Belief as an Evaluative and Affective Attitude: Some Implications on Religious Belief

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ABSTRACT

This paper wishes to reconsider how the notion of "belief" is seen in contemporary western philosophy. It is a widely accepted idea today that belief is merely a propositional attitude. However, the article shows that belief is not merely a propositional attitude, but is an evaluative and affective attitude as well. In its treatment of belief, this paper focuses on religious belief, which occupies a central place in the controversy. In particular, the discussion sheds light on the problem of fideism, or the view that religious beliefs cannot be subjected to analysis or evaluation using methods other than its own.

Keywords: Belief, attitude, proposition, propositional attitude, evaluative attitude, affective attitude, belief-in, belief-that, fideism

THE PROPOSITION AND THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE

The Proposition

According to Matthew McGrath (2008, para. 1), the term "proposition" has many applications in contemporary philosophy. Among its uses include some, if not all, of the following: the primary bearer of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses (e.g. Noah believes *that* there will be a great flood; Socrates thinks *that* reason is eternal and immutable), and the meaning of a sentence.

However, McGrath had doubts whether "a single class of entities can play all these roles." Hence, he cautioned about the seeming impossibility to encapsulate the meaning of the term "proposition" in a consistent definition. Thus, he provided a much safer definition which does not shut out any important issues. He, therefore, defined "propositions" as "the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity" (McGrath, 2008, para. 4). One can find in R.B. Braithwaite (1967) some support for McGrath's redefinition of "proposition" when he points out two specific aspects which may be used to describe propositions. "There is, first,

the relation in which the proposition stands to fact, that is, the truth and falsity of the proposition. And there is, secondly, the relation in which the proposition stands to a mind cognizing it" (Braithwaite, 1967, p. 28).

One can find truth in the claim that two different sentences uttered by two speakers can have the same meaning. For instance, when person *A* states that "That ball is red," this holds the same meaning as that when person *B* asserts that "That is a red ball." They are both saying the same thing although they uttered different sentences. This is also true with different languages. A native French speaker's claim that "C'est un livre" is no different from a native English speaker's utterance that "This is a book." There is understanding among advocates of propositions that whenever people speak of the same thing through different declarative sentences, there exists something in what each has said – and that something is a proposition. According to Jeffrey King (2008, para. 1), this proposition is "expressed by both of the sentences uttered by the speakers, and can be thought of as the information content of the sentences. The proposition is taken to be the thing that is true or false. A declarative sentence is true or false derivatively, in virtue of expressing a true or false proposition." This assertion obviously coincides and supports McGrath's (2007) and Braithwaite's (1967) claims that propositions are bearers of truth and falsity.

As mentioned earlier, there are other uses of propositions aside from being bearers of truth and falsity and of those to which declarative sentences refer. For instance, when two people, for example a French speaker and an English one, both believe that "this is a book," they are not believing in a sentence but in a proposition. This is the case since the French speaker would express the belief by saying "C'est un livre" while the English speaker will say "This is a book." Evidently, although different sentences were expressed, the same proposition is believed in. This also applies to things other than beliefs, such as doubts, fears, knowledge, and desires among others. Lastly, it is "the proposition a sentence expresses, and not the sentence itself, that possesses modal properties such as being necessary, possible or contingent" (King, 2008, para. 2).

Although a great majority, if not all, of the proponents of propositions agree on these various uses of propositions, there is, however, still much debate on the nature of propositions. King pointed out that laying a claim that propositions are structured is tantamount to stating a claim on the nature of propositions. "Roughly, to say that propositions are structured is to say that they are complex entities, entities having parts or constituents, where the constituents are bound together in a certain way. Thus, particular accounts of structured propositions can (and do) differ in at least two ways: 1) they can differ as to what sorts of things are the

constituents of structured propositions; and 2) they can differ as to what binds these constituents together in a proposition" (King, 2008, para. 4).

An example of propositions that assume a structured view is the singular proposition. Singular propositions or "Russellian propositions" are propositions that are "about a particular individual in virtue of having that individual as a direct constituent" (Fitch & Nelson, 2009, para. 1). One example of this kind of proposition can be found in a correspondence between Frege and Russell: "Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 meters high." Other examples are: "Aphrodite is beautiful," "Michael Jackson is famous," and "Asia is the largest continent."

Fitch and Nelson (2009) contrast singular propositions with general propositions and particularized propositions. They point out that general propositions do not refer to any specific item while particularized propositions refer to particulars or individuals but do not have those individuals as constituents. Examples of the general propositions are: "Most students study hard for the exams" and "Some kinds of food are not healthy." Examples of particularized propositions are: "The legendary basketball player is tall" and "The most famous spy is British." "A singular proposition is directly about an object whereas a particularized proposition is indirectly about an object in virtue of that object satisfying the condition that is a constituent of the proposition" (Fitch & Nelson, 2009, para. 1)—in the said instances, the conditions being a legendary basketball player and being a most famous spy.

The Propositional Attitude

A propositional attitude is a mental state that links a person to a particular proposition. Linguistically, they are expressed by an accompanying "that" clause in the formula "S A that P," where S represents the subject, A the attitude held, and P the proposition; as for instance, "Christelle believes that she is beautiful." Propositional attitudes are often believed to be the most basic aspects of thought; since they constitute propositions, they can convey meanings or content that bear truth or falsity. However, since propositional attitudes are a species of attitude in general, it follows that a person can have diverse mental attitudes towards a proposition, for instance, wishing, desiring, fearing, hoping, or believing, which therefore, imply connections with intentionality. Thus, these diverse attitudes toward propositions, which are called propositional attitudes, are also discussed under the titles of intentionality and linguistic modality.

There is a difference between what a proposition is and how one feels about, treats, or regards a particular proposition. For example, toward a certain proposition P, say, "The stone is hard," one can either believe that the stone is hard, or deny that the

stone is hard, or maybe doubt that the stone is hard. In other words, one can either exclaim that P, expect that P, accept that P, believe that P, assert that P, command that P, deny that P, contest that P, enjoin that P, declare that P, doubt that P, and so forth.

Nonetheless, it is important to point out that despite being attitudes toward propositions, these attitudes should not, in any way, be treated or understood to be psychological at all.

> What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth? I should be inclined to call them 'propositional verbs'. This is merely a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the form of relating an object to a proposition. As I have been explaining, that is not what they really do, but it is convenient to call them propositional verbs. Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that because it is a psychological term, and although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological. There is never any reason to suppose that sort of thing. (Russell, 1956, p. 227)

Russell hit the bull's eye with this remark. There are many problems revolving around propositions that require analysis (including, but not limited to, comparison and contrast, patterns of interaction, relationship between belief and assertion, and the relationship between knowledge and belief, among others) of the propositions themselves in order to glean some sort of understanding of the actual propositions. Such task at analysis begs the question regarding the need for logic (and language) to take the helm to accomplish the endeavor. In simple terms, due to the seemingly infinitesimal number of propositions that exist—all of them varying in mode, tone, mood, and whatnot—one cannot find any point of comparison among propositions and is forced to analyze every proposition, individually bringing it to the realms of logic and language. Thus, despite being called such, propositional attitudes are not considered psychological attitudes because logic and language merely focus on the formal attributes and patterns of interaction that can be found among these attitudes rather than explore them in relation to mental processes and functions vis-à-vis individual and societal cognitive functions and behavior, which falls under the punditry of psychology.

Meanwhile, it is not surprising that many of the concerns that can be found in discussions on propositional attitudes involve problems about belief. Schwitzgebel (2006) points out that recent discussions about belief are most of the time fixed deeply on more general talks about propositional attitudes and that discussions about propositional attitudes often regard belief as their primary example.

BELIEF: JUST A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE

The holding of beliefs is considered one of the most fundamental and essential characteristics of the human mind. Thus, the notion of belief holds a vital function in both fields of epistemology and philosophy of mind.

As pointed out earlier, contemporary analytic philosophers of mind use the term "belief" to generally and roughly refer to a person's attitude toward things that one regards to be the case or takes to be true. Schwitzgebel (2006) argues that in this sense, to believe something does not need to involve active reflection on it. He adds that in contrast with ordinary English usage, in standard philosophical usage, the term "belief" does not imply any form of uncertainty or any kind of extended reflection about the thing believed in. However, in everyday English usage, the term "belief" may also normally refer to considered opinion on subjects of general importance such as in "the belief in life after death" or "the belief that humans are free."

In general, contemporary analytic philosophers of mind employ the term "belief" in a broader sense in order to capture the attitude that is frequently referred to by English statements of the structure "S thinks that P". Schwitzgebel (2002, para. 3) explains that this kind of usage of "belief" prevents "the ambiguity inherent in the word 'thinks' between actively reflecting on something (often expressed by the progressive 'is thinking', as in 'Xinyan is thinking about Beijing') and taking a particular proposition to be true (as in 'Eli thinks that waking early is a healthy habit,' which can be true even if Eli is not currently pondering the matter). The nominal form 'thought' may then be reserved for thinking in the first sense and the nominal form 'belief' for thinking in the second sense." Thus, in the first sense, it is absurd to say that "Xinyan is believing about Beijing." However, to state, in the second sense, that "Eli believes that waking early is a healthy habit" does not appear absurd at all.

From the preceding discussions, at least three issues concerning the contemporary philosophical treatment of the term "belief" can be observed, namely, that:

1. the current widely accepted notion of belief does not include the concept of active reflection with it;
2. the treatment of belief as a propositional attitude expressed in the form "S A that P" fails to capture belief in statements such as "I believe in you," or "We believe in this thesis," as well as the idea of basic beliefs; and
3. the philosophical usage of belief has departed from its ordinary English usage.

Although these issues are very much distinct from one another, they are nevertheless interrelated, with the third issue serving as the link. Nonetheless, it is vital to treat these issues one by one.

BELIEF: NOT JUST A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE

The first problem concerns the exclusion of active reflection in the contemporary treatment of belief. The reason for this, as stated above, is to get rid of the ambiguity that could arise between actively reflecting on something and taking something to be true with respect to the particular word "think." However, I think that this precaution is not necessary and has done more damage than good on the treatment of belief. To borrow from Wittgenstein, "the meaning of a word is its use"; it is quite obvious that saying "Xinyan thinks about Beijing" and "Eli thinks that waking early is a healthy habit" conveys two different meanings of the word "thinks" based on its usage in each sentence. Further, it denies belief the characteristic of active reflection which may, at any given moment, also be present in the example "Eli thinks that waking early is a healthy habit." In this case, there is a possibility that Eli is currently pondering the matter of waking early as a healthy habit and believing it at the same time. However, this is not applicable to statements such as "Xinyan thinks about Beijing" since there is nothing to believe about Beijing, if "thinks" here will be understood to mean "believes." A slight modification of this statement, however, as in "Xinyan thinks that Beijing exists" brings us back to the nature of the example on Eli. In this case, it can be understood that Xinyan is currently pondering about Beijing's existence while believing it at the same instance. Ultimately, when one says that "I think God is good," or "I believe God is good," it can mean one of three things: it can either mean that one is currently pondering on God's goodness; or that one is not pondering on God's goodness, but one believes it to be true; or that one is pondering on God's goodness and believing it to be true at the same time. Whatever the case may be, it does not undermine the thought that the speaker wishes to convey, that is, "God is good."

Moving on, the second predicament is about the failure of the treatment of belief as a propositional attitude to capture the essence of statements such as "I believe in you" or "We believe in this thesis" and the idea of basic beliefs. Evidently, there is an absence of propositions in the statements, "I believe in you" and "We believe in this thesis". In these instances, the formula "S A that P" lacks the elements of "that P" albeit the subject and the attitude are present. With regard to this problem, H.H. Price's[1] (1969) Gifford Lectures can prove to be of great assistance.

Price (1969, p. 435) elaborates on distinctions between belief "in" and belief "that" by formulating his main question as thus: "Is belief-in reducible to belief-that?" He begins his lecture with the following statement:

> Surely belief 'in' is an attitude to a person, whether human or divine, while belief 'that' is just an attitude to a proposition? Could any difference be more obvious than this? … On this view belief 'in' is not a propositional attitude at all (Price, 1969, p. 426).

However, Price (1969) admits that there are many philosophers who think that "belief-in is in one way or another reducible to belief-that" (pp. 426-427). He calls this view the "reducibility thesis" while the contrary, the "irreducibility thesis."

According to Price (1969), there are different varieties of believing "in" and that it is "certainly an over-simplification to say that belief-in is always an attitude to a person, human or divine" (p. 427). He argued that one can possibly believe in so many other things such as nonhuman animals, vegetable organisms, machines, nonliving natural objects, events, institutions, in individual as well as in a class of entities or institutions, in a procedure, method, or policy, and so forth.[2] Any reducibility thesis advocate can argue persistently that all these varieties of believe-in can still be reduced to believe-that. To this, Price provides a very instructive discussion with his last example of belief-in – belief in a theory.

> … at first sight belief in a theory might seem so obviously reducible to a set of beliefs *that*. What is a theory but a logically connected set of propositions? So when someone is said to believe in a theory, surely his attitude is just a rather complicated form of believing 'that'? He would believe *that p*, that *q*, that *r*, that *p* entails *q*, that *r* is highly probable in relation to *q*, etc. Now of course such beliefs-that are an essential part of belief-in a theory. But are they the whole of it? If this were a complete account of the believer's attitude, it would be more appropriate to say 'he accepts the theory' or 'he believes that it is correct' and not 'he believes *in* it'. Belief *in* a theory has some resemblance to belief in penicillin, or belief in an instrument such as the electron microscope. The theory, when you have understood it gives you power: a power of satisfying intellectual curiosity, of finding things out of which were previously unknown, of making verifiable predictions which could not otherwise be made, and of reducing an apparently disconnected mass of brute facts to some sort of intelligible order. When someone believes *in* a theory, it is this power-conferring aspect of it which he has in mind, and he esteems or values the theory accordingly. It is a fact about human nature that power of this kind is very highly esteemed by some people.

> Moreover, a person may still believe in a theory though he is aware that it contains paradoxes which have not yet been resolved. In that case he cannot believe that it is entirely correct … He relies on the theory, we might even say he trusts it. But in the belief-that sense he does not altogether believe it. (Price, 1969, pp. 430-431)

By introspection, or perhaps also by retrospection, one can realize that there is, indeed, truth to this argument. One may not actually believe *that* the Theory of Evolution is correct but one may still believe *in* it. In believing *in* something, one indeed bestows an element of trust in the thing believed in. He values it, esteems it. These elements, though obviously felt in instances of believing 'in' may not hold true in instances of believing 'that'.

Nevertheless, the reductionist (a term derived from Price's "reducibility" thesis, which asserts that *all* instances of belief-in can be reduced to belief-that) can still claim that there are also instances of believing 'in', which lead to the other direction. Price (1969, p. 432) uses belief in fairies as an example. He said that it could be argued that belief in fairies "amount to no more than believing that fairies exist." The same is true in believing in ghosts or in fire-breathing dragons and in leprechauns, perhaps. Referring to a classical philosopher who believes *in* Plato, one can say that the philosopher believes *that* a certain person by the name of Plato existed and *that* this person was the one who wrote *Republic*, *Apology*, and *Laws*, which students of philosophy still read to this day.

Price (1969) admits that there is certainly an attitude called "minimal or merely factual sense of 'believe in'. This is a very common and familiar use of the expression 'believe in'; and 'believing in' in this sense certainly *is* reducible to 'belief that'" (pp. 432-433). He also pointed out that the "converse rendering of belief-that sentences into belief-in sentences is also possible, at least sometimes" (p. 434). Does this mean that the problem of belief-in and belief-that is merely a case of semantics? How has the discussion, so far, become relevant to the question, "Is belief-in reducible to belief-that?" To this question, Price (1969) gives a very enlightening response:

> The obvious conclusion is this: there are two different senses of 'believe in'. On the one hand, there is an evaluative sense. This is illustrated by believing in one's doctor, or believing in railways, or believing in a procedure such as taking a cold bath every morning. Something like esteeming or trusting is an essential part of belief-in in this sense. (The other part of it would be conceiving or having in mind whatever it is that is esteemed or trusted.) … On the other hand, there is also a factual sense of 'believe in'. The most obvious examples of it are the belief in fairies or the belief in King Arthur. Belief in, in this sense,

certainly *is* reducible to belief-that … There is also a corresponding and equally reducible sense of 'disbelieve in' … Moreover, just because these two senses of 'belief in' are different, the attitude denoted by the one can be combined with the attitude denoted by the other. One may *both* believe that there is such and such a thing *and* have esteem for it and trust in it … In St. James' Epistle a similar combination of attitudes is attributed to the devils who 'believe and tremble'. They believe that God exists, and we may suppose they believe it with full conviction too. At the same time they have an attitude of distrust towards him. (Price, 1969, pp. 435-437)

Hence, from this discussion, it seems that it is safe to assume that belief is not merely a propositional attitude but "[i]t is a valuational attitude as well" (Price, 1969, p. 76). Consequently, belief can be an attitude towards a person (I believe in you), a thing (He believes in charm bracelets), a place (Christelle believes in Atlantis), an idea (She believes in beginner's luck), a proposition (Christians believe that Jesus Christ is the Messiah), and so forth. The author thinks that this treatment of belief does more justice to the essence of the term. Furthermore, it provides for the idea of basic beliefs.

Jim Leffel (1994) defines basic belief as "an idea we hold that cannot be explained by some other idea. Its truth seems self-evident to us. That is what makes it basic or foundational" (para. 3). Basic beliefs such as belief in God, in the freedom of humans, in the creation of people as equals, in happiness as the goal of life, among others, cannot be simply reduced to that-propositions. Although, there are instances that these beliefs can be expressed through that-propositions, as shown earlier, belief as a propositional attitude lacks the vitality to capture the idea of these world-views. As Price (1969) puts it, "there is perhaps some residue which the 'believing that' analysis leaves out. This residue might be described rather vaguely as 'attaching importance to'" (p. 76). The difference in meanings between the belief as a propositional attitude statement, "I believe that Jesus exists" and the basic belief statement, "I believe in Jesus" is easily discernible. The latter holds so much more meaning than the former and, in fact, the latter even captures or implies the meaning of the former within it.

Still, although the reductionist might concede to the argument that there are two senses of believe-in, "he might still claim that evaluative belief-in can itself be reduced to belief-that, if we go the right way about it. All we have to do, he might say, is to introduce suitable value-concepts into the proposition believed. Once we have done this, the difference between factual and evaluative believe-in will turn out to be just a difference in the content of the proposition believed, a difference in the 'object' and not in the mental attitude of the believer; and believing *that* will

turn out to be the only sort of believing …" (Price, 1969, p.441). Indeed, there is this possibility and Price (1969) went about to discuss it.

He pointed out that there are, in fact, two value-concepts that need to be introduced in order for the reduction of evaluative belief-in into belief-that to be possible, namely, the "good at …" and the "good thing that …" value-concepts.[3] Price (1969) explains that, "[w]hen someone expresses a belief in another person, it is always appropriate to ask 'As what is he believed in by you?' or 'What is there about him, in respect of which you believe in him?'" (p. 442). Of course, the answer to these questions has to include the first of the two value-concepts – "good at …", and hence, the answer has to be something which someone is "good at."[4] For instance, when someone believes in one's pet dog, a Golden Retriever, one may ask, "What is there about your dog in respect of which, you believe in it?" One may say in response that, "Well, my dog is *good at* bringing me back my baseball so that whenever I forget where I left it, I will just tell my dog to find it and it will bring my baseball back to me in a few minutes." As one can see, this kind of statement can easily be rendered to a belief-that statement, explicitly, that "the person believes that the dog is good at retrieving the baseball."

However, the dog's being good at retrieving the master's baseball can also be a reason for someone's disbelief in it. For instance, a relative of the dog's master is one who is extremely conscious of the health of everyone in the family. The relative might think that there is great risk that the bacteria in the dog's saliva, which may be transferred to the dog's master through direct contact with the baseball and, as a result, might make the master sick for a couple of days, may be a good enough reason for *not* believing in the dog. The relative might reject the skill of the dog is good for its own sake. Consequently, the relative might arrive at the conclusion that it will be best for them to get rid of the dog at once and that the whole lot of their family will be safer and healthier that way. Hence, in order to avoid cases of this sort, Price (1969, p. 443) suggested that there is a need to introduce the second value-concept – "good thing that …" "We do not believe it is a good thing that a man is good at extracting information by means of torture. But we ordinarily believe it is a good thing that our doctor is good at curing diseases" (Price, 1969, p. 443). Adding the second value-concept, the dog owner's former statement can be formulated as thus, "My dog is good at bringing back my baseball and a good thing too!" or "It is a good thing that my dog is good at bringing back my baseball!" Other people, (such as the health buff relative), may disagree with the dog owner in believing that this is a good thing, although they both agree that the dog is good at retrieving his master's baseball. In this sense, then, the relative does not believe in the dog, or to put it more appropriately, he does not believe in the

factual sense of believing that the existence of the dog's in the company of their family is something praiseworthy. As Price wraps it up:

> It seems then that the proposed reduction of evaluative belief-in to belief-that must introduce *two* value concepts in the proposition believed: not only 'good at ...' ('efficient', 'effective'), but also 'good thing that ...'. As we have seen, it need not be at all a good thing that someone should be 'good at his job' nor that something is an effective means or method of producing a certain result. And unless we do believe it as a good thing, we shall not believe *in* him or *in* it. (Price, 1969, p. 444)

Up until this point so far, what has been exposed about belief-in can be briefly summarized in two points: 1) that there are two senses of belief-in, namely, that which can be reduced to 'belief that' or the factual sense, and that which belief-in can be equated with "esteeming" and "trusting" or the evaluative and affective sense; and 2) that the evaluative sense of belief-in can still be reduced to belief-that if one is to employ the value concepts of "good at ..." and "good thing that ..." in the statement or proposition believed. Further down in Price's (1969, pp. 444ff) lecture, he pointed out the prospective character of evaluative belief-in as well as two types of evaluative belief-in, namely, interested and disinterested belief-in.[5] However, towards the end of the lecture, Price picked up certain proposals that he had given during the onset of his discussion, particularly, his proposals about "trusting" and "esteeming".

> ... the proposed reduction does not completely fit any of the examples to which we have tried to apply it. In all of them, it leaves something out. At an early stage of the discussion it was suggested that 'esteeming or trusting' is an essential feature of evaluative belief-in. We now see, I think, that *both* esteeming *and* trusting are essential features of it. This reductive proposal does provide fairly well for the esteeming, by means of the concepts 'good thing that ...' and 'good at ...' (or 'efficient'). But does it provide for the trusting? Can this be done by insisting on the prospective character of evaluative belief-in?

> Suppose I believe not only that my doctor has been and is good at curing my diseases, but will also continue to be so; and not only that it is and has been a good thing that he is good at this, but also that it will continue to be a good thing. But what if I do believe these two propositions as firmly as you please? Believing them may be a necessary condition for trusting him, but it is not the same as trusting him. Trusting is not merely a cognitive attitude.

> To put the same point in another way, the proposed reduction leaves out the 'warmth' which is a characteristic feature of evaluative belief-in. Evaluative

belief-in is a 'pro-attitude'. One is for the person, thing, policy, etc. in whom or in which one believes. There is something more than assenting or being disposed to assent to a proposition, no matter what concepts the proposition contains. That much-neglected aspect of human nature which used to be called 'the heart' enters into evaluative belief-in. Trusting is an affective attitude. We might even say that it is in some degree an affectionate one. (Price, 1969, pp. 451-452)

Here, Price clearly pointed out that esteeming *and* trusting are both essential aspects of belief-in. Again, by introspection or retrospection, one can find the truth in these words. Is it not true, by means of personal recollection and experience that one can find particular instances in one's life wherein he believed in something and that belief is not merely an assent about something factual or an esteeming of something good but a belief coupled with the warmth of trust? For instance, in the case of this author, the belief that he gives to the thesis of this paper is not merely that he is in agreement with it but that he also trusts that the argument he is trying to make a case for will stand the test and scrutiny of the reviewers who are reading and evaluating it based on the strength and logic of the arguments that he is presenting. However, there can be cases wherein some people will appeal that such an argument is weak and is merely an appeal to emotion or, perhaps, a romanticization of belief. These people will also insist that there are no elements of "trusting" or "esteeming" in belief whatsoever and would only agree to such unless they are convinced otherwise by means of more potent arguments. If this is the case, then it seems to be more beneficial to lay this predicament aside for the moment and proceed to the next one with high hopes that it will aid in the resolution of the current dilemma.

It was mentioned earlier that these three distinct problems are interrelated and the third problem serves as their link. The author thinks that the two problems that have been previously discussed are rooted in the third problem; that is, that the usage of the term "belief" in contemporary philosophy has departed from its normal English usage. In order to argue this point, there seems to be no better way than to trace the origin and development of the term "belief." Wilfred Cantwell Smith's discussion is very illuminating and instructive on this matter:

Literally, and originally, 'to believe' means 'to hold dear'. This is what its German equivalent *belieben* still means today. *Die beliebeste Zigarette* in an advertisement signifies quite simply the favourite among cigarettes; the most popular; the most prized. Similarly, the adjective *lieb* is 'dear, beloved' (*mein lieber Freund*, 'my dear friend'). *Die Liebe* is the noun 'love'; and *lieben* is the verb 'to love' (*Ich liebe dich*, 'I love you'). *Belieben*, then, is to treat as *lieb*, to consider lovely, to like, to wish for, to choose. This root survives in English in

> the modern-archaic 'lief' as in Tennyson's *Morte d' Arthur*: 'As thou art lief and dear'—that is, beloved. One finds it, too, in quaint phrases such as 'I would as lief die as betray my honour'. (Smith, 1998, pp. 105-106)

"To believe" means "to hold dear"— from this etymology alone, it is already crystal clear that the current philosophical usage of the term "belief" is far, much too far, from the original one. Though it is quite fortunate that the original meaning still exists in Modern German, it is still unfortunate for philosophers in the English-speaking world that this "warm" meaning has been watered down, if not already lost. Perhaps, this might be one of the reasons why Continental philosophers do not discuss issues on belief as much as Anglo-American thinkers do—they understand belief in a broader and deeper way than merely an attitude toward a proposition. The same meaning of the root *lieb* can be found in Latin. As Smith (1998, p. 106) explains: "[t]he same root shows in Latin, as in *libet*, 'it pleases'; in the Latin phrase used in English, *ad lib* (for *ad libitum*), 'as one likes, at pleasure'; and in the noun *libido*, 'pleasure', projected into modern usage by the Freudians. Latin *libet* and *libido* are also found although less commonly, in the forms of *lubet* and *lubido*." Meanwhile, its surviving counterpart in the Early Modern English, *lief*, carries a sense much nearer to the etymological meaning.

> Modern English 'lief' (dear, beloved) goes back to Old English ('Anglo-Saxon') *leof*, *liof*, of the same meaning, with which there was a cognate and more or less parallel form *lufu*, 'affection, love'. The latter is the form that has come down into modern English in our word 'love', noun and verb. The pair of related words, with what the linguistics call different grades of vowel but the same consonants, is widespread. Forms from a reconstructed original root *leubh--* in proto-Indo-European are found widely in the Indo-European language family—as far away as Sanskrit, where *lubh-*, *lubhyati*, 'to desire strongly, to be lustful', is the same root. This serves also in passing to make the point, as with the Latin *libet*, *libido* (or *lubet*, *lubido*), that the notion of passionate longing or attachment is also somewhere in the background. For the Teutonic languages, however, it is admittedly a matter usually of cherishing, rather. (Smith, 1998, p.106)

From this statement, a very crucial point can be singled out—that there is an element of "passionate longing or attachment" present in the early understanding of belief. In fact, the much stronger and bolder sense can be found in the much earlier root of the word, that is, the Sanskrit *lubh-*, *lubhyati* — "to desire strongly, to be lustful"— as described above. To "be-lief", then, seems to indicate that in believing, a person finds oneself to be in a very passionate state when one "be-lief(s)" (believes) something. Smith's succeeding discussion proves this point:

In Old English, from *leof*, 'dear, beloved', was formed the verb *geleofan*, *gelefan*, *geliefan*, 'to hold dear, to love, to consider valuable or lovely'; this later reduced phonetically to *ilefen*, *ileven*, with the same meaning. From the other grade came Old German *gilouben*, again with the same meaning. This last has developed into the Modern German *glauben*, first 'to hold dear, to regard as lovable, to attach oneself to', and now 'to have faith in'. Along with this is the noun *der Glaube*: the act or condition of, if you will, endearing; now, 'faith'. In the Middle English it was the lighter of the two grades that prevailed with the meaning 'to hold dear, to consider lovely, to value, to love': namely, be-lçve(n). This gave the early Modern English 'believe' ('to cherish'; later, 'to have faith' ...). A verb 'to belove' in English has not survived beyond the nineteenth century, except in the past participle: 'beloved'.

The two original variants in the vowel gradation show also in modern German *sichverlieben*, 'to fall in love with', and (*sich*) *verloben*, 'to betroth, to engage' (to become engaged). Note also *geloben*, 'to promise' (virtually the same word as *glauben* originally – which is a nice comment on this being chosen as a translation of the Church's term *credo*). *Loben*, 'to praise', is closely akin. (Smith, 1998, p. 106)

Indeed, the element of "passionate longing or attachment" exudes in the earlier treatments of the root of the term belief that it even reaches the realms of love and even that of faith. (It is now much clearer at this point how "belief" and "faith" came to be related with one another, at least, in the Modern English sense). This may also be the reason why faith is often regarded as an attitude of belief. This is a good opportunity to make the point that up until the Modern English era (as with the Modern German era), the sense of the term *lief* in belief still carries with it the "warmth" that has been associated with its roots: the German *lieb*, the Anglo-Saxon *leof*, the proto-Indo-European *leubh* and the Latin *libet*, *libido*. Aside from this, there is also another crucial point or, rather, a very interesting question that needs to be underscored — that since the meaning of the term "belief" has changed more or less considerably and radically over the centuries, is it possible that contemporary philosophers' interpretation of the writings of philosophical thinkers of the past centuries about the topic of belief could be wrong? This question shall be presently laid aside for a later discussion. At this point, a brief wrap-up of the task of tracing the origin and development of the term "belief" is in order.

The word 'believe', then, began its career in early Modern English meaning 'to belove', 'to regard as lief', to hold dear, to cherish. The object (if any) of the verb was for many centuries primarily, and often only, a person, as with the cognate term 'love'. All other meanings are derived. To believe a person, or to believe 'in', or 'on', or for a time 'to' or 'of', a person, was to orient oneself

> towards him or her with a particular attitude or relationship, of esteem and affection, also trust—and more earnestly, of self-giving endearment. The noun 'belief', whose development accompanied but later outpaced that of the verb, similarly meant literally endearment, holding as beloved, and specifically then a giving of oneself to, clinging to, committing oneself, placing—or staking—one's confidence in. (Smith, 1998, pp. 106-107)

In ordinary English parlance then, belief is understood as "to belove," "to regard as lief," to hold dear, to cherish, or to put one's trust in someone or something. Aside from this definition, there are no restrictions to the notion of belief such as its characterization as a propositional attitude or the exclusion of active reflection on its treatment, which merely cripples the flexibility of the thought that is inherent in the term "belief" in ordinary English usage. More importantly, this provides the solution for the dilemma that was set aside earlier concerning the second predicament—that of a strong argument that could support the existence of "trusting" and "esteeming" in the notion of belief. What would be better arguments than those which are historical facts that can be empirically verified by reductionist skeptics? This only proves that branding belief as a propositional attitude does not apply wholesale to the term "belief". Indeed, there is more to belief than merely propositions; there is the "warmth" which resides deeply in the believer— the warmth of trust, the warmth of esteem, the warmth of *lief*. Simply put, "esteeming" accounts for the evaluative aspect of belief-in while "trusting" accounts for its affective aspect. And even if one employs the value concepts of "good at ..." and "good thing that ..." in the statement or proposition believed to prove that the evaluative sense of belief-in can still be reduced to belief-that, one cannot, in any way, provide a value concept to substitute for its "trusting" or affective aspect, which is intrinsically found in the notion of belief from the onset, as Smith has clearly shown.

If this is the case, then, where did the narrow notion of belief as a propositional attitude come from? This notion seems to be a delimitation that is a by-product of the persistent efforts of many philosophers to specialize studies in philosophy and make it akin to science. Nonetheless, if philosophers are only able to revert to the ordinary and "warm" usage of the term "belief" and also treat it not only as a propositional attitude but also as an evaluative and affective one, these problems might just easily be avoided while more interesting topics on issues concerning belief and other related concepts will be available for philosophers and students of philosophy to take on.

THE PROBLEM OF FIDEISM[6]

Up until this point, the discussion of belief as an evaluative and affective attitude was approached in a general way that one would expect that various kinds of beliefs will be tackled with regard to their being evaluative or affective. However, it appears more prudent to shift the focus of the discourse to an area where exchanges on belief-in appear to be particularly relevant, that is, in the sphere of religion, which also occupies a central place in the controversy between belief-in and belief-that; and leave discussions of nonreligious beliefs to another paper especially dedicated to addressing concerns of such nature. In particular, this paper will proceed to tackle a problem that seems to be found in any discussions on belief-in, namely, fideism.

Wittgensteinian Fideism

From an account of belief such as the one provided above, one might ask whether such an account can lead to fideism. Fideism (or Wittgensteinian fideism) is a term coined by Kai Nielsen to refer to the view that one cannot subject belief, particularly religious belief, to analysis or evaluation using methods of analysis other than its own, that is, using methods of analysis native to the community or tradition from which the belief originates and persists.

> A Wittgensteinian Fideist ... could readily argue that religion is a unique and very ancient form of life with its own distinctive criteria. It can only be understood or criticised, and then only in a piecemeal way, from within this mode by someone who has a participant's understanding of this mode of discourse ... Philosophy cannot relevantly criticise religion; it can only display for us the workings, the style of functioning, of religious discourse. (Nielsen, 1967, p. 193)

Nielsen accused some of Wittgenstein's followers including Norman Malcolm, Peter Winch, and D. Z. Phillips, to be such fideists.[7] But in his essay "Wittgensteinian Fideism" (1967), Nielsen appears to focus on Peter Winch's "Understanding a Primitive Society" (1964) as one of the more central essays for his critique. According to Nielsen, Winch's assertion that the reality which God's "reality amounts to can only be seen from the religious tradition in which the concept of God is used ... The point is that it is *within* the religious use of language that the conception of God's reality has its place" (Winch, 1964, p. 309) can most easily be used to cultivate any fideistic mode of thinking. Here, one can see that God-talk seems to have its place only in the hallowed halls of religious language, which cannot be *wholly* understood by those who have no direct participation in it. "At a deeper level, I suspect that [arguments on the concept of God] can be thoroughly understood only

by one who has a view of that human 'form of life' that gives rise to the idea of an infinitely great being, who views it from the *inside* not from the outside and who has, therefore, at least some inclination to *partake* in that religious form of life" (Malcolm, 1960, p. 62). In other words, for one to engage in God-talk one does not only need to have a participant's understanding of it but one must also *actually* partake in it—a view that Nielsen explicitly rejects:

> I agree with such Wittgensteinians that to understand religious discourse one must have a participant's understanding of it. However, this certainly does not entail that one is actually a participant, that one *accepts* or *believes* in the religion in question (Nielsen, 1967, p. 193).

Moreover, religious discourse appears to be characterized by evasion and escapism in the sense that it seems to *transcend* other standards of verification apart from its own. Phillips (1970) argues that the "most obvious difficulty [regarding religious statements] concerns their method of verification. Many religious statements seem to be making claims about what is the case, but it becomes obvious fairly soon that no observation can demonstrate the truth or falsity of the statements … No one among contemporary philosophers has done more than … to show us that religious beliefs are not experimental hypotheses about the world" (pp. 173-174). In this sense, Phillips agrees with Malcolm regarding verification through *internal* standards as the only means to verify religious expressions.

In addition, as Phillips points out, there are certain instances wherein the believer and nonbeliever do not, in fact, contradict each other in religious discourse but merely participate in different language games:

> … if I said, "There is a German aeroplane overhead" and you doubted this, we would both be participating in the same activity, namely, locating the German aeroplane; we would be appealing to the same criteria: I would be certain, you would be doubtful. But if I say that the idea of a Last Judgment plays no part in my life, then I am saying that in this respect you are on an entirely different plane from me; we are not participating in the same language game, to use Wittgenstein's phrase at all. (Phillips, 1970, p. 115)

This is to say that if religious belief "plays no role" in one's life, the nonbeliever will never be able to participate in the language game of the believer and probably will not even get the chance to believe. Here, the nonbeliever is "on an entirely different plane" from the believer since the meaning of religious expressions for the nonbeliever is different from that of the believer. Thus, to "reject the belief in God [means] you will not only reject a belief, but a whole world picture, even a way of life" (Stosch, 2010, pp. 119-120).

Fideism seems to spring forth from the idea that religious "belief is a language game, a form of life, that establishes its own internal criteria of meaning and of rationality" (Bottone, 2001, p. 11). In this respect, if one is to criticize a religious belief, the criticism must be played in accordance with the rules set by the language game of the particular religion in which the belief is upheld. However, one cannot make a criticism that would encompass all religions because each religion plays a unique language game. "Indeed, a necessary premise of philosophy of religion is acknowledging the existence of differing criteria of rationality" (Bottone, 2001, p. 13). Quite convincingly, this appears to be a device for fideists to conveniently put religion outside the critical reach of other bodies of knowledge. "The fideists' strategy seems designed to avoid confrontation by eliminating the common ground between languages that allows different forms of life to engage into dialogue" (Bottone, 2001, p. 20).

Nielsen (1967), in his criticism of the Wittgensteinian fideists, points out that "'religious discourse' and 'scientific discourse' are part of the same overall conceptual structure. Moreover, in that conceptual structure there is a large amount of discourse, which is neither religious nor scientific, that is constantly being utilised by both the religious man and the scientist when they make religious or scientific claims. In short, they share a number of key categories" (p. 201). Since religion and science (and philosophy) share various key concepts, truths or ideas, Nielsen argues that one can, by all means, criticize religious claims without necessarily playing along the rules of the language game set by religious discourse, although it is indispensable that one must have a participant's understanding of religion; and if judged to be irrational, one may discard these claims altogether. As Nielsen (1967) puts it:

> Perhaps God-talk is not as incoherent and irrational as witch-talk; perhaps there is an intelligible concept of the reality of God, but the fact that there is a form of life in which God-talk is embedded does not preclude our asking these questions or our giving, quite intelligibly, though perhaps mistakenly, the same negative answer we gave to witch-talk. (Nielsen, 1967, p. 209)

Nielsen's criticism of fideism gives the impression that fideism leads to irrationalism. If one can only criticize a religious belief under the rubrics of its particular language game, then it appears that there is no point in criticizing at all. For instance, one cannot argue whether or not miracles are real if one has to argue only within the parameters of the internal criteria of the language game of Catholicism, precisely because these criteria support and assert the reality of miracles. It follows that if the premises on which these criteria are based are flawed from the outset (such as in the case of various religious cults) then the criteria will, in themselves, be flawed and the resulting religious claims will be

downright irrational. It seems that this is a valid point against fideism. However, there are thinkers who claim that fideism is an empty concept.[8] Many thinkers try to evaluate religious beliefs by trying to find justifications with a set of criteria that do not fit into the reality of religious beliefs. An example is that of trying to find empirical evidence to justify the existence of God. The reality of religious beliefs is a kind of reality that cannot be properly evaluated using the lenses of the sciences, be they natural or social, if one is strictly confined to the methodologies of the sciences. However, the philosopher might just pierce through the veil of religion if he goes about it the right way. "The notion that a language game can occur independently of all others has no basis in Wittgenstein's work, who on the contrary speaks of language games as interconnected activities, which often come into conflict" (Bottone, 2001, p. 20). Indeed, it is true that religion plays a language game that is unique to its claims and purposes. However, the components of this game are not necessarily exclusive to religion alone. "Religious discourse is not something isolated, sufficient unto itself; 'sacred discourse' shares categories with, utilises the concepts of, and contains the syntactical structure of, 'profane discourse'" (Nielsen, 1967, p. 207). Moreover, "different languages may imply different logics but this does not mean the same person cannot know more than one and know when and how to use them" (Bottone, 2001, p. 16). It appears, therefore, that contrary to the arguments of fideists, religion may be subject to criticism in terms other than its own because multitudes of these terms are not exclusive to religion but are shared and understood in common in numerous language games. As a result, one may simply regard fideism as a "perspective of believers who are tired of arguing" (Bottone, 2001, p. 14).

One may argue that although there are terms in religion that are also used in different language games, it is only a matter of *how these words are used*. Simply put, religious terms, although shared in other language games, are understood *not* in common with these other languages but understood particularly in a religious sense. This is exactly what fideists are pointing out; in particular, that religious concepts should be treated in the religious sense whenever they are analyzed. One potent example is the term "God." Blaise Pascal made a clear distinction in his *Memorial* (1965): "Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob, non des philosophes et des savants" (God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and of the learned). And more clearly in the *Pensées*:

> The God of Christians is not a God who is simply the author of mathematical truths, or of the order of the elements; that is the view of heathens and Epicureans. He is not merely a God who exercises His providence over the life and fortunes of men, to bestow on those who worship Him a long and happy life. That was the portion of the Jews. But the God of Abraham, the God of

> Isaac, the God of Jacob, the God of Christians, is a God of love and of comfort, a God who fills the soul and heart of those whom He possesses, a God who makes them conscious of their inward wretchedness, and His infinite mercy, who unites Himself to their inmost soul, who fills it with humility and joy, with confidence and love, who renders them incapable of any other end than Himself. (Pascal, 1660, sect. 556, p. 90)

Fideists claim that for one to understand the religious God, one must see God through the lenses of religion that will show a God different from when viewed from the lenses of philosophy or the sciences. But as Nielsen and Bottone have similarly argued, religious concepts, such as the concept of "God" are understood in common in different language games such as when "God" is understood in the language games of religion, philosophy, and various sciences as a perfect entity without beginning or end.

Nonetheless, if there is really such a thing as fideism, it does not lead to irrationalism. A belief is only irrational (or rational) insofar as it is viewed against the backdrop of a particular reality. If one wishes to find rational and logical meaning in religious beliefs, one should view religious beliefs in the context of the reality in which they can be found (as one can see, however, this reality is not a detached or isolated kind of reality) and use a methodology that is akin to these religious realities (philosophical analysis, for instance, since many religious beliefs have philosophical undertones), otherwise, the search would be futile.

Belief-In and Fideism

This paper argues that belief is not merely a propositional attitude but an evaluative and affective attitude as well. Earlier, it was pointed out that belief as an evaluative and affective attitude carries with it the notions of "trusting" and "esteeming." Does this mean that this treatment of belief is a reduction of belief to trust devoid of rational and logical meaning? Or, in other words, a form of fideism?

Surely, belief in God is not only a belief in the factual sense, but also a belief in the evaluative sense. "Belief in God (in the evaluative sense) clearly does have the 'warmth' or 'heart-felt' character which we have noticed in other evaluative beliefs-in. It is certainly a pro-attitude, and both esteeming and trusting enter into it" (Price, 1965, p. 26). But as shown earlier, belief as an evaluative attitude does not only deal with belief in God but also deals with the most trivial beliefs-in that one has about the world (as a master's belief in one's dog). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that these beliefs-in are held by the believer for particular reasons (as it is a good thing that the dog is good at bringing back the baseball!). From this,

one can surmise that the treatment of belief herein is not devoid of rational and logical meaning but underscores the reality that there are beliefs that are meaningful only to the believer.[9] That said, what does "rational and logical meaning" mean? "Rational and logical meaning" in this sense indicate that a belief can be understood cognitively and, if the circumstances permit, can also be verified intersubjectively although it does not entail that being able to verify the belief intersubjectively is a necessary condition for the belief to be rational and logical. At the same time, such belief does affect the individual because such belief is rationally and logically meaningful not only to the individual believer but also to the community of believers who hold the same belief. And even if there is no community of believers and only an individual believer remains, such a belief will remain to be rational and logical because the underlying reason or the circumstance why the individual holds the belief ultimately determines the rationality of holding the belief.

For instance, when the communication link of an astronaut who is on the way home from a solo mission to Mars is cut off from the command center on Earth due to some unknown accident, it is the surrounding circumstances—facts regarding the situation known to the astronaut alone— that will determine the rationality of the belief that the astronaut may hold regarding the possibility of returning to Earth alive. And if by some great misfortune the astronaut, upon reaching the Earth, discovers that while he was gone the Earth was hit by an asteroid as huge as the moon, thereby possibly destroying all forms of life (which provides the explanation why the communication link was cut), it is the surrounding circumstances—facts regarding the situation known to the astronaut alone—that will determine the rationality of the belief that the astronaut may hold regarding the possibility of finding another habitable planet or the belief that there may be survivors. At the given moment, the astronaut's beliefs cannot be intersubjectively verified yet such beliefs may be deemed rational and logical. It is for this reason that one must ask, "What is there about the object of your belief in respect of which you believe in it?" The reason that the believer sees in what is believed in may be of a pragmatic, utilitarian, normative, religious, or other nature; this is the meaning behind such beliefs-in.

Belief, Atheism, and Agnosticism

Given the aforementioned discussions on belief as an evaluative and affective attitude and its implications to religious belief, particularly its take on the problem of fideism, it may be significant to focus at this juncture on one of the more endemic concerns persisting in society today regarding religious belief— the spread of atheism and agnosticism. In the history of humanity, a deity or deities have played a range of important roles—from being credited by ancient civilizations as

origins or causes of "natural" phenomena, to being those for whose names and glory medieval civilizations waged holy wars that claimed millions of lives, to being central figures in many festivities celebrated by modern and contemporary civilizations. Society, however, is now faced with the reality that more and more people are starting to doubt whether God really exists. This problem boils down to being not a question of faith but a matter of belief.

It is an undeniable fact that the number of religious believers of the 21st century has paled radically in comparison to that of the past three centuries (WIN-Gallup International Association, 2012). This is partly due to the inadequacy of religions to explain most of the paradoxes rising from their claims, and in part to the lack of interest of people, especially those in developed countries, to be bothered with matters concerning religion. Between these reasons, it is the former that gives birth to atheists and agnostics—the former deny the existence of God, while the latter are unsure whether or not God exists. "[R]eligious discourse is coming to fail to do its distinctive task because many people do not find it coherent" (Nielsen, 1967, p. 196). Many people do not find religious discourse coherent because they cannot believe (in the factual sense) what religion is telling them. Religion, for instance, cannot get them to believe (again, in the factual sense) that there is a perfect God in the midst of all the evils, sufferings, and pains in the world and that such a God is not apathetic to or detached from the plights of the human race. However, for those believers (in the evaluative and affective sense) who do not need reasons to believe (in the factual sense), the idea of a loving God—a co-sufferer—is enough. From this kind of belief blooms faith.

Faith, which is a species of belief (it was shown earlier in the discussion on the etymology of belief that the term "faith" was derived from "belief"), originally meant "to hold dear, to consider lovely, to value, to love"—to cherish. This probably is a promising way to explain why religious believers have faith in God and believe the whatnots of their respective religions. They have faith because they hold dear, consider lovely, value, love, or cherish their respective beliefs. They believe not because of an indubitable, universal fact that God exists but because they have faith in God's existence. Simply put, they cherish the belief that God exists. After all, beliefs need not necessarily appeal only to the mind, they may also appeal to "the heart." Looking at belief from the perspective of the mind seems to limit it to that of being merely an object of analysis, much like mathematics. But seeing belief from the vantage point of "the heart" makes it "warm" and seemingly more meaningful. It may sound cliché but the utterance of Pascal (1660) that "the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know" (sect. 277, p. 46) appears to be appropriate here.

The discussion presented above regarding belief as not only an attitude toward a proposition but also an evaluative and affective attitude offers an explanation why people hold on to beliefs even if these beliefs *seem* to be unreasonable, impractical, or at times, irrational. Belief in the evaluative and affective sense provides the social sphere a way to justify, or at least clarify, those beliefs that people have, albeit they cannot be sufficiently and definitively explained by reason. Atheists and agnostics struggle to make sense of God-talk by finding reasons to believe God's existence. Unfortunately, their struggle may never come to fruition because what they want to achieve appears to be to believe in the factual sense while most believers believe in the evaluative and affective sense; that is, they believe not because they want to see but they believe *because* they see. And what they see are reasons that are not universal—very far from what atheists and agnostics are trying to find—but reasons that are very much personal. Ultimately, unless atheists and agnostics are able to find personal reasons to believe in God; unless evangelizers and preachers are able to provide attractive and (intellectually, or evaluatively, or affectively) stimulating reasons to believe in God or, at the very least, motivating reasons to participate in the language game of God-talk; unless belief in God is understood not only in the factual sense but also in the evaluative and affective sense, this world will never see a shortage of atheists and agnostics.

ENDNOTES

[1] One may observe that discussions regarding the difference between belief "in" and belief "that" relied solely on Price. This is because it was only Professor Price who discussed, at length, the difference between the two outside the context of philosophy of religion. Such a comprehensive treatment of belief "in" is precisely what is needed for the purposes of this paper.

[2] For full discussion, see H. H. Price, 1969, pp. 427-431.

[3] For full discussion, see H. H. Price, 1969, pp. 441ff.

[4] Price pointed out that terms which are closely related to "good at ..." such as "efficient", "effective", "good way of ..." etc. can be used as substitute for "good at..." since "good at ..." is only appropriate to persons and animals. For example, one who believes in jogging believes that jogging is a "good way of" keeping the body fit and in good shape or one who believes in airplanes believes that riding an airplane is an "efficient" means of traveling to other countries.

[5] These points of the lecture are not discussed in this paper because of their lack of relevance to the topic at hand.

[6] This section was not originally a part of this essay; however, one of the reviewers suggested that a discussion on fideism might prove useful to the endeavors of this paper and provide greater depth and meaning to the subject matter being discussed.

⁷ See Kai Nielsen (1967), Wittgensteinian fideism, *Philosophy*, *42*(161), pp. 191-209. Klaus von Stosch has an interesting essay," Wittgensteinian Fideism?" that attempts to defend Phillips from accusations of being a fideist.

⁸ Many thanks to Dr. Earl Stanley Fronda for elucidating this point.

⁹ One of the reviewers asked whether the phrase "rational and logical meaning" indicate being able to be understood *cognitively*, that is, that the belief can be tested or evaluated *intersubjectively*. Or does the term "meaningful" refer to the idea that such belief *affects the individual*, not necessarily that such belief *is logically meaningful*? It may be useful to clarify here that "rational and logical meaning" indeed refers to being able to be understood cognitively but cognitive here does not in any way mean that a belief can be verified intersubjectively since reason and logic are not dependent on intersubjective verifications but rely on the strength by which evidences support their conclusion. Thus, cognitive here must be understood to mean "comprehensible by the intellect."

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