

Opium: The Evolution of Policies, the Tolerance of the Vice, and the Proliferation of Contraband Trade in the Philippines, 1843-1908

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Abstract

This research entitled “Opium: The Evolution of Policies, the Tolerance of the Vice, and the Proliferation of Contraband Trade in the Philippines, 1843-1908” presents a discussion of the opium trade in Asia, the commercial networks it created, the political ties it strengthened, and the social relations it fostered. It also aims to reconstruct an aspect of Philippine social history in the nineteenth century through the use of archival materials that bear witness to the distribution and exploitation of a substance which some people still classify as taboo. The poppy was not endemic to the Philippines but opium, its derivative substance, was known to numb pain and could induce a “natural high” that left one with feelings of ease and contentment. A more complete introduction to the drug necessitates a discussion of the way it was extracted and processed. It is a cash crop that does not require complex devices and is, therefore, within the reach of farmers and common folk. From the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries opium became very popular among the Chinese who discovered that their markets were being flooded with it by the British so that the latter could pay for the tea that they craved.

The Spanish Bourbons, in an effort to boost Philippine economy, allowed the trading of this substance. Initially this was supervised by the officials of the Alcaiceria de San Fernando but in 1843 the meticulous examination of the country’s finances merited the creation of an opium revenue farm through municipal franchising. Opium could only be used by the Chinese who were migrating in big groups. This paper presents the details of the monopoly contract, identifies some of the wealthier *contratistas* of the period, and discusses the consequences of such a commercial venture. Smuggling or contraband trade proliferated and by way of illustration the events namely, the Scandal of 1843 and the Gunga Incident, have been narrated. The creation of an over-all apprehending unit called *Resguardo* and the para-military *comisionados* for the Chinese community assured the Royal Treasury of a constant supply of cash.

The pragmatism of the government was the basis for its tolerant attitude. Even at the time of the Revolution, leaders like Aguinaldo used the opium trade for the acquisition of funds. The American colonial officials made the “supreme” sacrifice of giving up profits from its importation and trade only in 1908 with the passage of the Opium Law.

Keywords: Opium, contraband trade, Alcaiceria de San Fernando, mercantile houses, Gunga Incident, Scandal of 1843.

Poppies (*Papaver somniferum*) that cover the highlands of many subtropical areas of Asia have always been a marvelous sight to behold with their fully-opened flowers, half-opened buds and seedpods. Poppies originally grew in the mountainous regions of Yunnan and Szechuan but eventually spread to southern and central China.¹ Other accounts state that the plant had long been cultivated by the Sumerians, Egyptians and Babylonians. Yet behind the beauty of a poppy unfolds a story of how opium, its extract, had disadvantaged many countries in Asia. As a commodity, opium played an important role in the intricate web of trade relations that sustained the capitalist system among the many nations. It had been linked with the development of cities and commercial *entrepots* that absorbed migrant groups who maintained the division of labor for the production of other commodities. Opium partly shaped Great Britain’s free trade policies that eventually granted her super-hegemony status. It also challenged colonizers like the French, Dutch, and Spaniards to more creative ways of surplus accumulation and appropriation while at the same time defraying the costs of colonization.

This research focuses on the following themes: first, the Philippines was within the ambit of countries that supported Britain’s initial attempts at free trade, opium being one of the more lucrative commodities that it controlled; second, the Spanish government tolerated opium smoking through the establishment of the opium monopoly contract; third, ambivalent colonial policies regarding the disposition of opium presented opportunities for smuggling, particularly among people vested with a modicum of power, and further stigmatized many Chinese migrants; fourth, the Aguinaldo Government during the Revolution relied on the opium trade to acquire much-needed funds; and lastly, the Americans as the next colonial masters did not immediately eradicate the opium trade. The practicality of selling opium outweighed its deleterious effects. The timeframe highlights developments from 1843 when the Spanish government auctioned opium monopoly contracts to the highest bidders until 1908 when the enactment of the Opium Law allowed the American officials to control the distribution of the drug.

Much of the data used have been taken from the Philippine National Archives specifically the books on *Anfion* (Manila, Quiapo, Binondo, *Varias Provincias*) and the documents of the *Alcaiceria de San Fernando*. Some court records regarding opium smuggling were incorporated into the bundles which made it possible for the researcher to identify its users, to determine the manner in which the drug changed hands, and to see its links with the other offenses. The inability to include specific data on the degree of addiction commonly linked with the drug is a limitation of this paper. Though Binondo was already an established commercial district, it had very meager medical facilities.² The policy of the Aguinaldo Government on opium contracts was culled from the different volumes of John Taylor's *Philippine Insurrection Against the United States* and *Reports of the Philippine Commission*. Official gazettes and government reports were also used. Secondary sources bridged historical gaps, furnished data that allowed some adequate measure of comparison, and provided continuity to the narrative.

This research highlights a significant portion of Philippine social history in the mid-nineteenth century. The opium trade allows readers to gauge the degree of commercial involvement between Spain and other colonial governments of Asia, to determine the ability to accommodate migrant groups like the Chinese and the efforts to integrate them within a particular social order, and to assess the government's will to create economic stability and self-sufficiency among subjected peoples all within a moral ideal that it purported to uphold.

Relevant Scholarship Regarding the Asian Opium Trade

One of the pioneering works on drug-trafficking in Asia was Alfred McCoy's *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (1972). The author pegged the beginnings of Asia's opium problem to western developments as far back as the Age of Discovery and reaching unprecedented heights in the middle of the 19th century with the establishment of "colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence." The English East India Company was the leading opium smuggler.³ The demands of the Industrial Revolution saw Southeast Asian hillsides transformed into opium plantations, mines opened to migrant coolie labor, and hinterlands bustling with trade with commercial centers and agents of mercantile houses.

Hsin-pao Chang's work *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* (1964) looked into British efforts to establish commercial ties with China and one of

its more significant aspects was the opium trade. While recognizing the English East India Company's monopoly from Canton to London, the author equally blamed the Chinese *Hong* merchants for allowing foreign firms like Jardine, Matheson & Company to exploit the resources of underdeveloped areas and furnish the needs of the industrializing world in all ways possible, smuggling being one of them.⁴ Martin Lynn (1999) traced the formulation of the free trade policy by the British. Britain needed neither colonies nor overseas involvement since other European powers had the option to trade or borrow from Great Britain for their own interest. The Foreign Office "can push for treaties that would open up markets to outsiders, protect British traders and financiers under international law and guarantee that British trade and finance would receive equal treatment with the other European states."⁵ On the other hand, J.D. Wong in his study of the Arrow War or what was commonly known as the Second Opium War, questioned the validity of this free trade because the British in India were really bent on preserving the opium supply for China. He opined that such a move nipped competition in the bud.⁶

Jurgen Osterhammel (1999) explained the existence of a British informal empire to which Spain, in the 19th century, was slowly being incorporated. Alan Knight (1999) described this relationship as "political and coercive" but "not territorial."⁷ Spanish economic policies underwent drastic changes when Napoleon invaded Spain who then had to ally herself with the British to expel the "godless" French. Richard Herr (2000) affirmed that Britain looked for her reward later in the form of trade with the Spanish Empire.⁸

Spain allowed British participation in the Philippine sugar trade to which the latter shared technology such as steam mills, iron mills, iron cattle mills, and the like. Benito Legarda Jr. in his book *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change, and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (1999) charted and analyzed the career of many a British agent of mercantile houses like Ker & Co and Gilbert McMicking of London. For example, B. Barretto of the B.A. Barretto & Co. founded by Jardine Matheson in Manila, was an agent in the Macao opium market.⁹

Major developments in the nineteenth century such as the opening of the Philippines to world trade and the commercialization of agriculture necessitated the use of Chinese labor particularly in imparting technical expertise involved in the operation of machines and in the conduction of products to the different commercial centers. Edgar Wickberg (2000) noted that policy changes regarding Chinese immigration, settlement and trade at this time were fundamentally liberal and pegged with the ulterior motive of acquiring greater

privileges for Spanish trading vessels at Canton.¹⁰ As the Chinese resettled in the many provinces it seemed apt for the authorities to provide them with leisure facilities such as opium dens. By 1857 the acquisition of opium monopoly contracts was one of the most lucrative business opportunities for many people employed in the provincial and municipal echelons.¹¹

Yen Ching-hwang (1986) emphasized that fluidity characterized relationships among overseas Chinese since they were no longer pressured by the civil service examination of the homeland. Outside China it became relatively easy for many of them to acquire new social status for as long as they worked hard, behaved and kept to themselves. Wealth or symbols of wealth were indicated by the wearing of silk garments, becoming *kapitan* or head of their guild, and others.¹² Andrew Wilson, in an authorized facsimile of his dissertation entitled *Ambition and Identity: China and the Chinese in the Colonial Philippines, 1885-1912*, (1998) identified other requisites of equal importance. These were the following: conversion to Christianity, civic-mindedness and active participation in community affairs, charitable works, and sincerity in forging ties with the Spanish government. All these combined to make Chinese migration to the Philippines a unique experience.

Early Interest in Opium

Opium was an important commodity in the Sino-Arab trade in the 7th century AD. The Chinese knew it as *a-fu-yong* while the Arabs called it *af-yum*. Other than its being a cure for diarrhea, opium was also an anaesthetic agent when mixed with cannabis. It was popular among the members of the Chinese gentry who encouraged their concubines to eat it so as to make the latter docile and sexually compliant.¹³ In 1617 the Dutch sailors in Indonesia observed the Chinese mixing opium with tobacco and smoking it.¹⁴ Such a mixture, when laced with arsenic, cured them of malaria.¹⁵ Men of science like Sir Francis Bacon believed that opium like coffee, tobacco, and the betel nut, could prolong life. It could transform the emotional state of the consumer because of the power of “somnolence” brought about by its natural ingredient known as morphine.¹⁶ Initially, opium use was perceived to be more medicinal than commercial.

The Europeans were lured by the big China market and the profits that would accrue from selling opium along with spices, tobacco, edible birds' nests, dried sea cucumber and others. In 1557 the Portuguese were given a trading base in Macau and a settlement on the west coast of India called Goa where poppies were cultivated. The Dutch were also granted business concessions

which allowed them to supply Indian opium to Taiwan. The drug had already gained wide acceptance among the Chinese of Java.¹⁷ However, these maritime powers were eventually surpassed by the British through the English East India Company, commonly known as *The Company*.

By 1715 it was the principal European trading agency in Canton and controlled Asian trade for the British government.¹⁸ It acquired the exclusive right to produce and sell Bengal opium while its junior officers acted as agents for private firms. The Company was not allowed to distribute the drug outside India but they could sell to traders of varying nationalities¹⁹ This business by “proxy” popularized the *tael* (from the Hindu word *tola* or the Malay *tabil*), a silver weight popularized by Chinese. One Canton *tael* was worth \$1.388 Mexican silver dollars, according to the standard set by the Royal Mint of Seville. Shroffs were the silver experts of Canton who determined the quality of silver ingots.²⁰

Poppy Cultivation and Opium Preparation

The *ryot* were poppy cultivators who belonged to the Kachhis and Koiris castes of India and had long specialized in this activity.²¹ They grew the opium poppy in well-cultivated soil where they dropped the pin-head sized seeds into rows of shallow holes. The plant thrived better in cooler regions with low humidity and was easy to maintain for it did not require pesticides and fungicides. Booth gives a detailed account of the processes involved in manufacturing opium. In the fields the *ryot* usually searched for poppy pods that had already matured so that they could start “milking,” “tapping” or extracting juices. This was done through the use of a mussel shell whose edges had been thinned out to be able to cut or a special knife which was called *nushtur* by the Afghans. The depth of the incision was approximately 1.5 millimeters, not too shallow or too deep to allow the sap to continually drip and be wasted. Tapping was usually done at dusk several times a week so that the sap could coagulate gradually before it was collected. Farmers often licked this special knife so it would not get blunt at the edges. Addiction was common among the *ryot*. At first the sap appeared cloudy and white but prolonged exposure to the air made it dark-brown, sticky and odorous. This was called raw opium. It was then sun-dried for several days to allow its water contents to evaporate, kneaded, and then shaped into blocks, cakes, and balls.²²

In Bengal opium balls were formed through brass cups of standard measure lined with poppy petals soaked in *lenab* or inferior opium. These were ready for the market if they were 15 centimeters in diameter, if they weighed about 1.5 kilograms, and if they were properly sealed with petals. These were

kept in rooms where they were regularly checked against insect damage by *ryot* children. Balls were packed in mango wood chests equipped with two fitted trays that could hold twenty balls each. The chests were then sealed with pitch and packed in coarse cloths or animal hides.²³ Opium from Turkey was blackish-brown and flattened into oval cakes that weighed between 250 grams to one kilogram.²⁴

Prepared opium was classified in many ways. One was Bengal opium. It was extracted from poppies cultivated on English East India Company lands such as Bengal and Bihar. Processing was done in the Patna and Benares factories. Because of its black casing it was also known as “black earth” opium.²⁵ Another type was “white skin” which referred to opium from Bengal while “red skin” meant that it was from Madras. Opium from the independent (not under Company supervision) Maratha states was called Malwa Opium, much of which was traded by the Parsees.²⁶

Ryot generally received interest-free advance payments from company agents in exchange for produce that had to be delivered within the year. Inability to fulfill such an obligation resulted in the payment of a penalty fee thrice the initial amount entrusted. In 1797 there were 25,000 acres of poppy fields in Bengal alone. By 1828, the extent of lands cultivated involved 79,488 acres which increased to 176,745 acres after ten years.²⁷ Also in 1838, there were 40,000 chests of opium sold in Canton alone.²⁸

Anglo-Hispanic Alliance: The Pursuit of Imperial Ambitions

In 1800, the Chinese government imposed a total ban on the importation of opium. The drug did not only put the people’s health at risk but its sale drained the royal coffers of its silver resources. By 1818, the British amassed \$50 million Mexican silver dollar profit. The English East India Company trade with China ended in 1833.²⁹ The Company’s demise in England prodded English lawmakers to shift to free trade in order to expand British economic interests overseas. Its underlying principle was that capitalism could be a moral force that brought with it “enterprise, progress, and civilization to backward nations” through its emphasis on enterprise and the work ethic.³⁰ The maintenance of India as a colony was justified with the argument that ideas of self-government could be disseminated there though this did not necessarily mean separation from Britain. *The Economist* was the journal that upheld free trade ideas in 1843. Lord Palmerston, (Foreign Secretary from 1830-51 and later Prime Minister from 1855-1865) favored the “judicious” use of force.³¹

These initial steps were crucial for Great Britain's development as a "super-hegemonic" power in the 19th century.³² Super-hegemony was a privileged position in which one zone of the world system and its constituent ruling and propertied classes are able to accumulate surplus more effectively and concentrate on accumulation at the expense of other zones. It was also a class position in the over-arching world-accumulation process. From then on the world found Britain engaged in all forms of negotiations, diplomatic and/or illicit. Examples were treaty agreements, gunboat diplomacy, setting up consular offices, pitting political candidates against others, flooding markets with contraband or smuggled goods, selling war materials, and any activity that would give her greater lead.³³ Smuggling was done by mercantile houses such as Jardine Matheson, Dent and Daniell.³⁴

The British also took advantage of the disintegration of the Spanish Empire and, after the creation of an alliance, requested Spain's approval of business deals.³⁵ In the Philippines two British firms namely, Ker & Co. and Wise & Co., imported British goods and were very active in the Canton trade.³⁶ Like the rest of Southeast Asia, the country seemed to be a fertile area for investment. It was here where they sold liquor, knives, wigs, frames of all types, rubber and other merchandise from English possessions in return for commodities such as wood and lumber, tobacco, salt, mother of pearl, *ilang-ilang* essence, laundry soaps, hats, canes and so on. There was cheap labor to be had which included that of the Chinese migrants and/or coolies. These were the same people who were all too familiar with opium which ranked high in the British list of profitable commodities.

The Philippines Taps the World Market in the 1800's

There were factors that urged Spanish monarchs to end the isolation of the Philippines and rethink her mercantilist policies. The abolition of the galleon trade in 1815 and the Mexican declaration of independence in 1821 deprived Spain of important sources of revenue. Mexico was the most prosperous of all Spanish holdings that excess wealth was siphoned to the mother country, to the Philippines and to less prosperous colonies in the Mediterranean. The port of Veracruz alone produced 30 million pesos around the 1800's notwithstanding the overall silver production valued at 27 million pesos in 1804.³⁷

The Bourbon king Carlos III (1759-1788) saw the success of internal free trade among British possessions and the wide acceptance of Adam Smith's ideas in the book *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*

among Spanish intellectuals. Smith hailed England's espousal of the liberty of trade, the liberty of exporting commodities duty-free to any country and the unbounded liberty of transporting these to other countries.³⁸ Spanish intellectuals such as Francisco Cabarrus and Vicente Alcala Galiano championed the right of property, the accumulation of capital, and the strengthening of the economy through a reduction of tariffs and international trade barriers.³⁹ It was at this point when Bourbon rulers wanted a more direct control over their colonies' affairs and finances. In the Philippines the Office of the *Intendencia General* was created to design policies that would increase public wealth.⁴⁰

Some Philippine ports like Manila, Sual, Iloilo and Cebu were opened to international commerce from the 1830's to the 1860s. Manila was fast becoming an urban center with Binondo as its most prosperous district. Occupational diversity existed among its inhabitants, most of whom were Christian Chinese working on metals, forging iron, merchandising, sculpturing, and others.⁴¹ When Binondo became too congested, the Chinese were encouraged to resettle in the various provinces where they worked as traders, artisans, and daily-wage laborers. It was then that they were accorded the same treatment as non-Spanish European nationals.⁴² This was definitely a far cry from the ambivalent attitude of the authorities who restricted and/or regulated their mobility, limited their economic activities and expelled them from the country.⁴³ They now had the option to choose their gainful occupation.⁴⁴ Transient traders were allowed to stay at the *Alcaiceria de San Fernando* or the Silk Market of San Fernando. The Chinese migrants usually enlisted here and waited for their papers to be processed or rented its rooms until they found suitable lodging quarters. Their movement and activities were closely monitored, their belongings carefully inspected, and their cargo audited. The opium they possessed had to be declared.

The Alcaiceria de San Fernando, 1756-1850's

Various descriptions had been ascribed to the Alcaiceria. It was the silk market, the customs house, the Parian, or the edifice that had many stalls. It was popularly known to the Chinese as *Chen-nai*.⁴⁵ Common among these descriptions were its links with trade. It was built on the north side of the Pasig River, just outside the walls of Manila. Its construction started during the reign of Governor-General Don Manuel Arandia.⁴⁶ The Royal Decree of July 16, 1756 was passed to respond to the Chinese request of a warehouse where they could store goods that had just been unloaded from their junks, where they could sell merchandise, and where they could temporarily stay. Don Fernando Mier y Noriega presented a proposal which estimated building costs at P48,000

and suggested that he could lend the government half the amount provided that the latter split the revenues earned in half to enable him to build additional warehouses. He also asked that he be given the title “Alcayde de Alcaiceria,” that he be allowed to employ his sons and descendants, and that they each receive P50 as monthly salary. This was approved by the succeeding Royal Decrees of July 24, 1758 and September 7, 1758. However, the actual building cost only amounted to P29, 427 and the government still owed the Noriega clan some amount of money. One of Noriega’s sons committed excesses while serving in office in 1776. This forced the government to give the administrative supervision of the Alcaiceria to a *Castellano* or a port-master/captain. This was approved by Madrid in 1777. By December 1783 the colonial government had fulfilled all its financial obligations to the Noriega clan.⁴⁷

On May 6, 1768 the Aduana or Customs House started its operations at the Alcaiceria. It housed the transient crews of the Chinese sampans until such time when they were allowed to leave.⁴⁸ Since Armenians and Muslims also traded in the country, the colonial government, in an effort to protect Christian Chinese from foreign competition, ordered the former to sell their goods only by the bulk through a decree passed on September 15, 1787.⁴⁹ The Alcaiceria in 1808 was able to earn P4, 258 and 4 *reales* from storage and rental fees. Some of the merchandise stacked in its rooms were high-backed chairs common to Chinese eateries, goldsmithing apparatus, opium divans or the *lancape* and many others. *Bodega* fees were pegged at P200.⁵⁰ A fire razed the original structure in 1810. This necessitated rebuilding and by 1822, stall rentals increased to P3000.⁵¹ Another fire in the 1850’s destroyed it permanently.

The doors of the Alcaiceria usually closed at six in the evening. The Postigo entrance was the only one left opened for it was by this gate where the *Castellano* held office. No one was allowed to enter or leave the premises without the administrator’s permission. The *Castellano* regularly inspected Chinese lodgings to make sure that there were no suspicious characters lurking around, that no occupants gambled or played prohibited card games, and that no one smoked opium.⁵² The authorities had already associated the Chinese with opium use.

Opium Policies and Monopoly Contracts, 1843-1890’s

The colonial governments in Southeast Asia institutionalized the auctioning of opium monopoly contracts to increase revenues.⁵³ It was also common knowledge that addiction was an after-effect of drug use as seen in the Chinese experience when people from all walks of life – be they mandarins, workers, merchants, servants, nuns, and priests – smoked opium.⁵⁴ Initially, the

Madrid Royal Decree of December 1, 1814 banned opium smoking and explicitly stated that anyone caught clandestinely using the drug would be imprisoned for 15 days. The second offense subjected him to 30 days imprisonment while the third, to 4 years of hard labor. Those caught peddling it would suffer jail time with hard labor for 6 years. Anyone possessing 20 balls of opium had to pay P500 fine.⁵⁵ However, in 1828, Spain had a change of heart when she allowed the sowing and cultivation of opium.⁵⁶ The rationale was that “civilized nations” were into it.⁵⁷ In 1835, some Christian Chinese requested that an edifice be built where they could manufacture opium and smoke it.⁵⁸ Opium from Benares, Malwa, and Patna, collectively known as *Opios de la Yndia*, penetrated the Philippine market.⁵⁹ The *Intendencia* managed all monopolies. Revenues went to the government coffers as opium was classified as a form of an *indirect* tax in the same way as alcohol, wine, liquor, and betel nut were. Opium revenue farms, according to Warren Bailey and Lan Troung, involved the granting of “monopoly rights for the preparation, distribution and sale of retail opium” to licensed individuals or concessionaires.⁶⁰

The opium monopoly contract (*fumaderos de anfon*) for the Philippines took effect in December 1843. This was auctioned to the highest bidder and its revenues were later entrusted to the *Administración General de Tributos*, an office formed in 1850 to supervise the collection of taxes. Books were examined and evaluated by the accountants of the Inspector General’s Office to enable them to prepare local statistics reports regarding the status of commerce and industry.⁶¹ The authorities informed the public about the auction three days before it began. In Manila auctioning procedures took place at ten in the morning inside the *Salón de Actos Públicos* of the *Intendencia General de Hacienda* building. In attendance were the Intendant, the treasurer, the paymaster, the officers of the *Junta de Reales Almonedas*, and a notary public. In the provinces it was the governor who announced the price at which the bidding started and the other conditions stipulated in the contract. He then distributed official documents to interested individuals who would write on them the price they were willing to offer. These were to be passed after a week’s time, in duplicate form and sealed.⁶²

Opium contracts covered a three-year period during which time the *contratista* or contract holder had the privilege of bringing in opium, using laboratories, selling the drug, and smoking it only within the premises of the Alcaicería de San Fernando. As long as the necessary papers were presented to the customs’ officials, the *contratistas* were given a free rein in acquiring their own supply of opium. But then it was also relatively easy to augment their provisions through clandestine negotiations with merchants of Chinese junks or sampans. Supply came from the Calcutta auctions in India which was

maintained by the British government even after the nullification of the East India Company contract.⁶³ Contract holders in the provinces put up their own official opium dens where they posted signs saying, “Public Opium Den Number__” in Spanish and Chinese characters. Permission to establish opium dens in the provinces began in May 1851. Areas covered were Cavite, Pampanga, Bulacan, Laguna, Batangas, Ilocos and Zamboanga.⁶⁴ Some of the *contratistas* for Manila in 1867 were Jose Colucco de Ormachea, Don Eduardo Jackson, Jose Cembrano Yu-syquia, Jose Santiago Tiaoqui, and Don Pedro Soler.⁶⁵ The destruction of the Alcaiceria by fire forced Manila contract holders to put up their own licensed dens.

Failure to comply with payment deadlines meant a fine of P100 for every 5 days and the cancellation of the contract. All proceeds went to the *Hacienda Publica*, the fiscal center which supervised the collection of revenues for the National Treasury.⁶⁶ *Contratista* transactions were entered in a journal which was regularly checked. All contract holders shouldered the costs of cleaning the dens and repairing fixtures that may have been damaged by fires, floods, rains and earthquakes. Don Carlos Palanca, a former *gobernadorcillo*, had his own den called “*Real Asiento de Opio*” located along the Plaza del Conde in Binondo. From this establishment emanated a strong odor that wafted through the windows and the open patios of nearby houses. Neighbors deduced that the preparation of opium produced fumes which were injurious to public health. Luis Velasquez, a Spanish Peninsular who owned a nearby inn called “Alhambra” complained to the authorities since he started losing clients. An inspection was conducted but there seemed to be no effort on the part of Don Carlos Palanca to remedy the situation. When summoned, Palanca retorted that he was not personally notified. Nonetheless, he was asked to pay a fine of twenty-five pesos for disobeying orders and was given twenty-four hours to build a chimney on the roof of his establishment.⁶⁷ *Contratistas* were allowed to bid for several contracts in different places. They were also allowed to sublease their contracts to other persons provided the authorities knew about them and that they strictly adhered to conditions regarding the payment of license dues. The holder of the subcontract gave his financial contributions to the major *contratista* who, in turn, handed them to the designated officer of the *Hacienda Publica*. If a *contratista* died before his contract ended the license could be passed on to other family members.⁶⁸

The Chinese were banned from smoking opium in their own houses. Spaniards, mestizos and Filipinos were not allowed to enter opium dens. Anyone caught smoking opium not supplied by the *contratista* was an offender possessing a contraband or smuggled commodity.⁶⁹ The *contratista* was allowed by the

head of the *Resguardo* (Customs' Police) to choose his own men to run after smugglers. This para-military force was known as *comisionado*. The irony of the *Real Asiento de Opio* case was that Don Carlos Palanca had his own *comisionados*. The group saw to it that opium dens were open only after ten in the evening; that there were no *indios*, *mestizos*, drunkards, and armed men inside; and that no form of gambling was being played. However, they were not allowed to search houses without proper papers duly signed by authorities nor to accost, taunt and harm any offender. Only the contract holder had the right to confiscate any item that may serve as evidence.⁷⁰ Confiscated opium was brought to the *Laboratorio de Medico-Legal de Manila* where it was tested. Authorities determined its state (whether it was in the form of balls, inside cans, sticky, semi-solid, and so on), its color (reddish-brown), its taste (bitter), and its solubility and the characteristic carbon residue.⁷¹

There seemed to be a common practice among the *contratistas* to include some Chinese as law enforcers or *comisionados*. The probability was that these men may have come from the same clan or dialect organization for, in this line of work, trust was of primary importance. Such ties fostered unity among them in a new social environment.⁷² This was obvious in the case of Don Matias Saenz de Vizmanos who picked his *comisionados* from the Christian Chinese of Binondo.⁷³ His zeal in apprehending wrongdoers earned for him the prestige and the trust needed to seek permission from the government to go to Singapore and supply a contract holder there some fifteen chests of opium to be loaded aboard the Spanish warship *Don Jorge Juan*.⁷⁴ Through his example his *comisionados* saw the need to cooperate with the government. This was what Andrew Wilson described as the dynamics behind the *cabecilla*-agent system. A headman or a *cabecilla* of a *gremio* or guild strengthened his patronage network by hiring apprentices who were dependable and trustworthy or by employing newly-arrived migrants who came from his own hometown and, therefore, spoke his dialect. These aides were assured of employment and support when problems arose and were indirectly being taught survival strategies. The colonial government saw these *cabecillas* as reliable "Christians." Furthermore, these were the leaders who knew that obedience, hard work and loyalty would eventually be rewarded with social acceptance and advancement.⁷⁵

The Royal Decree of July 20, 1852 urged the authorities to closely monitor the activities of *contratistas* outside Manila while that of November 4, 1853 reminded the *Resguardo* and the *Cuerpo de Carabineros* (the apprehending arm of the municipalities) to be more vigilant in punishing smugglers.⁷⁶ Opium sales had become highly beneficial to the national treasury. In 1867 Spanish

ships brought to the Manila Aduana 13,027 kilos of opium which traders got from Chinese, English and German merchants.⁷⁷ Pampanga received a total of 3,671 kilos from February to October 1886.⁷⁸ In the case of Cebu and Bohol, bidding started at 3, 128 pesos and 36 centimos for the year 1880 but this initial bid soared to 62,576 pesos and 20 centimos in ten years' time.⁷⁹ Cebu, in particular, was home to many Chinese middlemen and merchandisers active in the sugar, hemp, and textile trades of the Bicol and Panay regions. In Mindanao no bidding took place until all the *contratistas* would have served their final term.⁸⁰ The opening bids for Cotabato, Isabela de Basilan, Distrito de Pollok, and Zamboanga was 33,720 pesos. Some *contratistas* for Zamboanga were Francisco Reyes Piejo, Antonio Monroy, Alejo Felix, Antonio Reyes and Santos Tan-Joco.⁸¹ Francisco Reyes Piejo, a resident of Binondo, must have had envisioned brighter and more prosperous days in this far-flung area.

Smuggling: An Aftermath

During the second half of the nineteenth century there were harsher penalties for offenders. A person accused of smoking contraband opium was allowed to post bail but should appear in court when summoned. Those who were judged guilty of the offense were fined and imprisoned for 6 months. Inability to pay the fine increased the duration of incarceration to two years only.⁸² The rationale of the government for these strict measures was that even if the Spanish monarchs were aware of the destitution of some of their subjects, they were not willing to allow crimes to go unpunished.⁸³ Subcontracting was also a problem for some *contratistas* who controlled drug distribution in several provinces. They usually limited the supply of the subcontractors to one opium chest containing 40 balls, each of which was valued at 26 *taels*. If there were a few Chinese staying within his area or province any subcontractor would definitely find it difficult to sell all his supply, in addition to paying the major *contratista* the amount stipulated in the contract. If the subcontractor really lacked money, his superior would then be forced to pay for the difference. On the other hand, if there were many Chinese in the area but less of supply, the subcontractor, considering the limitations imposed on him by the major *contratista*, would then buy from opium smugglers selling the drug at lower prices. He could really make huge profits. Furthermore, he could still allow his clients to use his den for he was also duly licensed.⁸⁴ The next time around he would be wiser to choose a province where the business prospects were better. He would have to wait until he had earned enough profit to be a major *contratista*. As of now he would have to remember that the interest of the major contract holder should never be jeopardized by any subordinate.

These developments prompted major *contratistas* to be shrewd and meticulous enough to suggest that the lessees give them a list of all the Chinese who patronized their dens, the quantity each consumed, and the amount at which they bought the drug. Receipts were to be issued and these should have detachable stubs that prove that some transaction had taken place. More *comisionados* should be employed to monitor lessees' activities. Smuggling was tantamount to the payment of a 500 peso fine, the nullification of the contract, the payment of one thousand pesos for every *tael* in excess, and the prohibition against securing any opium contract.⁸⁵

The selling of contraband opium reduced maximum profits for the government. Smugglers tried all ways and means to conceal their activities. Authorities in Palawan were more vigilant since it was often visited by Bornean and Singaporean traders who bought timber, beeswax, rattan and others from the Tagbanuas and Muslims. Officials could not discount the possibility that some amount of opium also changed hands.⁸⁶ In Mindanao, Indian opium that was coursed through Zamboanga and Jolo was more expensive for Chinese settlers because contract holders like D. Santiago Lledo y Pont had to pay an additional P40 for every opium chest. Smuggling was done by Moros from Davao.⁸⁷

In Manila many Chinese had been apprehended for smoking the drug in unauthorized areas other than within premises of the Alcaiceria de San Fernando. An example was Tan Yangco who was caught smoking in his restaurant. An acquaintance, Chino Pang-engco, testified that this had long been Tan Yangco's habit.⁸⁸ Sometimes unsuspecting Filipino employees of the Chinese were used as couriers. This happened to Vicente Manalo (a *carromata* driver) and helpers Catalina Manalo and Bernabe Molina, who were employed by a non-Christian Chinese named Ang Chuy Tenga. They were ordered to carry ten cans of opium concealed among clothes in a leather valise to Tanauan. With them was the Chinaman's mistress, Cornelia Cunanan, who had three cans with her. After the authorities questioned them, the servants were absolved but the couple had to pay P500 each.⁸⁹ Many more cases were brought to the courts but there were two big smuggling cases that caught the public's attention. These were the Alcaiceria Scandal of 1843 and the *Gunga* Incident.

The Alcaiceria Scandal of 1843

On August 17, 1843 from 9 to 10 in the evening the guards from the Infantry Regiment of the Queen assigned at the Alcaiceria de San Fernando were startled by the rattling of speeding carriage wheels.⁹⁰ From the first carriage

alighted Sr. Alcalde Don Tomas Balbas y Castro and from the second one, troops. The Alcalde had in his possession a letter from the Governor-General allowing him to inspect the Alcaiceria's bodegas or warehouses that were leased to the Chinese. He ordered the guards to close all the gates so that no occupants could leave. From *Bodega No. 21* and *22* reverberated laughter and shouts of Chinese who were playing *liampo*, a card game popular in opium dens. All the five tables in *Bodega 21* were occupied. When the Chinese saw the soldiers, many attempted to run. Forty-seven men were apprehended that night. Col. Don Francisco Martinez Robles, the Commandant of the Resguardo, was informed that the Chinese would be taken to the headquarters of the *Guardias de Prevencion*. After statements were taken, it was not long before the *Castellano* of the Alcaiceria Don Jose Ordovas and Commandant Robles were imprisoned in Fort Santiago by the *Auditoria de Guerra* because of drug-trafficking.⁹¹ They had sold opium to the Chinese, allowed them to gamble, and connived with some of the soldiers to turn a blind eye on these nightly activities.⁹² During the raid, no one was patrolling the inner corridors of the Alcaiceria so that women and Filipinos roamed around freely.⁹³

According to *Chino Cristiano* Cayetano Enriquez Tan-Leco who rented Bodega No. 20, an officer whom they knew by the name "Pezeta" allowed him to gamble after the Angelus bell rang and upon payment of a P10 fee. He was assured that this would be kept in confidence. Other times Tan-Leco would be startled by someone hiding in one of the dark corners of the edifice and selling him an opium ball similar to what some natives and foreigners were buying.⁹⁴ The man known as "Pezeta" was none other than Second Lieutenant Aniceto de la Cruz, a 67-year old Spaniard serving the Resguardo.⁹⁵ Agustin Vianco, a Chinese Christian, was said to have supplied opium and was usually given a tip of 6 *reales* to P10 for his efforts and his silence. The first time that he brought opium he tried to conceal it in a bag filled with palay. Other times he would slip them in between clothes in his rattan bag. He later was instructed by Aniceto de la Cruz to give a P20 bribe to Corporal Valentin Morales and the other guards.⁹⁶ His suppliers were Spaniards and meztizos whom he identified as Srs. Mercader, Baranda, Urbeta, Eguia, and Cortejarena. Senor Cortejarena sold opium balls with prices ranging from P20-25 each and chests of which he would load into his carriage bound for the Alcaiceria. A soldier by the name of Pena brought them in. Sometimes this Pena dressed in ordinary clothes and concealed opium in his person or under his hat.⁹⁷ Cortejarena rented Bodega No. 3 and would sell as many as twenty balls of opium (equivalent to a chest) for P460.⁹⁸

Aniceto de la Cruz gave credence to the testimonies by further adding that he would regularly collect P26-28 on Mondays and charge P1 for every table used for gambling.⁹⁹ He also added that the *Castellano* Ordovas stacked

opium in his house and would sometimes order Corporal Mariano Coronel to get them. Senor Ordovas also received gift bribes of candies, cookies, fans and other items from the Chinese.¹⁰⁰

The Alcaiceria bustled with activity every time Chinese junks arrived and the crews and passengers had to disembark for 15 days. Some sailors supplied opium that they had acquired during their various trips.¹⁰¹ The more transients there were, the bigger the opportunities for financial gain.

The perpetrators were punished. The officers Francisco Martinez Robles and Aniceto de la Cruz were expelled, banned from taking any government posts, and asked to pay a fine of P300 each. The soldiers Valentin Morales and Mariano Coronel were fined P100 each. The Castellano D. Jose Ordovas was also disqualified from serving any position in the Hacienda Publica and had to pay P1,500.¹⁰²

The Gunga Incident

In the morning of May 28, 1878, an English ship named *Gunga* entered Manila Bay. It had just come from Hongkong with a crew of 40 and 154 passengers, seven of them Europeans and the rest Chinese. Nothing seemed unusual as the ship captain, D.S.W. Brown, surrendered the manifesto that indicated all the details regarding crew, passengers, and cargo. They were temporarily docking in Manila to replenish the ship's coal supply as it was bound for Cooktown, Australia.¹⁰³ The ship was consigned to Peele and Hubbell. No one on board was allowed to leave while the Philippine Coastguard Commander and some of his men inspected the ship.

On board were crates of dried fruits, bales of raw silk, packets of handkerchiefs, pounds of tea, and other items. However, in some obscure corner, the guards noticed unmarked crates which when opened revealed 32 chests of opium, each containing six cans that weighed five kilos each. All in all there were 960 kilos of opium valued at \$19, 200. Spanish customs' laws indicated that tobacco, gunpowder and opium were contraband commodities and that possession of these had to be declared. The opium carried by the *Gunga* had to be confiscated. Captain Brown flatly stated that he had no knowledge of the opium chests on board. The authorities had no choice but to stop the ship from leaving.

News of the confiscation reached the ears of the British consul who complained that the seizure of goods was "illegal," "undue," and an "infringement" on the freedom to travel. The Commander of the Coastguards countered

that Article 176 of Customs' Regulations required a declaration of all cargo and he was sure that this was common knowledge by all ship captains. He initially noticed a seemingly reluctant attitude on the part of Captain Brown when he was requested to submit the manifest in triplicate form. The Spanish government ruled that ignorance of laws could not be excused and a fine of 6,375.36 pesos had to be paid before the ship was allowed to sail.¹⁰⁴ This was a case of the British trying to jostle another government through its consul, the highest executive tasked with maintaining their interests overseas.

The Opium Policy of the Aguinaldo Government, 1898-1901

The struggle for Philippine independence was inspired by a vision that someday the Philippines would be politically free, materially progressive and culturally eminent. It was a slow and gradual process because the Spanish government clung to power and upheld the institutions that it built in the country. Some affluent Filipinos of Luzon, uncertain of the Revolution's outcome and/or unwilling to compromise their status and wealth, refused to participate in the fight for independence.¹⁰⁵

The bidding for contracts continued so the opium *contratista*, for example, went about his business. In 1895, a year before the outbreak of the Revolution, some 679,868 balls of opium were brought to the Philippines.¹⁰⁶ As fighting ensued between the Filipinos and the Spanish forces in provinces surrounding Manila in 1896, Cua-Puaco asked that his contract be nullified because of the difficulty of putting up opium dens in Batangas after the colonial government decreed the burning of towns where the rebels hid.¹⁰⁷ Eventually the ardor of many Filipinos in their desire for freedom unleashed itself as seen through their participation in Katipunan activities.

Emilio Aguinaldo assumed leadership on March 23, 1897 and had already established his headquarters in San Miguel de Mayumo, Bulacan when he received word that Primo de Rivera was negotiating for the war to end. Aguinaldo had known that his soldiers were weary and his army was in need of more weapons so he accepted the terms of the Pact of Biak-na-Bato. His voluntary exile to Hongkong was agreed upon by both camps. Aguinaldo also accepted the P400,000 which he later deposited in the bank. However, the feelings of mistrust which prevailed between the Spanish government and the revolutionaries resulted in the resumption of hostilities. Aguinaldo wanted to buy weapons and the friars wanted to keep their parishes. When Isabelo Artacho sued Aguinaldo for refusing to give him his "share" of the money, there was

no recourse for the latter but to leave for Singapore.¹⁰⁸ There Aguinaldo was notified by E. Spencer Pratt of the brewing war between Spain and the United States because of the sinking of the Maine in Havana and the hostile sentiment of the American public about the de Lome Incident.

When the United States declared war against Spain on May 25, 1898 Aguinaldo was asked to return to the Philippines and continue the struggle for independence. George Dewey defeated Admiral Montojo's fleet on May 1, 1898. In August of that year Dewey manipulated the surrender of Manila to the Americans to allow the Spaniards to keep their pride. Peace negotiations between Spain and the United States culminated in the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898 which gave the Philippines to the latter for \$20,000,000. Aguinaldo was never consulted.¹⁰⁹

Upon his return, Aguinaldo urged all Filipinos to join the Revolution to hasten the recognition of independence by foreign powers. Through a circular he assured Filipinos of their inherent rights, promised to initiate industrialization, and vowed to put an end to the operation of leisure or recreation facilities (opium, lottery and gambling) that hindered progress.¹¹⁰ But in the arena of war, Aguinaldo and his compatriots had to prioritize boosting army morale and obtaining funds to finance all military preparations. Aguinaldo also saw the Chinese as revenue providers so he commissioned Jose Alejandrino to collect extra taxes from this group.¹¹¹ Foreign merchants were also required to file applications with the *Departamento de Fomento*.¹¹² All imported goods were taxed by 5% and those leaving the country by 15%.¹¹³

By November 1898 the Revolutionary Government saw the practicality of auctioning opium contracts and leasing opium dens.¹¹⁴ Some of the contractors for Binondo were Francisco Bonifacio, Nubla Lim Chico and Felipe Lim.¹¹⁵ Aguinaldo retained some of the provisions of the Spanish contracts such as that which stated that only the Chinese could use opium. A radical departure from the previous obligations was a clause that lowered the initial bidding price to P9,000 but retained the original three-year duration as an incentive for more offers. The *contratista* had to give the government monthly dues in addition to a 10% deposit. Interested contract holders from Cebu rejected this scheme and devised their own. Those from Tarlac pegged the amount to P23,000 for three years.¹¹⁶ Despite all the bickering monopoly revenues for December 1898 amounted to P104,574.78. Cagayan province contributed P23,239.33.¹¹⁷

As the Aguinaldo Government was still trying to decipher the real intentions for American involvement in the war against Spain, captains and

merchants of foreign ships still brought in opium so that it seemed that *contratistas* never ran out of supply.¹¹⁸ In Romblon, the provincial governor's report stated that since opium smoking was becoming so rampant there, addiction was fast developing even among the native populace.¹¹⁹ Politico-military commanders went to the extent of decreeing that violators would be forced to cultivate camote, abaca, cacao and lumbang plants.¹²⁰

The Americans and the Philippine Opium Commission, 1902-1908

The continuous arrival of American reinforcements made Aguinaldo and leaders like Mabini and Ricarte suspicious and uneasy. The printing of the original text of McKinley's *Benevolent Assimilation* by General Miller allowed them to understand American intentions. They were determined to fight the extension of American sovereignty over the Archipelago. The San Juan Incident on February 4, 1899 led to the outbreak of hostilities. Aguinaldo had managed to avoid capture through the efforts of generals like Antonio Luna, Licerio Geronimo and Gregorio del Pilar. Eventually, as his letters and copies of ordinances from Palanan fell into American hands, he had no choice but to surrender and pledge allegiance to the new colonial master on August 7, 1899.¹²¹

The Americans could not impose new policies drastically as they were still bent on quelling revolts perpetuated by Filipinos like General Miguel Malvar, General Vicente Lukban, and Macario Sakay and others who refused to surrender and resorted to guerilla warfare. Changes were gradually effected in areas crucial to the maintenance of American rule such as public instruction and the improvement of health and sanitation facilities.

The Americans took over an opium trade that was still brisk. In 1902 the Philippine Commission Report stated that the value of imported opium increased to \$819,625 which almost quadrupled the value of the supply in 1899.¹²² Some 49,346 Chinese migrated to the Philippines despite the lingering sense of insecurity that the war wrought.¹²³ There were still two hundred opium dens operating in Binondo. Most of these were located at the back rooms of business establishments and for twenty centavos the Chinese could enjoy their own space.¹²⁴ According to Anne Foster, in her study of the United States' opium policy which was compared with those formulated by the British, French and the Dutch, the Americans had considered opium a legal commodity up to 1909. Even for William Howard Taft, opium was not a "hindrance to the civilizing mission." In 1902 the Chinese were just asked to pay an import tax 45% of the drug's value.¹²⁵ The government definitely benefited from the revenues raised through import taxation.

However, there were criticisms from active anti-opium groups, such as the Protestant missionaries who not only saw the threat of addiction but also recognized the impossibility of creating a healthy, responsible, thrifty, and industrious citizenry.¹²⁶ Taft, with his back against the wall, created a committee to help in the formulation of an opium policy which was factual, realistic and scientific. This was the Philippine Opium Commission whose members were the Episcopal Bishop Reverend Charles Henry Brent, the physician Dr. Jose Albert, and Health Commissioner E.C. Carter. They were to investigate the policies propagated by the colonial powers in the Southeast Asian region.¹²⁷ Reverend Brent, a staunch crusader against opium, suggested ending the drug's importation thus cutting off supply.

By March 1906 what was operational in the Philippines was Opium Law No. 1461. Opium was kept at the Aduana where it was classified and priced as follows: crude opium with a net weight of one kilo, P2. 50; cooked or prepared opium of the same weight at P7. 50. Buyers and would-be retailers were subject to importation duties of p2. 50 and P5. 00, respectively, for every kilo of crude and prepared opium. To process, sell, distribute or use the drug, each regular smoker had to secure a license worth P5, retailers at P200, and dealers at P1000, in addition to a P5-P10 imposition of every kilo of opium purchased. Licenses were regulated by the Office of the Collector of Internal Revenue.¹²⁸ Colonial powers controlling Southeast Asia favored the government monopoly policy. Smuggling was still a perennial problem in the Philippines as supply came from Hong Kong, Singapore and North Borneo.¹²⁹ The American authorities knew that a uniform policy among colonies was needed but the other colonial rulers in Asia were not yet inclined towards opium prohibition. The latter still believed in "maximizing revenue collection" and "extending mechanisms of control."¹³⁰

On October 1907 the Philippine Commission, authorized by the Act of Congress dated March 3, 1905, passed the Opium Law 1761 which nullified the previous law and was designed to gradually restrict and regulate the sale of the drug until March 1, 1908. After the aforementioned date, opium use would be totally prohibited except for medical purposes.¹³¹ Importing, cooking, smoking, ingesting, and injecting opium were all banned unless such acts were supported by prescriptions of duly authorized persons, physicians, pharmacists, or licensed dispensators. Furthermore, opium paraphernalia such as pipes, hypodermic syringes, pots and lamps had to be turned over to government authorities.¹³² Violators were subjected to fines that ranged from P300 to P10, 000 and incarceration at the Bilibid Prison from three to five years.¹³³ Spies and informers received a portion of the fines paid by the wrongdoers.¹³⁴ The

government also feared that the opium habit might be passed on to the native populace. Such was the case against Martin Gaboya of Cebu who was arrested for possessing 421 grams of cooked opium and 321 grams of ashes kept in tin cans (which indicated drug use beyond the shadow of doubt). He explained that these items belonged to a Chinaman who deposited them at his house the past year. The authorities found Gaboya's reason to be flimsy, his ignorance of the law unacceptable, but the material possession of the banned items well-founded. He was asked to pay a P200 fine and was sentenced to two months' imprisonment.¹³⁵ There were also provisions that pertained to sanctions for foreigners. Those who were already residents of the Philippines, but were found guilty of carrying or smoking even a small dose of the drug, were to be exiled. A foreigner addicted to opium and caught peddling the substance had to be deported.¹³⁶ If the authorities were very strict with the handling and distribution of opium, it was because they only wanted to monitor its use and prevent it from falling into wrong hands. The road to achieving this objective had been rough since smuggling persisted during the early decades of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the American colonial government managed to project the image that compared with the other powers of Asia, it was "firmer" in its resolve to ban opium and to give up whatever profits importing and selling the drug could bring.

Conclusion

The Bourbon monarchs sponsored economic reforms that would keep the Philippines financially afloat after the subsidy from Mexico ended. Such reforms involved the close monitoring of economic activities supplemented by an initial experimentation with free trade, an idea that was becoming the norm among colonizing powers of the nineteenth century. Cognizant of the success of the British informal empire in Asia, Latin America and in the Caribbean, the Bourbons abandoned the policy of isolation for the Philippines and opened its ports to traders and merchants eager to exchange their merchandise for commodities needed by the world market. One such commodity was opium which many Chinese migrants were familiar with as they continued to flock all over Southeast Asia. The idea or the principle involved in the trade of the drug as far as the Spanish colonial government was concerned was one of pragmatism which compels one to question a colonizer's aspersions to civilization, progress and humanitarian goals.

Colonial policies regarding opium can be characterized by an ambivalence manifested by the shifting attitudes of tolerance and intolerance to the practical security of selective tolerance. In 1804 the government banned opium use because of its pernicious effects to one's health. Such was the Chinese

experience which the world had grown familiar with. The first successful attempts by the British at free trade, the soaring profits accumulated by the English merchants, the migration of many Chinese to the Philippines, and the need for more skilled laborers and business entrepreneurs, prodded the Spaniards to tolerate opium in 1828. From 1843 onwards, selective tolerance was the rule as opium was established as an indirect tax, the trade of which was only possible through municipal franchising and its use limited to the Chinese. Auctioning defined participation and assured the government of the continuous flow of money into its coffers. The more affluent classes of Spaniards, *mestizos*, and natives competed among themselves for franchise acquisition. As they were responsible for the maintenance of all the amenities in their dens they enabled the government to economize on such expenses. Furthermore, in the eyes of the authorities, what was the best way of keeping the Chinese docile after a back-breaking day but to allow them to drown their troubles in the stupor of an opium-induced quiescence? Archival documents examined by this researcher did not explicitly state reasons why only the Chinese were allowed to use opium. One can deduce that availability of cash that stemmed from their daily wages and the profits from commercial activities made them willing clients. If Filipinos were allowed to smoke opium, could they still manage their farms or be depended upon for forced labor projects?

Smuggling was the perennial problem of the government and monopoly contractors. It took away revenues and opened avenues for corruption especially on the part of officials commissioned to apprehend wrongdoers. This was the issue in the Alcaiceria Scandal of 1843. The Gunga Incident, on the other hand, showed the capability of foreigners to circumvent legal principles such as Customs Laws in their desire to trade contraband goods. So important was smuggling that instead of rejecting opium altogether, it was better to create officials called *Resguardo* to run after culprits. Fines, after all, increased municipal revenues.

In the fight for independence, Aguinaldo relied on the opium monopoly contract to fund the Revolution. Except for a uniform bidding price, Aguinaldo followed and applied the contract to the letter. As a consequence one wonders how the revolutionaries envisioned the participation of groups and communities in nation-building when independence would have been achieved. Did they have a program for national integration?

It took the Americans several years before they finally stopped the importation and the selling of opium to the Chinese. Smuggling was also rampant so much so that they had to formulate harsher penalties from 1902-1908. Again revenue-raising was hard to resist. In similar fashion, so was the rationale behind tolerance or selective tolerance a hard nut to crack.

Notes

¹Alfred McCoy with Cathleen Read and Leonard Adams II, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 64. I wish to thank Dr. Milagros Guerrero for lending me her copy of this book.

²Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898*, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), pp. 185-189; see also *Guía Oficial de Filipinas Part I, 1892*, (Manila: Litografía de Chofre y Compania, 1892), p. 308-309. Initially the Hospital of San Gabriel in Binondo catered to the medical needs of the Chinese. It ceased to operate with the expulsion of this group from the country in 1766. The Dominicans, who had earlier managed the hospital, began attending to the needs of the Chinese in the privacy of their own homes with the intention to cure and to convert. Another option was the Hospital de San Juan de Dios where there were services for general medicine and surgery. Unfortunately, the space allotted for the Chinese could just accommodate seventy-five beds. Treatment was expensive and the efficacy of western medicine was doubted. It was only in 1891 and through the efforts of Antonio Yap Caong, Tan Quien-sen and the availability of Chinese funds that the Chung-jen Iyuan was erected south of the Chinese cemetery.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

⁴Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 3-14.

⁵Martin Lynn, "British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Andrew Porter, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 103-105

⁶J.D. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 35.

⁷Osterhammel, Jurgen, "Britain and China: 1842-1914," and Knight, Alan, "Britain and Latin America," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire...*, pp.148-149 and p. 24 respectively. The existence of an informal empire is a historical situation of some stability and permanence in which overt foreign rule is avoided while economic advantages are secured by 'unequal' legal and institutional arrangements, and also by the constant threat of political meddling and military coercion pillars, namely: legal privilege for foreigners; a free trade relation dictated from the outside; the use of means of intervention such as gunboats and imperial consuls.

⁸Richard Herr, "Flow and Ebb 1700-1833," *Spain: A History*, Raymond Carr, ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 197.

⁹Benito Legarda Jr., *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change, and Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth Century Philippines*, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), p. 259.

¹⁰Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898*, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), p. 49

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 59

¹²Yen Ching-hwang, *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia, 1800-1911*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 143

¹³Martin Booth, *Opium: A History*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 103-105.

¹⁴McCoy, p. 60

¹⁵Booth, p. 105

¹⁶Ellis Markman, *The Coffee House: A Cultural History*, (London: Phoenix, 2005)

¹⁷McCoy, p. 60; Booth, p. 107

¹⁸Maurice Collis, *Foreign Mud (Anglo-Chinese Opium War)*, (Singapore: Graham Brash Ltd.,) 1994, p. 8

¹⁹Hsin-pao Chang, p. 257. The English East India Company gave the impression that it was in no way connected with the opium trade. It cautioned its private partners namely, the "country firms," "country merchants," "country *wallahs* or traders" to refrain from calling the substance as "The Company's opium." However, it had the principal function of nullifying the contracts of traders who desisted from buying opium at Bengali auction sales. The profit the Company accumulated was used to buy tea and silk from China; see also Wong, p. 392

²⁰Wong, p. 7

²¹Wong, p. 392

²²Booth, pp.5-6 and 13. The author also says farmers could tell when the time was ripe for harvesting for they suffer from severe headaches and nausea in the mornings. Opium can also be absorbed by the skin.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 7-9

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 10

²⁵Hsin-pao Chang, p. 48; Wong, p. 39

²⁶Booth, p. 107; Wong, p. 394; Hsin-pao Chang, p. 21

²⁷Wong, p. 393

²⁸Frederick Wakeman Jr., *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 32

²⁹Wong, pp. 40 & 44

³⁰Lynn, p. 103

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 104-106

³²Barry K. Gills and Andre Gunder Frank, "The Cumulation of Accumulation," *The World System: 500 Years or 5,000?*, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 103-104.

³³A concrete example is Gunboat diplomacy which meant the "omnipresent threat of violence" through a limited naval force working to gain advantages against a foreign country or within the power's own political boundaries. See Wong, p. 453 and Osterhammel, p. 154

³⁴Wong, p. 144. Jardine Matheson was the largest agency as a consequence of the partnership that was forged by William Jardine and James Matheson in 1828. The firm's

fortune was based on opium trade. Jardine eventually became a member of the British Parliament where he lobbied for the interests of merchant groups. When he died in 1843 people believed that opium dealers came to a “sticky end.” On the other hand, James Matheson lived to a ripe age of ninety-one. He was able to build for himself a castle, to serve in the Parliament, and to teach Chinese at the University of London. One of his nephews did business with the Spanish colonial government. Mercantile houses of other countries were the Parsee firm of Dadabhoy Rustomjee; the Jew-owned David Sassoon & Co., the American Russell and Co., Perkins & Co., Green and Whetmore, and a litany of others. American firms were more interested in Indian and Turkish opium. Their monopoly of Turkish opium created a fallacy among the Chinese common folk that Turkey was part of the United States. See also Stella Dong, *Shanghai: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2001), pp. 53-57; Booth, p. 114; Collis, p. 283

³⁵This prevailed in Latin America, specifically Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. By 1820 church images in Argentina were said to have been attired in ‘coarse English cloth’; Cornish miners in Mexico left behind blue-eyed children and Lord Palmerston speculated with Peruvian stocks. See Alan Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” *The Oxford History...*, p. 127

³⁶Legarda Jr., p. 242

³⁷Michael Meyer and William Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 255-256

³⁸Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations, Books IV-V*, (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 193

³⁹Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 53-54

⁴⁰Eliodoro Robles, *The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century* (Quezon City: Malaya Books Inc., 1969), p. 138

⁴¹O.D. Corpuz, *An Economic History of the Philippines*, (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1997), p. 125

⁴²Wickberg, p.29

⁴³Milagros Guerrero, “The Chinese in the Philippines,” *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770*, Vol. I, Felix Alfonso, ed. (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966), p. 29

⁴⁴Wickberg, p. 48

⁴⁵Alberto Santa Maria, O.P., “The Chinese Parian,” *The Chinese in the Philippines*, pp. 68-69; see also Manuel Rivadeneyra, *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana*, (Madrid, 1869)

⁴⁶Don Jose de Alcazar, *Historia de los dominios españoles en Oceanía Filipinas*, (Manila: Juan Atayde y Compania, 1895), p. 164

⁴⁷Letter of J. Reyes, May 20, 1851 with annotations by Urbiztondo, *Alcaiceria de San Fernando*, SDS-12250, Philippine National Archives (PNA)

⁴⁸Manuel Buzeta y Bravo, *Diccionario geografico, estadistico, historico de las islas Filipinas*, Tomo I, (Madrid: (s.n.), 1850), p. 138

⁴⁹P. Joaquin Martinez de Zuñiga, OSA, *Status of the Philippines in 1800*, (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1973), p. 264; see also Santa Maria, p. 114

⁵⁰“Cuenta de la Real Alcaiceria de San Fernando pertenecientes al ano pasado de 1808 por Antonio Robredo,” *Alcaiceria...*, SDS-12550

⁵¹Santa Maria, p. 114

⁵²Letter signed by Ricafort, *Alcaiceria...* SDS 12550. From the time the Royal Cedula of July 3, 1745 took effect up to 1800, gambling was prohibited. Card games like *liampo*, *laypo*, *monte*, the use of dice, cockfighting, and selling raffle tickets were not allowed for these necessitated the pawning of possessions like lands and jewelry. Further justification centered on negative consequences such as fights, brawls, killings, disturbance of public order, and the weakening of family ties. Punishment of offenders ranged from public humiliation, torture, flogging, shipyard labor, service in the municipal hall, or payment of fines. The government auction of gambling den operations could have occurred earlier for in 1800 Padre Zuñiga already talked of *contratistas* buying cards from the King’s monopoly store. More stringent measures were passed in 1812 and offenders were thrown into the Tondo municipal jail. By the 1840’s gambling was allowed in designated areas controlled by contract holders in gaming. Otherwise, nowhere could people gamble from 6-12 noon and 2-6 in the evening. Winnings were confiscated and debts declared null and void. See Miguel Rodriguez Berriz, *Diccionario de la Administracion. Anuario de 1888*, Tomo II, (Manila: M. Perez, hijo, 1889-1893), pp. 343-348 ; Zuñiga, p. 237

⁵³In 1871 opium importation in Thailand was supervised by the Office of the Minister of Finance which issued licenses for the Chinese working in mills and pulling rickshaws. The government amassed revenues well over 7M *baht*. In Burma the British created the monopoly in 1852 and gave the local aristocrats called *sambwas* the right to export the drug to neighboring countries. The Dutch in Indonesia institutionalized the opium revenue farm in 1854. They earned 10.5M florins just after three years. The closure of opium dens at the turn of the century paved the way for the licensing of credit facilities. Their Chinese operators accepted loan payments in the form of opium, thereby converting their pawnshops into illicit opium dens. See the following sources for more detailed accounts: George Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 120-121; McCoy, pp. 66 and 70; Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: The New Siam*, (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corporation, 1967), p. 726; Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 423-424 and 431-459.

⁵⁴Hsin Pao Chang, p. 34.

⁵⁵Letter of Rafael Perez de Vento, April 17, 1868, *Anñon: Manila, 1837-1898*, PN.

⁵⁶Letter signed by Sr. Ramos, November 14, 1843, *Alcaiceria...* SDS 12549.

⁵⁷*Legislacion Ultramarina*, Vol. VII, p. 66.

⁵⁸Letter dated May 26, 1835, *Alcaiceria...* SDS 12549.

⁵⁹“Informe analítico pericial efectuado en un anfon por D. Ulpiano Rodriguez y D. Antonio Roa,” *Anfon: Manila, 1837-1898*.

⁶⁰Warren Bailey and Lan Troung, “Opium and Empire: Some Evidence from Colonial-Era Asian Stock and Commodity Markets,” <http://cornell.edu/pages/wbb1/papers/opium.PDF>.

⁶¹Robles, pp. 139-142.

⁶²*Anfon: Nueva Vizcaya, 1884-1895, Book 3.*

⁶³Opium was manufactured in Canton and loaded into smug boats (also called “fast crabs,” and “scrambling dragons”) skilfully navigated by some 60-70 men. It was then taken to the different countries in Asia or sold to traders of merchant ships plying the seas. These ships may also have been what Gibby calls the “true opium clippers” which had small hulls and vast sails that enabled them to make 2-3 trips a year. See Wong, p. 32; Mike Gibby, *Crowned With the Stars: The Life and Times of D. Carlos Cuarteron, First Prefect of Borneo, 1816-1880*, (Diocese of Kota Kinnabalu, 2005), p.3.

⁶⁴*Anfon: Varias Provincias, Book I, 1835-1898.*

⁶⁵*Anfon: Manila, 1837-1898.*

⁶⁶Robles, p. 18. This office also controlled indirect taxes such as those that came from customs’ duties, other government monopolies and excise taxes from markets, slaughterhouses, and cockpits.

⁶⁷“Expediente sobre que si recojen los humos que producen el establecimiento titulado Real Asiento de Opio,” *Anfon: Binondo, 1888-1892, Book III.*

⁶⁸*Anfon: Cebu and Bohol, 1873-1898*

⁶⁹“Pliego de condiciones que esta Administracion central forma para contratar ante la Junta de Reales Almonedas de esta Capital y las subalternas el arriendo de los fumaderos de anfon en la provincial de Manila redactado con arreglo a la prescripciones de la Real Instruccion de Servicios Publicos aprobado por S.M. en 25 de Agosto de 1858” por Emilio Romero, *Anfon: Manila, Book 4, 1837-1898*

⁷⁰Letter of Instruction signed by Col. Francisco Martinez, *Anfon: Manila, 1837-1898, Book III*

⁷¹Letter signed by Dr. M. del Rey, 13 August 1895 in *Anfon: Binondo, 1895-1897, Book III*. The Chinese heated opium so as to smoke it. The opium pipe was no ordinary pipe for it had a small porcelain dish attached to its end. This had a lid with a hole in its middle. A toothpick-like plunger or needle was used to pick a small amount of opium gum which was inserted inside the hole. This was heated over a small oil lamp and the pipe puffed.

⁷²Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 35-46. The author analyzed the primacy of dialect and kinship organizations in cementing relationships, forging ties of mutual assistance and supporting social mobility among the overseas Chinese as they were confronted by language problems, cultural differences, and indifference by the original inhabitants.)

⁷³*Anfon: Varias Provincias, Book I, 1835-1898*

⁷⁴“Un informe de la Direccion General de Rentas Estancadas fech 9 manifestando que el contratista del anfon esta autorizado para introducir esta droga,” por Jose Sandino

y Miranda, *Anfion: Varias Provincias, Book I, 1835-1898*. In Singapore the excise farm system was very similar to Philippine monopolies. Unsuccessful bidders tried to get even by selling smuggled opium. Contract holders used members of secret societies to man their police force. See Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 121-122

⁷⁵Andrew Roger Wilson, *Ambition and Identity: China and the Chinese in the Colonial Philippines, 1885-1912*, (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, 2000), pp. 124-125; 86-87

⁷⁶*Anfion: Nueva Ecija 1880-1894*, Book I

⁷⁷“Estados de las mercancías importados por las Aduanas de estas Islas en dicho año, con expresión de sus cantidades, peso o medida, procedencia, bandera-conductora, así como sus valores y derechos que han satisfecho,” *Estadística Mercantil del Comercio Exterior de las islas Filipinas Correspondiente al año de 1867*, PNA

⁷⁸“Estado comprensivo del opio importado por el contratista de los fumadores de anfibon de la Pampanga a partir desde el 1 de Febrero hasta el 31 de Octubre del corriente año,” *Anfion: Nueva Ecija, 1880-1896*, Book I

⁷⁹*Anfion: Cebu y Bobol, 1873-1898*, Book I

⁸⁰“Prohibiendo la venta de dicho artículo en Cottabato,” *Anfion: Zamboanga, 1854-1894*, Book I

⁸¹*Anfion: Zamboanga, 1854-1898*, Book II

⁸²“Circular de 28 de Setiembre 1860,” *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1835-1898*, Book I

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*Anfion: Nueva Ecija, 1880-1894*, Book I

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶*Anfion: Palawan, 1886-1897*, Book II

⁸⁷“Petición de D. Santiago Lledo y Pont,” *Anfion: Manila, Book 6, 1837-1898*; Wickberg, p. 116

⁸⁸Letter of Ramon Aenlle, January 21, 1871, *Anfion: Quiapo, Book 6, 1850-1879*

⁸⁹Case No. 7778, “Contrabando de Opio,” *Anfion: Manila, Book 9, 1837-1898*

⁹⁰The Army was divided into 5, namely: del Rey, de la Reina, de Ferdinand VII, del Ynfante, and de España. They were under the jurisdiction of a Deputy Captain General. See Robles, p. 151 and Buzeta y Bravo, p. 112

⁹¹This office tried cases against military personnel. See Robles, p. 151

⁹²“Testimonio integro de la sumaria formada de orden del Exmo. Sr. Gobernador-General, en averiguación lo ocurrido en la Alcaicería de San Fernando en la noche de 17 de Agosto del presente año,” *Alcaicería...*, SDS 12550

⁹³“Testimonio de Aniceto de la Cruz,” *Alcaicería...*, SDS 12550; this was also stated in the testimonies of Anselmo Candido and Jose Flores. It was not mentioned whether the women they were with were prostitutes.

⁹⁴Testimony of Cayetano Enriquez Tan-leco, *Alcaicería...*, SDS 12549

⁹⁵Testimony of Agustín Vianco and Chino Nau-cion, *Alcaicería...*, SDS 12550

⁹⁶Testimony of Agustin Vianco, *Alcaiceria...*, SDS 12550

⁹⁷Testimony of Agustin Vianco and Chino Nau-cion, *Alcaiceria...*, SDS 12550

⁹⁸Testimony of Mariano Tan-coco, *Alcaiceria*, SDS 12550

⁹⁹“Testimonio de Aniceto de la Cruz,” *Alcaiceria...*, SDS 12550

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁰¹Second Testimony of Cayetano Enriquez Tan-leco, *Alcaiceria...*, SDS 12550

¹⁰²Report signed by Bernardo Malvar, *Alcaiceria...*, SDS 12550

¹⁰³The ship was possibly carrying coolies from the Treaty Ports for the brokers of the coolie depots of Australia. Cooktown was said to have much of gold and mining was fast becoming an attraction. Many Chinese became recruiting agents of European firms like Johnson & Co., Lind and Asmus, Rautenberg, Schmidt, & Co., Boustead & Co., and Guthrie & Co. See Yen Ching-hwang, p. 132

¹⁰⁴“Expediente relativo a la apprehension de 32 cajas de opio y otro efectos encontrados fuera de registro por el Resguardo de Bahía a bordo del vapor Yngles Gunga,” *Anfion: Manila, Book 4, 1837-1898*

¹⁰⁵Milagros C. Guerrero, “The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon During the Revolution, 1898-1902,” *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, Alfred W. McCoy and Ed C. de Jesus, eds., (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), p. 156.

¹⁰⁶*Guía Oficial de las islas Filipinas, 1898*, Part III, S542

¹⁰⁷*Anfion: Batangas, 1864-1892*, Book II

¹⁰⁸Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People*, (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1990), pp.182-188

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 190-199

¹¹⁰John Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction*, (Quezon City: Lopez Foundation, 1971), Vol. II, Exhibit 88, p. 495

¹¹¹Taylor, Vol. II, p.143

¹¹²Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 412, p. 540

¹¹³Taylor, Vol. III, pp. 562-563

¹¹⁴The Spanish government, despite the confusion caused by the war, continued the opium monopoly. As of April 1898 it granted permission to Don Enrique Roses y Vergara to cultivate the white poppy. See *Anfion: Manila, Book 9, 1835-1898*

¹¹⁵Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 472-473

¹¹⁶Taylor, Vol. III, p. 570

¹¹⁷Taylor, Vol. II, pp. 472-473

¹¹⁸Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 448, p. 579

¹¹⁹Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 786, p. 509; see also Vol. II, p. 213

¹²⁰Taylor, Vol. II, p. 473

¹²¹Taylor, Vol. V, Exhibit 1170, p. 356

¹²²Agoncillo, pp. 215-226

¹²³*Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission 1905, Part 4*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 122

¹²⁴*Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903*, Vol. I, (Washington: US Bureau of Census, 1905), p. 38

¹²⁵*Sixth Annual Report...*, p. 86

¹²⁶Anne Foster, "Models for Governing Opium and Colonial Policies in Southeast Asia, 1898-1910," *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, Julian Go and Anne Foster, eds., (Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 93 and 96

¹²⁷Foster, *ibid.*, p. 94

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 101

¹²⁹Ty Sue vs. John Hord, G.R. No. L-4495, January 14, 1909, *Philippine Jurisprudence-The Lanphil Project*, Arellano Law Foundation, Net weight referred to the weight of the commodity alone and excluded the packaging medium or container.

¹³⁰Foster, p. 112

¹³¹*Ibid.*, p. 106. Foster cites the case of the Burmese opium addicts who were required to register in 1893. From then on registration stopped and those who failed to do so had no access to the drug. Retailers of opium had to furnish the government with their clients' names and the amount individuals bought. Incomplete records and sales to non-registered Burmese subjected sellers to heavy fines.

¹³²The United States vs. Sy Maco, G.R. No. L-5994, December 20, 1910, *Chan Robles Virtual Law Library*

¹³³The United States vs. Martin Gaboya, G.R. No. L-4801, October 22, 1908, *Philippine Jurisprudence-The Lanphil Project*, Arellano Law Foundation

¹³⁴*Journal of the Philippine Commission*, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), p. 437; Booth, p. 180

¹³⁵The United States vs. Tan Tayco and Co Sencho, G.R. No. L-4723, February 8, 1909, *Philippine Jurisprudence-The Lanphil Project*, Arellano Law Foundation

¹³⁶The United States vs. Martin Gaboya, G.R. No. L-4801

¹³⁷*Coleccion de las Decisiones de la Corte Suprema de las Islas Filipinas desde Agosto 1912 a Diciembre 18, 1912*, Tomo 23, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), p. 426. This volume is filed under the Claro M. Recto Collection under *Jurisprudencia Filipina* at the Filipiniana Section, UP Main Library. This volume also cited many cases against the Chinese convicted of smuggling opium even after 1908. It must have also been very difficult for the authorities to eradicate smuggling. One such case was that of SoFo who was initially accused of hiding a can of opium beneath a heap of coal inside the bakery owned by Tan Quin Choc. SoFo vehemently denied that he owned the can. Finally, the owner admitted that it was his so he was fined and incarcerated. Other cases involved Chia Tua, Lao Lock Hing, Villano, Lee See and others.

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