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John Rawls and distributive justice in a globalizing world

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ABSTRACT
This paper critically examines John Rawls' theory of global justice, particularly his rejection of global egalitarianism and subsequent proposal of the duty of assistance to poor countries. The aim of such assistance is to establish just and decent institutions that are necessary for political autonomy and, subsequently, for international stability, which is the main goal of global justice. The paper attempts to show the inadequacy of these positions by raising two arguments. First, a coercive and global basic structure exists, as demonstrated by the current global cooperation among nations, whether economic, political, or cultural. Such global cooperation, no matter how crude, has profoundly affected people's life prospects, particularly the world's poor, by unjustly harming them. Second, although Rawls' duty of assistance may have noble targets, it is not demanding enough because it leaves untouched the global inequality of resources. Thus, there exists a moral and political imperative to address such global inequality, primarily because 1) global inequality can worsen global poverty, and 2) global inequality is a potential source of humiliation.

KEYWORDS
egalitarianism, global difference principle, global justice, negative duty, Pogge, Rawls
Introduction

Today, two realities afflict our world like a disease: massive poverty and obscene inequality. Nelson Mandela describes these as “terrible scourges of our times—times in which the world boasts of breathtaking advances in science, technology, industry, and wealth accumulation” (UNDP 2005, 40). According to the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2014, “[d]espite recent progress in poverty reduction, more than 2.2 billion people (or roughly 15 per cent of the world’s population) are either near or living in multidimensional poverty” (2014, 3). Globally, 1.2 billion people live on less than $1.25 US dollars a day, of whom 730 million come from South Asia (2014, 19). Meanwhile, there is staggering global inequality today, which is measured through different and competing means, such as the Gini coefficient, population-weighted or un-weighted (see also opposing position in Atkinson 1999; Melchior 2000; Milanovich 2002; and Wade 2004). According to the Oxfam report 2014, almost half of the world’s wealth (around $110 trillion US dollars) is owned by a mere one per cent of the world’s population (Oxfam report 2014, 2). Such an amount is 65 times the total wealth of half of the world’s poorest population. In the last 30 years, seven out of 10 persons live in countries characterized by increased economic inequality. In the United States alone, since 2009, the wealthiest one per cent continue to enjoy 95 per cent of the post-financial crisis growth as the bottom 90 per cent become even poorer. These worsening socio-economic conditions are further aggravated by the effects of climate change. Between 2000 and 2012, 200 million people, mostly in developing countries, were hit by natural disasters, such as floods and droughts (UNDP 2014, 3).

The moral imperative to respond to these human disasters of epic, yet preventable, proportions screams like a brassy sound of the trumpet, stirring debates on the search for the possibility of global justice. The argument is that, contrary to the traditional view that justice is only associated with the affairs of the nation-state, the duty of justice must extend to all peoples of the world, particularly the world’s poor. Cosmopolitan thinkers, such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, argue that current national boundaries of nation-states have been blurred mainly due to globalization (Beitz 1999; Pogge 2002). Amid the backdrop of a new global economic order, the decisions and actions of states and individuals, which are mediated by domestic and transnational institutions, mutually affect each other. Individuals, particularly those from vulnerable countries, are the ones who suffer the burdens, thereby affecting the exercise of their freedom. As such, for the proponents of moral cosmopolitanism, the egalitarian principle of distributive justice must not only apply within states but globally as well.
Distributive justice is mainly concerned with how social institutions distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (Rawls 1999a). However, the liberal American philosopher John Rawls disagrees with this view. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls shelves the global application of distributive justice in favor of duty of assistance (1999b). Convinced that what is important at the international level is only to maintain international stability, he sees no need to redistribute the wealth of rich countries to poor countries. The aim of the duty of assistance is to secure the right of citizens to basic subsistence, but it does not have to address global inequalities of resources. Thus, for Rawls, distributive justice is not owed to everyone in the world.

Such a view is a huge departure from his earlier work, A Theory of Justice (1999a). In his theory of (domestic) justice (also known as “justice as fairness”), he proposes the redistribution of wealth, income, power, and opportunities according to his principles of justice, particularly the equal liberty principle, the difference principle, and the fair equality of opportunity principle. These principles of justice—specifically the last two—aim to mitigate the effects of natural and social contingencies. He argues that socio-economic inequalities can only be permitted if they benefit the worst off, and that individuals who are equally talented and willing to pursue their dreams are to be given equal opportunity.

The present paper attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of Rawls’ theory of global justice by raising two claims. First, contrary to Rawls, the paper argues that a global basic structure exists, profoundly affecting people’s life prospects, particularly those of the poor. Second, despite the noble aims of Rawls’ duty of assistance, it is not demanding enough. Even as the target of the duty of assistance has already been met, global inequality still ought to be addressed primarily because inequality at the global level can be a source of injustice.

This paper will proceed in four steps. The first section will discuss Rawls’ arguments for rejecting egalitarianism or distributive justice at the global level. The second section will show how, contrary to Rawls, a global basic structure exists regardless of how crude the form it takes. The third section will argue for the need to address global inequality. The fourth and last section will present a brief conclusion.

Rawls’ theory of (domestic) justice

Rawls has stirred the world of political philosophy with the publication of his work, A Theory of Justice, in which he outlines his thoughts on social justice in a domestic society, particularly a liberal democratic nation-state (1999a). Unlike the ancients, such as Plato and Aristotle, who take individual decisions, judgments, attitudes, and personal dispositions as the subject of
justice, the early Rawls of *A Theory of Justice* pays more attention to the justness or unjustness of laws, institutions, and social systems. The primary subject of justice, he says, is the basic structure of society, “understood as the way in which major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation” (2005, 258; 1999a, 4). This basic structure includes the political constitution, judiciary, system of property, market relations, and family. Part of the reason why Rawls takes the basic structure as the primary subject of justice is its effects on individuals’ lives, which are “pervasive and present from the beginning of life”. Such a basic structure shapes the kind of individuals they want to be, their ambitions, hopes, as well as the opportunities open for them (2001, 10). Another reason is that institutions of the basic structure preserve or secure background justice (2005, 286–89). For Rawls, there exists a need for procedural rules that regulate the social system in order to maintain background conditions, within which activities of individuals take place.

Rawls’ theory of (domestic) justice models an equal moral position of individuals in the original position, a hypothetical situation in which members of society—hidden behind a so-called “veil of ignorance”—come together and agree on a binding contract concerning, not the establishment of political authority, but the choice of principles of justice. Drawing upon decision theory, the early Rawls claims that through the “maximin rule” as a strategy of choice, the parties in the original position would choose the principles of justice, namely, the equal liberty principle, the difference principle, and the fair equality of opportunity principle, which are utilized in the assessment, design, and reform of the basic structure of society (1999a). The intuitive idea of the maximin rule is that, under conditions of uncertainty, it is prudent to choose the option with the best worst possible outcome (1999a, 134). Furthermore, according to Rawls, the principles of justice match our considered judgments or considered convictions about justice as manifested in a state called “reflective equilibrium” (2001, 29).

In other words, what Rawls seeks to achieve in his theory of (domestic) distributive justice is to combine individual liberty with a formal equality that would justify socio-economic distribution. He argues that the distribution of material and non-material resources, including basic rights and liberties, opportunities, powers and positions of authority, income and wealth, and the social basis of self-respect, is made in accordance with the idea that individuals should not be unjustly or unfairly deprived of these “primary goods” just because of morally arbitrary factors. Moreover, social institutions have to be arranged in such a way that the effects of inequalities caused by
natural and social contingencies are mitigated (1999a). For example, the difference principle, which permits socio-economic inequalities as long as they work to the best advantage of the worse-off, addresses the inequalities brought about by the natural lottery. Meanwhile, the fair equality of opportunity principle, which means that individuals who are talented and equally motivated to develop these talents should be given equal support by the state regardless of their social status, addresses the inequalities caused by social contingencies.

Rawls’ central argument is that circumstances and endowments should not serve as bases of one’s distributive share because they are undeserved or arbitrary from the moral point of view. As such, faithful to his egalitarian views, the early Rawls argues emphatically for the need to address the effects of inequalities—socio-economic and otherwise—a task that obviously requires radical wealth transfer from the rich to the poor. Institutionally, such wealth transfer includes universal basic income, employment subsidy, and the provision of equal educational opportunities, such as educational subsidies in the form of vouchers, tuition tax credits, loans, and scholarships (see Van Parijs 1995; and Phelps 1997). Interestingly, Rawls’ theory of justice at the domestic level does not leave enough room for personal responsibility or individual choice. No distinction is presented between the deserving and the undeserving poor, particularly those who have expensive tastes or those who make irresponsible choices.

### Rejection of global egalitarianism

In *The Law of Peoples* (published 28 years after *A Theory of Justice*), in which he outlines his thoughts on political rights and justice applicable to international law and practice, Rawls notoriously rejects the moral necessity for the global redistribution of resources (Rawls 1999b, 115–19). No mention is made of the need to address the global inequality of resources through re-distributing wealth and resources; nor is there any mention of the need to tolerate the world’s inequality as long as it is to the greatest advantage of the poorest and weakest peoples (Vandevelde 2005). Such a rejection of global egalitarianism springs mainly from Rawls’ Westphalian assumptions, especially the idea that the nation-state is the end-all and the be-all of political and economic affairs.

Although Rawls has made mention of “the basic structure of the Society of Peoples” in *The Law of Peoples*, he makes no reference to a “global basic structure” that is comparable to the basic structure at the domestic level (Rawls 1999b, 61). Samuel Freeman clarifies Rawls’ position here. According to Freeman, although there exists international trading between countries,
or global relations as demonstrated by globalization, which has given birth to global cooperative institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank), strictly speaking, these are not equivalent to a basic structure presupposed in the idea of distributive justice (Freeman 2006; 2007, 420–23). The primary reason is that they do not possess a coercive character that can compel a rich country to distribute its wealth or resources to a poor country. Only a global state can perform such coercion (in the same way that a domestic state can legitimately coerce its citizens to share their resources with others) (see Nagel 2005). Such a global state, however, is obviously non-existent, aside from the fact that it is not desirable because it can open the door to global tyranny (Rawls 1999b, 36–48). Hence, in the absence of a global sovereign authority as well as a coercive global basic structure, Rawls argues that the pursuit of global justice is but a mere chimera (1999b). To talk of the distribution of resources at the global level is both unfeasible and indefensible. As Thomas Hobbes perspicuously puts it: “Covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1996, 153).

Rawls’ insistence that there is no global basic structure has unnecessarily led him to fall into the pit of what Pogge calls “explanatory nationalism”—the idea that the causes of severe poverty and other human deprivations are domestic to the societies in which they occur (Pogge 2002). Rawls explicitly confirms this when he says that the social and economic conditions of any state depend on its internal or domestic affairs, namely, its political culture; religious, philosophical, and moral tradition; and more particularly, its population policy (Rawls 1999b, 108). In fact, Rawls insists that a state with scant natural resources, such as Japan or Singapore, can become rich; or conversely, a state with abundant natural resources, such as Argentina or the Philippines, can become poor (1999b, 108). For Rawls, the domestic policies of the state are the primary determinants of its socio-economic future, such that some external factors, namely, the international trade rules, the consumption patterns of rich countries, and the legacy of colonialism, have very little or no significant bearing (1999b, 108).

Moreover, Rawls argues that the application of the global distributive principle may unnecessarily penalize societies with good domestic policies while compensating those with ill-considered ones (1999b, 117). Consider two societies, A and B, with a rather high population growth rate (1999b, 117–18). Society A decides to control population growth while society B, because of its religious background, does otherwise. After several years, the population growth rate of society A has significantly decreased while that of society B remains high (1999b, 117–18). Consequently, society A turns
out to be twice as rich as society B. Rawls argues that the now-rich society A cannot be compelled to transfer its wealth to the poor society B, as required by the principle of global distributive justice. Doing so would unfairly treat the former by forcing it to bear the costs of the imprudence and neglect of the latter. In the final analysis, Rawls is reluctant to apply the difference principle to the global level in order to regulate inequalities among countries, because doing so nullifies the choice/circumstance distinction (1999b, 117).

Obviously, Rawls' position here goes against his earlier views on justice at the domestic level, in which the choice/circumstance distinction is not really given emphasis. Contrary to Robert Nozick's libertarian views, the early Rawls contends that whatever wealth and income one has produced cannot be exclusively or entirely attributed to one's industry (Nozick 2001). Certain factors, such as being favored by nature either through the gift of talents and skills or through favorable events in the process of social cooperation, have also contributed to one's wealth. As such, in *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls contends that the greater call of justice is not to find ways through which the hard-earned wealth of the better endowed is protected, but on how to build a system of cooperation, in which the better endowed are not compensated two times over. Rawls writes that “The better endowed do not have a right to a cooperative scheme that enables them to obtain even further benefits in ways that do not contribute to the advantage of others” (Rawls 1999a, 89).

Furthermore, in the discourse of social justice, the early Rawls would insist that the question of personal responsibility, no matter how important, is only secondary. The primary concern, he says, is that there exists an objective condition of poverty, of deprivation, and of suffering not fitting for a human being and that this needs to be addressed in the name of social justice. Unfortunately, in his theory of global justice, Rawls seems to have given up these arguments altogether and, instead, the role of choice is now given a very central role.

Rejecting global egalitarianism, Rawls endorses the duty of assistance in addressing global poverty. Rawls holds that well-ordered peoples (i.e., rich countries) have a duty to assist burdened societies fraught with bad public policies and backward beliefs, unhealthy environment, and scarce resources, which are worsened by their governments’ corruption, inefficiency, and sometimes cruelty (1999b, 106). Rich countries have the duty of assistance to people that are “condemned to extreme and life-threatening poverty” (Martin 2006, 227). According to Rawls, the duty of assistance is not aimed at increasing or maximizing the wealth of any particular class in these poor societies (Rawls 1999b, 107). Instead, it seeks to establish and preserve just
or decent institutions that guarantee a worthwhile life for all citizens. Such humanitarian duty, as Kok-Chor Tan calls it, helps poor societies acquire the requisite level of economic, political and social development in which access to basic means of subsistence is guaranteed to all citizens (Tan 2004). Ultimately, the goal is to empower burdened societies to become self-reliant and to be able to manage their own affairs by establishing just and decent institutions. In other words, the duty of assistance helps burdened societies achieve political autonomy through which they can become members of good standing in what Rawls calls a “Society of well-ordered Peoples.” Once this objective is attained, further assistance stops, albeit such societies remain poor. Rawls contends that “a well-ordered society need not be a wealthy society” and “great wealth is not necessary to establish just (or decent) institutions” (Rawls 1999b, 106–7). The duty of assistance is, therefore, but a principle of transition that merely lays down the ground for burdened societies to become well-ordered and achieve political autonomy (1999b, 118).

Why do well-ordered societies have a duty to assist poor societies? Where does the force of such duty emanate from? The duty of assistance is based on a political argument, not on a moral argument. Understandably, Rawls makes no reference to arguments like the arbitrary character of the natural lottery or the unjust international distribution of wealth (Beitz 1999). The final goal of global justice is to preserve international stability and the external independence of societies, the attainment of which requires not a world-state but a network of cooperative associations and federations. Following Immanuel Kant, Rawls believes that a “pacific federation” of republican states is generally a peaceful collaboration, given that these states have no desire to wage war with each other and comprise satisfied peoples who have no need to expand their territories (Rawls 1999b, 36). These states also have neither the desire to increase their wealth nor the desire to rule over other states.

It might be argued that, although the duty of assistance does not make the same egalitarian demand as Rawls’ view on domestic justice, it could still be interpreted as demanding enough. First, the duty of assistance protects urgent human rights, most particularly the right to the means of subsistence and security, even as the list of human rights it supposedly protects is short. The list is only short because Rawls deliberately wants to steer clear of criticisms that human rights are parochial, typical only of Western liberal societies (1999b, 107). Second, the duty of assistance requires standards of fair trade, cooperative organization, and correction of their unjustified effects. All of these are not easy targets, such that developed countries tasked to carry out the duty of assistance remain far from achieving their goals. In a
lecture he delivered following the publication of his 1993 essay on *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls expressed his utter disappointment with the rich liberal countries’ dismal performance on their duty of assistance, stating that “We must hold in mind that our world, with its many societies burdened by unfavorable conditions and many injustices and evils, is not a world in which the duty of assistance has been fully satisfied” (quoted in Tan 2000, 166). If the duty of assistance were only fully implemented, it could have made a difference to the lives of the poor, making it a big step forward in development aid.

Notwithstanding these arguments defending the serious demands of the duty of assistance, I want to raise two arguments: 1) that a coercive global basic structure—no matter how crude—exists, profoundly affecting people’s life prospects; and 2) that even after the main goal of the duty of assistance has been met, global inequality still needs to be addressed.

**Harmful global basic structure**

The economists of the 1970s largely influenced Rawls’ thinking on justice. Nation-states were regarded then as sufficiently autonomous, particularly in the ways by which economic policies and institutions were crafted and developed. However, such a view—if applied to current international relations—is no longer appropriate primarily because of globalization. There is an existing global scheme of cooperation wherein states participate in “complex international economic, political, and cultural relationships” (Beitz 1999, 144). As a result, the autonomy of nation-states has become increasingly limited by and vulnerable to economic and political developments elsewhere. This is proven by the existence of a “world-system”, a social system characterized by “boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence” (Wallerstein 2011, 347). Although their dynamics are largely self-contained, world-systems have highly unstable structures and forces, such that if one part of the system changes, other parts of the system change as well (or remain the same) (2011, 347–48). This is precisely illustrated, for instance, by the Brexit phenomenon which, although primarily a European Union matter, has affected other countries of the world in different ways.

Rawls may have rightly argued that there is no global state at the moment. A world government operating according to a global constitution under which all peoples of the world are subjected does not exist. Nevertheless, this way of describing the current global political landscape so as to dismiss any talk of global distributive justice might have been expressed too narrowly. How would Rawls account for the fact that the idea of sovereign states is increasingly becoming a thing of the past? Empirically, in some parts of the
world today, laws have become multilayered, emanating from autonomous federated entities as can be seen in federal states (Van Parijs 2010). Take the case of the European Union which, as a “regional supranational entity”, seems to have successfully superseded nation-states in Europe. Numerous legislations crafted and enforced by the European Parliament and the national administrators, police forces, and courts are themselves subjected to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (2010). Another example is the ASEAN integration, the aim of which is to form a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor within South East Asia. As the integration requires changes to domestic laws and even to the constitutions of ASEAN members, challenges and compliance issues remain.

Meanwhile, although supranational state-like organizations, say the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the International Labor Organization (ILO), fall short of the requirements of a global state because they do not exist independently from the laws of the nation-state, it is undeniable that the rules of these organizations possess some coercive power over the latter. In other words, these supranational organizations may have no police or military power, but they have the effective power of imposing binding rules on all member countries (2010, 647). Additionally, these supranational organizations are the locus of decision processes that are complex, opaque, and unequal. The structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the WB aptly demonstrate this fact. For instance, when Argentina’s new government headed by Raul Alfonsin did not give in to the pressure of international financial institutions to abandon its neo-Keynesian policies, liberalize trade, and privatize public enterprises, the WB suspended the disbursements of a structural adjustment loan after declaring that the country has failed in its “reform” implementation.

This coercive global scheme of cooperation, aptly called “new imperialism”, has coincidentally produced harmful effects suffered mostly by poor countries (see Harvey 2005). The global economic phenomenon, for instance, may have yielded “substantial aggregate economic benefits in the form of higher economic growth as well as greater productive efficiency” (Beitz 1999, 145). This is exemplified by the increase in the total amount of foreign direct investment at the global level amounting to $1.3 trillion US dollars in 2013 and in the world’s total export value amounting to $6,455 billion US dollars in 2002 (OECD 2014; World Bank 2004). Yet, what was supposed to be a huge economic leap turned out to be a yoke mostly for poor developing countries, in which international corporations poured their big investments. As multinational companies possess more capital and technological monopoly as well as a greater capacity to transfer production from one country to another, they often fix prices in excess of competitive
levels to the detriment of local industries in developing countries. It is also easy for them to evade paying taxes on domestic profits as required by law through wielding political power, not to mention their capacity to transfer profits from one country to another.

The perceived economic gains resulting from participation in global trading and investment have mainly benefited the tiny upper class in poor countries. The investments of multinational companies in vulnerable countries may have opened new job opportunities, but oftentimes these jobs are taken on by a few highly skilled workers, mostly the educated upper class. Moreover, the entry of new capital investments has driven the prices of basic goods to rise sharply, making them generally unaffordable for the poor. Indeed, despite the perceived rosy picture of development attributed to economic globalization, the poor are still excluded from the market. In India, for example, it was reported that only 0.01 per cent of its population, mainly the rich, has disproportionately taken advantage of the economic globalization in the last decades (Banerjee and Piketty 2005; Basu 2006, 1364). Consequently, because the economic growth potential opened by globalization mainly benefited the rich, the internal inequality between the rich and the poor in vulnerable countries has increased as well. In this condition, the poor do not just become poorer compared to the richest, but their absolute welfare has also declined (Basu 2006, 1364).

The supranational organizations operating in this global scheme of cooperation work on the premise of neoliberal philosophy, which for the most part causes harm to the poor (see Hayek 1960). Neoliberalism champions free markets, which hinge upon the notion that markets have to be deregulated because regulation violates “the rights and liberties of market actors” and that any market inefficiency is corrected by market mechanisms themselves. However, the global economic meltdown in 2008 nullified all of these assumptions. As Ned Dobos puts it, it made abundantly clear that “a series of voluntary exchanges can also impose significant risks upon unsuspecting third parties” (Dobos 2011, 65; see also Harvey 2005). Initially, investment banks and other financial institutions involved in house mortgages trading bore the brunt of the crisis. However, within a year, millions of people worldwide, including retirees and taxpayers who had no direct participation in the global financial markets, lost their savings, homes, and jobs.

Given this constellation, it is highly questionable that a country’s socio-economic conditions depend entirely on its domestic policies. True, an oppressive government, corrupt political leaders, unsound domestic policies, and even illiberal traditions may significantly shape the social and economic conditions of a country. They can also impede national economic growth
and a fairer distribution of gross national product. This nationalist explanation, however, is unsatisfactory. It downplays, if not totally ignores, the causal role played by global factors in the domestic affairs of the vulnerable country. As Pogge puts it, “It portrays the corrupt social institutions and corrupt elites in the poor countries as an exogenous fact: as a fact that explains, but does not itself stand in need of explanation” (Pogge 2002, 112). The roots of global poverty cannot simply be attributed to corrupt local institutions and political elites. More importantly, one has to ask why this local corruption occurs and persists. The point is that global conditions breed domestic corruption, a condition exploited by rich countries and their multinational corporations with the help of local elites in order to pursue their business and national interests (1994).

Take the case of the Philippines. While local corruption is cited as a fundamental reason why the Philippines continues to lag behind its ASEAN neighbors in the race towards economic development, this myopic causal explanation is insufficient. First of all, poverty in the Philippines has its roots in the brutal project of colonization. For example, by using the Filipino elite to pursue its colonial project, US colonialism constructed a “national oligarchy” who, until today, have “used their position in society to aggrandize both their political and economic supremacy” (Radics 2001, 40). Second, apart from the fact that corruption has become endemic to Philippine society, many international companies take advantage of this condition. For one, they pay bribes to national and local politicians so that business deals are struck, bids are won, contracts are signed, and projects are implemented, among other things. As one academician puts it, “the foreigners [or the multinational corporations] can be as bad [as the corrupt local businesses]” (Dela Rama 2012, 514).

Meanwhile, according to Pogge, two concrete schemes that harm the world’s poor are “international resource privilege” and the “international borrowing privilege” (Pogge 2002, 113–15). International resource privilege allows the transfer of rights of ownership of the poor country’s natural resources to foreign corporations, mainly enacted through its leaders who are corrupt, inefficient, brutal, authoritarian, undemocratic, and repressive (2002, 113). For example, multinational oil companies like Shell, in collusion with some foreign governments, supported and maintained the repressive Nigerian government previously led by Sani Abacha in order to benefit from the rich oil deposits in the Niger Delta (2002, 113–14). The same thing can be said in the case of multinational mining companies in the Philippines which, having been given the license to extract mineral resources, have virtually destroyed some of the country’s forests, rivers, and other natural resources (Espiritu 2015). Meanwhile, the international borrowing privilege
allows government leaders of poor countries—even if they are known to be corrupt—to borrow money from international banks, binding the whole country to pay for the foreign debt (Pogge 2002, 115). Unsurprisingly, at present, large chunks of many poor countries’ national budget are allotted to fulfilling debt obligations, money that could have been used for structural reforms, development projects, and improvement of government-provided social services. Indeed, rather than putting a stop to or curbing local corruption and oppression as well as improving the conditions of the world’s poor, both the international resource privilege and the international borrowing privilege sustain these unjust conditions.

This scenario, according to Wallerstein, reflects the extensive and unjust division of labor in the world economy between the exploiter and the exploited (Wallerstein 2011, 349). Poor countries, particularly their resources, are being unjustly used by rich countries in order to make themselves richer, while making the world’s poor even poorer. This is a condition called “dependency”, which is defined as:

An historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries [the dominant, center] to the detriment of others [the dependent, periphery] and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economic... [Dependency is] a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected. (Dos Santos 1970, 226; see also Amin 1974)

Coincidentally, the ability of rich countries to exploit poor countries is even made more convenient by the “absence of a central political mechanism for the world-economy” that can counteract such exploitative tendencies (Wallerstein 2011, 350). This situation is not surprising in this age of “new imperialism”, given that states—serving as political agents—continue to pursue “self-interested territorial logic”, even as capital has been globalized (Harvey 2005; see also Robinson 2007, 11; Lenin 1999).

What is interesting here is that the “global basic structure”, no matter how crude, is not merely shown to be abstract and faceless, as if possessing an inherent logic contributing to the perpetuation of global poverty. Instead, as a cause of global poverty, the global basic structure is described as possessing a human face by implicating directly the governments of rich countries and their corporations that impose and maintain the global economic order. This phenomenon constitutes “harming the poor”, which means making them worse off than they should have been. That is to say, the poor are subjected to live under conditions that are way below what should
be best for them, not simply what is feasible (Pogge 2005, 55–84). Harming the poor involves imposing an unjust global institutional order on them without compensating them through victim protection and reform efforts. Such is a gross violation of the poor’s human right to basic necessities (2005, 67). By harming the poor, the rich share institutional responsibility for the prevalence of poverty in the world. Interestingly, the harmed poor do not only include contributors to the creation of global wealth, such as workers in factories of multinational companies, but also the outsiders, such as those who barely, if not at all, contribute to the world economy, also known as the poorest. The poorest may have contributed nothing to the world economy, but they suffer considerably from the negative effects of globalization, including the destruction of the environment due to mining or natural disasters like super typhoons brought about by global warming (Vandevelde 2005).

Aside from this institutional responsibility, the rich also share personal responsibility for the incidence of global poverty. The problem, however, is that while it is easy to point fingers at institutional responsibility, say, unfair trade rules, investments, loans, bribes, and military aid, it is not the case when applied to individual responsibility (see Young 2010). How exactly do individual citizens cause harm when they do not themselves make the decisions and policies of their governments and the multinational institutions in their countries? Citizens of rich nations harm the poor either directly through their own personal dealings with a poor individual, or indirectly through the mediation of the unjust institutional structure, such as when they cooperate in imposing the unjust institutional order under which the poor are prevented from having secure access to basic subsistence (Pogge 2005, 60). These can be seen in their consumption patterns, participation in sex tourism, and even in the choice of political leaders who tolerate unfair trade rules, practice bribery, or give military aid to oppressive governments, among others. No matter how contentious the issue of personal responsibility is, the point is that ordinary citizens of rich countries cannot claim not to have caused harm at all to the poor by resorting to a “political-decision obscurity” defense, while at the same time benefiting from unjust policies and an unjust global structure (Pogge 2007, 25–30). Let me now proceed to my second argument—the need to address global inequality of wealth and resources.

Why global inequality matters

As mentioned previously, staggering global inequality is a major problem in the world today. According to the calculations of Madison, in the year 1500,
the richest regions of the world had a per capita income that was 1.8 times the income of the region (Madison 2001). Today, the richest region is 20 times richer than the poorest region (see also Basu 2006, 1363). The richest two per cent of the world, mainly from North America, Western Europe, and the rich Asia-Pacific, own more than half of global wealth, with an average per capita income exceeding $50,000 US dollars (Davies, Sandström et al. 2011). Intuitively, this massive gap between rich and poor countries is unacceptable. There is something morally wrong in a situation where a few people live in opulence while billions more suffer from hunger, disease, squalid surroundings, and illiteracy, among others.

Unfortunately, drawing from his proposal for duty of assistance, Rawls sees no need to address global inequality. He maintains that once burdened societies have achieved a threshold of development or basic subsistence, the inequality between rich and poor nations need not be a serious moral and political concern. Hence, Rawls rejects the global application of the egalitarian principle of justice. Such a position could only be justified if, indeed, the baseline distribution of resources is just. However, judging from the current situation of global inequality of resources, that is not really the case (Tan 2000). However, it would be a fatal mistake to assume that there is nothing wrong with the existing global situation of inequality and that the duty of assistance is extended within this supposedly just institutional framework. By ignoring the structural causes of global injustice, Rawls can be accused of treating only the symptoms, not the causes of injustice.

Recall that, in Rawls' domestic theory of justice, addressing inequality is a major component of the theory. In fact, his principles of justice are meant to combat inequality in the political, social, or economic realms. The difference principle, for instance, is meant to mitigate socio-economic inequalities in society, particularly when they have become very extreme. They can only be tolerated as long as they work to the greatest advantage of the worst off. Similarly, the fair equality of opportunity principle is meant to mitigate the effects of social contingencies, such that individuals who are equally talented and equally motivated to develop their talents should have equal prospects for success, regardless of their social circumstances, including their social status or family background. Indeed, the early Rawls’ account of distributive justice is largely anchored on the normative ideal of equality. However, as shown, on the global level, Rawls sees no need to address the inequality between rich nations and poor nations.

Against Rawls’ position on global justice, I argue that even as poor nations of the world have reached the minimum threshold of development and well-being through the duty of assistance, the inequalities between rich and poor
nations still need to be addressed. I offer two interrelated arguments: 1) the global inequality of resources can worsen global poverty, and 2) the global inequality of resources is a potential source of humiliation. Let me discuss the first argument.

According to Amartya Sen, while poverty and equality are distinct concepts, the former is worsened by inequality in resource distribution (Sen 1981, 15). The reason for this is that the inequality of resources subverts the individual’s entitlement to basic needs. What the poor can buy to meet their basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, and healthcare mainly depends on their money’s purchasing power (i.e., the amount of goods that one’s money can buy). However, purchasing power is necessarily a relational concept in that it depends on the amount of money others have; for example, for the rich, it includes the salaries they take home, the bonuses they receive, as well as the price they pay for basic goods. As such, it is not inconceivable that the poor’s access to basic needs is directly affected by the wealth of the rich. Globally, this is exemplified by competition. As multinational companies have more capital and resources, they can mass produce a particular good, say textile, and sell it at a cheaper price. Although this may be beneficial to consumers, it can potentially wipe out local industries in poor countries, especially when government support is lacking. This explanation of poverty, called the “relational view,” asserts that “people are poor because of others. . . They are] unable to control future events because others have more control over them” (Wood 2003, 456; see also Mosse 2010, 1158). Given that poverty is affected by income inequality, current poverty reduction programs have necessarily included income distribution schemes that seek to address income gaps between the rich and the poor.

Furthermore, inequality opens the floodgates for economic and political exploitation, coercion, and deception of the poor, thereby threatening their right to subsistence. As Onora O’Neill puts it succinctly, what makes coercion possible is “the relative weakness of their intended victims (O’neill 2000, 95). It is not their absolute lack of capabilities and resources that constitutes vulnerability to coercion; rather it is that they possess fewer [my emphasis] capabilities, powers, or resources than others, and specifically their coercers.” Being susceptible to coercion and exploitation, the poor become even poorer. At the global level, this condition is quite observable in the phenomena of “differential power relations” and global “democratic deficit” mainly brought about by global inequality of resources. Decisions that have political and economic repercussions on vulnerable countries are controlled by a few rich countries (Tan 2004, 119). In the IMF, for instance, a country’s vote is measured according to its financial contribution to the organization—a condition that is obviously more favorable to wealthier countries. As such,
it might be difficult to address global poverty if power relations between rich and poor countries are ignored. Criticizing poverty reduction strategies of international institutions, Nederveen Pieterse writes:

[E]conomic growth, good governance, reinforcing democracy by strengthening civil society, empowerment—are welcome in themselves; yet in the absence of scrutiny of macroeconomic policies and international power dynamics, they exonerate the powers that be and, at the end of the day, abide by the conservative cliché that the poor are to blame for their fate...These treatments seem to address a parallel universe in which there are no major powers—transnational corporations, banks, Western governments, international trade barriers and institutions—that produce and reinforce poverty and inequality. (Pieterse 2002, 1034)

Meanwhile, global inequality ought to be addressed because it is a potential source of humiliation to the world’s poor. According to Avishai Margalit, “[i]n general, inequality symbolically expresses an attitude of downgrading—the view that the other is inferior in the social hierarchy (my emphasis)” (Margalit 1996, 148). Although not all forms of social inequality can produce this feeling of inferiority, it cannot be denied that there are forms of social inequality that are necessarily humiliating. This is particularly true in cases when the inferior other is treated as nonhuman, that is, as an object, animal, or a number. What make socio-economic inequalities humiliating? It is not only because socio-economic inequalities prevent the upward movement in the social ladder of individuals, but more importantly they permanently create a “rejected” status on individuals in society (Margalit 1996, 153; cf. Beitz 2001, 104). Those at the bottom are socially stigmatized, taken as outcasts who are in a permanent condition of “defilement, impurity, pollution, and untouchability, so that it is...morally necessary to keep away from them” (Margalit 1996, 151). Often, they are made to feel unworthy of respect, as if their lives have no significance or integrity of their own (Beitz 2001, 194). They are made to feel unwanted in society, such that their lives can be dispensed with anytime. As such, social inequality is objectionable as it “undermines a person’s dignity and self-respect and diminishes the capacity for independent agency” (2001, 104). From these, a new question arises: Does global inequality make poor nations inferior to rich nations, so that it becomes a potential source of humiliation?

The assumption that global inequality leads to feelings of inferiority and undermines the dignity and self-respect of the world’s poor might be regarded as erroneous. The case is thought to be more applicable to the domestic level, primarily because feelings of being humiliated due to socio-economic inequality are mainly products of “cultural attitudes” toward the
extent of these inequalities, say the shared attitudes related to one's social class (105). Nevertheless, I believe that the issue here is not so much about whether or not feelings of humiliation due to socio-economic inequality apply on the global level. Rather, it is about why we should believe in the first place that such dynamic cannot be applied globally. It is undeniable that poor nations, just because they lack resources compared to rich countries, have been subjected to stereotypes by people from rich, developed nations, either through their media or the attitudes of their own citizens. Take the case of Filipinas (and Indonesians) who, at some point, and this I believe still exists up to now, were caricatured as domestic helpers in TV programs or even in textbooks in many developed countries just because many of them work as domestic helpers in these countries (Cayabyab 2014). Who can deny that such an attitude of treating them as wholly other, inferior, marginalized, and uncivilized, is a potential source of humiliation? Defining a people in such condescending terms, just because they cannot find any other way to make both ends meet, produces feelings of inferiority, which are inconsistent with their sense of self as an active agent who can take command of their lives adequately and meaningfully (Beitz 2001, 105; cf. Schweiger 2014 and 2013). Of course, one might argue that there is nothing wrong with being defined as a domestic helper. After all, it can be the most dignified job in the world just like working as an engineer, professor, or doctor. But is it really? How do developed societies really treat those who are considered as low-skilled workers? The fact is that these are jobs that most citizens in rich countries abhor because they are viewed as dirty, demeaning, and fit only for the poor and uneducated.

In fairness to Rawls, he also makes references to self-respect and self-esteem. He says that feelings of inferiority could produce, on the one hand, “deference and servility” and, on the other hand, a “will to dominate and arrogance” (Rawls 2001, 131). However, he seems to be unwilling to propose a strong connection between inequality and the experience of loss of self-respect and self-esteem. The probable reason is that he cannot accommodate liberally the experience of humiliation within his theory of justice without jeopardizing some of its tenets (see Pilapil 2014). After all, for Rawls, the metric of injustice is about how many resources people have.

Now, if global inequality has to be addressed because it worsens global poverty and is a potential source of humiliation, then, the existing condition of global inequality should not be taken as a given, leaving it as it is without lifting a finger to change it. Equality should remain a moral ideal that guides us on how the global society is to be arranged. All countries in the world are entitled to an equal share of goods available for distribution. Concretely,
this requires redistributing resources from rich to poor countries. To do so is not meant to bring down the globally better off to make them as worse off as the globally poor—the common claim of leveling down objection (see Frankfurt 1987; Raz 1986). Rather, it is meant to close the gap between the rich and the poor so as to prevent global poverty from worsening and avert feelings of humiliation that may be experienced by the poor.

Coincidentally, alleviating global poverty through wealth transfer is cheap. Rich economies comprising 14.9 per cent of the world's population have an annual per capita income of $27,510 US dollars. Meanwhile, the 2.8 billion poor who live below $2 US dollars per day has an annual per capita income of $85 US dollars (Pogge 2002, 99–108). These figures tell us that the global rich can improve the conditions of the global poor without necessarily becoming impoverished (Pogge 2005, 99–198). It is in the power of rich countries to help the world's poor without having to sacrifice anything of “comparable moral significance” (Singer 1993, 2). If such is the case, Peter Singer rightly argues that reducing absolute poverty is something that rich countries ought to do (1993, 3). In other words, helping the world's poor, particularly assisting the poorest members in raising their living standards, is the moral obligation not only of the governments of rich countries but more importantly their citizens. They cannot just sit in front of their television sets, watching millions die of hunger while they do nothing. Contrary to popular objections, helping the world's poor does not compete with taking care of their own co-nationals or families, nor does it violate their property rights (3–4). In particular, citizens of rich countries should not only give aid privately through voluntary agencies, as Singer points out, they should also be involved politically in their respective countries and actively fight for the interests of the world's poor (4).

**Conclusion**

Thinking about justice assumes rights and duties. A victim of robbery can go to the police and demand his property rights, but to whom does the starving person go and demand the right not to starve to death? Although there are international treaties that codify and protect this right, they have no practical meaning to the hungry. Inevitably, what the poor can do is to claim this right from their neighbor or from everyone else in the world. Today, there is little disagreement on the moral obligation to help the world's poor. What remains in dispute is the content of this obligation. Evidently, for Rawls, it is not an obligation of justice. He rejects the global application of distributive justice because of the absence of a global basic structure, but instead proposes the duty of assistance, which aims at helping decent but
poor societies attain the basic level of economic and political development necessary for political autonomy. However, despite the noble goal of Rawls' duty of assistance, this paper argues that this proposal is insufficient. Against Rawls, the paper contends that there is an existing global basic structure that harms the world's poor. Although, strictly speaking, there is no global state, the existing cooperation between nations of the world—whether economic, political, or cultural—has created a negative impact on the life-prospects of individuals in poor nations. Moreover, this paper argues that there remains a need to address global inequality even if poor nations have attained political autonomy. This is because global inequality of resources can worsen global poverty and is a potential source of humiliation for the world’s poor.

References


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