ideas that they would be the future antagonists in the Pacific. Thus, the road was set for an eventual showdown between the two imperialist countries.⁵

Japan appeared to have continued to respect her agreements with the United States so long as such agreements worked in her favor. Actually, she was biding her time. The rise of a militarist-expansionist clique in Japan during the 1920's served the world a rude warning of Japan's snowballing aggressive expansionist policy. This was concretely manifested when the Tanaka Memorial was published in 1928. It clearly set the tone of Japanese expansion in the Pacific, particularly Japan's intentions in the Philippines.⁶

The outbreak of the "China Affair" (which was actually an undeclared war between China and Japan) during the late 1920's was one of the first evidences of Japan's aggressive Asian policy. In this case, Japan was expanding in the Asian mainland at the expense of China. This was followed by similar moves, such as the annexation of Hainan Island as well as other strategic islands in the Pacific. These moves were abetted by the deteriorating

relations with the United States and other European nations, by the collapse of the civilian government in Japan and the rise of the militarist-expansionist clique led by General Hideki Tozjo, and by the pervading pacifist and conciliatory attitudes in the Allied camps, particularly that of the United States. Japan appeared to have exploited this international condition as evidenced by her pronouncements which got bolder and bolder. In these statements, Japanese assertion of her predominance in the Pacific became more pronounced. One writer later called it Japan's "Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia." During the war years, this doctrine became known as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity."

By the late 1930's, the Japanese planners, feeling that war with the United States was becoming inevitable, convoked a series of Liaison Conferences that drew up contingency plans in anticipation of such event. One such conference was held in Tokyo on November 20, 1941 which laid down the basic policies for the areas which Japan expected to dominate.⁸ These policies envisioned an initial military administration for the regions to be dominated, pending a future policy with respect to their final form of government.⁹ Specifically, the military authorities were to work for the immediate restoration of peace and order in the areas to be occupied; to procure resources in the said areas which are vital to Japan's war efforts; to subordinate the needs of the inhabitants to Japan's military needs; to utilize to the fullest existing administrative systems in the occupied areas insofar as they do not hinder the attainment of military objectives; and, to use popular local officials, elders, etc. in dealing with the inhabitants. These aims were to be achieved through strict control by the Japanese military over communications, the economy, etc. — over practically all aspects of life in the occupied areas.¹⁰

On December 12, 1941, another plan was drawn up by the Japanese leaders which envisioned the more permanent economic reorganization of areas Japan expected to dominate. This plan was entitled "Outline of the Economic Counterplans for the Southern Areas."¹¹ Two days later, another plan was drawn up which envisaged the political set-up within which the said economic reorganization program was to be carried out. It was entitled "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea

Area." This last plan aimed for the de-westernization of the occupied areas and their complete subordination to Japan. Specifically, it provided for the establishment of military bases throughout the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" area; cooperation with Japan in foreign policy and national defense by the newly-created states; permanent economic cooperation; and, the driving out of western influences in the entire area. The plan sought the banishment of western liberalism and promised independence patterned after Japan's system to encourage the occupied areas to support voluntarily Japan and each other.^{1 2}

Another plan was drawn up by the Japanese leaders on February 18, 1942. Entitled "Establishment of East Asia — Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War," it provided for a cultural program that shall effect the total de-westernization of the occupied areas. It specifically provided that inhabitants favorably disposed to Japan should be reinforced and that pro-Japanese propaganda be promoted, it being necessary for Japan's cause, especially in convincing the inhabitants of the occupied areas of the need to discard the West. The plan provided that this aim could best be attained through education based on the ideals of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, by retraining native teachers, and by sending scholars and technical men to and from Japan to the various occupied areas. And from the occupied areas teachers, students, leaders, etc. were to be sent to Japan where they would be indoctrinated to serve definite functions created for them by and for Japan. Leaders, scholars, and intellectuals, too, were to be brought together to Japan to encourage the realization of the idea about East Asiatic unity. Moreover, native leaders were to be appointed to important posts to stimulate the enthusiasm of the inhabitants to cooperate and to show that their traditions were being respected. It also stressed that the Japanese language should be taught everywhere to make it the common language of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

These various plans, in effect, envisaged the establishment of a sphere of influence in greater East Asia of which Japan was to be the dominant entity. And with these aims went, too, the eventual displacement of the Americans, the British, the Dutch, etc. in the Pacific area. The displacement of the westerners by Japan was

meant to encompass all aspects of life of the inhabitants in the said areas. All these aims, according to this plan, are regarded as part of the first round of an expected protracted war between Japan and her enemies. When the reorganization of the Co-Prosperity system was done, then the second round would be started to eliminate, finally, all of Japan's enemies. The final round of the war would be the "War of the Hemispheres" which would find Japan as the sole ruler of the world. This would mean the realization of Japan's ultimate goal — *Hakko Ichiu* i.e., one world under one roof (that of Japan).¹³

These were the primary themes of Japanese designs in the areas and its inhabitants which it expected to dominate. The Japanese military authorities, specifically, followed these in the Philippines.

Thus, the seeds of discord and distrust sown in the past decades between the countries of Japan and America came into the open when Japanese warplanes bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The various contingency plans drawn up by the Japanese planners, in turn, were put into operations. This could be noted in the Imperial Rescript that was issued by the Japanese Emperor proclaiming a state of war against the United States, stating that ". . . the aims of the war were to effect lasting peace and stability in East Asia and to liberate said area from Anglo-American exploitation."¹⁴ The Imperial Rescript also called the conflict the "Greater East Asia War" which had the purpose of establishing a co-prosperity sphere in which the members would all cooperate to form a self-sufficient economic zone with Japan as the leader and guiding spirit for spreading the moral principles which were based on the "original spirit of the Imperial influence."¹⁵ To the United States and its allies, the Japanese concept of the war was nothing but Japanese supremacy in Asia —

. . . one in which Japan herself stood forth as the leader in all walks of life — military, political, economic, and cultural. Around her were to be grouped the satellite States, varying in the degree of political subordination to Tokyo, but all in common looking to Japan as the superior country, whose ways they should endeavor to imitate and with whom they should all faithfully cooperate. For the Japanese the successful establishment of the long desired goal of economic self-sufficiency, but also of . . . the recognition of Japan's ethical and cultural superiority, the acceptance of Japan at her own valuation as the 'light of Asia' . . .

"The evidence is clear," said American Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, "[that] the Co-Prosperity Sphere means eventual Japanese hegemony over all the areas therein contained."¹⁷

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

The impressive successes chalked up by Japan during the early phase of the war boosted her assertion that she was the destined leader of Asia. This was also abetted by the initial enthusiasm to cooperate with Japan by the peoples in the occupied areas, especially those in Burma and Indonesia. In fact, the Japanese were hailed as liberators by the Burmese and the Indonesians who even aided the Japanese in ferreting out their former colonial masters from their hideouts. These actions by the Burmese and the Indonesians could best be explained by the ill-treatment that they received from the British and the Dutch. Thus, when the Japanese came, they seized it as an opportunity to even out things with their former colonial masters.

In the Philippines, the Japanese were met with a much different situation. In the first place, the Filipinos had become "little brown Americans."¹⁸ Prolonged USAFFE resistance in Bataan and Corregidor sustained Filipino hopes that America had not forsaken them and that Japan would be driven out in a matter of weeks. Also, the Japanese failed to bag Quezon which, had they succeeded, would, probably, have facilitated their bid to win Filipino allegiance to Japan's cause. There were also the numerous guerilla movements within occupied Philippines which severely undermined Japanese efforts to wean the Filipinos away from America. Finally, successful Allied broadcasts to the Philippines kept Filipino hopes of eventual redemption from the Japanese. Thus, the Filipinos continued to resist Japanese efforts to "de-Americanize" them and bring them under Japan's fold.

It must be noted that even before the Japanese occupation of the Philippines there were already various Japanese efforts to polish their image before the Filipinos. This was shown by their economic undertakings in the country and by their interests in cultural interchanges with the Philippines.¹⁹ The extent and nature of their dealings with many of the Philippine elite grew

significantly.²⁰ Thus, when Manila was occupied on January 2, 1942, these activities helped the Japanese in trying to attain their objectives in the Philippines. And with the occupation came, too, the period when the Filipino mind was brought "at bay."²¹

The Propaganda Campaign Began – New Year of 1942 came without fanfare. There was "only quietness."²² The expected entry of the Japanese occupation forces was anxiously met by the Filipino people. The populace had reason to be tense and afraid – the memory of the "Rape of Nanking" was still quite fresh in their minds. Moreover, the people were uncertain about the Japanese character and what kind of treatment they would receive in the hands of the newcomers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Expeditionary Forces to the Philippines sought to assuage the people's troubled minds by issuing the first of many proclamations before the people. This intention, however, was belied at the outset by the draconian warning that said first proclamation carried (in Japanese English):

The Japanese Armed Forces wishes to share the well-beings with the officials and peoples of the native land. Wait the arrivals and peoples of the native land. Wait the arrivals of the Japanese troops with confidence and ease.

1. Regardless of the nationality, no one is necessary to flee.
2. Making resistance or taking the hostile actions against the Japanese Armed Forces in any manner, leads the whole native land into the ashes. Therefore everyone should come under the protection of the Japanese Armed Forces without seeing even one drop of blood and should continue daily business as usual.
3. Any one who falls under any of the following will be considered as the interfering of the well-beings of the native peoples, and therefore be subject to the death penalty. Be aware of not committing any of said crime:
 1. Those who show hostility against the Japanese Armed Forces.
 2. Those who jeopardize or break any existing means in politics, economics, industry, transportation, communications, financials, and etc.
 3. Those who disturb the thoughts of the officials and peoples.
 4. Any actions disturbing the economic and financial status.

Those who report to the Japanese Forces any flagrant offense of any said crime will be rewarded by the Japanese Armed Forces.²³

Two other proclamations were issued, both related to the above and all embodying the bases of Japanese policies towards

the Philippines. The proclamation addressed "to all the authorities and the peoples of the Commonwealth" spelled out such policies:

1. As the result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under the martial law over the districts occupied by the Army.

2. The purpose of the Japanese expedition is nothing but emancipating you from the oppressive domination of the United States of America, letting you establish "the Philippines for the Filipinos" as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Greater East Asia and making you enjoy your own prosperity and culture.

3. The Authorities and the people of the Commonwealth would sever the relations with U.S.A. and trust the just and fair administration of the Army, obeying faithfully all its commands, cooperating voluntarily with it in its stationing and activities here and military supplies when asked.

4. So far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws, both executive and judicial institutions now in force in the Commonwealth shall continue to be effective, for the time being as in the past. Therefore, all the public officials shall remain in the present posts and carry on faithfully the duties as before.

5. The Army recognizes the freedom of your religion and residence and has a regard for your usual customs, so far as the Military Administration permits. Accordingly, all the people in the Commonwealth are requested to comprehend the real intention of the Army and never be deceived by propaganda of U.S.A. and Great Britain, and you should never disturb public peace in any way, warning yourselves against rashness and refraining from spreading fabulous, wild rumors. Their actions shall be regarded as hostile operations and offenders shall be severely punished, the gravest among them shall be put to death, according to the martial law.²⁴

A similar proclamation was issued "to all third party foreigners in the Philippines."²⁵

The Japanese Consul-General to the Philippines, Katsumi Nihro, who was a long-time resident of the Philippines, was well aware of Filipino sensibilities. In a press release on January 3, 1942, the same day the abovementioned harsh proclamations came out, Katsumi Nihro sought to temper the harshness of the proclamations by the Japanese Military Administration. In this press release, Katsumi explained that the Japanese came as friends, assuring the people that "life and property will be protected and that the civilian population will not be molested . . . normal life and business will be restored as rapidly as possible and that nobody need fear any insecurity at home or anywhere . . ." that the Japanese have nothing but the best wishes for the Filipinos who,

in turn, should understand the true motives of Japan.²⁶ Together with these efforts, Japanese planes flew over Manila, dropping leaflets calling the inhabitants to be friendly with Japan as this act could help convert Greater East Asia into a world paradise. The simultaneous impositions of various repressive measures, however, belied such angelic promises and made the inhabitants largely distrustful of Japanese motives.

Thus, the first days of January 1942 were spent expediting the resumption of normal life in occupied Philippines. The Japanese Military Administration at once organized a central governing body to effect the pacification and reconstruction campaigns throughout the country. This was done on January 7, 1942, when representatives of the Japanese Imperial Forces in Manila and Mayor Jorge Vargas²⁷ agreed to recognize Vargas as Mayor of Greater Manila and matters relating to the protection of life and property, recognition of existing laws, customs, and free worship of religion were threshed out outwardly in favor of the Filipinos. This was done on condition that Mayor Vargas maintain peace and order, restore all public utilities, meet the needs of the Japanese Armed Forces and, above all, accept "Japanese directors and experts in the general administration . . . of the city of Greater Manila."²⁸ A few days later, a Manila Defense Command was set up "to maintain peace and order" in the city.²⁹ Moreover, a Liaison Office was established by the Japanese Army outwardly "to attend to reports, communications, petitions and complaints from civilians in order that effective cooperation be facilitated to promote the general welfare."³⁰ All of these, however, only showed that the Japanese Military administrators were the ones running the affairs of occupied Philippines and that the native officials were reduced to more puppets.

On January 23, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines appointed Vargas as Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission and ordered him "to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs in the Philippines and to the execution of the administration under the commands and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces." The order likewise reconstituted the central administrative bodies of the

Philippine government into six departments namely, Finance; Interior; Justice; Agriculture and Commerce; Education, Health and Public Welfare; and Public Works and Communication. Jurisdiction over judicial courts was vested in the Japanese Commander-in-Chief. What was very significant in this January 23 order was the provision whereby the Japanese Commander-in-Chief's approval on virtually all Philippine matters was required.³¹ In effect, Vargas and the rest of the local officials were reduced to mere figureheads. As Chairman of the Executive Commission, Vargas was merely assigned the unenviable task of overseeing the civil administration of the occupied city in accordance with the orders of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

The January 23 order, followed by more orders of the same nature, began the direct supervision and control of Philippine affairs by the Japanese conquerors themselves. Military dictatorship was thus instituted. Regulations in relation with status and dutiful cooperation was now the basis laid for the Filipinos and the Philippine government under Japan. The new administration began to operate under the pre-war elite, sans Quezon and Osmeña. It was obvious that many of those who served under the Japanese did so under compulsion as refusal to accept appointments was interpreted as hostile action against the Japanese which was punishable by death.

THE THREADS OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IN THE PHILIPPINES

With the establishment of the administrative machinery the Japanese were freed from the task of dealing with the Filipino masses directly. Effective control, however, was maintained with the assignment of Japanese advisers to every important Filipino official. In turn, the Japanese now focused their efforts toward the renovation of the Filipino mind along Japan's blueprint for Greater East Asia.

From the start of the war, Japan's propaganda took the cue from the Imperial Rescript and other official pronouncements from Tokyo. The Imperial Rescript called the war against the American a "sacred war" which Japan was waging in order to

liberate fellow Asians from Western exploitation and domination, to establish economic solidarity for Greater East Asia to end its economic dependence on the West, to rejuvenate and promote Asian culture which had degenerated due to Western encroachments, and above all, to establish the spirit of "Hakko Ichiu" or Universal Brotherhood in building an "Asia for the Asiatics" and a "Philippines for the Filipinos" with Japan as the guiding spirit. To add to Japanese claim of military superiority, Japan's mythology was emphasized. To impress the inhabitants of the occupied countries, a policy of granting independence to them was announced as a component of the Co-Prosperity Sphere plan.³² Evidently, the promise of independence was aimed at winning the occupied inhabitants over to the Japanese side. Moreover, by playing on their independence aspirations, Japan would be depicted as their liberator, one who is responsive to their aspirations for freedom.

Japanese Propaganda During the Bataan Campaign – While occupied parts of the Philippines were undergoing reorganization under the Japanese Military Administration, unoccupied areas, where fighting or resistance continued, were subjected to intensive Japanese propaganda campaigns. Of these areas, Bataan and Corregidor experienced this type of Japanese onslaught.

In Bataan, Japanese propaganda was calculated to weaken and demoralize the defender's resistance. It was here also where various Japanese propaganda techniques were used to the utmost. While the fight continued to rage, the USAFFE forces were subjected to numerous propaganda barrages on the air and on the ground. Leaflets were airdropped over the Bataan defenders, their contents written in the various local dialects as well as in English and Spanish. They were filled with cajoleries and tantalizing offers for the defenders to surrender, if the Filipinos would leave the "white imperialists" who were deluding them.³³ Other propaganda leaflets carried pictures seeking to arouse the baser instincts of man, calling the Filipinos as "brothers," providing for surrender tickets, etc. One such leaflet carried semi-nude and luscious-looking women in provocative poses telling the defenders

DON'T WAIT TO DIE

Before the bombs fall, let me
take your hand and kiss your
gentle cheeks and murmur

Before the terror comes, let me
walk beside you in garden deep
in petalled sleep

Let me, while there is still a
time and place. Feel soft
against me and rest rest your
warm hand on my breast

Come home to me,
and dream with me 34

On the ground, radio broadcasts and loudspeakers brought as near as possible to the USAFFE lines blared all forms of Japanese propaganda, torturing many USAFFE's minds. The account by Carlos P. Romulo, himself in the warfront, vividly recorded this intense psychological battle:

Abruptly, the silence was riven by screams, groans, gunfire, wailing, and heartbroken sobbing This was the sound barrage that was part of the clever Japanese program to soften up the defenders of Bataan. It came from the sound trucks pushed as close as possible to the Fil-American lines.

The shattering beginning was followed by the tender voice of a woman. She sang sentimental songs and then spoke softly in tones of love. "Defenders of Bataan, go home. Your mothers need you, your sweethearts are lonely Throw down your guns, soldier boys, go home to those who love you."³⁵

Daily, during the course of the Bataan conflict, the propaganda fed to the defenders concentrated on cajoleries, tempting offers, threats, and boasts of Japan's armed might, and the line that America had forsaken the Philippines. This very insidious propaganda had its telling effects. Many Bataan defenders became sleepless; mixed thoughts tortured them. Some, if not many, broke down.³⁶

Another propaganda line by the Japanese used against the Bataan defenders was to sow division between the Filipino and American forces. On one hand, the Filipinos were told to leave the Americans to their fate. On the other hand, the Americans were told to leave the Filipinos who were ungrateful to America. An example of this divisive ploy was to force captured American soldiers to broadcast to their fellow soldiers in the front:

To you soldiers still fighting the hopeless battle here in the Philippines let me tell you that I have seen much of the Japanese Army in the past few weeks and cannot help but admire its soldiery qualities, its fighting spirit, its will to win . . . , why should you sacrifice yourselves . . . with no hope of succor in this land so far from our native soil? Why waste American blood on Philippine soil?

Now accept the inevitable and surrender to a far superior force. We are not Spartans at Thermopylae with our homes to defend. We are soldiers far from home and family fighting for a colonial aggrandizement which is against the wishes of the majority of Americans . . . I say, place your trust in the hands of the Japanese and surrender.

Let the Philippines be dominated by the Japanese. What ties has America other than to protect the investments of a few capitalists? The Japanese are far closer to the Philippines geographically and economically, are better fitted to make this land bloom as we have never done.

The Filipinos themselves are not adverse to a change of masters. I have seen them . . . gaily welcoming the new conquerors to each town and barrio. Worse than that, the Filipino soldiers desert . . . Why should more American blood be spilt in defense of such an alien people?³⁷

The propaganda was a deceptive effort to drive a wedge between the Filipino-American defenders. Prolonged USAFFE resistance, however, appeared to have minimized the effects of this Japanese propaganda. For this, the Japanese mocked the Filipinos, in particular, telling them how stupid it was for them to die fighting for America, considering themselves Americans when, were they in America, they would be denied equal rights and even the chance to make a decent living.³⁸

For all the vituperation and bitter invectives hurled by the Japanese propagandists against the fighting Filipino soldiers and against the Filipinos as a whole, they remained steadfast to America. Worse, the Japanese barrages were effectively counteracted by USAFFE propaganda broadcasts, notably the "Voice of Bataan," which lifted, the sagging morale of the Filipino soldiers, during many critical moments of the war. The broadcast of the morale-boosting messages by Quezon, MacArthur and Roosevelt certainly propped up the faltering USAFFE men.³⁹

The Japanese saw the effects of the "Voice of Bataan" against their propaganda efforts. In particular, they sought to silence its spokesman, Carlos P. Romulo, by offering handsome monetary

rewards for the capture of Romulo. To counter Quezon, MacArthur, etc., the Japanese, likewise, used leading Filipinos. For instance, General Emilio Aguinaldo was put on the air to enjoin the Bataan defenders to end their resistance and accept the inevitability of Japanese victory. He also spoke about Japan's promise of independence for the Philippines.⁴⁰

Other known Filipinos were also tapped by the Japanese such as General Artemio Ricarte, Benigno Ramos, etc. to help in enjoining the Filipinos to end their hostility against the Japanese. They were utilized through the establishment of the Philippine Executive Commission which, in turn, acted as the official spokesman for the Filipino people. Through this organization, these prominent Filipinos were made to tour the country, conducting pacification campaigns telling the people to accept Japanese rule and end futile defiance to restore peace and order.⁴¹

In spite of pacification tours, intimidations, death threats, etc. the Filipino people, as a whole, withstood the Japanese propaganda onslaught. Japanese authority was accepted only where there were large concentrations of troops capable of imposing Japanese rule. In the countryside, the guerillas held sway.

In Bataan, the USAFFE defenders bore the brunt of the Japanese fury, fueled by the latter's rising frustrations over the continued defiance of the soldiers and the people. No quarter was given to the defenders. There was no respite from the barrages of attacks, both military and psychological. Captured USAFFE men were compelled to write letters addressed to their comrades in the field or to broadcast to them. The content was invariably the same -- give up resistance as it was futile to do so because it would only cause further carnage, destruction, and sufferings to the inhabitants and the nation as a whole. Aware of how concerned the people were over the fate of their fighting men in Bataan, the Japanese tried to exploit this sentiment. They announced that they would deliver to the Filipino soldiers in Bataan letters from their loved ones.⁴² It appeared that the public response was discouraging that the Japanese did not follow up this effort.

Efforts to plant dissension among the Filipino-American forces were reported in the various Japanese propaganda mouth-pieces. The attacks against the Americans were particularly virulent. Play-ups of American discrimination against the Filipinos and of alleged rising Filipino resentment against the Americans for forcing the former to fight were widely publicized. Even General MacArthur was quoted as expressing fear of Filipino uprisings against the United States.⁴³

The escape of Quezon, MacArthur, etc. from Bataan and, thereafter, to Australia provided the Japanese new themes to undermine the sagging morale of those left in Bataan. Japanese propaganda branded this escape as an act of abandonment, rendering the Filipinos' sacrifices in vain, showing that American acts were "full of cowardice and falsehood Unlike Japan whose real aim is to save the Philippines from exploitation"⁴⁴

Yet even without Quezon and MacArthur, the Japanese were still bewildered by the continued Filipino resistance in Bataan and elsewhere. Their inability to fathom the reasons for this prolonged resistance led the Japanese to describe said resistance as no longer justifiable, reasoning that --

The only justifiable condition of war under any circumstances is the possibility of success. As soon as that possibility disappears as influenced by the developments of the struggle, civilization demands that the vanquished or defeated party, in the name of humanity, should submit and accept the result even though it is not pleasing to its sentiment. Such is the design of civilization, and whatever combatants depart from this principle become incompetent in the management of civil affairs because of his ignorance of the exigencies of humanity. The Filipinos have been clearly defeated in the field of battle . . . and wisdom in this state of the war should recognize the inevitable, suspend the hostilities, and help in the task of regenerating the islands⁴⁵

It was particularly galling to the Japanese that the USAFFE surrendered not by virtue of Japan's military prowess, as what they achieved in Singapore, Hongkong, and Malaya, but largely due to hunger, sickness, and deprivation. This was precisely voiced out by the USAFFE Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainright, when he reported to President Roosevelt why he must cease resistance against the Japanese:

With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame I report to Your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay

There is a limit of human endurance and that limit has long since been past I feel it is my duty to my country and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human sacrifice. If you agree, Mr. President, please say to the nation that my troops and I have accomplished all that is humanly possible and that we have upheld the best traditions of the United States and its Army.

With profound regret and with ⁴⁶continued pride in my gallant troops I go to meet the Japanese Commander.

The fall of Bataan and Corregidor were hollow victories for the Japanese. This must have been one of the reasons that enraged many Japanese soldiers who gave vent to their frustrations and sufferings, too, in what is now known as the "Death March" as well as in other atrocities committed against the vanquished USAFFE troopers. In spite of such hollow victory, the Japanese propaganda corps utilized the fall of Bataan and Corregidor to substantiate their boasts of Japan's military might. Widespread publicity attended the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. The surrender and the subsequent "Death March" of the hapless USAFFE soldiers was described by Japanese propaganda thus —

Performing the song of defeat, the file of prisoners continues windingly on, with exhaustion showing on their pallid features, dragging their feet heavily ⁴⁷after them. It is the dirge of the haughty and arrogant American Army.

It was obvious that the Japanese propaganda against the Bataan and Corregidor defenders had minimal effects on the people. This was shown by their undampened sympathy with their defeated fighting men expressed through various ways. The people along the way of the "Death March" bravely defied the Japanese guards, and confronted by Japanese cruelties, sought ways and means to help USAFFE men.⁴⁸

Japanese Propaganda Against Quezon — Side by side with the virulent propaganda against the USAFFE was the one directed against Quezon. The Japanese were aware of Quezon's influential leadership over the Filipino people. If they could undermine his hold over the Filipinos and, at the same time, enhance the influence of their Filipino puppets over the people, the Japanese

task of winning the people to Japan's side would be a big feat for them. Moreover, there appeared to be an urgent need for the Japanese propaganda corps to intensify their efforts since the protracted USAFFE resistance was already worrying Tokyo. The Japanese timetable for the conquest of Southwest Pacific was being held up. USAFFE resistance was holding off the Japanese forces in the Philippines which was intended for the invasion of Australia. General MacArthur noted that

There was an influence, a spiritual influence, exerted by the resistance on Bataan. Not only did the Japanese at home worry about the length of the period of resistance on Bataan, but it served to indicate to the Filipinos that the Americans had not deserted them and would continue to try to assist them.⁴⁹

Quezon's morale-boosting messages reflected this influence mentioned by MacArthur. Thus, both the military and psychological elements of warfare were used by the Japanese to bring pressures on Quezon, who, by this time was already wracked with fever and coughs. The first move undertaken by the Japanese was to gather the Filipino leaders left behind by Quezon, organizing them to form the Philippine Executive Commission. Its establishment was given wide publicity. Official announcement of its creation was made in Tokyo on January 28, 1942, together with the claim that a new government in the Philippines was already established which had pledged adherence to Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere policy. Quezon was bothered by this Tokyo news and commented that the "effect of this broadcast was bad," not only to him but to the Filipino people. In a broadcast intended to neutralize this Tokyo announcement and to reassure the Filipinos, Quezon absolved the men now holding positions under the Japanese. He then proceeded to cloud with doubt what Tokyo had announced in order to undermine its impact on the Filipinos, thus:

I have no direct information concerning the veracity of the news broadcast from Tokyo that a commission has been recently organized The organization of such a commission, if true, can have no political significance not only because it is charged merely with purely administrative functions but also because the acquiescence by its members to serve on the commission was evidently for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of the civilian population and can, in no way, reflect the sentiments of the Filipinos towards the enemies. Such sentiments are still those I have repeatedly expressed in the past: loyalty to America and resolute resistance against the invasion of our territory and liberties⁵⁰

Through printed and oral subterfuge and machinations, Japanese propaganda bore down on Quezon. So beleaguered was Quezon himself that, at one point, he entertained ideas of going over to the Japanese side but he was quickly dissuaded.⁵¹ Letters addressed to Quezon were either published, air-dropped or broadcast to Corregidor where Quezon was holed in. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief made a personal broadcast to Quezon telling him that "the true aim of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the present war is to drive out the evil influences and power of the United States which have obstructed the natural development and healthy growth of nations in East Asia." He urged Quezon "not to misjudge the real situation nor to lead the Filipinos in an utterly futile resistance, simply for the sake of the United States of America." He further assured Quezon that the Japanese Imperial Forces do not regard the Filipinos as their enemies, neither do they wish to change the administrative organization of the Commonwealth, nor were they interested in politics.⁵²

Failing to get any response from Quezon through these efforts, the Japanese military authorities utilized their puppet Filipino officials. The latter were ordered to draw up messages to be broadcast to Roosevelt, appealing to him to order the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines. The Japanese, probably, knew that General MacArthur would not surrender; the latter had already expressed the desire to remain with his family to fight to the end.⁵³ It appeared that the Japanese believed that unless ordered by Roosevelt, MacArthur and the USAFFE would not heed Japanese appeals for them to surrender. Thus ordered, the Filipino commissioners drew up a message and it was broadcast through Station KZRH to Roosevelt:

We the undersigned leading officials of the newly established civilian administration of the Philippines beg leave to express our desire for the re-establishment of peace in the country and earnestly request you to consider the advisability of ordering the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines to prevent further carnage and sacrifice of Filipino lives. We believe that in view of the trend of events, particularly the fall of Singapore and the actual supremacy of Japan in the Far East, further resistance in the Philippines will only mean more destruction of lives . . . We are cooperating with the Japanese forces in the re-establishment of civil government on the promise by the Japanese government to grant the Filipino people independence with honor. We have taken this step with the aim of realizing and insuring our aspiration for early independence which you yourself have in the past encouraged and praised . . .

A similar message was broadcast to Quezon advising him of "taking the necessary steps to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines."^{5 5}

Even the families of the Filipino officials were used by the Japanese to pressure Quezon. On the occasion of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon's birthday on February 19, 1942, Vargas' daughter, Nena, was used to make a broadcast to her:^{5 6}

Dear Doña Aurora:

Are you listening? This is Nena Vargas speaking in Manila from the studios of Station KZRH.

The war has taken you away from our midst, but our spirits are ever together. We shall continue to keep at heart the happiness and welfare of our people. We shall continue to pray that the war may soon end and that we shall be brought together again that we may rebuild the country so dear to us all into a new, a greater Philippines.

And to create a burden of guilt in the mind of Quezon as the one responsible for the useless deaths of Filipino lives, the Japanese tapped Mrs. Jorge Vargas to broadcast "A Message from a Mother":

Those who have sons in the battle fronts suffer from a continuous agony which other people who have not borne or reared children would not be able to comprehend fully. I know the agonies of those who have sons in the front, for I have one myself. I share with them all their sorrows and their griefs^{5 7}

Dissatisfied with the dismal results of their propaganda against Quezon, the Japanese concocted a wild report that Quezon was already dead in Iloilo.^{5 8} As expected, many Filipinos were troubled for if the report were true they would be leaderless and their efforts to resist the Japanese would be undermined. Unfortunately, the effort by the Japanese was neutralized when the *Manila Tribune* unwittingly published Vargas' statement saying that he had no personal information on the reported death of Quezon.^{5 9}

Even before his successful escape to Australia, the Japanese made it appear that Quezon was an unwilling prisoner of the Americans to create the impression that if Quezon had his way, he would have gone over to the Japanese side. One of Quezon's Japanese friends before the war made such allegation, saying

Being a thorough believer in collaboration with Nippon in view of geographical and economic and cultural relations, Quezon is known to have opened his heart to his close lieutenants.

I had hoped that Quezon, holding the destiny of his country in the palm of his hand, would make use of this rare opportunity.

Yet, he was compelled to flee with MacArthur, and thence to the United States. I do not believe he did this of his own free will – he must have been dragged away by the Americans . . .

As his friend, I regret that Quezon did not choose Rizal's path.⁶⁰

This was part of a published letter intended for the persual of the Filipino officials of the Philippine Executive Commission. Vargas, chairman of this commission, replied:

It was the personal tragedy of President Quezon that he was compelled by the American high authorities to leave the Philippines, just when the way was opened for the realization of his fundamental policies of peace and friendship with the nations of Greater East Asia. I believe that if he had his own way, he would have remained and entered into understandings with the Imperial Japanese Forces with respect to the safety and welfare of the Philippines.⁶¹

Thus, Quezon was made to appear that he was virtually a prisoner of the Americans and, therefore, was helpless to follow what he wanted to do.

Quezon's escape to Australia elicited acid comments from Tokyo which described the departure as "a most concrete proof that the United States has despaired of doing anything further in the Philippines and therefore has scuttled the ship and abandoned the Filipinos to their fate."⁶²

In a *Manila Tribune* editorial, the Japanese made a biting comment on Quezon's departure from the Philippines:

. . . unlike Rizal who would rather die for his ideal than surrender it, Mr. Quezon lacked the martyr's firmness of character, a character strong enough in ordinary circumstances and equal to minor climaxes, but tragically weakened by the subtle operations of the American way of life which in blinder moments we tried to defend.

The tragedy of Mr. Quezon is thus linked with the tragedy of American democracy and of American imperialistic adventure in this part of the globe.⁶³

Whenever Quezon made a broadcast to the Philippines, the Japanese propaganda was quick to jump on him, calling Quezon

ignorant of what is taking place in the Philippines and advising him to listen on Manila.⁶⁴ In other Japanese reactions, Quezon was criticized as "one who seems to be resigned to playing the puppet for American propaganda" and one who deserted his people in time of their dire need, and that "in the New Philippines there is no room for him." He was depicted to have deserved such an exile, adding that "nothing could be more dishonorable than for a person who was born a Filipino, to die without a country."⁶⁵

The Japanese did not relent on their attacks against Quezon. They knew very well that he symbolized the very orientation of the Filipino people in their unswerving loyalty to America. Their failure to discredit Quezon and his leadership proved a serious hindrance to their efforts to alienate the Filipinos from the Americans. The Japanese never forgave Quezon so much so that even at the death of the latter on August 2, 1944, they still reserved a biting editorial for him:

Death has put finish to his career. As far as we of the Philippines are concerned while we respect his memory, we accept the unalterable fact that his death also put an end to the agreements and compromises he had willy-nilly entered into with the American government. Government in captivity and the lights of the stage turned off on the disgraceful independence measure forced by the U.S. Congress upon a dying man . . . And now that the man who accepted America's offer is dead, let that offer be interred too, and forgotten . . .⁶⁶

Indeed, the bitterness of the propaganda hurled against Quezon by the Japanese only showed how vital he was to the Japanese blueprint in winning over the Filipino people to the cause of Japan. Certainly, had Quezon gone over to the Japanese side, as the lesser political elites did, the picture would have been entirely different. Ironically for the Japanese, tuberculosis proved more effective in silencing Quezon than their propaganda barrages.

CULTURAL PROPAGANDA AND THE PROGRAM OF JAPANIZATION OF THE FILIPINOS

With the termination of organized resistance in the Philippines, the Japanese shifted their calls for cessation of resistance to calls for collaboration in the building of a New Philippines and the

renovation of the entire Filipino life according to the Japanese blueprint of a Philippines under Japan.

After issuing proclamations terminating American sovereignty over the Philippines and calling on the Filipinos to join hands with the Japanese Military Administration in reconstructing the Philippines, another series of orders was issued banning all forms of media. The Military Administration declared that listening to foreign broadcasts would be punishable by death, and the operation of media of communications was banned. As a consequence, all prewar newspapers and publications, radio stations, etc., except those converted into Japanese mouthpieces, ceased operations. After banning these mass media, the operators/owners were later required to secure permits before they could resume operations. Finally, they were placed under strict censorship.⁶⁷ With one sweep, the mass media was placed under the strict control of the Japanese military authorities.

Simultaneous with the imposition of various restrictive measures, the Japanese authorities reconcentrated American, British, and other enemy nationals as they were considered agents propagating western influences in the country. Immediately following the occupation of Manila, the Japanese warned foreign nationals not to commit any hostile acts and they were ordered to report to any office of the Japanese Army authorities for interment. Their properties were sequestered. Moreover, the Japanese used every chance to humiliate the Western nationals, whether military or civilian, and held them up to the hatred and derision of the Filipinos. The Japanese did these in an effort to show to the Filipinos that white superiority over the Asians was a myth. The Japanese reconcentrated all foreign enemy nationals for the reason that if they were allowed to mingle with the Filipinos they would, apart from the possibilities of obstructing Japanese policies, "spoil the right spirit of understanding between the Japanese and the Filipinos."⁶⁸

Japanese propaganda also depicted American rule in the Philippines as one of unbridled exploitation, without love for the Filipino welfare and was contrasted with Japan's rule which was depicted as just and humane.⁶⁹ The myth of Anglo-American invincibility was also branded as hollow in the face of

Japanese victories. Organized hostility to the West was deliberately pursued as necessary to Japan's bid to supplant the West in the Pacific.⁷⁰ This policy to eliminate the Anglo-Saxons in Philippine life was viewed to be a mark of Japan's New Order in the Philippines. The Japanese authorities believed that the implementation of this policy would lead to the severance of all ties between the Philippines and the United States. To effect this policy, all references to or about the West were removed, replaced, or renamed in Japanese or Filipino. Thus, *Kigenreki*, the Japanese calendar, replaced the Western calendar. So, 1942 became Year 2602. The Land of the Rising Sun should henceforth be called *Nippon* or *Dai Nippon* and the use of foreign names such as *Japan* was strictly forbidden.⁷¹ American names of Philippine places were also replaced. So, Fort McKinley became *Sakura-heiei*; Zablán Field became *Kita-heiei*; Dewey Boulevard became *Heiwa Boulevard*; Wallace Field and Burnham Green was renamed *Plaza Bagong Pilipinas*; Harrison Park became *Rizal Park*, etc.

Legal holidays before the Japanese occupation were replaced by Japanese legal holidays as well as anniversary dates commemorative of Japan's victories (like the outbreak of the Pacific War, the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, etc.) Thus, the founding of the Japanese Empire (*Kigen-setu*), the birthday of the Japanese Emperor (*Tenyo-setu*), and the veneration of Emperor Meiji (*Meiji-setu*) became legal holidays for the Philippines. A new government code of ethics patterned after the Japanese code of *Bushido* was enforced for all government employees to follow. Time schedule of work was likewise revised. The obligatory bow in the direction of Tokyo was always required to be performed to start all public gatherings and meetings. The display of the Philippine flag was forbidden. During days of public celebration the Japanese flag had to be displayed on all buildings.⁷²

This Japanization process went hand in hand with a determined effort to spread the Japanese language and make it the common language in the Philippines and in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Its spread was regarded by the Japanese authorities as "the first step to bring the blessings of Japanese civilization to the less advanced peoples of Asia." Thereafter, Japanese language schools were established in the Philippines, such as the Nippongo Institute of the *Kan Min Ren Raku Sho*, to facilitate the spread of

Nippongo and effect the Nipponization of the "New Philippines." In particular, this language institute was to foster "closer understanding and friendship between the Imperial Forces and the Filipino people . . . with reference to the present and future destiny of this country."⁷³

Schools in the Philippines were allowed to reopen but Japanese and Tagalog languages were prescribed as the official languages besides being made compulsory subjects for all students to learn. In place of English (which the Japanese sought to eliminate), Nippongo was made the second medium of instruction in the Philippine schools.⁷⁴ Even in private and government correspondence, Nippongo was prescribed. Japanese songs were also taught. In short, Japanese culture and life were stressed in the Philippine educational curricula as a way to reorient the Filipino mind. In other words, the curricula focused largely on the excellence of the Japanese, their Emperor, their institutions and ideologies. "The Japanese attempts at cultural indoctrination of the people," said one writer, "greatly exceeded wartime considerations. Their ultimate objective appeared to have been to absorb the people of the Archipelago into a completely-orientated East Asiatic community."⁷⁵

As the most effective means of realizing their goals, the Japanese authorities utilized the educational system to the fullest. The upbringing of the younger Filipinos could be done to suit the policies that Japan wanted inculcated in them. From early childhood, the child's mind could be made to assimilate concepts that the Japanese wanted spread. It was clear that the Japanese authorities banked on the upbringing of younger Filipino generations according to the Japanese blueprint. Through it, the aim to eradicate all vestiges of Western influences in the Philippines could be gradually effected.

Barely two months following their occupation of Manila, the Japanese military authorities laid down the basic aims of Philippine education under Japanese rule:

1. To make the people understand the position of the Philippines as a member of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the true meaning of the establishment of a New Order in the Sphere and the share which the Philip-

piners should take for the realization of the New order, and thus to promote friendly relations between Japan and the Philippines to the furthest extent.

2. To eradicate the old idea of the reliance upon the Western nations, especially upon the United States of America and Great Britain, and to foster a new Filipino culture based on the self-consciousness of the people as Orientals.

3. To endeavor to elevate the morals of the people, giving up to over-emphasis of materialism.

4. To strive for the diffusion of the Japanese language in the Philippines, and to terminate the use of English in due course.

5. To put an importance to the diffusion of elementary education and to the promotion of vocational education.

6. To inspire the people with the spirit to love labor.⁷⁶

Certainly, these principles were not merely confined to the educational field for it is clear from them that they encompassed all the various aspects of Philippine life.⁷⁷

Before schools were reopened, all textbooks and other learning materials were purged of all references to Western life so that they should only inculcate anti-Western, pro-Japanese, and pan-Asiatic topics.⁷⁸ For this purpose, a Textbook Examining Committee was formed and tasked to designate books to be used in the schools after it had eliminated portions in the books which were incompatible with the established educational policies.⁷⁹ In general, only those books that were about the Philippines, Japan, and the Orient were allowed to circulate.⁸⁰

In the reopening of the schools, the elementary level was given priority. The Japanese knew that the elementary pupils were the ones "who will best bear the imprint of the New Spirit — being the forces of the policy of intellectual readjustment for the Philippines."⁸¹

Since love of labor was to be emphasized, normal and vocational schools as well as those of the natural sciences (such as agriculture, medicine, and engineering) were given preference, too. It was almost a year after the public schools were reopened that private schools were permitted to reopen.⁸²

Educational leaders of the country were brought into constant conferences with the Japanese Military Administration authorities and were often reminded about emphasizing the abovementioned educational policies. The school teachers, too, were retained in-

asmuch as they were the one directly charged with the dissemination of the said aims. They were required to undergo retraining in various institutes which were established for this purpose, acquainting them especially with the policies pertaining to the place of the Philippines in the New Order of East Asia and the role the Philippines would play.⁸³

The elder Filipino generations were not spared. For government employees, a Government Employees Training Institute was created to provide training for government employees in performing their duties under Japan's New Order.⁸⁴ A New Life Camp for Young Filipinos and Japanese was established in Balara, Quezon City, to show that Filipinos and Japanese could live together harmoniously, thus providing a symbol of Asian solidarity.⁸⁵ A training school was also established for Constabulary officers who would shoulder the burden of keeping domestic peace and order for the Japanese.⁸⁶ An Institute for Former USAFFE soldiers was created where ex-USAFFEs, before they were released from confinement, were subjected to a series of re-education programs which was capped by a mass oath-taking of loyalty and adherence to Japan.⁸⁷ There was also established a Naval Technical Training School for Filipino boys for service in the Japanese navy yards.⁸⁸ Then there was the New Philippines Cultural Institute at Tagaytay where young Filipinos were sent to imbibe the Japanese way of life.⁸⁹ For the workers, a Labor Institute was also created.⁹⁰ And so the Japanese virtually established all kinds of schools and training institutes and a host of study courses for Filipinos in all walks of life. And the graduates of these schools invariably were utilized to spread Japan's New Order gospel. Renovation of Philippine life was to be total in scope and the Japanese left no stone unturned. These institutes exemplified determined Japanese efforts to mold the Filipinos for service in the New Philippines as it was being evolved under the Co-Prosperity Sphere program.

Over and above these determined efforts to renovate Philippine life was the utmost desire by the Japanese Military Administration to develop a corps of Filipinos loyal to this New Order -- to create Filipinos thinking and acting like the Japanese -- to insure the perpetuation of Japan's New Order in case Japan

would emerge victorious in the Pacific War. Thus, just as the Americans did earlier, the Japanese recruited and selected young Filipinos as *pensionados* of the Japanese Government to study and train in Japan where they would "undergo training as future leaders of various circles of the New Philippines."⁹¹ Certainly, this program aimed to replace the current Filipino leaders should the time come when they would no longer be needed or useful to Japan.

Reminiscent of the American *Thomasites*, a corps of mentors from Japan came to the Philippines to complement the establishment of the various schools and institutes. Together with various well-known Filipino scholars and scientists, they were ordered to submit works on all aspects of Philippine life. Both Japanese and Filipino scholars and scientists were organized under a research commission tasked "to aid in the intellectual advancement and practical rehabilitation of the country toward a New Philippines."⁹² Scientific researches were emphasized as a vital step for the country's preparation for membership in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁹³

Intercultural exchanges were encouraged. Aside from the sending of Filipino *pensionados* to Japan, Japanese scholars and intellectuals were sent to the Philippines to hold conferences with their Filipino counterparts -- Japanese musicians, artists, writers, etc. Along this line, a Philippines-Japan Cultural Relations Committee was created to help coordinate these cultural exchanges between Japan and the Philippines. The main function of this committee, which was made an important office under the Department of Education, was to establish cultural relations between the two countries through the dissemination of information through books and publications, addresses and lectures, films, pictures and exhibits, to promote the establishment of professorial chairs on Japanese and other oriental cultures and languages in various higher institutions of learning; to work for the revival of ancient Philippine cultural heritage; and to promote Greater East Asia athletic meets and other similar gatherings.⁹⁴ During the early part of February 1944, a Bureau of Oriental Culture was created, tasked to study oriental culture, especially the Philippines, and its dissemination through the schools.⁹⁵

Through these cultural exchanges, Japanese intellectuals, scholars and mentors were enabled to participate in all areas of Philippines life. Japanese athletes joined various athletic competitions in the Philippines to demonstrate that the Japanese people were not only athletic-minded but were also strong. Leading Japanese musicians and artists and Japanese songs were regularly featured in many radio stations. Regular concerts were held at the New Luneta by the New Philippines Symphony Society, composed of Japanese and Filipino musicians. To coordinate these artistic activities and contribute to the cultural reconstruction and spiritual rejuvenation of the Filipinos, a New Philippines Music Federation was organized.⁹⁶ Cultural meetings between Japanese and Filipino painters, musicians, writers, and scholars were encouraged and often held, these meetings capped by a literary, cultural, or press convention held in Tokyo.⁹⁷

Song-writing contests were also held to help spread Japan's New Order in the Philippines. Their changing themes reflected the changing tide of the Pacific War and of the changing Japanese propaganda themes. As early as February 7, 1942, a song contest was announced by the Japanese Military Administration. One of the rules of this contest stated that "the song must express the joy of the Filipinos from being liberated by their Oriental brothers, the Japanese, from Anglo-American domination as well as the spirit of cooperation with Japan in the building of a New Philippines."⁹⁸ Later on, other themes showing the policies of the Japanese in the Philippines were used such as "What I Must Do to Help Make the Philippines a Worthy Member of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,"⁹⁹ "Construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,"¹⁰⁰ and, in the latter part of 1944, a contest was held on the theme "P.I. At War."¹⁰¹

Even illiterate Filipinos were not spared from these cultural onslaughts when the stage was used by the Japanese propaganda corps. The stage was not only a medium of entertainment but could also be used as a medium of instruction to shape public opinion. The Japanese knew that its appeal was "direct, visual, and auditory so that even the most illiterate, merely sitting passively through a performance, may be instructed."¹⁰²

In a similar manner, the Japanese widely utilized the printed media. The T-V-T (*Tribune-La Vanguardia-Taliba*) chain was allowed to resume operations on condition that it would help in making the Filipinos collaborate with Japan. Specifically, the press was charged with the task of emphasizing the "important function of the dissemination of public information if our common objective is to be attained -- that all the peoples collaborate."¹⁰³ The *Liwayway* magazine was tasked to popularize the use of Japanese and Tagalog languages in order to gradually eliminate the use of Spanish and English.¹⁰⁴

The radio was widely used since it was the easiest and most economical way of reaching the largest number of people. The widely-known radio program was the so-called "Radio Taiso" conducted by the Station KZRH to popularize the idea that a healthy people is a wealthy nation. It consisted of daily morning exercises held in practically most of the occupied areas of the Philippines -- in schools, government offices, etc.

It could be said that Japanese propaganda permeated almost every corner and nook of the Philippines. For even the animals were not spared and were used as propaganda tools when a "Horse Day" was held on April 7, 1943 and the speech of the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration noted that

It is my earnest desire to extend kind treatment to the native Philippine horse in active cooperation with your individual efforts and to develop thereby to the highest degree possible its characteristic features so that we can all accelerate . . . the breeding of Philippine horses and by this means speed up the progress of industry and communication in the New Philippines.¹⁰⁵

Inanimate things, too, were utilized as shown in the advertisement of one of the Japanese-made medicines which said

For the promotion of health of Philippines! WAKAMOTO which presents the richest sources of potent Vitamin B Complex, so essential to life and health, is a remedy kept by every family in Nippon. It is also an essential tonic of military use.

Drive off the course of all diseases through WAKAMOTO just as Nippon exterminated the baneful Anglo-American influences from the Orient.¹⁰⁶

RELIGIOUS REGIMENTATION AND PROPAGANDA

Another major area of Japanese propaganda activities lay in their efforts to regiment the various religious groups in the Philippine and make them fit the mold of the Japanese New Order in the Philippines. A week following the occupation of Manila, the leaders of the various religious groups in the country were brought one after the other into conferences with the head of the Japanese Army religious section. Here they were instructed about the Japanese authorities' desire "to have intimate intercourse between the Catholic and Protestant Churches of Japan and the Philippines in regard to the ultimate goal of the Japanese Imperial Army."¹⁰⁷ In relation to their future activities, the religious leaders were directed "to confer and consult" for advice with Japanese ministers and priests attached with the Japanese Army. The first step to regiment religious activities was thus imposed. This would be reinforced by the bringing in of Japanese priests, ministers, and nuns under the leadership of a Japanese bishop, Msgr. Taguchi. They were to gradually take the place of the foreign religious leaders.¹⁰⁸

It was the claim of the Japanese Army that they came here to protect, too, the religious freedom of the Filipinos. The Japanese bolstered their claim by citing a proclamation issued by Pope Pius XII "reorganizing the motives of the Japanese campaign to establish peace that will be just and permanent."¹⁰⁹ The Japanese propaganda also justified Japan's desire to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere to be "with the help of God" and that the fundamental principle underlying Japan's actions was the spirit of universal brotherhood which they claimed is the same as that of the Catholic Church.¹¹⁰ Japanese propaganda likewise depicted that there was religious toleration in Japan, that Catholicism was encouraged in Japan, that Christian doctrines had undeniably influenced the modern culture of Japan, and that Japan adopted Christian morals and ethics making the Japanese people in accord with the general principle of love for all fellow-men.¹¹¹

Daily conferences were held with the religious leaders of the Philippines to enable the Japanese religious section to know them and to drill in them the Japanese Army's policies regarding church

activities as well as Japan's New Order. To make it appear that foreign religious groups in the Philippines were respected and well-treated, they were instructed to send messages to their home countries stating that they were "safe and given privileges on some church activities."¹¹²

Not only did the Japanese participate in the various fields of Philippine life but in the religious field as well, where Japanese priests and ministers, besides Japanese soldiers and civilians, were pictured as participating in the religious life of the country.¹¹³ But it was the Filipino religious leaders that were especially utilized to use the pulpit in preaching Japan's New Order in the Philippines.¹¹⁴ Then, to put a halo of sacredness on Japan's religious efforts for the Filipinos, the Vatican was often invoked. For instance, an agreement between the Vatican and the Japanese government calling for an exchange of envoys was given widespread publicity.¹¹⁵

The preliminary conferences held with the foreign religious groups was then followed by a series of orders gradually restricting religious activities and placing the various groups under strict control. First, all religious heads were told that they must obtain permits from the Japanese Military Administration's Commission on Control before they could solemnize marriages, upon the recommendation of the Director of Religious Affairs.¹¹⁶ Another order provided that those who had not obtained such permits could not perform such ceremonies.¹¹⁷ This was followed by another order requiring all religious groups to register with the Bureau of Religious Affairs. The purpose was to enable the Japanese Military Administration to secure a complete record of all the existing religious organizations in the Philippines, their memberships and properties.¹¹⁸ Religious activities were further curtailed when all religious groups were required to secure prior permits before they could hold public religious processions or demonstrations outside Church premises. Rules and regulations were also prescribed governing such public activities.¹¹⁹ Then the Director of Religious Affairs of the Japanese Army was given supervisory power and authority over trust accounts for charitable purposes of which any religious organization was the trustee.¹²⁰ Finally, religious instruction in schools was ordered abolished.¹²¹

With these orders, the religious life in the Philippines was regimented to conform with the Japanese policies.

Simultaneous with these restrictive measures was the mobilization of all religious groups to assist the Japanese Military Administration's pacification, reconstruction, and collaboration campaigns. Firstly, these religious groups were made to pledge adherence to the Japanese Military Administration. Typical was the one extracted from the Protestant groups:

We, the Protestant missionaries and those who are connected with the Christian works, will gladly cooperate with the Japanese Army as it proclaims the military administration in the Philippines and do hereby pledge ourselves to take the duties of the restoration and maintenance of peace by observing the following items:

1. Although we are granted the freedom of faith, we will gladly offer our buildings and their equipment whenever they are needed and are requested through proper channels for military strategy.
2. We would never hold meetings primarily for the people of the hostile nations (worship service included), except services in the Sto. Tomas Internment Camp.
3. We would not hold, for the time being, any meeting other than the religious services.
4. We would lead and instruct our members of the Church, trusting in the Japanese Army, understanding that the great ideal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity is on the road to its realization, and believing that the very fulfillment of that great ideal is to attain world peace.
3. We would not hold, for the time being, any meeting other than the not fail its generous considerations toward us.¹²²

Not only the Protestants, but also the Catholics, the Muslims, and the Chinese religious organizations were made to sign similar pledges upholding the Japanese cause, pledging full cooperation, and placing all religious properties and equipment at the disposal of the Japanese Army.¹²³

To replace the immobilized religious organizations, the Japanese Military Administration established a Nippon-Filipino Catholic Association, with a magazine, *Tagapagturo*, as its organ, to foster Japanese policies using religion as a means. In place of the foreign priests, ministers and nuns, Japanese priests, ministers and nuns were sent to the Philippines as a way of severing the religious ties between the Filipinos and the West.

Since Filipino Catholics were idolatrous worshippers, the Japanese fostered this and used Christian Japanese martyrs like Takayama Ukun. They created an aura of martyrdom and saintliness around Takayama Ukun, a Christian Japanese who escaped persecution in Japan and sought refuge in the Philippines, spending the rest of his life in the country. On December 8, 1942, the Japanese publicized the papal brief proclaiming the Blessed Virgin of the Immaculate Conception patronness of the New Philippines, adding that "it bespeaks His Holiness' paternal thoughtfulness about the faith and welfare of the Filipinos and implies His sympathy with the justice of Japan's cause."¹²⁴

The religious heads did not have a choice but to act as the mouthpiece of the Japanese in spreading Japan's New Order in the Philippines. They were told, in speaking before the Filipinos, to depict the war as a fight against the forces of materialism as represented by America. The war, according to the Japanese priest named Tsukamoto, who was attached to the religious section of the Japanese Army, was "not alone for the people consecrated in the religious work, it is for all the faithfuls [sic] to participate in it actively . . . as soldiers of Christ. The victorious outcome as a part of the manifestation of Divine Providence, is destined to construct a new world order."¹²⁵ The Japanese priests and ministers received wide publicity in this aspect of propaganda work. They were depicted as doing good works for the people — celebrating masses, appealing for Christian brotherhood, etc. They used the pulpit to tell the Filipinos that now is the time "to reexamine their national character and correct their faults" in order to renovate the country.¹²⁶ In their efforts to make the Filipinos collaborate, the Japanese even used Christ to convey to them that a house divided cannot stand. This could best be illustrated by a poster of Christ, captioned

Now I beseech you brethren, by the name of our Lord, Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that you be perfect in the same mind, and in the same judgment. (Corinthian, 1-10).

To those who were born in this New Republic by the Will of God:

Why should we not devote ourselves to the service and glory of our Motherland? We were born Filipinos by the Will of God to love our native land and devote all our efforts for the sake of our country.

We should be obedient to our superiors. Anyone who does not devote himself to the service of his country is not obedient to the Will of God.

"If a Kingdom is divided by itself, that Kingdom cannot stand,"
God commands.

An outlaw by his own will is not obedient to the Ten Commandments of God. Obey the laws of God by giving up your personal will and cooperate wholeheartedly to [sic] the rapid progress of the Philippine Republic.¹²⁷

In this instance, one could note that the Japanese surpassed themselves -- not only was the Pope invoked, but even Christ!

When Premier Tozjo announced that independence shall be granted to the Philippines, the religious groups were enjoined to redouble their religious efforts for peace as a necessary step in the attainment of independence for the Philippines.¹²⁸ They were reminded to take advantage of every sermon and every opportunity to inform the people of Japan's policy in this regard.¹²⁹

The Japanese Military Administration endeavored to isolate the foreign religious leaders but was careful with regards to the Filipino Catholic leadership. After extracting consent from the Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Piani, diocesan authority was given to a Filipino, Bishop Cesar M. Guerrero, and to a Japanese, Bishop Taguchi. The Japanese authorities even advocated the Filipinization of the leadership of the clergy in the Philippines as a practical step because "to all intents and purposes, ministers of the gospel of alien origin who from time immemorial have been at the helm of the Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines cannot be expected to sympathize with Filipino aspirations for freedom and independence."¹³⁰

In their attempt to use religion for their purposes, the Japanese Military Administration hoped to profit from a tie-up with the Church aware of the latter's influence over the people. But with all the restrictive measures imposed against the Church and the other religious groups, it was doubtful whether the latter cooperated wholeheartedly. This observation could be substantiated by the fact that the worsening situation towards the late part of 1944 led the Japanese to re-incarcerate many religious leaders, charging them of espionage and "refusal to cooperate."¹³¹

ECONOMIC RENOVATION AND JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

Since one of their aims was to end Philippine economic dependence on Western economy, the Japanese Military Administration implemented plans to achieve this aim. These plans envisaged the economic reorganization of the Philippines according to the Co-Prosperity Sphere plan. According to this plan, each member-nation would cultivate and engage in the production of goods which are basic to their local needs. Japan, for its part, would provide the necessary technical know -- how and machines. For this task, a Greater East Asia Construction Research Council was created. It was charged to undertake exhaustive studies of ways and means of developing the member countries into self-sustaining economic units which would thereby end their dependence on the West, whose economic policies Japan called as crafty and exploitative. Thus, Japan would be the dominant leader in this proposed economic bloc.¹³²

Specifically, the Co-Prosperity Sphere economic aims had two objectives: first, preference would be given to the acquisition of resources for the successful prosecution of the war; and second, to effect the self-sufficiency of the Co-Prosperity Sphere bloc itself. Thus, economies of the southern Pacific countries, including the Philippines, would be transformed to achieve the first objective and every area in the Co-Prosperity Sphere would be made self-sufficient in food as much as possible.¹³³ The Sphere itself was to be a mutual economic bloc where each member would produce those to which it was best adapted and would receive, in turn, what it lacked from the other member countries.

To end Philippine dependence on the American market, the Japanese drew up various plans. First, sugarlands were transformed into cotton or rice plantations according to a five-year plan for the expansion of cotton production and export. Philippine cotton would find markets in Japan and other members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Cultivation of sugar would be limited only to cope with local demands and with the production of liquid fuel and alcohol for the needs of the Japanese Military.¹³⁴

Eight Japanese firms were each assigned portions of the sugar-lands that were converted into cottonlands.¹³⁵

To facilitate foreign exchange in the Co-Prosperty Sphere, a cashing system was set up based and at par with the Japanese Yen.¹³⁶ And so Philippine money was replaced by Japanese military notes. To prevent foreign firms from obstructing Japanese economic policies, foreign business firms were closed and replaced by Japanese firms. These firms were to exploit lands and would carry out Japanese economic policies in connection with the mobilization of the resources of the occupied countries. Thus, one of the motives behind the Japanese plan to transform the occupied areas into self-sustaining economic units was to utilize their much-needed resources considered vital to the prosecution of Japan's military aims. The Japanese pronouncement to make the Philippines a self-sustaining unit was thus defeated by their very own emphasis in subordinating the economic needs of the inhabitants to the needs of the Japanese Army.¹³⁷

Another aspect of Japanese economic policies was the emphasis on food production drives which sought to increase food supply. Ostensively to attain self-sufficiency for the people, such drives were intended to sustain the needs of the Japanese Army stationed in the Philippines and elsewhere. These food production drives were also justified as a means of ending the people's attachment to Western luxuries and to encourage them to lead simple lives. A luxury tax was imposed on goods and other imported things to discourage consumption of luxury goods and encourage local production of cheaper substitutes. The tax was also intended to remove consumption of luxury goods as a status symbol or as a mark of Western upbringing.¹³⁸

Vocational, agricultural, and technical education was emphasized in order to effect the plan to attain economic self-sufficiency for the Philippines. Aware that the Filipinos disliked manual labor which the Japanese blamed as having been encouraged by the West, the Japanese military authorities emphasized love of labor as part of the educational re-orientation of the people. This was complemented by compelling everyone to cultivate every available land, especially in Manila. Frugality, thrift and other similar virtues were encouraged by the Japanese authorities.

To achieve better results and to facilitate food procurement, especially for the Japanese Army, the Japanese mobilized everyone engaged in various economic endeavors. Thus, rice growers' associations under the NARIC were formed in every rice-growing municipality while coconut-hemp growers associations were organized under the Philippine Copra Purchasing Union. Under the Foodstuff Control Association there were formed various municipal associations of growers of vegetables, fruits, and other farm products.

The formation of associations of manufacturers and producers of goods and other essential commodities were undertaken to implement total economic control programs although these were disguised as efforts to sell commodities at reasonable prices and to combat hoarding and profiteering.¹³⁹

Often the activities and functions of these associations overlapped but the Japanese authorities permitted them for this enabled them to exercise control, besides promoting Japanese dominance of the Philippine economy. This was secured by placing general trade and industry under Japanese military control subject to a permit system. Also, only those economic associations licensed by the Japanese Army were permitted to operate.¹⁴⁰ For the most part, Japanese firms took over foreign-owned properties, thereby securing a dominant position in Philippine finance, overseas trade, mining, and manufacturing industries.¹⁴¹ Philippine banking, for example, was placed under the control of Japanese banks like the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan. These banks were allowed to operate in the Philippines earlier than non-Japanese banking firms.

Behind this facade created by the Japanese Military Administration was the main aim of mobilizing the economic resources of the occupied countries for the successful prosecution of the war efforts of Japan. The needs of the people were only secondary considerations. Great difficulties, therefore, were inevitable and should be borne unquestioningly, the Japanese authorities told the people. It was obvious that the Japanese reaped meagre results in these economic endeavors for their subordination of the needs of the Filipinos alienated the latter. Brought up under

the American way of life, the Filipinos were in no mood to accommodate the Japanese demands especially as they were exacted under abnormal wartime conditions.

THE INDEPENDENCE PROPAGANDA

Of all the propaganda stratagems employed by the Japanese in wooing the Filipinos to their cause, the "independence" bait appeared to be the former's greatest gamble. Its acceptance or rejection by the Filipinos would demonstrate whether the latter had accepted or rejected the Japanese regime.

In the Japanese plans for the Philippines, an autonomous existence was envisioned for the Philippines but with Japan retraining paramount interests in the country. Barely three weeks after their occupation of Manila, Premier Tozjo announced that "Japan will gladly grant the Philippines its independence as long as it cooperates and recognizes Japan's program of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."¹⁴² This speech was accorded enormous publicity and the Filipino officials, headed by Vargas, were prodded to lead the chorus hailing Japan's promise of early independence for the Philippines as proof of Japan's benevolent intentions.¹⁴³ The Filipinos were told not to fall short of Japan's expectations of them, that there was no possible reason for them to hesitate from accepting this offer.¹⁴⁴ It was obvious that collaboration was the pre-condition required by Japan for the grant of independence for the Filipinos.

Premier Tozjo's proclamation provided the cue for the Japanese officials in the Philippines to intensify their efforts to make the Filipinos collaborate with Japan. In essence, it also laid down the basis of future Philippine-Japan relations. It also signified the propaganda line which the Filipinos would be fed. Henceforth, the propaganda thrust would be "collaboration to attain early independence with honor." Pacification drives were launched since peace and order were requisites for attaining such independence. Thus, the Filipino officials were mobilized to sell the "independence" offer to the people.

The reason behind this offer of independence was based on Japanese awareness of the Filipinos' aspirations for independence.

They were eager to offer the Filipinos a Tokyo-made independence. If accepted by the Filipinos, Japan would deprive the United States of claiming the honor of having granted independence to the Filipinos. Moreover, such acceptance would give Japan tremendous propaganda subject against its enemies. Recto gave another value to the Japanese of this independence offer:

[Japan] wanted something more – something which she could not legally demand from a nation vanquished in war unless, that nation was first given a sovereign status, even if in name only. This was a pact of military alliance and a declaration of war on the Allied powers – the ultimate in propaganda value, even if without practical effect from the military point of view.¹⁴⁵

In effect, Japan greatly desired the Filipinos to turn their backs against their benefactor. By doing so, Japan would be able to depict the Filipinos as ingrates, a ploy that would be very productive in sowing dissension between the Philippines and the United States. The Japanese hoped that the realization of such dissension would make the United States disown the Philippines which would then be susceptible to fall into the lap of Japan.

The characteristic haste with which preparations for independence were made following Premier Tozyo's announcement was quite notable. Another year passed, however, before Premier Tozyo reiterated his independence pledge. On January 28, 1943 Premier Tozyo again announced that Japan would grant the Philippines her independence "in the shortest time possible" on condition that further tangible evidence of cooperation is actively demonstrated¹⁴⁶ Premier Tozyo's announcement carried insinuations that the Filipinos ought to be grateful that they were offered their independence by no less than the Premier of Japan. This insinuation could be seen from the communique issued by the Japanese Director General in the Philippines which elaborated on the conditions stated by Premier Tozyo, noting that "it must be a matter of deep chagrin to all Filipinos that the independence of the Philippines is being realized at a later date than the independence of Burma" and that the Japanese authorities in the Philippines were also disappointed that Burma got her independence earlier than the Philippines.¹⁴⁷

For the Philippines to receive her independence, the Japanese authorities laid down a three-point program which the Filipinos

must fulfill if they want to be free "at the earliest possible time."¹⁴⁸

Firstly: Eradicate among your midst of 16 million Filipinos all entanglements and connections with the past regime. Unify and harmonize your efforts into one compact body and demonstrate to the best of your ability sincere and active cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration. Above all else, take vigorous and forceful measures at your own initiative to eradicate the remnants of Americans and the bandits from this country, thereby bringing about complete peace and security throughout the length and breadth of the land.

Secondly: Not only work for the economic rehabilitation of the country in close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration but initiate, through your own will and efforts, effective ways and means of bringing about the much-needed economic self-sufficiency of the Philippines through the rapid reconstruction and renovation of the economic structure of this land.

Thirdly: Work for the speedy reorientation of your people, both spiritually and intellectually thereby regaining your original Oriental souls and with this as the foundation, drastically reorganize the social structure of the Philippines in strict accordance with the ideals and standards of Oriental peoples

And to create a feeling of regret among the Filipinos if they did not take advantage of Japan's independence offer, the Japanese authorities made it known that "the problem is now definitely up to the people of the Philippines." The puppet officials of the Philippine Executive Commission obliged by pledging the full cooperation of the Filipino people to realize at the shortest possible time the attainment of Philippine independence.¹⁴⁹

Less than two weeks following Premier Tozjo's announcement, the people were marshalled, on February 8, 1943, to a public demonstration of gratitude for Japan's promise of independence to the Philippines.¹⁵⁰ This was complemented by a manifesto signed by the members of the Council of State. The manifesto, issued on February 26, called upon the people to exert total and united efforts to attain independence.¹⁵¹ The Philippine Executive Commission also instructed the various religious denominations that

Peace and order should be a common objective by the State and Churches.

Priests and ministers and members of all religious organizations, because of their direct contact with, and moral influence over the people, can render valuable service . . . in restoring and maintaining peace in the whole coun-

try You are requested to instruct . . . and inculcate in the minds of the faithful . . . loyalty to the constituted authorities and the absolute necessity on the part of all Filipinos . . . of cooperating wholeheartedly with the present administration, in the establishment of peace and order in the Philippines.¹⁵²

A week after this instruction came out, Rev. Guillermo Piani, Apostolic Delegate to the Philippines, also issued a statement pledging the cooperation of the Catholic Church.¹⁵³ These things were done obviously to make it appear that the Catholic Church endorsed Japan's plan for the Philippines.

To sustain the pressures for the Filipinos to do as bidden by the Japanese authorities, a series of high-ranking Japanese officials visited the Philippines. They came apparently to see for themselves the progress of Filipino collaboration with Japan. Apparently, they came to believe that the public protestations of cooperation made by the Filipinos was real such that they issued statements that the Filipinos were demonstrating active collaboration with Japan.¹⁵⁴ Not content with his colleagues' observations, Premier Tozjo himself twice visited the Philippines to get confirmation. On May 6, 1943 he made a surprise visit to the Philippines. In the public celebrations that accompanied his visit the seemed to have been convinced, thus personally reaffirming Japan's promise of granting independence to the Filipinos.¹⁵⁵

Premier Tozjo's surprise visit carried an air of urgency. His repeated emphasis for the vanquished Filipinos to collaborate betrayed Japan's exigent demand. Recent Japanese reverses in the battlefronts (such as the battles at Coral Sea and Midway) partly influenced their importunings. Whether or not the Filipino people wholeheartedly collaborated, the Japanese authorities hastened preparations for the granting of Philippine independence. The Japanese promise to grant Philippine independence became definite when Premier Tozjo announced on June 16, 1943

. . . at this juncture we wish to go a step further and declare that we will accord the honor of independence to the Philippines in the course of the current year.¹⁵⁶

sa Bagong Pilipinas) to hold a convention that would form the PCPI (Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence).¹⁵⁷ By June 19, the members of the PCPI were appointed and the next day, Jose Laurel, Sr., was chosen President of the PCPI.¹⁵⁸ Three days later, the PCPI held its first meeting under instructions that the commission should proceed immediately in laying the preparatory work for Philippine independence. At this juncture, the Filipino leaders deliberately slowed their work aware that what they were doing was committing themselves irretrievably down the road of collaboration with Japan. They were also fearful of American threats of reprisal in the future.¹⁵⁹ Bothered by their slow work, Premier Tozo again visited the Philippines on July 10 to prod the PCPI to rush its work.

That the men at the PCPI were loathe to rush the work of collaboration was revealed by Laurel. They and their work also showed how they endeavored to subvert what the Japanese wanted them to do. Laurel noted that they worked having in mind that the New Constitution they were drafting would reflect the following: love of country, co-existence and co-prosperity within the hemispheric bloc, and adherence to the moral law in the administration of the government.¹⁶⁰ Laurel further claimed that they wanted "a government of Filipinos, by Filipinos, and for Filipinos without interference of, and, much less, dictations from any foreign power."¹⁶¹ The seriousness of tone in Laurel's claim could not be denied but it was obvious that the Japanese brushed it aside.

While the Filipino leaders were drafting the constitution of the New Philippines, the people were also being conditioned for the coming grant of Philippine independence. Circulars to provincial and city officials were sent instructing them to organize independence committees tasked to inform the people and prepare them for the coming Philippine independence. Men popular to the masses were sent on public speaking tours to perform similar tasks.¹⁶² The KALIBAPI coordinated this activity relative to preparations for Philippine independence.

To show to the Filipinos that the independence they shall receive was different from that offered by the Americans, the Japanese instituted various changes to reflect this difference. The

Philippine flag's old revolutionary design, for instance, was adopted. Then a New Philippine March was also composed for the coming occasion:

AWIT SA BAGONG PILIPINAS

Tindig aking Inang Bayan,
Lahing pila sa Silangan,
Iwaksi natin ang nakaraan,
Yakapin ang bagong buhay.

Hawakan ang watawat,
Ng pagpap akasipag,
Ibandila, iwasiwas,
Ang pagbabagong-tatag.

Koro

Lakad at harapin,
Pagtatanggol sa layunin,
Hirap, sakit ay tiisin,
Upang makamit ang mithiin.
Gumawa, bumuo, at magbata,
Itatag ang Silangang Asya,
Lupalop na maginhawa,¹⁶³
Kasaganaang sama-sama.

There was also made a New Philippine National Anthem which was reflective of Japan's New Order aims:

PAMBANSANG AWIT NG PILIPINAS

Lupang mapalad na mulya ng Silangan,
Bayang kasuyo ng sangkalikasan,
Buhay at yaman ng Kapilipinuhan,
Kuha't bawi na sa banyagang kamay.

Sa iyong langit, bundok, batis, dagat na pinaglupig,
Nalibing na ang karimlan ng kahapong pagtititis,
Sakit at luha, hirap, dusa at sumpa sa pag-amis,
Ay wala nang lahat at naligtas sa ibig maglupit.

Hayo't magdiwang, lahi kong minamahal,
Iyong watawat ang siyang tanglaw,
At sakaling ikaw ay muling pagbantaan,¹⁶⁴
Aming bangkay ang siyang hahadlang.

The draft of the new constitution was signed by the PCPI members on September 4, 1943. A general assembly was immediately convened in Manila on September 6-7 which ratified the constitution on the last day of the said convention.¹⁶⁵ A *Manila*

Tribune editorial in its issue of September 8 described the ratification of the new constitution as "the rallying point around which national unity may be firmly coalesced, the framework around which our future country is to be constructed."¹⁶⁶ More interesting was the fact that even before Philippine independence was proclaimed, the country was already being hailed as "now a worthy member of the Sphere," revealing the prearranged nature of the Japanese independence offer.

On September 14, the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines issued an executive order providing for the election of delegates to the National Assembly of the forthcoming Republic of the Philippines. The election was to be held on September 20. Only officers and members of the KALIBAPI were given the right to vote. Thus, the Assembly was to be composed of KALIBAPI men or women handpicked by the Japanese.¹⁶⁷

The election was duly held and the Assembly scheduled its first meeting or session on September 26. A day before the body met, Vargas, in a speech, recommended Laurel for the presidency of the Japanese-sponsored Republic. When the Assembly convened, the members "unanimously elected" Laurel as "first President" of the Republic.¹⁶⁸ Barely a week after Laurel's election, he, Vargas and Aquino were invited to Tokyo. It was in Tokyo where the *quid pro quo* of Tokyo's independence grant was revealed to Laurel. In a closed door conference with Premier Tozjo, Laurel was asked to declare war against the United States and Great Britain.¹⁶⁹ Tactfully, Laurel skirted the demand saying that

My people would not approve of it; that I could not carry them; that I have never been a popular leader, the then powerful leaders of the country being Messrs. Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas; that even if I should be willing to do what they wanted me to do, I would be a leader without any following because the Filipinos were opposed to such a step; and that it would not be "decent" for the Filipinos to declare war against the United States that was their benefactor and ally and only unworthy people could be expected to do that. . . .¹⁷⁰

The demand was serious and Laurel, knowing how his countrymen hated the Japanese due to their atrocities, was in a dilemma. Premier Tozjo's warning that the Filipinos' choice was between

extermination or freedom added to the gravity of the situation for Laurel. Fortunately for Laurel, Premier Tozyo did not press his demand. Subsequently, Laurel and his party returned to the Philippines and, according to instructions from Tokyo, announced in a broadcast to the people that Philippine independence would be proclaimed on October 14, 1943.¹⁷¹

The Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated on October 14 with Laurel as its first president. On the same day, the Japanese demand was concretized when a Philippine-Japan Pact of Alliance was signed.¹⁷² Japan hoped that this pact would provide tremendous propaganda for Japan's cause in spite of its little military value. The Japanese hoped that the Filipinos would accept this independence grant as a proof of Japan's sincere effort to befriend them. However, Japanese outrages committed against the Filipinos made such hope wishful thinking.

The inauguration of the Republic also terminated the existence of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Japanese Military Administration turned over to the Republic the civil administration of the nation. In turn, the Japanese Military proclaimed a general amnesty for "misguided elements" so that "all my join in the New Philippines."¹⁷³

The Japanese leaders believed that the foundations of the Co-Prosperity Sphere program were established with the inauguration of the independence of Burma and the Philippines, the participation of the Indonesian people in local administration, the conclusion of the Japan-China Alliance, and the recognition of the Provisional Government of Free India. Thus, to symbolize this success and to promote the coalition and coordination of efforts by Japan in the fight against the West, the Japanese convened an Asia Congress in Tokyo in November 1943.¹⁷⁴

The progressive turn of the tide of war against Japan gradually changed the tone of Japanese dealings with the Republic and the Filipino people. At the outset, the Japanese exhorted the former to collaborate and help build the New Philippines. From 1944 onward, it became one of winning the war and, because of

the exigencies of the conflict, the Filipinos could not expect to live a well-ordered life. As a *Manila Tribune* editorial commented:

War is an emergency, an abnormal condition in which the well-dove-tailed scheme of normal peacetime living becomes utterly disorganized. In such a time no one can even dream of continuing one's well-ordered pattern of living.¹⁷⁵

Two months later, the tone was harsher:

The war is becoming more and more intense day by day. The more impatient the Anglo-American become, the more trenchant becomes their propaganda. All we need to do is to reject everything inimical to the interests of the Filipino race as one member of the Asian family.¹⁷⁶

War measures complemented these stringent exhortations by the Japanese authorities on the Filipinos. Forced labor conscription was imposed. The Philippines was placed on an emergency footing and Filipino officials were ordered to disperse the inhabitants of the city to the provinces. By March 1944, Manilans were being prepared to take part in air defense drills, blackouts, etc. On the other hand, reprisals against the people mounted as the Japanese gradually realized the desperateness of their condition. The downfall of the Tozjo Cabinet following the fall of Saipan marked a radical change in Japanese policies toward the Filipinos. The exhortation urged on the Filipinos was no longer about collaboration but that Filipinos should fight side by side with the Japanese against the enemy's return, that the war was going to be a long drawn-out one and that the only way out was to fight it to the end.¹⁷⁷

The spotlight, by mid-1944, was no longer on the Laurel Republic. However, the Japanese still wanted to utilize it. Pro-nouncements from Tokyo stressed that "the war situation has become so intensified and Philippine freedom is now at stake," and the Filipinos must fight together with the Japanese in preserving this freedom.¹⁷⁸ This meant that the Japanese continued to expect the Republic to declare war against Japan's enemies.

By September 1944, the Philippines was subjected to bombing raids by the Allied planes. By late September, martial law was re-established. It was at this juncture that the Japanese authorities reminded Laurel of Premier Tozjo's demand, made the previous

year, that now was the propitious time to declare war against the enemy. Pressured, Laurel complied but his declaration was merely a statement of fact. The Japanese hailed this as symbolic of Philippine-Japan unity.¹⁷⁹ In Laurel's declaration, he pledged all aid short of conscripting the Filipino youth. Possibly, only Japanese Ambassador Murata sensed that there was something lacking in Laurel's declaration which still left much room for the Filipinos to defy the Japanese; yet Murata could not pinpoint this. Thus, the Japanese erred in choosing a scholar instead of a politician as their puppet.¹⁸⁰

By late 1944, Japanese military preparations in the Philippines showed that they would fight it out in the Philippines and make it a battleground. The decision not to make Manila an open city bore this out. By October 1944 major American landings were made in Leyte and elsewhere. From then on, Japan was on the retreat. While retreating, Japanese authorities thought it important to bring with them the Filipino officials of the Republic to show a semblance of Filipino allegiance to Japan and to fan the dying embers of her New Order. Even with this vain gesture, the Laurel Republic was by then only existing on paper although the Japanese continued to accord it significant propaganda value. But everything was ended upon Japan's surrender and Laurel, as his last official act, decreed that the Republic of the Philippines ceased to exist as of August 17, 1945.¹⁸¹

SOCIO-POLITICAL RENOVATION AND PROPAGANDA THE DANAS, THE KALIBAPI, MAKAPILI, KAPARIZ, AND MARIA CLARA SISTERHOOD

In line with the Japanese plan to renovate Philippine life according to Japan's New Order, the Japanese authorities organized various associations tasked to reorient the socio-political and cultural life of the Filipinos. The establishment of Japan's New Order in the Philippines needed mass support and for it to be realized, a mass base must thus be secured through the establishment of mass organizations which would serve as the means to penetrate and get a hold on the people, control them as propaganda mouthpieces, and condition them according to the set-up desired by Japanese policies toward the Philippines.

To the Japanese Military Administration it was vital that social integration must underlie the national regimentation of the Filipinos.¹⁸² Thus, the DANAS (district and neighborhood associations) were organized among the people which would provide a simple but effective means of controlling and supervising them.¹⁸³ The DANAS were a social organization whose ramifications extended down to the basic unit of society — the family. With its creation, the chain of social control created by the Japanese Military Administration was completed, i.e., from the Philippine Executive Commission (later, the Republic), down to the provincial and local administrative units and, finally, to the family. The chain of control extended from the center to the countryside, along a hierarchical manner, and was completed by the DANAS.

The DANAS consisted of some ten to twenty families. Its duty was to look after the maintenance of peace and order under joint responsibility through the mutual cooperation of its members, and in cooperation with the Military Administration. In other words, the DANAS were to function as an implementing arm of Japanese measures and as a support organization to achieve the purposes of Japan's New Order in the Philippines. As a propaganda organ, the DANAS had to give publicity to all Japanese instructions and directives, to promote food production campaigns, distribution and consumption, to provide help to the Japanese forces when asked, to render mutual aid among its members, and to promote common well-being for the interest of the community. Since only the DANAS were recognized as the legitimate social organization, the Japanese authorities had only to deal with its officials. Through them, Japanese wishes were made known to the people. To the Japanese, the DANAS were to function not only as a propaganda organ but also as a cooperative association. More important was that the DANAS heads and officials functioned as informers for the Japanese authorities. They were to inform the Japanese authorities about the activities of all the DANAS members, but especially about "strangers" and non-members coming to the community. For this task to be fulfilled, DANAS officials were responsible to the Japanese authorities. Thus, as envisioned by the Japanese authorities, the DANAS were to function for them as a "spy-hostage" system or, in local parlance, the "Pilipino-tago-Pilipino-turo" system.

It was obvious that the DANAS were given high priority by the Japanese in their efforts to reshape the Philippines. This was shown by the Japanese authorities' insistence that upon its success would depend "to a great extent the success of our national aim of making a New Philippines."¹⁸⁴ DANAS support was extracted though pledges secured from the DANAS officials that they would cooperate with the Japanese.¹⁸⁵

It appeared that the DANAS were largely effective in socio-economic projects, especially in the distribution of food and commodities when the people thought it expedient to join the DANAS since the Japanese distributed goods only through this organization. Insofar as its function as an espionage system was concerned, it appeared that there were very few instances where DANAS members betrayed a guerilla to the Japanese. Much to the dismay of the Japanese authorities, the DANAS folks cooperated only for expediency out of their desire to survive. On the other hand, it seemed that the DANAS were quite successful in inculcating in the minds of the members the spirit of mutual support under severe wartime conditions. Being an instrument to eradicate Western influences, the DANAS effected in one way or another the renaissance of Filipino virtues.

In the political renovation of the Philippines, the Japanese organized the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas), first, as a national service association as its name implied, and with the establishment of the Republic, as the only recognized political party in the country.

The KALIBAPI was also organized to function as a propaganda mouthpiece of the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines. Its creation was first preceded by a banning of all forms of meetings, assemblies and of foreign broadcasts, and the dissolution of all political parties in the country. The Filipino political leaders, at the outset, were warned against sticking to their old political adherence and against indulging in political bickerings. They were reminded that these were detrimental to the performance of their duties in the reconstruction of the New Philippines and that if they did otherwise, they would be punished severely.¹⁸⁶

On July 8, 1942 a Japanese military spokesman announced the dissolution of all political parties "on their own accord for the purpose of fostering closer harmony and unanimity among all Filipinos who are devoting themselves to the reconstruction of the country."¹⁸⁷ In place of the dissolved parties, the KALIBAPI was created to rechannel the political activities of the people according to Japanese plans. The basic idea behind the KALIBAPI's creation was, in Laurel's words, "the integration of all the Filipinos for purposes of effective totalitarian government and the realization of the ideals expressed in Japan's Co-Prosperity plan."¹⁸⁸ These ideas were outlined in the by-laws of the KALIBAPI:

1. To render such services as will bring about the rapid reconstruction of the Philippines and the rehabilitation of its people, for which purpose, it shall strive –
 - a. to secure the unification of the Filipino people of all classes through the development in them and among them of the conviction that the permanent security, well-being, and happiness of the Filipinos depend on the permanent security of the Philippines; and
 - b. to coordinate all activities and services of organizations or individuals that are or may hereafter be concerned with the development and promotion of the welfare of the people, socially, spiritually, physically, culturally, economically, or otherwise.
2. To insure a stable foundation for the New Philippines by fostering –
 - a. the cultural, moral, spiritual, and economic advancement of the people by giving encouragement to the abovementioned activities and by invigorating in them such oriental virtues as hard work, faith, self-reliance, loyalty, bravery, discipline, and self-sacrifice; and
 - b. the development of a more sturdy and vigorous race of Filipinos by attending to the physical development of the people through a wise supervision of physical exercise and wholesome recreational and outdoor activities, particularly sports, and athletic meets and contests;
3. To assist the Filipino people in fully comprehending the significance of, and to strengthen their adherence to, the principles of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere;
4. To secure for the New Philippines its rightful place in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity as a worthy member thereof;
5. To adhere strictly to the policies of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines in their administration and to render service in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; and
6. To do any and all acts which will facilitate the reconstruction of the New Philippines, and contribute to the advancement of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The KALIBAPI officials were tasked to explain these aims to the people through tours throughout the country subsequent to their

efforts to establish KALIBAPI branches all over the occupied areas of the Philippines.¹⁹⁰ In effect, the KALIBAPI was created to support the Japanese Military Administration in bringing up the people according to its policies, in eliminating Western influences in the country, in helping Japan mobilize the Filipinos for the successful prosecution of the Greater East Asia War and the spheric plan of which the Philippines was a part. Aside from this, as an adjunct function, the KALIBAPI also functioned as a propaganda mouthpiece since it had a Bureau of Publicity which was tasked to spread information on the association's aims and activities "through the press, radio, cinema, stage, posters, meetings, rallies, and/or other appropriate means in coordination with the proper Japanese Military authorities."¹⁹¹

The KALIBAPI was formally launched on December 30, 1942. In the words of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief,

... The new organization embodies the entire population of the Philippines . . . the KALIBAPI was born to awaken the Filipino public to the love of service to the country and to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration . . .¹⁹²

In coordination with the Japanese Military Administration's pacification drives, the KALIBAPI undertook speaking tours throughout the country to sell to the people the ideas propounded by the new rulers of the Philippines. Essentially, it was to be a national service association whose main role was to help the Japanese build, i.e., renovate the country. Benigno Aquino, Sr. described the KALIBAPI's role as

... the mouthpiece of the Government before the people, explaining and disseminating the real purposes and aims of [the Government], its program of activities and other pieces of information that are necessary in order that the Government may receive the unstinted support of the people. At the same time, the KALIBAPI shall also try to voice the popular will, in order that the Government may render the service which the people may require.¹⁹³

Hence, the task of the KALIBAPI was to bring about the total collaboration of the Filipinos with the Japanese Military Administration in carrying out its policies in the country.

Premier Tozjo's announcement on January 21, 1942 of granting independence to the Philippines "in the shortest time

possible" gave the KALIBAPI the needed impetus to intensify its pacification drives since this was the pre-condition set by Premier Tozyo in order for the Philippines to be worthy of Japan's offer of independence. Until a year later when Premier Tozyo repeated Japan's independence offer, the KALIBAPI primarily engaged in enlarging its memberships, conducting activities such as cultural concerts, contests, rallies, meetings, establishing training institutes like the KALIBAPI Leaders' Institute and the Labor Institute, etc., and other activities in line with Japan's New Order in the Philippines. To broaden the association's mass base, a Junior KALIBAPI was launched on June 19, 1943. The Junior KALIBAPI was actually a youth movement performing similar functions as their adult counterpart.

Following Premier Tozyo's announcement of the grant of Philippine independence "within the current year," the KALIBAPI was ordered by the Japanese authorities to form a Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence by convoking a special convention of KALIBAPI members throughout the country. The two-day special convention of the KALIBAPI, on June 18-19, 1943, was described by the Japanese press as marking the association as "the only popular representative body of the nation . . . through which the people may directly seek to express their will and by which decisions affecting the life and destiny of a nation may be made."¹⁹⁴ The order, in effect, marked the start of the KALIBAPI's functioning as the only recognized existing political body in the country.

Following the ratification of the Constitution of the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines, the Japanese authorities ordered the election of delegates to the National Assembly. The order provided that only officers and members of the KALIBAPI throughout the country would have the right to vote for the candidates to the National Assembly.¹⁹⁵ In effect, the National Assembly would be composed of and became an extension of the KALIBAPI itself.¹⁹⁶ The organization of the National Assembly and the preparation for the establishment of the Republic were done by the KALIBAPI. The election of Benigno Aquino, Sr., KALIBAPI Director General, as Speaker of the National Assembly completed the political regimentation sought by the Japanese authorities.¹⁹⁷

On May 6, 1944, the KALIBAPI was given a charter re-organizing it into a "non-partisan political entity."¹⁹⁸ As such the KALIBAPI was given an increasing role in the political renovation of the people and was strengthened to make it "adhere strictly to and effectively support the government in its policies and render its help to better insure the attainment of the ideals and objectives of the Republic."¹⁹⁹ As re-organized, the KALIBAPI functioned as the sole political entity to back up the Republic and the Japanese. Membership was now opened to any Filipino who would like to join the organization. For the female members, the Melchora Aquino Sisterhood was created as an auxiliary unit of the KALIBAPI. For Filipinos below 21 years old, the Junior KALIBAPI was replaced by the KAPARIZ (*Kabataang Pangarap in Rizal*). It was to be a national brotherhood of Filipino youth. The KAPARIZ was created with the following aims:

1. To instill in the Filipino youth an abiding interest in Rizal's life so that they will exert every effort to observe his teachings and his examples.
2. To develop in the youth of the land the belief in God, love of country, honor and respect to parents, and such cardinal virtues as honesty, courtesy, frugality, neighborliness.
3. To form a nucleus body of leadership from the rising generation, characterized by the highest and collective discipline, cultivated intelligence, moral power, initiative, and the spirit of service and sacrifice to the nation.
4. To evolve a counterpart of the KALIBAPI among the young people so that they may grow up cognizant of the aims and ideals of the Republic of the Philippines.²⁰⁰

The order creating the KAPARIZ provided that "all youth between the ages of 6 and 21 are *ipso facto* members of the brotherhood." The KAPARIZ was formally launched on Rizal's birthday, June 19, 1944, which was also called KAPARIZ Day.²⁰¹

As an auxiliary unit of the KAPARIZ and a counterpart of the Melchora Aquino Sisterhood of the KALIBAPI, a Maria Clara Sisterhood was created to be composed of Filipina youth. To insure that all youth would be brought up according to the KAPARIZ ideals, the educational system was tapped with the Director of Public Instruction appointed as national chairman of this sisterhood and brotherhood system and the division supe-

rintendents and division supervisors as regional chairmen.²⁰² In the words of the directive creating the KAPARIZ and designating the said school officials, the schools were to be "public plazas for the KALIBAPI's mission."²⁰³ The worsening situation for the Japanese increasingly led them to tighten their control over the inhabitants. By May 1944, the Japanese military authorities' view of what they wanted the KALIBAPI to perform was aptly expressed by a *Manila Tribune* editorial:

At this crucial hour of Philippine history, it is our earnest hope that the new set-up will manifest itself with maximum effectiveness through the sincere and united collaboration of all the Filipino people.²⁰⁴

Hence, these efforts to harness the population at all ages.

But it was 1944 and by then the tide of war was moving progressively against the Japanese. Whatever hurried preparations they did was undermined by the continued defiance of the Filipinos to their Co-Prosperity plan. For many Japanese military leaders, it was a bitter pill to swallow to see the crumbling of their imperial dreams. In the Philippines, many Japanese military men were exasperated. Frustrated by the Filipinos' non-cooperation, the Japanese military authorities did away with the Republic and organized the MAKAPILI (*Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Pilipino*) to accomplish practical results along the line of collaboration. It was created, in Laurel's words, "without our consent, against our wishes, and with our formal protest."²⁰⁵ It was launched on December 8, 1944 and the Japanese made Laurel and other recalcitrant Filipino leaders witness their humiliation by forcing them to go through the launching ceremonies for the MAKAPILI on that day.²⁰⁶

Benigno Ramos, Artemio Ricarte, Pio Duran, as well as other pro-Japanese Filipinos were chosen to lead the MAKAPILI. It was significant that the declared paramount aim of the MAKAPILI was to do the work of the uncooperative Republic. The Republic was no longer needed and trusted. In the face of successive American landings in the Philippines, the Japanese were desperately in need of allies. The MAKAPILIs were the answer and the Japanese gave them arms freely. The MAKAPILIs were the "real" collaborators and they were trusted by the Japanese military

authorities. Indeed, many MAKAPILIs collaborated fully with the Japanese and fought side by side with them against the Americans. They epitomized what the Japanese wanted the Filipinos to do — but did not.

CONCLUSIONS

World War II was fought by the belligerents using different means. One weapon that they used was propaganda. They recognized propaganda's potency in waging war as by far superior in effect and impact than the results secured through armed means. Its effects are long-range even after the conflict has subsided for it operates in influencing, reshaping, and redirecting the minds and behavior of the conquered according to the conqueror's plans. These long-range effects are secured through various socio-psychological techniques ranging from cajolery and bribery to threats and the use of naked force. As expected, education was the pivot of all propaganda activities of the belligerents in as much as the young generation of the occupied peoples were the most susceptible to be reshaped and to be made to conform with the conqueror's plans.

In the case of the Japanese, they employed propaganda to achieve the following aims: to increase Japanese fighting zeal at home and abroad, to picture Japan's war aims as just and those of her enemies as unjust, to influence neutral countries, to gain adherents among the peoples of the occupied areas to aid Japan in the war and undermine her enemies, and to weaken opposition to Japan's policies. Through published statements of Japan's war aims, the home government enabled its propaganda machinery to operate according to such war aims. The ultimate purpose of such complementary activities was for these policies to be given widespread dissemination to attain the desired effects for Japan's war plans.

The strategems utilized by the Japanese propaganda corps included monopolization and rigid control over all media of communication; the issuance of restrictive measures; the creation and cultivation of sectors of populations in the occupied areas amenable to Japanese plans; the revision of all educational cur-

ricula; the banishment, if not outright, elimination of anti-Japanese elements; the cultivation of young minds according to Japanese-approved ideas; the displacement of guilt and the over-stressing of the Anglo-American evil qualities while picturing Japan as just and humanitarian, morally superior and the destined leader of Greater East Asia; and the coordination of propaganda activities with violence which was ruthlessly enforced by the *Kempetai* (the Japanese Military Police).

The Japanese efforts to attain the abovementioned aims in the Philippines ranged from the most subtle to the most crude. In this aspect, one could fathom the two kinds of Japanese that came to rule the Philippines — the intelligent and the brute. The latter was best characterized by the crudity of the methods and approaches they utilized in order to make the conquered Filipinos conform to Japanese plans. The crudeness of their approaches reflected their contemptuous attitude towards the conquered Filipinos. This attitude was to be a major blunder on their part — it backfired against them for the Filipinos refused most of the Japanese blandishments and fervently hoped for American redemption.

The Japanese leaders, too, orchestrated, and even served as propaganda manipulators. Premier Tozjo's actions during the unfolding of the drama of Japan's independence offer to the Filipinos was actually done out of Japanese recognition of the ultimate propaganda value that could accrue to Japan's war aims. The Japanese leaders were primarily the very ones coordinating the administration of propaganda in consonance with the war aims of Japan. They were the ones who dictated the main lines of propaganda activities to be enforced in the occupied areas. The Greater East Asia Ministry, tasked to coordinate all cultural programs in the occupied areas, the respective boards of information of the Japanese Imperial Forces, the various institutions created to manifest and embody Japanese policies and propagandas in occupied areas — were but tangible bodies created, planned, and supervised by men in Tokyo to achieve results as envisioned by them. Premier Tozjo's visits to the occupied areas, for instance, were orchestrated to project the image of Japan's leaders as humane and concerned with the welfare of the occupied peoples.

Indeed, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines was a period when the Filipino mind was brought "at bay." Throughout the occupation years one could note that the propaganda themes blared out by the Japanese consisted of the very aims and policies enunciated by the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines according to Tokyo directives.

Like the Americans four decades ago, the Japanese came to the Philippines not as adventurers. They believed, especially the fanatic militarist group represented by Premier Tozjo, that they were fulfilling a sacred mission which Japan was destined to carry on to realize a prosperous Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia. Japanese tenure in the Philippines was not just an adventurous affair because they were definitely sincere in carrying out the blueprint that their leaders had laid out for this country and for the rest of occupied Asia. It was a long-range plan which had its roots from the precedent set by the West when Japan was forcibly opened to the West by the Americans. It is not farfetched that such incident inculcated in the minds of succeeding Japanese leaders the idea that in order to face the West in any eventual struggle, they had to play their own game. Thus, Japan played the imperialist's game and, in so doing, earned the established imperialist countries' odium. It appeared that the Western countries could not accept that an erstwhile second-rate Asiatic country like Japan would be one of them and would even dare challenge them. Japan seemed to be aware of this Western attitude towards her. This partly explained her pronouncements that Orientals and Occidentals are opposites. This explains, too, the interpretations given by the West of Japan's propaganda which they described as "racist."

It appeared that Japan tried to duplicate what America did to the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th century. In some aspects, Japan failed to turn the Filipinos against their former mentor, America. As the Japanese saw it, the Filipinos had become virtually "little brown Americans." Their lofty claim that Japan was "the light, leader and protector of Asia" was negated by the recurrent occurrences of Japanese military atrocities, abuses, and cruelties to the Filipino inhabitants. The subordination of the people's basic economic needs to Japanese military

needs resulted in severe economic hardships for the people who were previously used to the easy American way of life. The seizure of private properties, arbitrary arrests, executions, etc. undoubtedly produced disaffection for Japan's Co-Prosperity ideals. It was obvious that many Filipinos came to realize that an Asiatic master could be more, if not as cruel as a white master.

Japanese blandishments of Japan's righteousness were often shortcuted because their attempt to reorganize Philippine society led them to create an artificial situation which they expediently maintained for it suited them as long as they got what they demanded from the people. Compounding Japan's predicament in the Philippines was the lack of time to enable her to realize a substantial part of her aims in the country. Japan did not have the luxury of time needed to win the Philippines' allegiance to her cause. In this respect, she failed to recognize the fact that the Americans had to fight a bloody war and another four decades to transform the inhabitants into "little brown brothers." Moreover, the Americans took the Filipinos as partners in the business of government and not as obvious puppets as what the Japanese did. Thus, to Japan, it was a case of wanting too much for too little a time.

In some other aspects, Japan was successful. In a sense, the Japanese succeeded in showing to the Filipinos how pitiful it was for a people to have forgotten their own culture. This could be seen in the emphasis the Japanese gave for things Philippines which undoubtedly awakened the minds of some, if not many, Filipinos who saw in the institution of the Western culture in the Philippines the wilting of various aspects of Philippine culture. By undertaking a policy of eliminating Western influences in the Philippines, the Japanese unwittingly watered the Filipinos' nationalistic sentiments. Thus, in this aspect, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines undermined the colonial order resulting in some damage to Western hold in the country.

Lastly, the Philippines during the Second World War, viewed within the context of the struggle for power among imperialist countries, was nothing but a pawn. The United States had the better chance of impressing loyalty in the Filipinos' minds. Japan challenged this but failed. But in this fight to win the Philippines'

allegiance, the loser was already obvious even at the outset of the conflict. It was the Philippines. Japan came not as a liberating force as she had propagandized but as another imperialist country out to establish her power over the Philippines after driving out another imperialist country. It was simply common sense that in the conflict of interests among giants, the interests of the puny ones are but expendable. It is painful to note that so few Filipinos at that time appeared to have perceived this status of the Philippines as a pawn. After all, it could be said that in the chessboard of international politics and power struggle during the Second World War, the Philippines was not only a pawn – but also a prize up for grabs by whomever emerged as the victor. Viewed from this light, Jose P. Laurel Sr.'s exhortation to the Filipinos gained further relevance when he said, "No foreigner can pretend to love the Filipinos more than the Filipinos themselves."

NOTES

¹Josefa Saniel, *Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1963); Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1965), Vol. I, pp. 41-44.

²Agoncillo, *ibid.*, 2 Vols.

³Saniel, *op. cit.*

⁴Garel A. Grunder and William A. Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), pp. 207-8; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response, 1830-1965* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 284; M.A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 22-29.

⁵For a detailed discussion of this aspect see Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1950).

⁶Clyde and Beers, *op. cit.*, p. 299; Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 22; Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1946), p. 184.

⁷For a detailed discussion of this Japanese Monroe Doctrine, see Claro M. Recto, *Monroeismo Asiatico y otros ensayos* (Manila: People's Publishers, 1946).

⁸Harry J. Benda, *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), pp. 1-59.

⁹Francis C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 331.

¹⁰Benda, *op. cit.*; Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-96.

¹¹Jones, *op. cit.*; p. 331; Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹²These policies were diligently enforced by the Japanese in their administration of the occupied areas. For example, see Premier H. Tozoyo's speech on his clarification of Greater East Asia War objectives, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration* (Manila: 1942-1943), Vol. 5, pp. v-x. Henceforth to be cited as *Official Journal*.

¹³Aziz, *passim*, pp. 57-96; Jones, *passim*, pp. 330-6.

¹⁴*The Orient Yearbook, 1942* (Tokyo: Asia Statistics Co., 1942), p. i.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. i.

¹⁶Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

¹⁷Joseph C. Grew, *Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), p. xiii.

- ¹⁸ Renato Constantino, *The Mis-Education of the Filipino* (Quezon City: Alemars-Phoenix Publishing Co., 1966) best describes how the Filipino people became "little brown Americans."
- ¹⁹ Milagros C. Guerrero, "A Survey of Japanese Trade and Investment in the Philippines, with special reference to Philippine-American Relations, 1900-1941," (Quezon City: M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1965); G.P. Provideo, "Japanese Interests in the Philippines," (Stanford: Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1936); Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, I, p. 50; Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 173-183.
- ²⁰ Grant K. Goodman, *Four Aspects of Philippine-Japanese Relations, 1930-1940* (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1967); Friend, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-182, mentions several prominent Filipinos who were bribed by the Japanese to protect Japanese interests in the Philippines.
- ²¹ Agoncillo, *op. cit.*; I, pp. 424-476.
- ²² *The Manila Tribune* (January 1, 1942), p. 1.
- ²³ *The Manila Tribune* (January 3, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, p. 1.
- ²⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (January 4, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, p. 1. With respect to the administration of other Japanese-occupied areas, the Japanese Army and Navy were given their respective assignments. The Philippines was placed under Japanese Army administration, see Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- ²⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (January 4, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, pp. 3-4. Japanese
- ²⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (January 3, 1942), p. 1.
- ²⁷ Vargas was one of the Filipino officials told by President Manuel L. Quezon to remain and deal with the Japanese authorities.
- ²⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (January 4, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, pp. 3-4.
- ²⁹ *The Manila Tribune* (January 9, 1942), p. 1.
- ³⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (January 10, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, p. 4. This office was abolished on February 9 because the Japanese Military authorities claimed that peace and order had been restored in the Philippines.
- ³¹ *Official Journal*, I, pp. 7-8.
- ³² *The Manila Tribune* (January 22, 1942), p. 1; Aziz, *passim*, pp. 57-96.
- ³³ Teofilo del Castillo, *The Saga of Jose P. Laurel* (Manila: Associated Authors' Co., 1949), p. 149.
- ³⁴ John Toland, *But Not in Shame* (New York: Random House, 1961), for illustrations.

³⁵ Evelyn Wells, *Carlos P. Romulo: Voice of Freedom* (New York: Fund and Wagnalls, 1964), pp. 103, 111.

³⁶ As narrated by my father, the late Master Sergeant Pio G. Dery, himself a Bataan veteran.

³⁷ *The Manila Tribune* (January 21, 1942), p. 1.

³⁸ The Japanese charge in this respect was substantial as succinctly expressed by the noted Filipino writer Carlos Bulosan himself, many times a victim of American racial prejudice. "To a Filipino here [in America], democracy is a toilet which he hides with fear I have grown tired struggling to live." Quoted in Theodore Friend, *op. cit.*, p. 230, describing this kind of predicament by many Filipinos living in the United States.

³⁹ Wells, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁴⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (February 7, 1942), p. 1. Quezon appeared to have learned about Aguinaldo's broadcast and he made a biting comment against Aguinaldo, saying

I would not condemn in my own mind this attitude of Aguinaldo His actions at this time reminded me of his conduct under similar circumstances when he was the President of the Philippine Republic It will be remembered that when General Aguinaldo was convinced of the superiority of the American forces, many years before, he had been willing to enter into negotiations with the American authorities in Manila on a basis other than independence.

For this, see Quezon, *op. cit.*, p. 266. However, Quezon was bothered by the possible effect on the people of Aguinaldo's broadcast, especially the mention of Premier Tozjo's promise of independence for the Philippines. See *ibid.*, p. 267; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Crest Book Reprint, 1964), pp. 150-151; Friend, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-221.

⁴¹ History has come full circle with the Japanese creation of the Philippine Executive Commission and of its being tasked to conduct pacification tours throughout the country. The same was done by the Americans at the turn of the century when, through the formation of the Federal Party of the Philippines which was also composed of the Filipino elite, the Americans ordered or encouraged the holding by the Federal Party of pacification tours as a means to influence the inhabitants to cease their resistance against the Americans.

⁴² *The Manila Tribune* (March 9, 1942), p. 1.

⁴³ *The Manila Tribune* (March 5, 1942), p. 1.

⁴⁴ *The Manila Tribune*, see issues of March 20-22, 1942.

⁴⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (March 29, 1942), p. 4.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Toland, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁴⁷ Japanese Imperial Army, *Souvenir Photograph Album of Philippine Expedition Force, Japanese Imperial Army* (Manila: Manila Newspaper Co., 1943) in *Japanese Occupation Papers*, Box 23 (U.P. Library Collection).

⁴⁸ Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 215-6, 219-220; W. Dyess, *The Dyess Story* (New York: Putnam, 1944); E.B. Miller, *Bataan Uncensored* (Brainerd, Minn: 1949).

⁴⁹ MacArthur, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁵⁰ Quezon, *op. cit.*, p. 257-8.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 266-7; Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 265-6.

⁵² *The Manila Tribune* (January 4, 1942), p. 1.

⁵³ MacArthur, *op. cit.*, p.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Armando Malay, *Occupied Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1967), p. 88.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (February 20, 1942), p. 3.

⁵⁷ Malay, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁵⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (March 23, 1942), p. 1.

⁵⁹ *The Manila Tribune* (March 27, 1942), p. 1.

⁶⁰ *The Manila Tribune Magazine* (December 13, 1942), p. 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶² *The Manila Tribune* (March 21, 1942), p. 1.

⁶³ *The Manila Tribune* (December 15, 1942), p. 8.

⁶⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (June 27, 1943), p. 4.

⁶⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (August 25, 1943), p. 1.

⁶⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (August 3, 1944), p. 1.

⁶⁷ See the issues of the *Manila Tribune* during the first few weeks of Japanese rule in Manila and the *Official Journal* of the Japanese Military Administration regarding these proclamations and orders banning all media of communication from operation.

⁶⁸ For a detailed discussion of what happened to these interned Westerners, see A.V.H. Hartendorp, *The Santo Tomas Story*, ed. by Frank Golay (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

⁶⁹ This claim by the Japanese is best illustrated by the various speeches published in the propaganda mouthpieces of the Japanese Military Administration, notably the *Manila Tribune*, the *Official Journal*, and the *Official Gazette* of the Philippine Executive Commission.

⁷⁰ Hartendorp, *op. cit.*, Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-182.

- ⁷¹ Aziz, *op. cit.*; see also the *Japanese Occupation Papers* (U.P. Library Collection).
- ⁷² *The Manila Tribune* (April 22, 1942), p. 1. Vargas explained that this ban was necessary to avoid friction and confusion among the Filipinos and the Japanese because the Filipino flag was still being used by the USAFFE in its military actions against Japan, Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
- ⁷³ *Official Journal*, XI, pp. xxiii-xxiv.
- ⁷⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (July 25, 1942), p. 1.
- ⁷⁵ Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Although this was an observation of what the Japanese did in Indonesia, the same thing occurred in the Philippines due to the fact that Japanese authorities in both countries pursued and implemented the same policies based on instructions from Tokyo.
- ⁷⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (February 18, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, I, p. 13.
- ⁷⁷ For a detailed discussion of education during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines, see Domingo B. Santiago, "Philippine Education During the Japanese Occupation," (Quezon City: M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1951).
- ⁷⁸ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 312; Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
- ⁷⁹ *Official Journal*, III, pp. 1-9; VI, p. 1; I, p. 14.
- ⁸⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (January 25, 1942), p. 1.
- ⁸¹ *The Manila Tribune* (April 27, 1942), p. 1; (May 31, 1942), p. 1.
- ⁸² *The Manila Tribune* (May 5, 1942), p. 1; Santiago, *op. cit.*. It was not until February 28, 1943 that the Japanese Military authorities allowed private schools to reopen. Throughout the Japanese occupation period higher education, except technical and agricultural, remained closed. Instead, training institutes were created to encourage the people to become more sympathetic to Japan.
- ⁸³ *The Manila Tribune* (September 2, 1942), p. 1.
- ⁸⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (October 2, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, VIII, pp. viii-xiii.
- ⁸⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (April 15, 1943), p. 1.
- ⁸⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (May 28, 1942), p. 1.
- ⁸⁷ *Official Journal*, XII, p. 1.
- ⁸⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (March 25, 1943), p. 1.
- ⁸⁹ *The Manila Tribune* (May 1, 1943), p. 1; "New Philippines Cultural Institute Souvenir Book, 1943," *Japanese Occupation Papers*, Box 23 (U.P. Library Collection).
- ⁹⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (May 3, 1943), p. 1.
- ⁹¹ *The Manila Tribune* (May 1, 1943), p. 1; Grant K. Goodman, *An Experiment in Wartime Intercultural Relations, Philippine Students in Japan, 1943-1945* (Ithaca, New

York: Cornell University Press, 1962). Goodman noted that the *pensionados* were not selected on the basis of competitive examinations. Those who were chosen were sons of wellknown Filipino families. It was obvious that they were selected to serve as hostages, to be used, apparently, as a lever against their parents most of whom were serving under the civil administration of Japanese-occupied Philippines. Some of them were unwilling to accept and become *pensionados* to Japan by deliberately flunking the examination but this ruse was found out and they were chosen just the same. *The Manila Tribune* issue of August 31, 1943 revealed the purpose for the creation of the Japanese-sponsored *pensionado* system. It was to prepare the Filipino youth to take the place of the present leaders in the future. It was expected that these Japan-trained youths would cooperate more willingly with Japan than the current Filipino leaders.

⁹² Claro M. Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation, The Issue of Political Collaboration in the Philippines* (Manila: People's Publishers, 1966), p. 12; *The Manila Tribune* (January 22, 1943), p. 1.

⁹³ *The Manila Tribune* (April 6, 1943), p. 1.

⁹⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (October 19, 1942), p. 1. On April 3, 1943 the Manila Simbun-sya sponsored a series of lectures about Japan.

⁹⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (February 3, 1944), p. 1.

⁹⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (March 1, August 9, 1942), (October 29 and November 3, 1943), p. 1.

⁹⁷ *The Manila Tribune* (May 30, August 16, and September 26, 1942), p. 1.

⁹⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (February 7 and September 12, 1942), p. 1.

⁹⁹ *The Manila Tribune* (January 2, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (January 24 and April 26, 1942), p. 1.

¹⁰¹ *The Manila Tribune* (September 29, 1944), p. 1.

¹⁰² *The Manila Tribune* (September 13, 1942), p. 1; (October 28, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁰³ *The Manila Tribune* (October 23, 1942), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (May 14, 1942), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Official Journal*, XI, pp. xiii-xiv.

¹⁰⁶ *Nippon-Philippines*, II, No. 8 (1943), p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ *The Manila Tribune* (January 11, 1942), p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ *The Manila Tribune* (January 14, 1942), p. 1.

¹¹⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (January 20, 1942), p. 1.

¹¹¹ *The Manila Tribune* (February 11, 1942), p. 1. The Japanese propaganda regarding religious toleration in Japan deliberately deleted religious persecutions in Japan

which led to the Shimabara Rebellion, a rebellion which was brutally suppressed by Japanese government then.

- ¹¹²*The Manila Tribune* (February 27, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹³*The Manila Tribune* (March 2, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁴*The Manila Tribune* (March 13, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁵*The Manila Tribune* (March 28, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁶*The Manila Tribune* (April 24, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁷*The Manila Tribune* (May 3, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁸*The Manila Tribune* (June 5, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁹*The Manila Tribune* (June 14, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²⁰*The Manila Tribune* (February 16, 1943), p. 1.
- ¹²¹*The Manila Tribune* (August 6, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²²*The Manila Tribune* (January 30, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²³Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation, op. cit.*, p. 13.
- ¹²⁴*The Manila Tribune* (December 8, 1942), p. 1; (December 24, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²⁵*The Manila Tribune* (August 28, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²⁶*The Manila Tribune* (September 20, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹²⁷*Japanese Occupation Papers*, Box 12.
- ¹²⁸*The Manila Tribune* (February 21, 1943), p. 1.
- ¹²⁹David J. Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1967), p. 52.
- ¹³⁰*The Manila Tribune* (August 17, 1944), p. 1.
- ¹³¹*The Manila Tribune* (July 11, 1944), p. 1.
- ¹³²*The Manila Tribune* (February 14, 1942), p. 1.
- ¹³³Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-4; Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-6; Friend, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-2.
- ¹³⁴*Official Journal*, VIII, p. xx.
- ¹³⁵*Official Journal*, VI, pp. 29-33.
- ¹³⁶*The Manila Tribune* (January 28, 1942), p. 1. This exchange system collapsed due to successful counterfeiting activities by various anti-Japanese groups who also issued military notes in their respective areas of operations, and by the Japanese autho-

rities themselves who kept on printing their own military notes. Towards the end of their occupation of the Philippines, the Filipinos derisively called the Japanese military notes "Mickey Mouse money" because they had become worthless.

- 137 *The Manila Tribune* (February 14, 1942), p. 1.
- 138 *The Manila Tribune* (April 5, 1942), p. 1.
- 139 *The Manila Tribune* (January 25, 1943), p. 1.
- 140 *Official Journal*, VI, p. 14.
- 141 Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation, op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 142 *The Manila Tribune* (January 22, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, VIII, p. xxvii. The independence offer by Japan was part of her plan to dominate the Philippines, see Benda, *op. cit.*; Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Friend, pp. 232-245.
- 143 *The Manila Tribune* (January 23, 1942), p. 1.
- 144 *Ibid.*
- 145 Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation, op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 146 *Official Journal*, VIII, p. 1.
- 147 *The Manila Tribune* (February 7, 1943), p. 1.
- 148 *Official Journal*, IX, pp. xxi-xxv.
- 149 *The Manila Tribune* (January 30, 1943), p. 1. For this purpose, a convention of provincial governors, city mayors and constabulary inspectors in Luzon was held on February 22, 1943 at the Legislative building to discuss and adopt plans for the implementation of the three-point program enunciated by the Japanese Director General. A similar convention was held in Cebu on April 23. In these conventions, the Japanese independence offer was the subject discussed.
- 150 *Official Journal*, VIII, p. 48; X, p. v.
- 151 *Official Journal*, X, p. xxiii.
- 152 *The Manila Tribune* (March 15, 1943), p. 1.
- 153 *The Manila Tribune* (March 21, 1943), p. 1.
- 154 *The Manila Tribune* (March 8, 1943), p. 1.
- 155 *Official Journal*, XII, pp. xxvii-xxix.
- 156 *The Manila Tribune* (June 17, 1943), p. 1; *Official Journal*, XII, p. xiii.
- 157 *The Manila Tribune* (June 18, 19 and 20, 1943), all in p. 1; *Official Journal*, XIII, p. x, xxxi.
- 158 Laurel accepted the presidency on June 30. The delay was due to the shooting

incident at Wack Wack Club where Laurel was critically wounded. The first PCPI meetings were, in fact, held at the Philippine General Hospital where Laurel was confined.

¹⁵⁹ See Mauro Garcia, *Documents on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1965).

¹⁶⁰ *The Manila Tribune* (August 2, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁶² *The Manila Tribune* (August 20 and 21, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁶³ *Japanese Occupation Papers*, Box 1, Folder 11.

¹⁶⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (September 23, 1942), p. 1.

¹⁶⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (September 6 and 7, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (September 8, 1943).

¹⁶⁷ Governor Tomas Confesor to Jose P. Laurel, Sr., October 26, 1943, in *Japanese Occupation Papers*, Box -A-D.

¹⁶⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (September 25 and 26, 1943), p. 1. The Japanese hoped that it would be easier to deal with a scholar than with a politician, see Friend, *op. cit.*, p. 233; Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 59. Friend added an interesting note on the scramble for the Republic's presidency. He mentioned that General Emilio Aguinaldo offered himself as the only logical candidate. Quite notable was Laurel's tacit refusal to accept the post and, previous to this, even his expressed opposition that the early granting of independence was inopportune.

¹⁶⁹ Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *The Manila Tribune* (October 8, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁷² Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, p. 22, 33-34; *The Manila Tribune* (October 14, 1943), p. 1. The text of the Philippines-Japan Alliance Pact was bared only on October 21. Laurel claimed that the pact was defensive in nature and that Filipinos would fight only if the Philippines were attacked.

¹⁷³ *The Manila Tribune* (October 15, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ *The Manila Tribune* (November 5, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁷⁵ *The Manila Tribune* (January 13, 1944), p. 1.

¹⁷⁶ *The Manila Tribune* (March 10, 1944), p. 1.

¹⁷⁷ See the various issues of the *Manila Tribune* during the last months of the Japanese occupation.

¹⁷⁸ *The Manila Tribune* (September 23, 1944), p. 1.

- 179 Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, pp. 49-55.
- 180 Laurel, *ibid.*, p. 76.
- 181 Laurel, p. 45.
- 182 *Philippine Review*, I (June 1943), p. 48.
- 183 *Official Journal*, VI, pp. 93-99.
- 184 *The Manila Tribune* (March 1, 1943), p. 1.
- 185 *The Manila Tribune* (April 18, 1943), p. 1.
- 186 *The Manila Tribune* (July 8, 1942), p. 1.
- 187 *The Manila Tribune* (December 5, 1942), p. 1; *Official Journal*, IX, p. vii.
- 188 Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 189 *Official Journal*, VIII, p. 20.
- 190 *Official Gazette*, II (January 1943), p. 43.
- 191 *Official Journal*, VIII, p. 20.
- 192 *Official Gazette*, II (January 1943), p. 72.
- 193 *The Manila Tribune* (February 8, 1943), p. 1.
- 194 *The Manila Tribune* (June 19, 1943), p. 1.
- 195 *The Manila Tribune* (September 14, 1943), p. 1.
- 196 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- 197 *The Manila Tribune* (September 25, 1943), p. 1.
- 198 *The Manila Tribune* (May 6, 1944), p. 1.
- 199 *Ibid.*
- 200 *The Manila Tribune* (May 6, 1944), p. 1.
- 201 *The Manila Tribune* (June 19, 1944), p. 1.
- 202 *The Manila Tribune* (May 18, 1944), p. 1.
- 203 *The Manila Tribune* (May 16, 1944), p. 1.
- 204 *The Manila Tribune* (May 6, 1944), p. 1.
- 205 Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- 206 *Ibid.*, Recto *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, pp. 56-59.

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